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Some Cryptographic Techniques For Secure Data Communication 
V Varadharajan 
Abstract 
This t h e s i s i n v e s t i g a t e s conventional and p u b l i c key 
cryptographic techniques for secure data communication. 
Block and stream cipher methods to provide secure 
communication over an insecure channel are discussed with p a r t i c u l a r 
reference to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm. A 
microprocessor based data encryption i n t e r f a c e u n i t has been designed 
and constructed using the DES to provide both communication and f i l e 
s e c u r i t y . Several chaining techniques using the system have a l s o 
been investigated enabling a study of t h e i r e r r o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , 
speed of operation, l e v e l of s e c u r i t y and t h e i r a b i l i t y to overcome 
d i f f i c u l t i e s due to data redundancy and s t r u c t u r e . A s t a t i s t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s of the randomness of the output sequences i n each of these 
techniques has been made. Furthermore , the developed system can be 
used on the P r e s t e l p u b l i c network allowing storage and r e t r i e v a l of 
completely and p a r t l y encrypted frames of information on the P r e s t e l 
database. 
The use of such a DES based encryption system i n a 
communication network poses problems with regard to key d i s t r i b u t i o n 
s i n c e the keys used need to be d i s t r i b u t e d to the u s e r s over a secure, 
separate channel. Several methods of key d i s t r i b u t i o n including the 
use of public key systems are discussed. 
Extensions of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key 
scheme to matrix r i n g s , polynomial r i n g s and a l g e b r a i c number f i e l d s 
have been proposed. These extensions i n d i c a t e that r i n g s other than 
the r i n g of r a t i o n a l integers can be used to construct p u b l i c key 
systems with the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor property. The s e c u r i t y of 
such systems again r e l i e s on the d i f f i c u l t y of f a c t o r i z i n g a large 
integer. 
An extension of the Diffie-Hellman p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n 
system to matrix rings i s proposed. Short c y c l i n g a t t a c k s against 
the expxmentiation system i n GF(2 ) have been analysed and are shoum 
to be equivalCTit to a random search procedure. A hybrid system 
using exponentiation i n GF(2 ) for key d i s t r i b u t i o n and the DES for 
data s e c u r i t y has been inplemented and the advantage o f normal b a s i s 
representation i n the confutation of the exponentiation i n GF(2 ) i s 
examined. 
The r o l e of permutation polynomials i n the design of p u b l i c 
key systems has a l s o been i n v e s t i g a t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s shown 
that secure public key systems can be designed using Dickson 
permutation polynomials and RWei r a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . Further the 
complexity of public key systems can be increased by combining the 
permutation polynomials under the law of composition. 
- x i i -
C H A P T E R 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General 
The concept of data s e c u r i t y i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t ox»dng to the expanding r o l e of d i s t r i b u t e d computation, 
d i s t r i b u t e d data bases and telecommunications a p p l i c a t i o n s such as 
e l e c t r o n i c mail and e l e c t r o n i c funds t r a n s f e r . The computer and 
communications technologies have r e s u l t e d i n a dramatic increase 
i n the volume and speed of information c o l l e c t i o n , d i s t r i b u t i o n and 
storage. Greater information t r a n s f e r and storage i n turn imply 
greater r i s k of exposure of s e n s i t i v e or c o n f i d e n t i a l information to 
unauthorised users due to the ready a v a i l a b i l i t y of inexpensive 
miniature i n t e r c e p t i n g devices. These have r e s u l t e d i n an increased 
i n t e r e s t i n computer data s e c u r i t y not only i n the m i l i t a r y and 
p o l i t i c a l areas but a l s o i n the f i e l d of commerce, where a s i n g l e 
t r a n s a c t i o n may involve m i l l i o n s of pounds. T h i s has motivated 
research p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the a f t of cryptography, which forms the 
centr a l ^ technique of communication s e c u r i t y . 
Cryptography i s the science and study of s e c r e t w r i t i n g [ l ] . 
Cryptography can be defined as the transformation o f a message of a 
data stream by means of an algorithm so that anyone observing the 
transformed data cannot deduce the hidd«i information. Such 
transformations provide s o l u t i o n s to tuo major problems of data 
s e c u r i t y namely the p r i v a c y problem and the a u t h e n t i c a t i o n problem [2]. 
I n some environments the message can be transmitted i n c l e a r text as 
long as i t s i n t e g r i t y i s safeguarded. A common exanqjle where the 
problem of authentication predominates i s i n telephone comnamication 
where the c a l l e d party cannot determine who i s c a l l i n g . Other 
environments may require that the contents of the message be concealed 
during transmission from unauthorised observation and t h i s i s a privacy 
problem. The problems of privacy and a u t h e n t i c a t i o n a r e c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d and techniques for s o l v i n g one can frequently be applied to 
the other. Data encryption i s recognised [3] as the most r e l i a b l e 
method for not only p r o t e c t i n g v i t a l information from eavesdroppers 
but a l s o a technique of message authentication preventing i n j e c t i o n of 
f a l s e information into a communication system by i l l e g i t i m a t e u s e r s . 
T h i s t h e s i s i s mainly concerned with the data p r i v a c y problem. 
On one hand, the easy a v a i l a b i l i t y of enormous computer 
power enables the cryptographer to design complicated algorithms. 
But on the other hand, the computer technology a l s o helps the code 
breakers to be more e f f e c t i v e i n cracking the system. So i t i s a 
never ending struggle between code makers and code breakers. 
Recent developments i n encryption techniques f o r computer 
communication network s e c u r i t y i n c l u d i n g the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) [ l l ] and the evolution of p u b l i c key cryptosystems provided 
the major th r u s t of the present research work. E s s e n t i a l l y the t h e s i s 
can be divided i n t o two p>arts. I n the f i r s t p art (Chapters 2 to 9 ) , 
the use of encryption and decryption techniques i n communication 
systems i s i n v e s t i g a t e d . The design and operation of an encryption 
i n t e r f a c e u n i t incorporating the DES to provide communication and f i l e 
s e c u r i t y and d i f f e r e n t key d i s t r i b u t i o n schemes are d i s c u s s e d . The 
second part (Chapters 10 to 15) i s mainly concerned with the design of 
public key cryptosystems with a p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the extensions 
of the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [ l 2 ] type f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor 
systems. 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
In Chapter 2, b a s i c concepts of syimnetric and asymmetric 
cryptosystems and major cryptographic techniques are b r i e f l y reviewed. 
An a n a l y s i s of the i s presented i n Chapter 3 which 
includes a software inplementation of the Standard, i t s p o s s i b l e 
weaknesses, some of i t s underlying design c r i t e r i a and i t s crypto-
graphic strength. 
The design of a microprocessor based data encryption 
i n t e r f a c e u n i t using the DES i s described i n Chapter 4. 
The operation of the i n t e r f a c e u n i t to provide a two-way 
secure data t r a n s f e r i n a two-node Apple microcomputer network i s the 
subject of Chapter 5. four d i f f e r e n t stream and block chaining 
techniques of the DES have been i n v e s t i g a t e d using the developed 
i n t e r f a c e u n i t . 
In Chapter 6, a s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s of the randomness 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the output sequences produced by the DES under 
d i f f e r e n t modes has been c a r r i e d out. 
The use of the developed encryption i n t e r f a c e u n i t has been 
- 2 -
extended i n Chapter 7 to allow f i l e s e c u r i t y i n Apple d i s k systems. 
Chapter 8 i s concerned with the incorporation o f DES based 
encryption system i n P r e s t e l Viewdata network. T h i s enables t r a n s f e r 
and storage of encrypted as w e l l as p l a i n data between an Apple 
microcomputer and the P r e s t e l database. 
D i f f e r e n t methods of key d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r communication and 
f i l e s e c u r i t y are in v e s t i g a t e d i n Chapter 9. I t incl u d e s a b r i e f 
review of the RSA and the Knapsack public key cryptosystems. 
In Chapter 10, the prototype RSA system over r a t i o n a l 
integers has been extended to matrix and polynomial r i n g s . 
Chapter 11 d i s c u s s e s the notion of i d e a l theory and considers 
the RSA type f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor systems from an i d e a l point of 
view. 
The f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor concept i n some quadratic 
algebraic number f i e l d s and the design o f pu b l i c key systems i n such 
f i e l d s are i n v e s t i g a t e d i n Chapter 12. 
The iiqDlementation of a hybrid system using the DES and the 
D i f f ie-Hellman public key d i s t r i b u t i o n [35] system i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n 
Chapter 13. An extension of the D i f f ie-Hellman system t o matrix 
rings i s . proposed. 
The r o l e of permutation polynomials i n the design of pu b l i c 
key systems forms the subject of Chapter 14. In p>articular, the use 
of Dickson permutation polynomials and c e r t a i n R Mei functions i n the 
construction of public key systems i s discu s s e d . 
In Chapter 15, the use of chaining techniques i n the matrix 
public key system and some precautions which must be taken when the 
RSA system or i t s extensiois are used i n a broadcasting type s i t u a t i o n 
are described. 
Chapter 16 contains the main conclusions. 
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C H A P T E R 2 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONCEPTS 
2.1 Cryptographic Systems 
Detailed treatment of cryptographic p r i n c i p l e s can be found 
i n [2, 3, 4 l , A b a s i c cryptographic p r i v a c y system i s shown i n f i g u r e 
2mlm The transmitter or the sender generates a p l a i n t e x t message M 
which i s to be connnunicated to a l e g i t i m a t e r e c e i v e r over an insecure 
channel monitored by an eavesdropper. To prevent the eavesdropper from 
learning the contents of M, the sender encrypts M, with an i n v e r t i b l e 
transformation to produce the cryptogram or cipher t e x t , C = T(M). 
When the l e g i t i m a t e r e c e i v e r obtains C» i t i s deciphered with the 
i n v e r s e transformation to obtain the p l a i n t e x t message, M = T ~ ^ ( C ) . 
The transformation T applied a t the sending and r e c e i v i n g 
ends i s a key dependent mapping from a s e t of messages i n the p l a i n t e x t 
to a set of c i p h e r t e x t messages and v i c e versa* The p a r t i c u l a r 
transformation used i s chosen from a family o f transformations. The 
parameter that s e l e c t s the i n d i v i d u a l transformation to be en^loyed i s 
c a l l e d the key. Note that there may be more than one key involved. 
Assuming that the same key i s used i n both encryption and decryption, 
then C = Tj^ (M) and M = T J ^ ^ ( ^ ) -
Thus a general cryptosystem c o n s i s t s of the following 
components: 
1. A p l a i n t e x t message space M ; 
2. A c i p h e r t e x t message space C ; 
3. A key space K; 
4. A family of encryption transformations Ej^ : M-»- C where 
ke K. 
5. A family of decryption transformations D^^ : C-*' M where 
ke K. 
The encryption and decryption transformations and are defined by 
the encrypting and decrypting algorithms E and D which may be a set of 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , a piece of hardware or a computer program and i s connnon 
to every transformation i n the family. D i f f e r e n t values of the key ( s ) 
r e s u l t i n t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t transformations of p l a i n t e x t s and c i p h e r -
t e x t s - This i n p l i e s that the family of transformations, that i s , the 
general cryptographic system, can be made pu b l i c information without 
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compromising the s e c u r i t y of the system. Only the k e y ( s ) needs to be 
kept s e c r e t . T h i s s a t i s f i e s one of the general requirements of a 
cryptosystem that the s e c u r i t y must not depend on the secrecy of 
something l i k e a cryptographic algorithm swhich cannot be e a s i l y changed 
i f i t i s compromised. In addition* a p u b l i c l y known system i s necessary 
for standardization among commercial u s e r s . Even though the opponent 
knows the s e t of a l l p o s s i b l e keys, that i s , the key space, he may 
s t i l l be unable to discover the c o r r e c t s e t o f keys required i f the 
key space i s l a r g e . 
Simmons [5 ] c l a s s i f i e s cryptosystems as symmetric (one key) 
and asymmetric (two k e y ) . In symmetric cryptosystems, the enciphering 
and deciphering keys are the same or e a s i l y determined from each other. 
Because the general method of encryption and decryption i s known, t h i s 
means that the transformations and are a l s o e a s i l y derived from 
each other. Thus i f both E^ ^ and are protected both secrecy and 
a u t h e n t i c i t y are achieved. Ho««ver secrecy cannot be separated from 
a u t h e n t i c i t y because making e i t h e r or a v a i l a b l e , exposes the 
other. Thus for secure communication, such a system r e q u i r e s the key 
to be transmitted to the r e c e i v e r v i a some secure channel. Figure 2.2 
i l l u s t r a t e s how such a cryptographic system can be used to solve the 
authentication problem. I n t h i s c a s e , the opponent not only sees a l l 
c i p h c r t e x t s flowing on the channel but can a l t e r them a t w i l l . The 
legitimate r e c e i v e r p r otects himself from being deceived by an a l t e r e d 
or i n j e c t e d message, by decrypting a l l the messages he r e c e i v e s and 
accepting only those encrypted with the c o r r e c t key. 
In asymmetric cryptosystems, the enciphering and deciphering 
keys d i f f e r i n such a way that at l e a s t one key i s computationally 
i n f e a s i b l e to determine from the other « Thus one of the transformations 
^ revealed without endangering the other. Secrecy and 
a u t h e n t i c i t y are provided by protecting the separate transformations 
namely for secrecy and for a u t h e n t i c i t y . Such asymmetric systems 
are often r e f e r r e d to as p u b l i c key systems as i n addition to E and D, 
the encryption key i s made p u b l i c . Only the decrypting key i s kept 
s e c r e t by the r e c e i v e r . The use of such systems thus avoid the 
n e c e s s i t y to transmit the key used i n the algcorithm over a secure 
channel among the communicators. Moreover such systems can be used to 
transmit the s e c r e t key required for conventional symmetric systems. 
Such asymmetric systems are a l s o able to deal with the 
problem of dispute that may a r i s e between the sender and the r e c e i v e r 
over the a c t u a l message sent i n an authentication system. The 
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i n a b i l i t y of the symmetric system to deal with t h i s type of problem 
l i m i t s i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . T h i s can be seen as f o l l o w s . 
The v a l i d i t y of c o n t r a c t s and agreements i s u s u a l l y 
guaranteed by signatures* The essence of a signature i s that only one 
person can produce i t but anybody can recognize i t . For t h i s , each 
user must be able to produce messages \*tese a u t h e n t i c i t y can be checked 
by anyone, but which could not have been produced by anyone e l s e 
e s p e c i a l l y the intended r e c i p i e n t - In a symmetric system, the r e c e i v e r 
authenticates any message that he r e c e i v e s from the sender by 
deciphering i t with the key which the two hold i n common. Because t h i s 
key i s held i n common, however, the r e c e i v e r has the a b i l i t y to produce 
any ciphertext that could have been produced by the sender and hence 
the r e c e i v e r cannot prove that i t i s the sender who a c t u a l l y sent him 
the disputed message. The asyiametric system provides a d i r e c t elegant 
solution to t h i s signature problem. I f user A wishes t o send a 
signed message M to user B, he signs the message by producing 
S = D (M). When user B r e c e i v e s S, he can recover M by operating on 
S with E^, that i s , M = (S)« B keeps S as the proof that user A 
has sent him the p a r t i c u l a r message M as only the user A could have 
generated S because he i s the only one who knows D^. To obtain 
secrecy of communication as w e l l as au t h e n t i c a t i o n , user A sends 
Eg (S) instead of S to user B. As only B knows Dg, he i s the only 
one who can recover S and hence M. 
2.2 Cryptosystem S e c u r i t y and Complexity Theory 
Any attempt by the eavesdropper e i t h e r to decrypt a 
cryptogram C to get the p l a i n t e x t M or to encrypt an in a u t h e n t i c p l a i n -
text M" to get an acceptable cryptogram without p r i o r knowledge of the 
key i s c a l l e d c r y p t a n a l y s i s [ 2 ] . I f c r y p t a n a l y s i s i s impossible so 
that a cry p t a n a l y s t cannot deduce M from C or C from W without p r i o r 
knowledge of the key, the c r j ^ t o g r a p h i c system can be s a i d to be secure. 
I n order to measure the s e c u r i t y of a cryptosystem, D i f f i e and 
Hellman [2] have defined at l e a s t three types of a t t a c k \rfiich the 
system should withstand when being subjected. 
(a) A»ciphertext only' attack i s the weakest form of attack 
which the cryptographic system must withstand. I n t h i s 
attack, the c r y p t a n a l y s t attempts to decipher the 
cryptogram using only the s t a t i s t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of the 
message source* As an example, consider a l e t t e r 
w r i t t e n i n E n g l i s h . Not a l l c h a r a c t e r s o r uords occur 
equally often; for i n s t a n c e , the l e t t e r occurs 
approximately 13% of the time C d ] • Such non-
un i f o r m i t i e s i n the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
alphabet are used to give c l u e s about the message. There 
i s a l s o probably a heading w^ich c o n t a i n s a date and 
address and a c l o s i n g such as ' s i n c e r e l y * . With the a i d 
of s t a t i s t i c a l t a b l e s , the c r y p t a n a l y s t uses each of 
these f a c t s to determine lohich message was most l i k e l y 
sent. 
(b) Under a 'known p l a i n t e x t ' a t t a c k , the c r y p t a n a l y s t i s 
assumed to have a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of corresponding 
message - cryptogram p a i r s and t r i e s to determine the 
key used i n the algorithm. T h i s form of attack i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t threat as frequently messages are enciphered 
under the same key. Hence i f a system cannot withstand 
such an attack, a l l messages which have been encrypted 
under a common key needs to be kept s e c r e t as long as 
any of the messages i s to be kept s e c r e t . Such an 
attack i s quite common i n p r a c t i c e . For instance, a 
t y p i c a l example i s when information may be transmitted 
i n secrecy which i s intended f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e a t a 
l a t e r date. 
( c ) A 'chosCT t e x t ' attack g e n e r a l l y occurs l e s s frequently 
than a known p l a i n t e x t a t t a c k . In t h i s case, the 
cry p t a n a l y s t i s assumed to choose messages to be 
enciphered or c i p h e r t e x t s to be deciphered i n an attempt 
to determine the key. 
For the purpose of c e r t i f y i n g systems as secure, i t i s 
necessary to consider more formidable c r y p t a n a l y t i c a l t h r e a t s . These not 
only give more r e a l i s t i c models of the working invironment of a 
cryptographic system but a l s o make the assessment of the system's 
strength e a s i e r . 
There are two fundamentally d i f f e r e n t ways i n which crypto-
graphic systems may be considered secure. 
A cryptosystem i s s a i d to be un c o n d i t i o n a l l y secure under a 
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given form of attack i f the amount of information a v a i l a b l e to the 
cr y p t a n a l y s t i s a c t u a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t to determine the s o l u t i o n , which 
may be the key or the p l a i n t e x t , whatever be the computing power the 
cryptanalyst has at h i s d i s p o s a l [ ? ] . As an example, consider a 
cryptosystem m^ere a message-cryptogram p a i r uniquely determines the 
key. This system i s not unconditionally secure under a chos«i text 
attack or a known p l a i n t e x t a t t a c k . However i f the information content 
of the message plus the information content of the key i s greater than 
the maxinum p o s s i b l e amount of information i n the cryptogram, then t h i s 
system i s unconditionally secure under a c i p h e r t e x t only attack. The 
cr y p t a n a l y s t cannot determine the complete message and key from the 
cryptogram alone, s i n c e he would obtain more information than that 
provided by the cryptogram. 
Unfortunately, unconditionally secure systems require e i t h e r 
perfect source coding or a key utose length grows l i n e a r l y with respect 
to the sum of the lengths of a l l messages enciphered [ ? ] . This 
requirement i s not p r a c t i c a l i n most a p p l i c a t i o n s . Thus computationally 
secure systems are u s u a l l y used i n cryptography. A system i s s a i d to 
be conputationally secure under a given fonn of attack i f the amount 
of conqDUtation required to c o n ^ t e the s o l u t i o n exceeds the c r y p t a n a l y s t • s 
a b i l i t i e s or the economic value of the message to him. A measure 
c a l l e d the work factor i s often a s s o c i a t e d with a cryptosystem which 
gives an expression of the miriinaim amoiant of work necessary for a 
s u c c e s s f u l attack. In p r a c t i c e , there i s no u n i v e r s a l l y accepted 
f i x e d set of parameters used to express the work f a c t o r . Frequently, 
however, i t i s measured i n one or more of the f o l l o w i n g ways^ 
c r y p t a n a l y s t hours, number of mathematical or l o g i c a l operations, 
con^juting resources such as data storage and processing requirements, 
s p e c i a l hardware and calender time or more g e n e r a l l y the cost i n some 
money u n i t s such as d o l l a r s . This idea of computationally secure 
system i s a l s o r e l a t e d to the concept of one-way functions and 
complexity theory. 
Algorithmic complexity theory i s concerned with the comp-
u t a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m ^ t s (both time and sp>ace) as a function of the s i z e 
of the problem solved by a p a r t i c u l a r algorithm. Complexity theory i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y a c o l l e c t i o n of r e s u l t s i n conputer s c i e n c e that attempts 
to quantify the statement 'Problem A i s 'harder* than problem B' [ 6] . 
There i s a c l a s s of problems c a l l e d NP problems [ 8] and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
a distinguished subclass of NP c a l l e d the c l a s s o f NP—complete problems 
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which are regarded to be the 'hardest' problems. The c l a s s NP-
complete i s thought to be a source of problems that can be adapted to 
cryptographic a p p l i c a t i o n s and w i l l by v i r t u e of t h e i r computational 
complexity produce strong cryptographic systems. The c r y p t a n a l y s t 
i s then required to solve an NP-con^lete problem to break the 
cryptosystem which t h e o r e t i c a l l y should r e q u i r e an exponential time 
algorithm. 
However i t i s g e n e r a l l y argued that [9] the complexity theory 
deals often with the uorst case behaviour whereas i n cryptography, the 
c r y p t a n a l y t i c a l task must be hard f o r almost a l l the i n s t a n c e s . I t 
w i l l be a poor cryptosystem i f the system allows easy decryption of 
a l l but a few cryptograms by the opponent. I n addition conputationally 
hard problems are not n e c e s s a r i l y c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y hard problems s i n c e 
the c r y p t a n a l y s t generally possesses a d d i t i o n a l s i d e information and 
often' t r i e s to solve s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of the same problem [3] . 
Recently a conventional and a p u b l i c key cryptosystem based on NP-
complete problems have been solved using polynomial time algorithms 
[6, l O ] . This goes to show that merely s t a r t i n g with a computationally 
hard problem may not be enough to provide secure cryptosystems. 
2.3 Cryptographic Techniques 
There are two fundamaital cryptographic techniques that can 
be used to design strong encryption-based protection schemes, namely, 
the block cipher technique and the stream cipher technique [ 3 ] • The 
s u i t a b i l i t y of e i t h e r of these two techniques for use i n cryptosystems 
depends on the nature of the a p p l i c a t i o n . 
2.3.1 Block Ci2her_ 
L e t the message be divided i n t o blocks of f i x e d length. A 
block cipher then transforms these input blocks i n t o output blocks using 
the same key. For instance, considering a binary system a s t r i n g of 
input b i t s of f i x e d length i s transformed i n t o a s t r i n g of output b i t s 
of f i x e d length using a block cipher as show i n F i g u r e 2.3. The 
encryption and decryption functions are such that every b i t i n the 
output block depends on every b i t i n the input block as w e l l as on 
every b i t of the key. In the binary system, i f the b l o c k s i z e i s n, then 
the s i z e of the p l a i n t e x t space and the size of the c i p h e r t e x t space i s 
2". In order that the deciphering of a c i p h e r t e x t block y i e l d s an 
unambiguous p l a i n t e x t block, the mapping must be i n v e r t i b l e and hence 
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i n f e c t i v e and i n t h i s case s u r j e c t i v e as the s i z e of the input and 
output spaces are equal. Thus one can view a block c i p h e r as defining 
one of the 2" I transformations on the s e t of n - b i t b l o c k s . In 
p r a c t i c e , i t i s not f e a s i b l e to implement a block cipher that r e a l i z e s 
a l l the po s s i b l e contoinations because of the s i z e o f the key required 
and the l o g i c a l complexity of the cip h e r . Usually a key of n - b i t s i s 
employed to s e l e c t one out o f a subset of 2" functions. 
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A fundamental property of t h i s type o f c i p h e r i s that the 
bl o c k s i z e plays an important part i n determining the c r y p t a n a l y t i c a l 
strength of the cipher. The b l o c k s i z e must be chosm l a r g e enough to 
f o i l simple message exhaustion a t t a c k s . This a t t a c k c o n s i s t s of 
encrypting a l l 2" po s s i b l e p l a i n t e x t s with a given key thus building 
a d i c t i o n a r y of c i p h e r t e x t s and corresponding p l a i n t e x t s . A message 
can then be recovered by searching the d i c t i o n a r y and r e l a t i n g each 
intercepted c i p h e r t e x t block t o i t s corresponding p l a i n t e x t block. 
However i f the bl o c k s i z e i s made la r g e enough, the d i c t i o n a r y can be 
made too large to construct or s t o r e . Other a t t a c k s must a l s o be 
considered before a r r i v i n g at an acceptable b l o c k s i z e . An attack 
c a l l e d block frequency a n a l y s i s based on frequOTcy of occurrence of 
blocks i s quite common. I t i s s i m i l a r to the a n a l y s i s performed on a 
simple s u b s t i t u t i o n cipher by taking i n t o account l e t t e r frequencies. 
A n a l y t i c a l or d e t e r m i n i s t i c attack - which c o n s i s t s of expressing 
cipher operations i n mathematical form as a s e t of equations and 
solving for the unknown v a r i a b l e s d i r e c t l y using a n a l y t i c a l methods -
can be thwarted by making every b i t of the output block a complex 
mathematical function of every b i t of input block and key thus giving 
a strong intersyrabol depoidence property. The block c i p h e r s a l s o 
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e x h i b i t e r r o r propagation p r o p e r t i e s which are s u i t a b l e f o r e r r o r 
detection and authentication purposes. 
The Data Encryption Standard [11] i s an example of a symmetric 
block cipher of length 64 b i t s which w e l l withstands the above mentioned 
and more so p h i s t i c a t e d a t t a c k s . The algorithm w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n 
Chapter 3 and i s used i n the design of a e i c r y p t i o n i n t e r f a c e u n i t i n 
Chapters 4 and 5. Examples of p u b l i c key block c i p h e r s include the 
RSA system [12] and the trapdoor knapsack system [ 1 3 ] . They are 
discixssed i n Chapter 9. 
2.3.2 St ream_Cipher 
A stream cipher d i v i d e s the message M i n t o s u c c e s s i v e 
c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s . I t then uses a character or b i t stream generator 
to produce a cryptographic key stream which i s then combined with the 
p l a i n t e x t message c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s to produce the c i p h e r t e x t 
c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s . A s i m i l a r procedure i s c a r r i e d out to recover the 
p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s by combining the key stream with the 
cipher t e x t c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s . The stream cipher concept i s i l l u s t r a t e d 
i n Figures 2.4 and 2.5 vrtiere the c i p h e r t e x t Y i s produced from 
p l a i n t e x t X by E x c l u s i v e - o r i n g i t with a s e c r e t binary stream R. 
L e t us now assume that the key to the b i t stream generator 
i s f i x e d and that the cryptographic key stream R produced at each 
i t e r a t i o n depends only on t h i s key. T h i s then i m p l i e s that R does 
not change from one i t e r a t i o n to the other. Now i f an opponent knows 
a p l a i n t e x t - c i p h e r t e x t p a i r , then he can recover the key stream R by 
forming R = X ® Y. Having obtained R, the opponent can decipher any 
intercepted ci p h e r t e x t without even knowing the key to the g ^ e r a t o r 
which i s unacceptable. Further, r e p e t i t i o n s on the p l a i n t e x t would 
be r e f l e c t e d i n the c i p h e r t e x t even i f he d i d not know a c i p h e r t e x t -
p l a i n t e x t p>air. Hence to overcome t h i s problem, the key stream must be 
made to change for every i t e r a t i o n of the c i p h e r i n g algctithm. A 
stream cipher i s s a i d to be p e r i o d i c i f the key stream changes such 
that i t repeats i t s e l f a f t e r d c h a r a c t e r s or b i t s f or some f i x e d d; 
otherwise i t i s s a i d to be non-periodic. I d e a l l y , one would want the 
key stream to have a long period and to vary i n a random manner. I f 
the key stream were t r u l y random and i t s length i s equal to the length 
of the message, then t h i s would produce an unbreakable cipher. Because 
the key stream i s random, then i t must be provided to the users in 
advance v i a some independent and secure channel vrhich causes 
insurmountable l o g i s t i c a l problems when the intended data t r a f f i c i s 
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very l a r g e . Hence for p r a c t i c a l reasons, the key stream must be 
implemented as an algorithmic procedure so that the key stream can be 
produced by u s e r s at both ends. Ciphers generated by r o t o r and 
Hagelin machines [ l ] are p e r i o d i c v^iereas the Vemam cipher (one time 
pad) [ l 6 ] and running key c i p h e r s are non-periodic c i p h e r s . 
A system i n which the key stream i s generated independently 
of the message stream i s s a i d to be a synchronous stream cipher. In 
such a modulo 2 addition based system, each b i t i n the output c i p h e r -
t e x t i s dependent upon the corresponding b i t i n the input p l a i n t e x t 
but not upon any other b i t s i n the input p l a i n t e x t . T h i s i s i n con-
t r a s t to the block cipher which e x h i b i t s a much more ccanplex 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the b i t s i n the p l a i n t e x t and the b i t s i n the 
c i p h e r t e x t . Hence the stream c i p h e r s can be made t o have non-error 
propagating property. Both approaches however have conparable 
strength. 
Various techniques may be used to generate the key stream 
i n stream c i p h e r s . Not only the key stream generated must have good 
pseudo-random properties but a l s o the generation process naist be 
noD-linear. T h i s l i m i t s the d i r e c t use of linear, feedback s h i f t 
r e g i s t e r s for the generation of these key streams because with such 
generators* the c r y p t a n a l y s t can derive the e n t i r e key stream given 
a r e l a t i v e l y small amount of p l a i n t e x t - c i p h e r t e x t p a i r [ 4, 14] . I t 
i s a l s o important that the con^slexity of the l i n e a r equivalent of any 
non-linear generating process be estimated [ 14] . I t has been 
suggested i n [ 15] that non-linear substitution-permutation functions 
when cond^ined with a s h i f t r e g i s t e r produces c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y strong 
key streams. Since the key streams can be generated i n blocks, i t i s 
a l s o p o s s i b l e for a block cipher to be used to obtain a stream cipher* 
Because both the sender and the r e c e i v e r must generate key streams 
that are equal and s e c r e t , i t i s necessary that the keys used i n the 
algorithm must a l s o be equal and s e c r e t . T h i s i m p l i e s that a public 
key block cipher algorithm can be used to obtain a stream cipher i f 
and only i f i t i s used as a conventional algorithm, t h a t i s , both the 
sender and the r e c e i v e r use the same algorithm (encryption E or 
decryption D)\ and the same s e c r e t key. 
But as noted e a r l i e r , a f i x e d key even though i t i s kept 
s e c r e t does not ensure an unpredictable cryptographic key stream. To 
avoid producing the same key stream at each i t e r a t i o n of the 
algorithm, another parameter c a l l e d the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector ( I V ) i s 
- 14 -
introduced i n the ciphering process. D i f f e r e n t i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vectors 
axe generated i n a pseudo-random non-repeating manner which i n turn 
produce d i f f e r e n t cryptographic key streams. That i s , R i s generated 
using R = f (Z) where Z i s the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e ctor, f, defines the k k 
block cipher algorithm under key k. Encryption and decryption 
operations are then given by Y = X © f ( Z ) and X = Y ® f^^ ( Z ) . This i s 
shown i n Figure 2.5. For the stream cipher to be c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y 
strong, the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector needs to be v a r i e d i n a pseudo-
random manner. One way to do t h i s i s to generate independently a new 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector for each i t e r a t i o n of the c i p h e r i n g algorithm. 
T h i s has the disadvantage of i n c r e a s i n g the amount of transmitted data 
s i n c e the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r s are now added to each block of c i p h e r -
t e x t . A more e f f i c i e n t approach i s as follows: at the f i r s t i t e r a t i o n 
of the cipher algorithm, the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector i s used as before 
to produce a block of key stream b i t s v ^ c h can be used to encipher 
the f i r s t block of p l a i n t e x t (assuming the b l o c k s i z e of the cipher 
algorithm i s same as the s i z e of the p l a i n t e x t b l o c k ) . At a l l 
subsequent i t e r a t i o n s of ciphering algorithm, the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector i s a l t e r e d or determined using one of many feedback chaining 
techniques. Thus chaining e l i m i n a t e s the problem of t r a n s m i t t i n g or 
s t o r i n g a separate i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector value f o r each c i p h e r t e x t . 
A feedback can be obtained from s e v e r a l p l a c e s namely the key stream 
i t s e l f , the p l a i n t e x t , the c i p h e r t e x t or some combination thereof-
Each of these approaches g i v e s r i s e to cryptographic systCTis with 
d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s with respect to recovery from e r r o r s . 
Note that the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector i n addition to providing 
cryptographic s t r ^ i g t h a l s o e s t a b l i s h e s synchoronization betweOT 
communicating cryptographic devices. I t assures that the same 
cryptographic key streams are generated a t the both ends of the l i n k . 
Once the i n i t i a l s t a t e of the system has been s e t , only the current 
s t a t e of the s y s t ^ needs to be remembered to maintain synchronization. 
In general feedback chaining techniques i n c r e a s e the o v e r a l l 
strength of a cryptographic system. The chaining techniques when used 
during ciphering process make an output dependent not only on the 
current input and key but a l s o on e a r l i e r i n p u t ( s ) and/or o u t p u t ( s ) . 
In e f f e c t i t introduces noise i n t o the ciphering process. T h i s helps 
to eliminate the undesirable e f f e c t s of redundancy and s t r u c t u r e 
present within the p l a i n t e x t data. Several chaining techniques w i l l 
be discussed i n Chapter 5 with s p e c i a l reference to the Data Encryption 
Standard. 
- 15 -
C H A P T E R 
CATA ENCRYPTICW AljQORITHMS 
3.1 General 
In cryptography, two main operations have been used for 
c e n t u r i e s and they s t i l l form the main elements of modem encryption 
algorithms. They are t r a n s p o s i t i o n s and s u b s t i t u t i o n s and may be 
applied to wordst symbols, l e t t e r s and binary b i t s or groups of b i t s . 
There i s a l s o another technique, that of concealment where the symbols 
of the.message are mixed up with many other symbols which c a r r y no 
important information at a l l although they may appear t o . This method 
can be used to give considerable s e c u r i t y but i t expands the message 
by a great amount. These operations l e a d to t h r e e d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s 
of ciphers namely the . t r a n s p o s i t i o n c i p h e r s , .the s u b s t i t u t i o n c i p h e r s 
and a combination of both c a l l e d the product c i p h e r s . 
3-1.1 Transposition Ci£her_ 
A t r a n s p o s i t i o n cipher c o n s i s t s of rearrangCTtent of the 
characters ( b i t s ) i n a block of p l a i n t e x t ; the c h a r a c t e r s r e t a i n t h e i r 
i d e n t i t y but l o s e t h e i r p o s i t i o n . I f the t r a n s p o s i t i o n i s one-to-one 
then the process i s r e v e r s i b l e . On the other hand, i f the t r a n s -
p o s i t i o n i s not one-to-one then the operation becomes i r r e v e r s i b l e . 
Consider, f o r instance, the t r a n s p o s i t i o n \»»hich maps an 8 - b i t block 
to a 6-bit one, say by discarding b i t s 3 and 6 and rearranging the 
others. Here the t o t a l number of zeroes and ones are no longer 
preserved. Transposition by i t s e l f i s not a very secure type of 
encipherroent because unl e s s every message has a unique form of 
t r a n s p o s i t i o n , the a c q u i s i t i o n of s e v e r a l p l a i n t e x t - c i p h e r t e x t p a i r s 
allows the c r y p t a n a l y s t to discover the pemutation s t a t i s t i c a l l y . 
3.1.2 Subs t i t u t ion_Cipher 
A s u b s t i t u t i o n cipher c o n s i s t s of the replacement of 
characters of the p l a i n t e x t with c h a r a c t e r s from another alphabet. 
In the case of binary operations, a look-up t a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s e s the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n operation. The b i t s are divided i n t o smadl groups 
which are then replaced by the contents of the locdc-up t a b l e addressed 
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by each group. For example, i f the message i s d i v i d e d i n t o 4 b i t 
groups, there w i l l be 16 p o s s i b l e combinations for each group, so 
that the t a b l e w i l l r e q u i r e 16 e n t r i e s numbered O to 15. In general, 
the number of ones and zeroes i s not preserved and a change in one b i t 
of the input may a f f e c t s e v e r a l b i t s of the output. The Data Encryption 
Standard (Section 3.2) uses eight such look-up t a b l e s commonly r e f e r r e d 
to as S-boxes, each converting a s i x - b i t input i n t o a four b i t output. 
An inportant advantage of the s u b s t i t u t i o n cipher i s t h a t the contents 
of the lo(^-up t a b l e can be changed frequently and implementation of 
such an operation can be r e a d i l y done with read only memories (ROMs). 
A s u b s t i t u t i o n may or may not be r e v e r s i b l e d e p ^ d i n g on the form of 
the look-up t a b l e s . One of the o l d e s t s u b s t i t u t i o n c i p h e r i s the 
Caeser cipher which i s a monoalphabetical s u b s t i t u t i o n c i p h e r . This 
cipher can be broken i n c i p h e r t e x t - o n l y a t t a c k with approximately 30 
alphabet c h a r a c t e r s using l e t t e r frequency a n a l y s i s [ l 4 ] . An 
important s u b s t i t u t i o n cipher i s the one-time pad i n which the key i s 
random, non-rep>eating and used only once. One-time pads are 
unbreakable as there i s not enough information i n the c i p h e r t e x t to 
determine the key or message uniquely. The f i r s t implementation of 
the one-time pad cipher was the Vemam cipher [ l 6 ] i n which the key 
b i t s were added modulo 2 to the p l a i n t e x t b i t s . One major problem 
with t h i s cipher i s that the key length grows l i n e a r l y with the length 
of the message. 
3.1.3 ProAict Ci£her_ 
A product cipher involves both the steps of s u b s t i t u t i o n and 
t r a n s p o s i t i o n . Shannon [ 7 ] suggested the use of product c i p h e r s to 
b u i l d a strong system out of i n d i v i d u a l l y weak conponents. He 
suggested t h a t the product cipher be formed usin g s u b s t i t u t i o n and 
permutation c i p h e r s i n an a l t e r n a t i n g manner. The permutation s h u f f l e s 
the d i g i t s providing'diffusion* and non-linear s u b s t i t u t i o n s provide 
'confusion*. Confusion makes the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c i p h e r t e x t 
and the p l a i n t e x t as c o i ^ l i c a t e d as p o s s i b l e , that i s , i t hides the 
key and d i f f u s i o n spreads the s t a t i s t i c s of the p l a i n t e x t i n t o the 
c i p h e r t e x t . This formed the b a s i s of the L u c i f e r system designed by 
the IBM [17]. The Data Encryption Standard which i s considered next 
i s based on the L u c i f e r system. 
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3.2 Data Encryption Standard 
The cryptographic algorithm used i n the design of the 
encryption u n i t i s the Data Encryption Standard (DBS) [ 1 1 ] . This 
algorithm i s now regarded as the US Federal Standard recommended for 
use by non-military Government Agencies. I t has a l s o been adopted by 
the American National Standards I n s t i t u t e (ANSI) and i s recommaided for 
use by the American Bankers Ass o c i a t i o n , (ABA). The adoption of DES 
as a Standard for encrypting data contributed to the surge i n i n t e r e s t 
i n t h i s algorithm. Before considering the development o f an encryption 
system to provide communication s e c u r i t y using a hardware implement-
atio n of the Standard i n the next chapter, i n t h i s chapter the DES 
algorithm i s analysed to provide a deeper i n s i g h t i n t o the design of 
p r a c t i c a l encryption algorithms. The algorithm has been in^lemented 
by software to study some of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the 
software approach enables the study of intermediate outputs during each 
round, whereas the hardware ( L S I ) implementation only g i v e s the f i n a l 
c i p h e r t e x t output. The software implementation i s a l s o found to be 
u s e f u l when performing s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s on the randomness of the 
output obtained from the algorithm. T h i s forms the subject of 
Chapter 6. 
F i r s t an overview of the algorithm i s given. Then the 
software implementation i s described together with some performance 
f i g u r e s . Some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the algorithm together with 
some of the design c r i t e r i a underlying the choice of parameters i n 
the algorithm are presented. The controversy surrounding the DES 
and p o s s i b l e weaknesses of the algorithm are then considered. F i n a l l y 
the conqDlexity of the algorithm and i t s s e c u r i t y are i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
3.2.1 MS ALgpritta - An_Cveryiew 
The Data Encryption Standard algorithm i s a block product 
cipher system. Block because i t transforms more than one character 
at a time. Product because i t i s composed of a s e r i e s of t r a n s -
p o s i t i o n s , s u b s t i t u t i o n s and a d d i t i v e encodings combined by a sequence 
of feedback c y c l e s . 
I t i s a complex non-linear algorithm u ^ i c h enciphers a 
64-bit block of p l a i n t e x t i n t o a 64-bit block of c i p h e r t e x t under the 
control of a 56-bit cryptographic key. DES can be regarded as a huge 
key-controlled s u b s t i t u t i o n box (S-box) with a 64-bit input and 
64 
output. With such an S-box a t o t a l of (2 ) l d i f f e r e n t transformations 
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or functions from p l a i n t e x t to c i p h e r t e x t are p o s s i b l e . The S ^ b i t 
key thus s e l e c t s only a small subset ( 2 ^ ^ ) of the t o t a l s e t ' s 
p o s s i b l e functions. As a s i n g l e huge S-box i s d i f f i c u l t to c o n s t r u c t , 
DES i s implemented by using s e v e r a l smaller S-boxes and permuting 
t h e i r concatenated outputs. Repetition of the s u b s t i t u t i o n and 
permutation processes s e v e r a l times i n c r e a s e s the cryptographic 
strength. 
The complete DES algorithm i s givOT i n [ l l ] . The three major 
steps i n the algorithm are summarized i n Figure 3.1. 
1. A t r a n s p o s i t i o n operation, r e f e r r e d to as the i n i t i a l 
permutation (IP)* This f i x e d t r a n s p o s i t i o n does not u t i l i z e 
the 64-bit key and operates s o l e l y on the 64 data b i t s . 
2. A complex key dep>endent product transformation that uses 
block ciphering to i n c r e a s e the nuntoer of s u b s t i t u t i o n a l 
and reordering p a t t e r n s . 
A f i n a l t r a n s p o s i t i o n operation r e f e r r e d t o a s the i n v e r s e 
i n i t i a l permutation ( I P ~ ) which i s a c t u a l l y the r e v e r s a l < 
the transformation performed i n the f i r s t s t e p . 
The second step i s the most important step out of the three 
.and i t c o n s i s t s of 16 separate rounds of mcipherment; each round 
using a product cipher approach or cipher function. The steps 
performed i n each round shown i n Figure 3-2 are summarized below: 
( i ) The 64-bit input block i s divided i n t o two p a r t s , a l e f t h a l f 
( L ) and a r i g h t h a l f (R),each 32-bits long. 
( i i ) The r i g h t h a l f of the input block becomes the l e f t h a l f of 
the output block. T h i s i s denoted i n Figure 3.2 by an arrow 
going from ^ to L^. 
The steps ( i i i ) to ( v i i ) which follow can be regarded a s a complex 
cipher function, f , operating on both key and r i g h t h a l f of the input 
block. 
( i i i ) The 32-bits long r i g h t h a l f (R) undergoes an expansion 
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process ( E ) , y i e l d i n g a 48-bit data block. T h i s i s a f i x e d 
expansion pennutation and not key-dependsit. 
( i v ) fhe 64-bit key i s used to generate a 48-bit subkey through 
a key scheduling procedure described i n the next s e c t i o n . 
( v ) T h i s 48-bit suWcey K. i s exclusive-ored with the expanded 
r i g h t h a l f E(R^) y i e l d i n g a 48-bit r e s u l t . 
( v i ) T h i s 48-bit data i s d i v i d e d i n t o e i g h t 6 - b l t groups each of 
which i s subjected to a 6-to-4-bit n o n - r e v e r s i b l e 
s u b s t i t u t i o n function ( S ^ ) . S i x groups of 4 - b i t s are then 
concatenated to form a 32-bit output. 
( v i i ) The 32-bit output i s permuted to produce a 3 2 — b i t block by 
the f i x e d permutation P. 
( v i i i ) The 32-bit output of step ( v i i ) i s combined v i a the exclusive-
or operation with the l e f t h a l f of the input block to form 
the r i g h t h a l f o f the 64-bit output block. 
D e t a i l s of the (permutations I P , I P ~ ^ , P and s u b s t i t u t i o n boxes can 
be found i n [ 1 1 ] • 
3.2.2 The Kejf Sche^le_F^ocedure_ 
The key schedule procedure i s used to a i l a r g e the keyspace by 
expanding the e x t e r n a l l y supplied key i n t o i n t e r n a l subkeys. The PES 
key schedule operation d e r i v e s i t s s i x t e e n 48-bit subkeys required for 
16 rounds from the 56-bit key entered e x t e r n a l l y , by simple r e p e t i t i o n . 
For reasons of s e c u r i t y , a l l o f these keys naist be d i f f e r e n t . T h i s 
i s achieved by s e l e c t i n g a d i f f e r e n t subset o f 4 8 - b i t s from the 56-bit 
key. (Note that 8 - b i t s out o f 64-bits key are used as p a r i t y b i t s ) . 
The procedure i s based on a s h i f t i n g and b i t s e l e c t i o n algorithm. 
Figure 3.3 i l l u s t r a t e s the key schedule c a l c u l a t i o n used 
f o r enciphcrment. I t begins with an i n i t i a l permutation defined by 
Permuted Choice 1, (PC-1). PC-1 i s the same for CTcipherment and 
decipherment and i t s e l e c t s 56 of the 64 e x t e r n a l key b i t s ( s t r i p p i n g 
o f f the 8 p a r i t y b i t s ) and loads them i n t o two 28-bit s h i f t r e g i s t e r s 
C and D. The p a r i t y checking of the e x t e r n a l key i s performed p r i o r 
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to PC-1. During encryption, the contents of the r e g i s t e r s ^ and 
^ are s h i f t e d one or t w p o s i t i o n s to the l e f t according to the 
schedule of c i r c u l a r s h i f t operations shown i n Table 3.1, Figure 3,4» 
The key K ( i ) i s t h ^ derived from (C,, D^) through a second 
permutation defined by Permuted Choice, PC-2» Moreover the s h i f t 
schedule i s such that C, - = C and D, , = D . I t i s to be noted here 
l o o l o o 
t h a t PC-2 does not mix the contents o f and r e g i s t e r s . T h i s 
property together with the c i r c u l a r s h i f t operations allows c e r t a i n 
values of keys K to generate i d e n t i c a l i n t e r n a l suUceys* This i s an 
inherent weakness of the algorithm and i s dis c u s s e d f u r t h e r i n Section 
3*6.4. 
During the deciphering operation the key K(X6) i s used i n 
round one and K(15) i n round two and so on. But the contents of C 
o 
and are the same for enciphering- and deciphering, s i n c e the e x t e r n a l 
key i s loaded i n both cases v i a the Permuted Choice PC-X • This means 
that the key K(16) can be created at the f i r s t round merely by 
omitting the f i r s t s h i f t operation and K(15) can be c r e a t e d at the 
second round by s h i f t i n g C^ and one b i t to the r i g h t . The 
remainder of the i n t e r n a l keys are obtained i n the same manner using 
the s h i f t sche<hile i n Table 3.1, Figure 3.4, i n r e v e r s e order except 
that l e f t s h i f t s are changed to r i g h t s h i f t s . 
3.2.3 DES Encrj33tion_aj2d_Decry£t i ^ ^ 
I t i s seen that the same algorithm can be used to perform 
encryption and decryption with minor changes. An o u t l i n e of the proof 
of t h i s property i s as f o l l o w s : 
Let the contents of L and R r e g i s t e r s on the i ^ ^ round be 
L ( i ) and R ( i ) . L e t the output of the penmitation P be P ( i ) and the 
output of PC-2 be K ( i ) . L e t the operation of the expansion permu-
t a t i o n , S-boxes, penmitation P be represented by f . Then during 
encryption, 
L ( i ) = R ( i - 1 ) 
R ( i ) = L ( i - 1 ) e P ( i ) 
P ( i ) = f [ R ( i - l ) , K ( i ) ] 
where © denotes Exclusive-or operation. 
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Round Number Number of S h i f t s 
1 1 
2 1 
3 2 
4 2 
5 2 
6 2 
7 2 
8 2 
9 1 
10 2 
11 . 2 
12 2 
15 2 
14 2 
15 2 
16 1 
F i g u r e 3.4 - Ta b l e 3.1 : Schedule of S h i f t o p e r a t i o n s 
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Rewriting these as 
L ( i ) = R ( i - 1 ) (3.1) 
R ( i ) = L ( i - 1 ) ® f [ R ( i - l ) , K ( i ) ] (3.2) 
Hence the i ^ ^ round i s completely determined i n terms of the ( i - 1 ) ^ ^ 
round provided the appropriate b i t s of key K are a v a i l a b l e . S i m i l a r l y 
( i - 1 ) ^ ^ rotind can be completely expressed i n terms o f t h e i ^ ^ round. 
This can be done because of the r e v e r s i b l e property of e x c l u s i v e - o r 
operation: i f A = B ® C then B = A ® C. Therefore r e w r i t i n g (3.1) as 
R ( i - l ) = L ( i ) 
and r e w r i t i n g (3.2) as 
L ( i - l ) = R ( i ) ® f [ R ( i - l ) . K ( i ) ] 
i e , L ( i - l ) = R ( i ) ® f [ L ( i ) , K ( i ) ] (3.3) 
i t i s seen that the same algorithm can be used for decryption. The 
involute s t r u c t u r e of the DES can be seen by regarding the DES as a 
product of 33 mappings [6] as shouoi below 
IP~^ x l l ^ ^ x . . . x e x J I j ^ x I P 
where 
IP i s the i n i t i a l permutation and IP~^ i s i t s inverse 
n ^9 (1 - ^ i £ 16) are i n v o l u t i o n s given by 
n ^: (x, x^) s>(x ® f ( x ^ ) , x^) where x i s the l e f t 
h a l f and x i s the r i g h t h a l f 
9 i s the interchanges involution given by 
0 : (x, x ) (x'', x) 
The inverse of the DES i s then givCTi by 
( C ^ ) " ^ = ( I P ) " ^ X X 0 X ... x 0 X X I P 
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That i s , decryption i s e s s e n t i a l l y achieved by operating the DES 
backwards. 
3.3 Software DES Implementation 
The DES algorithm has been implemented using a 6502 based 
Apple microcomputer system. T h i s was done to gain a deeper i n s i g h t 
i n t o the working of the algorithm and to allow a comparison between 
hardware and software implementation with regard to performance 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and the r e s u l t s produced. The two implementations may 
not be c o n ^ t i b l e and the r e s u l t s may not agree with each other as 
the FIPS publication [ l l j g i v e s only the recommended values for the 
pernaitations and S-boxes. 
The d e s c r i p t i o n of the program together with a p a r t i a l 
l i s t i n g i s given i n Appendix 1. The two iiqx>rtant f a c t o r s to be 
considered i n the software design are the storage and the speed of 
the inclement at ion. I n t h i s design, a niixed approach has been adopted 
as there was no r e a l c o n s t r a i n t on memory or speed. In some places 
storage space increases are traded to obtain speed. A t y p i c a l example 
of such an instance would be the use of i n - l i n e code to replace loops. 
On the other hand, most of the t r a n s p o s i t i o n s and s u b s t i t u t i o n s are 
implemented as functions i n s t e a d of using t a b l e s . Consider for 
instance, the 48-bit key s e l e c t function i n v o l v i n g the 56-bit i n i t i a l 
permutation and then one or two l e f t s h i f t s of the 56-bit s t r i n g and a 
48-bit permutation to produce each of the 16 o p e r a t i o n a l keys required 
during a c y c l e through the algorithm. Here these subkeys are 
generated at the time required. But t h i s whole process could have 
been impIemCTited using s i x t e e n 48 byte t a b l e s , l i s t i n g equivalent 
permutations of the current keys b i t p o s i t i o n s . I n the beginning of 
the program, a l l the 16 operational keys can be c a l c u l a t e d and stored 
i n a t a b l e . Then each round through the algorithm can obtain the 
operational keys d i r e c t l y from the storage t a b l e . 
The storage space used by t h i s program i s approximately 2 
k i l o - b y t e s . The encryption times are of the order of 100 m i l l i -
seconds. T h i s would allow a maximum throughput of about 640 b i t s 
per second. Therefore the algorithm can be implemented with reasonable 
performance. But i t i s found that 6502 i n s t r u c t i o n s e t i s not s u i t a b l e 
for high speed implementation of the algorithm. I f b i t t e s t i n s t r u c t -
ions are a v a i l a b l e s i m i l a r to those of Z80, encryption time can be 
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much reduced. 
A numerical example showing the output from intermediate 
stages within an encryption round together with different key and data 
values after every round i s shown in Figure 3.5. I t i s also found 
that the results produced by t h i s program and the hardware in^lement-
ation (Chapter 4) agreed with each other. 
Although the algorithm can be implemented i n software, i t 
suffers from two major disadvantages. F i r s t l y as seen from above the 
operation i s slow compared to LSI implementation of the algorithm which 
allows of the order of 1 M b i t s per second or above. Secondly, i n 
the software approach, the key i s stored within the computer system 
memory which i s accessible when the system i s in. use. With the LSI 
hardware iu^leraentation the key becomes unavailable after i t has been 
entered into the device and hence the security of the overall system 
has been greatly enhanced. In the next section a possible advantage 
of the software approach i s discussed. 
3.3.1 A Ppss^bieJ\dyanta£e_of MS Spftware_ 
I f the internal functions of the DES algorithm are g^erated 
using tables, then i t seems that there ex i s t s a mechanism to increase 
the d i f f i c u l t y of cryptanalyzing a series of encrypted messages given 
an encrypted message and a copy of the corresponding plaintext. 
Assuming that there i s no f a t a l flaw which i s dependent on these 
internal tables, then i t i s shown that these tables (ie-permutations 
and substitutions) can be altered in software inplementations (in 
contrast to the hardware approach) to produce a s i g n i f i c a n t l y larger 
effective key space. One may argue that changing the values of these 
tables may strengthen the algorithm, but does not reduce the through-
put from the rate achieved with the specified standard. Therefore each 
of these tables can be used as variables, l i k e the key, agreed betwem 
senders and receivers. (Note that t h i s idea may not be v a l i d from 
subsequent sections where i t i s argued that carefully chosen permut-
ations and substitutions strengthen the DES algorithm and that randomly 
chosen parameters may introduce weaknesses into the algorithm). 
The I n i t i a l Permutation (IP) and i t s inverse(IP" ) operate on 
64^bit data blocks and hence there are 641 different settings possible 
for t h i s penaitation. Note that given IP, IP~ i s fixed. Here any 
bit ordering including an identity transform i s assumed to be accept-
able but each b i t must be used. The tables are defined by a series 
of 64 unique one byte addresses of bits in the I n i t i a l Permutation. 
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A l l data and Icey valuea are represented i n h e i a d e c i a a l fom. 
P l a i n t e i t , X: ?EDC3A9876545210 
Key, K: FEDC3A9876543210 
Round 1 
P l a i n t e x t L ( 0 ) 
H(0) 
PEDCBA98 
76545210 
P l a i n t e x t aTter I n i t i a l P e r s u t a t i o n 
Say a f t e r Permitatlan choice 1 
Key a f t e r 1 l e f t s h i f t 
Key a f t e r P emutation choice 2 
Output fron S-boxea, S1-S8 
Output a f t e r Perautation P 
Clphertext a f t e r round 1 
i . e . 1.(1) 
H ( l ) 
OP550P55 
A1E3159C 
53PP55000P550P55 
OE9aD4BE5498C2FE 
lE32AA7CAA32a6PC 
7A1E6C5032163234 
OC216D50 
921C209C 
OP550P55A1E3139C 
Round 1 -
Round 2 -
Round 3 -
Round 4 -
aoTind 5 -
Round 6 -
Round 7 -
Round 8 -
Round 9 -
Round 10-
Round 11-
Round 12-
Hound 13-
Round 14-
Round 15-
Round 16-
Ciphortoxt 
Data: 0P55OP55A1E3139C 
Key : 7A1E6C3032163234 
Data: A1E3139C7D1EC3B6 
Key : 4A4A4C4C6C522E32 
Data: 7D1EC3B6B66ABD06 
Key i 5C445A6A247A3S5A 
Data: B66ABD06P229B5O4 
Key : 462E305A2C4E6C50 
Data: P229B5048FC9PBC4 
Key : 6 0 6 2 3 E 7 8 7 4 0 A 4 8 7 A 
Data: 8 P C 9 P B C 4 0 E B 8 P 4 3 D 
Key : 6 E 1 A 5 6 4 2 6 0 6 E 5 4 7 4 
Data: 0 S B 8 W 3 D C 6 B 3 7 O B A 
Key ; 4 8 7 E 5 A 5 4 7 A 2 2 5 8 7 2 
Data: C 6 B 3 7 0 B A C B 7 2 3 8 B 9 
Key : 5 4 O E 3 E 0 S 4 8 6 2 5 2 7 C 
Data: CB7238B90C8EFF39 
Key : 1E66302C6C283E0C 
Data: OC8EPP39C3DD5634 
Kay : 364266704E1C141A 
Data: C3DD5634P5C83C96 
Key : 6E5C0278784B360A 
Data: P5ca3C96A38DA004 
Key : 465878345C541C56 
Data: A38DA0040B8B7529 
Key : 3646535E5A4E7806 
Data: OBSB75293393CBP1 
Key : 547662123E441A64 
Data: 3393CBP145770966 
Key : 242C76747A3C4A14 
Data: 4577096604DE0463 
Key : 1A38167822707E1A 
- A933P6ia3023B310 
Figure 3.5 - Data and Key values a f t e r each DES round 
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To change IP or IP~^ r e q u i r e s an input of 64 bytes. There are 32i 
d i f f e r e n t P permutations p o s s i b l e and a 32 byte input vector i s 
required to s p e c i f y the ordering of 3 2 - b i t s . Also there = 
2.25 X 10^^ d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e expansion ( E ) permutations for mapping 
32-bits into 4 8 - b i t s . The 16 intermediate keys K ( l ) to K(16) can be 
obtained using a 16 x 48 t a b l e . Assuming that the 16 k e y ^ s e l e c t vectors must 
be unique, the number of unique combinations i s equal t o | j ( ^ ) - i 
146 J-'O which i s approximately 2.77 x 10 . Changing the key s e l e c t i o n t a b l e s 
r e q u i r e s an input of 768 bytes. Further, there are = 2.25 x 10^^ 
p o s s i b l e combinations for S-boxes which reduce the 48-bit e x c l u s i v e ^ 
ored product to 3 2 - b i t s . 
Thus the number of p o s s i b l e c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s using t h i s 
t a b l e s t r u c t u r e i s equal to (number of I P / I P " ^ con4)inations) x 
(number of 48-bit e^qwjision combinations) x (number of P permutation 
combinations) x (number of 6 b i t s t o 4 b i t s reduction cond>ination) x 
295 
(niunber of key s e l e c t combinations). T h i s i s of the order 10 . For 
each of these parameter s e t t i n g s , there are 2^^ p o s s i b l e values of 
key which must be t e s t e d i f the DES i s to be broken by exhaustive 
attack. For t h i s extended algorithm, an input of 1232 bytes i s 
required. Changing the key merely r e q u i r e s changing any of these 
1232 bytes. 
The above argument shows how the permutations and s u b s t i t u t i o n s 
i n the DES algorithm can themselves be regarded as 'keys'. But one 
should be c a r e f u l i n determining the s e c u r i t y of such a system. I n 
the above a n a l y s i s , i t has been assumed for s i m p l i c i t y t h a t any one 
se t of permutations and s u b s t i t u t i o n s can be used i n the algorithm. 
But the s e c u r i t y of the algorithm may be h e a v i l y dependent on the 
p a r t i c u l a r values of the S-boxes and the permutations C 3] • Thus although 
the above process shows how the k e y s i z e to the DES algorithm can be 
extended, i t must be r e a l i z e d that not a l l these 'keys' may provide 
the same s e c u r i t y . 
3.4 Some C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of DES Algorithm 
3.4.1 Avalanche E f f e c t _ 
I f a small change i n the key or p l a i n t e x t were to produce a 
corresponding small change i n the c i p h e r t e x t , then t h i s might 
e f f e c t i v e l y reduce the s i z e of the p l a i n t e x t or key space to be 
searched. Hence one of the fundamental requirements o f a good 
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cryptographic algorithm i s to produce a • large* change i n the c i p h e r -
text f or a 'small*change i n the p l a i n t e x t or key. The DES e x h i b i t s 
t h i s property r e f e r r e d to as the * avalanche* e f f e c t by Horst F e i s t e l 
[ 6 ] - A c t u a l l y Meyer has shown i n [l8 ] that a f t e r f i v e rounds, each 
ci p h e r t e x t b i t depends on a l l p l a i n t e x t b i t s and key b i t s . This i n t e r -
symbol dependence property can be used for e r r o r d e t e c t i o n and 
authentication purposes. 
Table 3.2 i n Figure 3.6 shows the e f f e c t of change of a 
s i n g l e input b i t change i n the plalnteatt. The p l a i n t e x t s x and 
X = (11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 
11111111 11111111) 
X"= (01111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 
11111111 11111111) 
are enciphered with a randomly chosen key and the e f f e c t of changing 
a s i n g l e b i t as a function of the number of rounds i s seen. In 
Table 3.3 i n Figure 3.7, the procedure i s repeated, now f i x i n g the 
p l a i n t e x t and changing a s i n g l e b i t i n the key. 
A s i m i l a r e f f e c t i s seen to occur f o r changes o f s i n g l e b i t 
i n c i p h e r t e x t and key on decryption. 
3.4.2 Gompl^ementai^ £roperty_ 
The DES i s i n v a r i a n t under complementation o f p l a i n t e x t , 
key and c i p h e r t e x t . The r e l a t i o n s h i p c a l l e d the complementary property 
of DES can be expressed as: 
\ (-) = \ ( X ) 
where E j ^ stands for encryption under key K 
X i s the p l a i n t e x t 
and the bars represent complementation, that i s , b i t - i n v e r s i o n . 
This property a r i s e s because of the way i n which the 
i n t e r n a l sut^eys are used i n each round. T h i s can be shown as 
follows: 
Section 3.2.1 shows that the expanded v e r s i o n of r i g h t h a l f 
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Key 10000101 11001101 11001011 00011100 10011011 11010000 01000110 00011010 
Plaintext 1 
Plaintext 2 
Round 
0 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 
01111111 01111111 01111111 01111111 01111111 01111111 01111111 01111111 
11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 01000100 01111101 11111111 00010000 
11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 01000000 01110100 11111110 00000000 
01000100 01111101 11111111 00010000 00101010 11011000 10101000 01010111 
01000000 01110100 11111110 00000000 01100010 10100111 11010001 10110111 
00101010 11011000 10101000 01010111 00110101 01010000 01000110 11001000 
01100010 10100111 11010001 10110111 11010101 01001000 01100111 10001100 
00110101 01010000 01000110 11001000 10011011 10110000 01100010 01010001 
11010101 01001000 01100111 10001100 01110110 00001100 10100001 10011000 
10011011 10110000 01100010 01010001 00111001 00011110 00001000 01011001 
01110110 00001100 10100001 10011000 11011011 10000111 01010010 11111011 
00111001 00011110 00001001 01011001 11001101 00001111 11101001 00010010 
11011011 10000111 01010010 11111011 01101111 01111111 10101110 11001001 
11001101 00001111 11101001 00010010 10000011 01010000 00110110 00110011 
01101111 01111111 10101110 11001001 00111111 10110100 11110111 01000110 
10000011 01010000 00110110 00110011 10111010 10011110 11000100 00010110 
00111111 10110100 11110111 01000110 01000100 11111110 10001001 00110000 
( c o n t i n u e d on next page) 
9 
9 
10 
10 
11 
11 
12 
12 
15 
13 
14 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
Ciphertext 1 
Giphortext 2 
10111010 10011110 11000100 00010110 01000111 10011000 11001001 00011001 
01000100 11111110 10001001 00110000 10100101 11010100 11001111 01100110 
01000111 10011000 11001001 00011001 00101110 10110011 11000111 01010100 
10100101 11010100 11001111 01100110 00010110 10100001 11101011 01000100 
00101110 10110011 11000111 01010100 11000010 00100101 11110111 01001101 
00010110 10100001 11101011 01000100 10111110 01111010 00000010 01010111 
11000010 00100101 11110111 01001101 11011100 00000101 01101100 11011001 
10111110 01111010 00000010 01010111 01000110 10110010 11000111 01110111 
11011100 00000101 01101100 11011001 01001111 10100110 00000010 10111001 
01000110 10110010 11000111 01110111 00101101 11011011 10010000 00100100 
01001111 10100110 00100010 10111001 01101110 10010001 01100010 10101100 
00101101 11011011 10010000 00100100 11000010 10100111 00100001 00011111 
01101110 10010001 01100010 10101100 01001010 11100001 00101111 10000110 
11000010 10100111 00100001 00011111 01110011 01000011 11000111 00101011 
01001010 11100001 00101111 10110110.00100110 00011000 11110001 01101110 
01110011 01000011 11000111 00101011 01101001 10011011 01001100 01011101 
00101100 11001011 01001011 10011001 00010100 01101101 10100101 00100110 
11111011 10111010 00001101 01010111 10010001 11000010 11101101 00011000 
Figure 3.6 - Table 3.2 ; Avalanche E f f e c t I n DES; change i n p l a i n t e x t 
Key 1 10000101 11001101 11001011 00011100 10011011 11010000 01000110 00011010 
Key 2 00000101 11001101 11001011 00011100 10011011 11010000 01000110 00011010 
Round 
Plnintoxt 0 : 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 
Plaintext 0 j 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 
1 : 11111111 11111111 11111111 l l l U l l l 01000100 01111101 11111111 00010000 
1 I 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 01000100 00111101 11111111 01010000 
2 : 01000100 01111101 11111111 00010000 00101010 11011000 10101000 01010111 
2 : 01000100 00111101 11111111 01010000 00101110 11011001 11101100 01000110 
3 3 00101010 11011000 10101000 01010111 00110101 01010000 01000110 11001000 
3 I 00101110 11011001 11101100 01000110 11111011 11101110 01111001 00101001 
4 I 00110101 01010000 01000110 11001000 10011011 10110000 01100010 01010001 
4 I 11111011 11101110 01111001 00101001 OiOOlOlO 11100010 01111101 11001000 
5 i 10011011 10110000 01100010 01010001 00111001 00011110 00001001 01011001 
5 : 01001010 11100010 01111101 11001000 00100001 11100000 00010011 00101011 
6 : 00111001 00011110 00001001 01011001 11001101 00001111 11101001 00010010 
6 I 00100001 11110000 00010011 00101011 10001110 00110101 01000111 01111010 
7 t 11001101 00001111 11101001 00010010 10000011 01010000 00110110 00110011 
7 I 10001110 00110101 01000111 01111010 10100001 00001100 00110001 01110110 
8 : 10000011 01010000 00110110 00110011 10111010 10011110 11000100 00010110 
8 I 10100001 00001100 00110001 01110110 00111011 01011111 10111001 00110010 
(Continued on next page) 
9 
9 
10 
10 
11 
11 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
Clphertext 1 
Ciphertext 2 
10111010 10011110 11000100 00010110 PI O O O I I I 10011000 11001001 00011001 
00111011 01011111 10111001 00110010 10100011 00001110 11000010 01011110 
01000111 10011000 11001001 00011001 00101110 10110011 11000111 01010100 
10100011 00001110 11000010 01011110 00000010 00010100 10000011 11011111 
00101110 11010011 11000111 01010100 11000010 00100101 11110111 01001101 
00000010 00010100 10000011 11011111 01011110 11001011 01001100 01000111 
11000010 00100101 11110111 01001101 11011100 00000101 01101100 11011001 
01011110 11001011 01001100 01000111 01000111 01010001 01111100 00011011 
11011100 00000101 01101100 11011001 01001111 10100110 00000010 10111001 
01000111 01010001 01111100 00011011 10111011 01010101 11010010 01110001 
01001111 10100110 00000010 10111001 01101110 10010001 01100010 10101100 
10111011 01010101 11010010 01110001 11110010 01101010 10101101 10001111 
01101110 10010001 01100010 10101100 01001010 11100001 00101111 10000110 
11110010 01101010 10101101 10001111 11011010 01000011 11111000 01010011 
01001010 11100001 00101111 10110110 00100110 00011000 11110001 01101110 
11011010 01000011 11111000 01010011 00111110 01010101 01001010. 01111010 
00101100 11001011 01001011 10011001 00010100 01101101 10100101 00100110 
00110010 11100111 01010000 11001101 11011011 01001001 10111111 10001000 
F i g u r e 3.y - Table 3.3 i Avalanche E f f e c t i n DES; Change i n Key 
of the p l a i n t e x t undergoes a complicated process together with the 
key vectors K ( i ) at each roiind i * Let t h i s process be denoted by 
function f . Then, 
f [ R ( i ) , K ( i+1)] = f [ E ( R ( i ) ) ® K { i + 1 ) ] 
where E ( R ( i ) ) denotes the expanded r i g h t h a l f of p l a i n t e x t at round i 
® denotes Exclusive-or operation 
Complementing both R ( i ) and K(i+1) therefore does not change the value 
of f and 
f [ R { i ) , K { i + 1 ) ] = f [ R ( i ) , R(i+1)] 
Because 
L ( l ) = R ( o ) 
R ( l ) = L ( o ) ® f [ R ( o ) . K{1)] 
complementing p l a i n t e x t X means complementing L { o ) and R { o ) . 
Complementing key K means complementing K ( I ) , K ( 1 6 ) . Therefore 
t h i s r e s u l t s i n complementation of L ( l ) and R ( l ) . By induction, t h i s 
can be extended to L ( 2 ) R(2), L(16)R(16) and hence to c i p h e r t e x t 
C. 
Because of the complementary property of DES, i f a 
cryptanalyst could obtain Y = E (X) and Y = E (X) f o r an a r b i t r a r y 
X, he could reduce the s i z e of the key space he must search from 
2^^ to 2^^. The c r y p t a n a l y s t enciphers X with a l l keys K that s t a r t 
with a'o'. The r e s u l t a n t c i p h e r t e x t i s compared with Y^ ^ and Y^. I f 
C ^ Y the key i n use i s not K, i f C 4: Y the key i n use i s not R 
(which s t a r t s with a 1 ) . That i s , e f f e c t i v e l y t h i s symmetry reduces the 
search e f f o r t by 50 percent under a p a r t i a l l y chosen p l a i n t e x t a t t a c k . 
An example i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s complementary p r i n c i p l e of the DES 
obtained using the DES software i s shown i n Figure 3.8, This 
complementary behaviour can be avoided by s e l e c t i n g the &-boxes 
using one or more key b i t s d i r e c t l y , i n s t e a d of employing the modulo 
2 operation. On the other hand, t h i s complementary property can 
be used advantageously for t e s t i n g purposes. 
- 36 -
Key J 1000100010001000100010001000100010001000100010001000100010001000 
Plaintext: 0011011110110100111010100110110000100011110010111010000111111110 
Ciphertext 1i 1011000101110000011011011001100100010010101101111111110011110011 
complementation of keyi 011101110111011101110111011101110111011101110111011101110110111 
complementation of Plaintext: 1100100001001011000101011001001111011100001101000101111000000001 
Ciphertext 2 j OlOOlllOlOOOlllllOOlOdlOOllOOllOlllOllOlOlOOlOOOOOOOOOllOOOOllOO 
Ciphertext 2: Complement of Ciphertext 1. 
F i g u r e 3.8 i Complementation I n DES 
3.5 Design C r i t e r i a 
Although the DES algorithm has been made p u b l i c , the design 
c r i t e r i a behind the s p e c i f i c choice of some permutations and 
s u b s t i t u t i o n s remain s t i l l c l a s s i f i e d . For example,one design 
c r i t e r i o n for the DES was that the permutation schedule naist ensure 
that each output ( c i p h e r t e x t ) b i t i s a function of a l l input b i t s (plain-
t e x t and key) a f t e r a minimum number of rounds. I t i s reported that 
[3] the i n i t i a l approach of random s e l e c t i o n of the parameters such as 
the permutations and s u b s t i t u t i o n s had to be abandoned because they 
introduced weaknesses into the algorithm. Instead the p)arameters were 
randomly generated and t e s t e d against the design c r i t e r i a . I t i s 
believed that a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the random designs were r e j e c t e d 
i n t h i s process- One of the most important parameters i n the 
algorithm i s the S-boxes and they are considered i n the next s e c t i o n . 
3.5.1 S-BoxBS 
A l l the operations involved i n the DES algorithm except the 
S-box mappings are l i n e a r i n binary a r i t h m e t i c . Therefore the S-boxes 
play an important r o l e i n the s e c u r i t y of the CHS. I t i s therefore 
c r u c i a l that the S-boxes not be a f f i n e or the whole algorithm would 
be a f f i n e . A study by Hellman e t a l [19] found that none of the 
S-boxes are a f f i n e . But they point out that there are a number of 
questionable q u a s i - l i n e a r s t r u c t u r e s uAiich may tend to weaken the 
algorithm. But c u r r e n t l y no methods are f o w d which could e x p l o i t 
these q u a s i - l i n e a r i t i e s i n reducing the search e f f o r t . The designers 
of DES argue that i t should not be s u r p r i s i n g that c e r t a i n parameters 
contain some s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s d i f f e r e n t from those expected to 
r e s u l t from the use of purely random s e l e c t i o n . Ftirther they c l a i m 
that [ 3 ] t h e i r design e f f o r t showed that c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d S-box 
functions produce a much stronger algorithm than one based on random 
designs. 
The DES S-boxes are n o n - i n v e r t i b l e 6 to 4 non-linear 
mappings. Each S-box i s found to have the property t h a t changing 
any s i n g l e b i t of the input w h i l e keeping the others constant always 
changes a t l e a s t two b i t s i n the output. T h i s property r e s u l t s i n 
the e r r o r propagation property and i s e s s e n t i a l to avoid the key 
c l u s t e r i n g attack [ 2] • T h i s property p l a y s an important r o l e i n 
causing the avalanche e f f e c t mentioned eeurlier. On average i t i s 
- 38 -
found that the number of output b i t s that change i n the DES for a 
s i n g l e input i s above 2 (2.5 - 2.6) [ 1 9 ] . 
Another p r i n c i p l e underlying the design of the S-boxes i s 
that the d i f f e r e n c e betvieen the number of zeroes and the nuii±>er of 
ones i n the output when any one of the input b i t s i s h e l d constant 
i s a minimum. Th i s design c r i t e r i a i s believed [20] to strengthen 
the algorithm. 
3.5.2 I n i t i a l ^ and FiJial^ ^IF^^lPH^^ 
The p l a i n t e x t input to the DES i s f i r s t permuted using I P 
before transformed by the s i x t e e n rounds. The output o f the f i n a l 
round undergoes an inverse permutation I P ~ where I P " • I P = I,the 
i d e n t i t y permutation. I t i s in7X>rtant to note that i n a s i n g l e 
encryption process, I P and I P " do not c a n c e l each other as I P 
operates on the p l a i n t e x t and I P " operates on the c i p h e r t e x t produced 
by the 16th round. On the other hand, the permutation I P " ^ petformed 
during the encryption process i s c a n c e l l e d by the permutation I P 
performed at the beginning of the decryption process. 
I t seems that the permutaticxis IP and IP"^ do not have any 
cryptographic s i g n i f i c a n c e . P o s s i b l e reasons for t h e i r i n c l u s i o n i n 
the algorithm are that they f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of the 
algorithm for a p a r t i c u l a r I C layout or they r e s u l t from the way the 
data i s loaded i n t o the DES c h i p . These permutations I P and I P " can 
be absorbed by proper layout i n t o the main algorithm and they do not 
slow down the algorithm. The algorithm designers c l a i m that the 
permutations do have cryptographic value and they c o n t r i b u t e to the 
s e c u r i t y of the OES. This could be p o s s i b l e as f o l l o w s : In many 
ap p l i c a t i o n s , ASCII c h a r a c t e r s are used for the p l a i n t e x t . Because 
of the p a r t i c u l a r ASCII coding and the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n of the 
E n g l i s h alphabets, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of ' l * s and 'o's w i l l not be 
uniform. The I P permutation groups every i • b i t of each input byte 
i n t o j byte of the permuted output. . T h i s preprocessing of the 
p l a i n t e x t may r e d i s t r i b u t e the ' I ' s and 'o's i n a uniform way before 
inputting to the 16 rounds and thus may enhance the s e c u r i t y . 
3.5.3 P-Perpaitatipn 
The fimction o f the P-p>ermutation i n the DES as i n a l l 
substitution-permutation c i p h e r s i s to provide the element of 
d i f f u s i o n [ 7 ] . This ccaicept was f i r s t introduced by Shannon to 
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spread the dependencies of output b i t s on input b i t s through 
su c c e s s i v e rounds to achieve t o t a l mixing* 
3-6 C r i t i c i s m and Weaknesses of DES 
The controversy surrounding the DES e s s C T t i a l l y comes from 
two main objections given below: 
( i ) the small s i z e of the key space and 
( i i ) the algorithm's unpublished design p r i n c i p l e s * 
Other c r i t i c i s m s of the algorithm include the small number of rounds^ 
the two 'redundant' pemutations I P and I P ~ and a r e l a t i v e l y simple 
key schedule operation* 
To i n v e s t i g a t e these criticisms» two workshops were 
organized by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS)* The f i r s t 
workshop analysed the complexity of the algorithm and r e s t a t e d that 
no short cut methods, were found [ 2 0 ] * The second workshop concluded 
that a key searching machine cannot be b u i l t before 1990 and w i l l 
c ost s e v e r a l tens of m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s with a p r o b a b i l i t y f a c t o r 
of being a v a i l a b l e evra then o f about 0*1 to 0*2 [21]* L e t us now 
consider the major c r i t i c i s m s of DES i n ttim* 
3.6.1 The Kejr L e n ^ h _ 
By f a r the greatest source of controversy has been the choice 
of 56-bits as the key length* The length of the key determines the 
f e a s i b i l i t y of key t r i a l * C r i t i c s argued that the length of the key 
i s too small and that the key space i s amcviable to exhaustive search. 
i H f f i e and Hellman [22] disputed the NBS c l a i m that t r y i n g a l l 
p o s s i b l e keys i s not economically f e a s i b l e and estimated that a DES 
key can be recovered by e^diaustive search f o r approximately $5000 
worth of c o n ^ t a t i o n time on a s p e c i a l purpose machine* The s p e c i a l 
purpose machine would c o n s i s t of a m i l l i o n L S I chips and could t r y a l l 
the 2^^ keys i n one day. The c o s t of such a machine u s i n g the semi-
conductor technology of the mid-seventies was estimated to be i n 
20 m i l l i o n d o l l a r range. More r e c e n t l y [ 8 4 ] , the c o s t o f a 2-day 
average search time machine i s estimated to be around 50 m i l l i o n 
d o l l a r s * This meant that i t i s out of reach of most groups with the 
p o s s i b l e exception of government s e c u r i t y agencies. I t was predicted 
that i n 10 years, the machine w i l l c ost approximately 200,000 d o l l a r s 
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and recovery of one key w i l l be around 50 d o l l a r s . Such attac k s 
assume that the DES i s being used i n the standard code book mode. 
A l t e r n a t i v e brute force attack on the DES algorithm i s to 
use a t a b l e loc^-up approach. I n t h i s approach a l l the c i p h e r t e x t s 
r e s u l t i n g from enciphering a chosen p l a i n t e x t are stored and sorted 
using a l l the 2^^ keys. The amount of memory required f o r t h i s attack 
56 18 
i s of the order of 56 (2 ) = 4 x 10 b i t s which i s enormous. T h i s g would r e q u i r e 4 b i l l i o n magnetic tapes (about lO b i t s per t a p e ) , 
c o s t i n g about 80 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s ($20 per tape) [ 4 ] . I n [ 2 3 ] , 
Hellman proposed a trade o f f between time and memory. L i k e t a b l e look 
up approach, t h i s technique r e q u i r e s precomputation and storage of a 
t a b l e . However, with t h i s technique, the t a b l e s i z e i s only of the 
order 0(r?^^) instead of the p r e v i o u s l y 0 ( n ) where n = 56(2^^) b i t s . 
T his technique a l s o requires searching and the search time i s of the 
order 0(T?^^) instead of 0(n) wrtiere n = 2^^. Hellman p r e d i c t s that 
with proper combination of precomputation and searching, a machine 
may be constructed that would recover the key with high p r o b a b i l i t y 
i n one day. This i n turn l e d to the suggestion that a bigger key 
length of 128 b i t s i s required. 
Further the key space i s reduced i f the key i s not chosen 
as a 56 randomly s e l e c t e d b i t s . For i n s t a n c e , i f the key i s s e l e c t e d 
as eight c h a r a c t e r s , each character being one of say 64 p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
then the number of d i s t i n c t keys which need to be t e s t e d i s (64) = 
14 
2.8 X lO yit\xch may be quite f e a s i b l e . 
The key space i s a l s o reduced by the i n v a r i a n t property of 
DES under complementation. As seen i n Section 3.4.2, t h i s symmetry can 
be used to reduce search e f f o r t by 50% under a p a r t i a l l y chosen 
p l a i n t e x t attack. 
3.6*2 IMgLiblished Desi^_F^inciple£ 
The second major c r i t i c i s m of the DES algorithm i s that the 
design c r i t e r i a behind the choice of some of the parameters are not 
d i s c l o s e d p u b l i c l y . Those parameters are the S-boxes, f i x e d 
permutation P and the key schedule operation. 
The c l a s s i f i e d design p r i n c i p l e s l e d some c r i t i c s to argue 
that deliberate- trapdoors might have been incorporated i n the 
algorithm by the designer to h i s advantage. T h i s argument i s based 
on the f a c t that i t i s p o s s i b l e to design •innocent-looking* S-boxes 
which contained trapdoors [ 1 9 ] . Further, regular s t r u c t u r e s were 
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discovered i n c e r t a i n parts of the DES algorithm which were s u r p r i s -
ingly s i m i l a r to a type that can be used t o b u i l d a trapdoor i n t o the 
system [ l 9 , 24 J. L i k e the conplementation property, i t may be p o s s i b l e 
to save another f a c t o r of two with c a r e f u l l y chosen S-boxes thus 
saving a t o t a l of 75% over exhaustive search. Lexar Corporation [24] 
examined the properties of the s u b s t i t u t i o n s and permutations and 
reported some 'peculiar' p r o p e r t i e s of the S-boxes but t o date no 
f e a s i b l e c r y p t a n a l y t i c technique f o r DES has been found. 
3.6.3 MLimber_of R9unds_ 
DES i s a l s o c r i t i c i z e d f o r having a small number of rounds 
and i t i s suggested that the number of rounds should at Ijeast be 
increased to 32 [ l 9 ] - The number of rounds c o n t r o l s the mixing of 
input b i t values, that i s , the amount of d i f f u s i o n introduced by the 
co-ordinate permutation. An i n c r e a s e i n the number of rounds w i l l 
produce a greater avalanche e f f e c t . A two round DES was s u c c e s s f u l l y 
crypt analyzed [19 ] by e x p l o i t i n g the c o r r e l a t i o n between L_R- and the 
^ 2 
input. Such c o r r e l a t i o n i s b e l i e v e d to disappear a f t e r eight 
rounds [ 6 ] . 
Some s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s to t e s t the randomness of the 
DES output sequences and any c o r r e l a t i o n between p l a i n t e x t input and 
ci p h e r t e x t output i s considered i n Chapter 6. 
3.6.4 Kejf 5=iiedureJUporit>m_-J^ and Semiwe^J^eys 
The cryptographic strength of the DES w i l l be reduced i f 
some of the i n t e r n a l subkeys derived from the external key are the 
same. In the extreme case, i f a l l the i n t e r n a l keys a r e the same 
48 
then the key space i s reduced to 2 . Refer r i n g to the key schedule 
algorithm given i n Figure 3.3, t h i s s i t u a t i o n occurs w^ienever a l l b i t s 
i n the r e g i s t e r C are a l l ones or zeroes and the b i t s i n r e g i s t e r D 
are a l l ones or zeroes. There a re four such weak keys altogether [ 3 ] . 
These weak keys a l s o have the property that there i s no d i f f e r e n c e 
between the operations of encipherment and decipherment, that i s , 
E^Ej^{X) = X = E^Dj^(X) f o r weak keys. There i s another s e t of keys 
defined as semiweak vrtiich have the property that only t w d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r n a l keys are produced each occurring 8 times. There are s i x 
such semiweak keys and they have the propjerty E ^ ^ / (X) = X = 
Ej ^ E j ^ ( X ) , tt^ere k and k^ are d i s t i n c t semiweak keys. Further there 
are 48 other external keys which produce only 4 d i f f e r e n t i n t e r n a l 
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keys. 
These s p e c i a l keys do not pose any th r e a t to t h e s e c u r i t y 
of the algorithm because the number o f such keys i s small compared to 
the t o t a l s e t . Provided that the keys are randomly s e l e c t e d the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of choosing such a key i s very s m a l l . Further these keys 
can e a s i l y be avoided during key generation. 
The key schedule algorithm can be improved by incorporating 
n o n - l i n e a r i t y i n the i n t e r n a l key generation process [ 3 9 ] . A 
s u i t a b l y s h i f t e d e x t e r n a l key can be inputted to a s u b s t i t u t i o n -
permutation process i n each round to produce the i n t e r n a l key as 
shown i n Figure 3.9. The scheme allows, i n addition to the enlarge-
ment of the key space, other c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e properties 
such as e r r o r propagation. As the s u b s t i t u t i o n permutation function 
i s already a v a i l a b l e i n the algorithm, t h i s r equires minimum a d d i t i o n a l 
hardware. 
3.7 Cryptianalysis of DES 
C r y p t a n a l y t i c a l methods can be divided i n t o two subcategories 
namely d e t e r m i n i s t i c or a n a l y t i c a l and s t a t i s t i c a l methods. 
In a d e t e r m i n i s t i c approach, the c r y p t a n a l y s t attempts to 
e g r e s s the desired unknowi quantity (such as the key o r the message) 
in terms of some other known quantity or q u a n t i t i e s (such as given 
c i p h e r t e x t or given p l a i n t e x t and corresponding c i p h e r t e x t ) . Oie 
method of attack i s therefore to represent the 64 c i p h e r t e x t output 
b i t s as fiinctions of the 56 key b i t s i n a known p l a i n t e x t attack 
and t r y to solve the 64 non-linear equations over GF(2) for 56 
unknowns. This problem i s an NP-complete problem [8] and hence i s 
d i f f i c u l t to solve i n general. Such an a n a l y t i c a l a t t a c k of the DES 
was proposed i n [ 2 5 ] . The attack proved to be manageable with a f f i n e 
S-boxes but i n f e a s i b l e when the r e a l DES was considered. IBM and 
NSA a l s o reported to have conducted s i m i l a r a t t a c k s as part of t h e i r 
v a l i d a t i o n process with no short cut s o l u t i o n s being found. 
In the s t a t i s t i c a l approach, the c r y p t a n a l y s t attenpts to 
ex p l o i t s t a t i s t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p l a i n t e x t , c i p h e r t e x t and 
key. To thwart s t a t i s t i c a l a t t a c k s , the algorithm's output should be 
pseudo-random even for highly s t r u c t u r e d inputs. In other words,for 
a l a r g e s e t of p l a i n t e x t and key inputs one must not be able, on the 
ba s i s of s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s , to r e j e c t the hypothesis that the 
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output b i t stream i s random. Some fundamental s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s have 
been performed on the DES output streams and they are d i s c u s s e d i n 
Chapter 6. 
F i n a l l y one should mention the brute force a t t a c k to f i n d 
the unknown quantity such as the message or key by using a d i r e c t 
search method, t r i a l and e r r o r or exhaustion. As mentioned e a r l i e r 
the key length i s an important f a c t o r on t h i s type of a t t a c k and 
greater the key length bigger the work f a c t o r to perform the key 
exhaustion. 
3.8 Discussion 
I f an algorithm i s defined to be c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y strong 
when the algorithm complexity i s such t h a t , 
( i ) using a l l known shortcut s o l u t i o n s , i t i s not p r a c t i c a l l y 
p o s s i b l e to solve for the key or for the message 
( i i ) i t i s too c o s t l y to employ simple methods such as key 
exhaustion because too much time and/or hardware are 
required 
then,despite a l o t of controversy surrounding the DES, DES can be 
considered to be a c r y p t o g r a p h i c a l l y strong algorithm. As f a r as the 
author i s aware not a s i n g l e s u c c e s s f u l 'break' has been developed 
that can produce or determine the unknown key. F\irther,the l i f e of 
the DES can be extended ( u n t i l a shortcut s o l u t i o n i s found) by 
enciphering the data two or more times with d i f f e r e n t k e y s . Double 
encryption w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e the d i f f i c u l t y o f i n t r u s i o n 
r e q u i r i n g of the order of 2^^ words of memory and 2^^ operations [ 3 ] . 
Ho«i«ver i t i s preferred that such a m u l t i p l e encryption process i s 
s p e c i f i e d as part of the algorithm i t s e l f . The s e c u r i t y can a l s o be 
improved by enploying DES under va r i o u s chaining modes. They are 
considered i n subsequent chapters. In account of t h i s * the DES 
algorithm has been chosen to be employed i n the design o f an 
encryption i n t e r f a c e u n i t to be used i n a communication network. T h i s 
forms the subject of the next chapter. T h i s chapter i s concluded by 
noting that the DES can be used as a b u i l d i n g block f o r designing more 
sop h i s t i c a t e d algorithms. For instance,the DES i t s e l f can be used as 
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the cipher function f i n Figure 3.2. T h i s g i v e s r i s e to the scheme 
shoim i n Figure 3.10 where a block of 128 b i t s forms the 
p l a i n t e x t . 
L (1) 
> r 
R (1) 
f 
P i ^ r e 3.10 - Extended DES A l g o r i t h m 
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C H A P T E R 4 
DESI04 OF ENCRYPTION SYSTEM: SYSTEM HARDWARE 
4.1 System Requirements 
The requirements f or the encryption system may be c l a s s -
i f i e d i n t o three groups namely 
( i ) s e c u r i t y requireonents 
( i i ) Operator requirements and 
( i i i ) t e c h n i c a l requirements. 
4.1.1 Secur i ty_Requ^i reraej^^ 
B r i e f l y , the s e c u r i t y requirements a re as f o l l o w s : 
( a ) The encryption algorithm used i n the system should be 
cryptographically strong. That i s , i t should withstand at 
l e a s t a l l the major c r y p t a n a l y t i c a t t a c k s d e s c r i b e d i n 
Section 2.2. 
(b) There should be a l a r g e nuirt>er of user s e l e c t a b l e keys to 
prevent the opponent employing exhaustion techniques to 
determine the key s e l e c t e d . 
The DES algorithm outlined i n Chapter 3 meets these conditions very 
w e l l . 
( c ) The use of the algorithm within the system should be c a r r i e d 
out i n such a way that the system as a «tole i s at l e a s t as 
strong as the i n i t i a l strength of the algorithm i t s e l f . 
(d) At no time, keys used by the algorithm must be stored i n 
p l a i n form within the system as otherwise i t would enable 
any unauthorized user to i t s recovery. 
(e ) Key changes should be made easy to implement. 
( f ) A high degree of p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y measures nzust be provided 
to protect the system against i n t e n t i o n a l or a c c i d e n t a l 
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t h r e a t s . 
4.1.2 Oper a t orJRequ i£emen t s_ 
The system should be made 'user f r i e n d l y ' thus allowing any 
user to operate i t e f f i c i e n t l y with l i t t l e t r a i n i n g . T h i s aspect i s 
very important i n the case of l a r g e networks. The uni t should a l s o 
be easy to i n s t a l l . 
4.1.3 J^?S}^£P^ Bl^3}*i,^£FI£Pl.s_ 
The t e c h n i c a l requirements f o r the «icryption system depend 
to a great extent upon the use to which the system w i l l be put. T h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r encryption system i s designed to be used i n t h e following 
a p p l i c a t i o n s : 
( a ) transmission/reception of encrypted/plain data i n a poin t -
to-point communication s e c u r i t y system not containing a 
host computer; 
(b) a l o c a l encrypted/plain data s t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l system using 
floppy d i s k s ; 
( c ) transmission/reception of encrypted/plain data over the 
communication l i n k to a host computer and s t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l 
of encrypted/plain data using a host computer, i n p a r t i c u l a r 
with the ftrestel Viewdata computer. 
The requirements for a s t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l encryption system 
are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those necessary i n a point-to-point 
communication system. Some of the aspects to be considered are: 
1. Real time processing and transmission delays: These are 
p a r t i c u l a r l y important i n point-to-point communication 
where information flow i s i r r e g u l a r and messages may not be 
of f i x e d format. 
2. Transmission data r a t e s : This aspect i s i n ^ r t a n t i n 
determining whether asynchronous or synchronous transmission 
i s needed. We are concerned here with only asynchronous 
transmission of data r a t e s up to 1200 bauds. Further the 
- 48 -
communication with P r e s t e l computer i s asymmetric f u l l 
duplex i n the sense that i t r e q u i r e s 1200 bauds for 
transmission and 75 bauds for reception. 
3. Where a mixture of p l a i n and encrypted t e x t s i s required to 
be sentp sudtching between encrypted t e x t mode and p l a i n -
text mode should be easy. This should be c a r r i e d out w i t h i n 
the message so that the r e c e i v i n g u n i t can follow i d e n t i c a l 
mode changes. 
4. I n the case of s t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l system with a host c o n ^ t e r , 
s i n c e the encrypted information i s l i k e l y to pass through 
the host computer c o n t r o l u n i t where c e r t a i n c o n t r o l 
c h a r a c t e r s are generated and detected, there i s a need to 
prevent the occurrCTce of these s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r s i n the 
encrypted information. This i n ^ j l i e s that the encryption 
system should be made transparent t o the host computer 
protocols. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t when the system i s 
used i n P r e s t e l network. 
5. Standard e d i t i n g f a c i l i t i e s such as ch a r a c t e r delete, l i n e 
d e l e t e etc* must be a v a i l a b l e to the system u s e r s . 
4.2 General System Description 
A symmetric encryption-decryption system i n an end-to-end 
communication configuration i s shown sche m a t i c a l l y i n Figu r e 4.1. 
The operation of the system can be summarised as fo l l o w s . Referring 
to Figure 4.1, the p l a i n t e x t from an Apple terminal forms the input to 
the encryption system. The p l a i n t e x t i s a combination o f any of the 
alphanumerical c h a r a c t e r s from the keyboard. The key required for the 
encryption process i s entered from the terminal keyboard under the 
user control p r i o r to the commencement of the ses s i o n and i s stored 
i n an i n a c c e s s i b l e area within the encryption device. The encryption 
system operates on the input sequence using the key to produce a 
ciphertext sequence. This cipher i s transmitted through input:-output 
communication c o n t r o l l e r to the modem. The modem converts the binary 
data pulses to analog frequencies using FrequCTicy S h i f t Keying (FSK) 
scheme for transmission over the public switched telephone network. 
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At the r e c e i v i n g end, another modem converts the FSK s i g n a l s back to 
d i g i t a l form which i s then deciphered to regenerate the o r i g i n a l plain-
t e x t . T h i s deciphered information can then be displayed on a V i s u a l 
Display Unit or print e d on a l i n e p r i n t e r . 
The communication l i n k between Apple microcomputers i s a 
half-duplex one thus allowing t r a n s f e r of data i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n but 
not at the same time. 
From Figure 4.1 i t i s seen that i n t h i s implementation, the 
encryption system i s incorporated as an i n - b u i l t f e a t u r e of the 
terminal, rather than as a separate u n i t . The b u i l t - i n implementation 
i s superior to stand-alone implementation i n the area of access 
prevention as the former t«:hnique g r e a t l y reduces the chances of 
detection between the terminal and the «icryption u n i t where the t e x t 
i s i n p l a i n form. However t h i s technique may be d i f f i c u l t to 
inclement i n e x i s t i n g systems and can r e q u i r e major redesigns. T h i s 
i s where the stand-alone u n i t has the advantage i n that i t can simply 
be i n s e r t e d i n t o e x i s t i n g networks with l i t t l e or no impact to 
e x i s t i n g equipment. 
The d i f f e r m t se c t i o n s ^ i c h c o n s t i t u t e the system are: 
1. Apple microcomputers - comprising 6502 microprocessor, 
memory, d i s k e t t e i n t e r f a c e and Language card. 
2. The encryption i n t e r f a c e u n i t . 
3. The modulator-demodulator equipment. 
4.2.1 Ap^le Microcon^ter 
I n t h i s p r o j e c t , Apple microcomputers have been used to form 
a two node network. The Apple microcomputer i s a 6502 microprocessor 
based system with d i s k e t t e i n t e r f a c e s , d i s k d r i v i n g u n i t s . Integer 
card and a standard keyboard. The processor can d i r e c t l y r e f e r race 
up to 64 k i l o b y t e s o f memory. Along the back of the / ^ l e ' s main 
board, i s a row of eight • s l o t s ' or p e r i p h e r a l connectors. In seven 
of these s l o t s , p e r i p h e r a l i n t e r f a c e boards designed f o r Apple system 
can be i n s t a l l e d . I n s l o t O, Integer firmware card i s i n s t a l l e d . 
Each s l o t has a 2K-byte of common shared memory a s s o c i a t e d with i t , 
with a view to holding programs or d r i v i n g subroutines o f the 
peripheral i n t e r f a c e card. The designed encryption i n t e r f a c e card i s 
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i n s t a l l e d i n s l o t niiii±>er 2 providing a memory range of CBOO to CFFF. 
4,2.2 Encr^t^ion_InterfaceJLAi^it 
The u n i t i s designed u t i l i z i n g the 6502 microprocessor of 
the Apple microconqouter system. A block diagram showing the various 
s e c t i o n s of the u n i t i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figu r e 4.2. The s e c t i o n s a r e : 
1. Data S e c u r i t y Device. 
2. S e r i a l Input-CXitput C o n t r o l l e r . 
3. RS-232C I n t e r f a c e C i r c u i t s . 
4. Timing C i r c u i t s . 
5. Decoding C i r c u i t s . 
6. Memory. 
4.2.2.1 C i r o U t 2pscri£tipn and Operation 
A complete c i r c u i t diagram i s shown i n Figure 4.3. Some 
important aspects of the c i r c u i t a r e now b r i e f l y considered. 
4.2.2.2 Sa t a _ S e c u r i t i ^ S^i£'^_ 
As mentioned e a r l i e r * i t has been decided to use the PES 
algorithm i n hardiware i n the design of the i n t e r f a c e u n i t . The choice 
o f the data s e c u r i t y device incorporating the standard was r e s t r i c t e d 
due to l i m i t a t i o n s of not only t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y but a l s o t h e i r 
access. A Western D i g i t a l device has be«i used for t h i s purpose 
because of i t s ready a v a i l a b i l i t y . The device i s made i n n-channel 
s i l i c o n gate MDS technology and i s TIL compatible on a l l inputs and 
outputs. The device can be i n t e r f a c e d to a wide v a r i e t y of processors 
though i t i s t a i l o r e d to the I n t e l 806QA c l a s s microprocessor. The 
device performs 64-bit block encryption and decryption using 56-bit 
key. The block diagram, shown i n Figure 4.4, i l l u s t r a t e s the i n t e r n a l 
s t r u c t u r e of the device. I t contains 64-bit data r e g i s t e r , 56-bit 
key r e g i s t e r , an 8-b i t command/status r e g i s t e r plus the necessary l o g i c 
to check key p>arity and implement the D£S algorithm. The device has 
a s i n g l e 8-bit data bus buffer with t r i - s t a t e operation through which 
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data may be entered i n t o the key r e g i s t e r or the data r e g i s t e r . 
Outpxit data from the s t a t u s r e g i s t e r or the data r e g i s t e r i s a l s o 
switched through the data bus bu f f e r . The device can be programmed 
e i t h e r v i a the input l i n e s or v i a the data bus. In t h i s design, the 
second approach has been adopted. The prograimning of the device w i l l 
be b r i e f l y discussed i n system software (Chapter 5 ) . 
4.2.2.3 §^TiaX_lnput^>it^t Cont£oUer_ 
There are a nundDer of such devices which would be s u i t a b l e 
for transmission and reception of p l a i n and enciphered data. Again a 
Western D i g i t a l device, dual enhanced communications elemmt (DEUCE) 
has been used. I t i s p r i m a r i l y designed to operate i n an 8-b i t 
microprocessor environment. 
The c o n t r o l l e r contains two independent f u l l - d u p l e x 
asynchronous r e c e i v e r / t r a n s m i t t e r channels and two i n t e r n a l baud r a t e 
generators a s s o c i a t e d with the two channels. A block diagram of the 
i n t e r n a l a r c h i t e c t u r e of the device i s shown i n Figure 4.5. 
Communications between the c o n t r o l l i n g CRJ and the two r e c e i v e r / 
t r a n s mitter channels or the two baud r a t e generators occurs v i a the 
8-bit data bus through a common s e t of bus t r a n s c e i v e r s . The use o f 
t h i s conplex device has enabled the development of a c o n ^ c t encryption 
system. 
Each channel has as s o c i a t e d with i t a number o f r e g i s t e r s 
such as the Transmit Holding R e g i s t e r , Receive Holding R e g i s t e r , 
Command Register, Mode Register, Status R e g i s t e r etc,which can be 
programmed to transmit and r e c e i v e asynchronous s e r i a l data. I t 
performs s e r i a l to p a r a l l e l conversion on data c h a r a c t e r s received 
from the modem and p a r a l l e l to s e r i a l conversion on data c h a r a c t e r s 
received from the CRJ. The CRJ can read the s t a t u s of e i t h e r channel 
at any time. Status information includes the type and condition of 
t r a n s f e r operations being performed by the device as w e l l as any 
transmission e r r o r conditions. I n t e r n a l c o n t r o l of each channel i s 
achieved by means of two i n t e r n a l m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r s one f o r transmit 
and one for r e c e i v e . A block diagram of one of two communication 
c o n t r o l l e r s i s shown i n Figure 4.6. The c o n t r o l r e g i s t e r s , v a r i o u s 
counters and ext e r n a l s i g n a l s provide inputs t o the m i c r o c o n t r o l l e r s , 
u ^ c h generate the necessary c o n t r o l s i g n a l s to send and rec e i v e 
s e r i a l data according to the programmed pr o t o c o l . 
The device a l s o contains Baud Rate Registers which can be 
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programmed to des i r e d data r a t e s by loading them with the appropriate 
number of bauds. The contents of these r e g i s t e r s are then decoded and 
then addressed to a frequency s e l e c t ROM f o r the generation of proper 
frequency by the d i v i d e r c i r c u i t r y and the c o n t r o l l o g i c during 
operation. A diagram of one of the two Baud Rate generators i s shown 
i n Figure 4*7. The baud clock source i s s e l e c t e d using s e l e c t clock 
pin ( S E L O L K ) i n conjunction with the c l o c k s e l e c t b i t ( C R l ) i n the 
Conmand Register (see Figure 4.8). When the b i t CRl i s high, the 
external clock mode i s s e l e c t e d . T h i s means that the Transmit and 
Receive c l o c k s are i n t e r n a l l y t i e d together and SELCLK input determines 
whether those c l o c k s are driven from the i n t e r n a l baud r a t e generator 
(SELOJC high) or from the e x t e r n a l clock input X C I / B C O (SELCLK low). 
I f the i n t e r n a l baud r a t e generator i s s e l e c t e d , then the ext e r n a l 
clock input becomes a baud r a t e generator c l o c k output. When the 
b i t CRl i s a l o g i c 'O' then the i n t e r n a l clock s e l e c t mode i s chosen. 
The transmit clock i s driven by the i n t e r n a l baud r a t e generator clock 
and the r e c e i v e clock i s drivOT by the SELCLK input. The XCI/BOO pin 
thCTi becomes the baud clock output, the transmit clock. The inputs 
to the SFI .O X and XCI/BOO pins are derived using the simple l o g i c 
c i r c u i t shovn i n Figure 4.8(a). 
When the s i g n a l present on the l i n e marked X i s low and the 
s i g n a l a t Y i s high, t h i s enables the t r i s t a t e 21 and s e t s the SELCLK 
to be high. With the b i t CRl a t l o g i c t h i s would r e s u l t i n both 
the transmit and r e c e i v e c l o c k s t i e d together and driven by intemad 
baud r a t e generator. This mode shown i n Figu r e 4.8(b) i s adopted f o r 
point-to-point comnainication between two Apple microcomputers. 
When the signaJ. present on the l i n e marked X i s high and 
the b i t CRl i s at l o g i c 'O' then the t r i s t a t e Z2 i s enabled. The 
XCI/BOO output i s then connected to the SELCLK input which d r i v e s 
the r e c e i v e c l o c k . The transmit clock i s driven by the i n t e r n a l baud 
ra t e generator. This configuration thus allows to transmit and 
rec e i v e a t d i f f e r e n t frequencies using only one channel without using 
an e x t e r n a l baud r a t e generator. T h i s i s one of the main reasons f o r 
using t h i s I / O c o n t r o l l e r . Thxs mode of operation, shown i n Figure 
4 . 8 ( c ) , i s adopted when the i n t e r f a c e i s used i n the P r e s t e l network 
where the transmission data r a t e i s 75 bauds and r e c e i v e data r a t e 
i s 1200 bauds. 
The s i g n a l s Clear To Send (CTS) and Request To Send (RTS) 
to and from the device are used i n c o n t r o l l i n g the modem. These 
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s i g n a l s are discussed i n the next s e c t i o n , 
4,2,2^4 RS-232C i n t e r f a c e C i r c u i t ^ s _ 
These c i r c u i t s are used t o i n t e r f a c e between Data Terminal 
EquipiDent (eg Apple computer te r m i n a l ) and Data Communications 
Equipment (eg M3dem) i n conformity uri.th the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of EIA stand-
ard number RS-232C. The RS-232C standard defines a l l the control and 
data s i g n a l s ( i n c l u d i n g s i g n a l l e v e l s ) used to enable the modem and 
the terminal t o operate together and t r a n s f e r data. For t h i s purpose* 
a quad l i n e d r i v e r (MC 1488) and i t s conpanion c i r c u i t (M:: 1489) quad 
l i n e r e c e i v e r are used to provide a complete i n t e r f a c e system between 
TTL l e v e l s i g n a l s from the system to RS-232C l e v e l s . 
The i n t e r f a c e control l i n e s can be divided i n t o two groups* 
one concerned with the control sequences f o r connecting the modem to 
the l i n e and the other concerned with the sequences c o n t r o l l i n g the 
app l i c a t i o n (and detection) of s i g n a l to the l i n e . 
The s i g n a l s Data Terminal Ready (DTR) and E>ata Set Ready 
(DSR) belong to the f i r s t group. The DTR s i g n a l from the terminal i s 
used to t e l l the modem to answer the telephone (ON) and t o hang i t up 
(OFF). In t h i s design* t h i s s i g n a l i s used to i n d i c a t e »*iether the 
terminal power i s . CN or CFF. The DSR s i g n a l i s used to i n d i c a t e t o 
the terminal that the modem i s i n a s t a t e i n which i t i s capable o f 
transmitting data. 
The group of RS-232C c o n t r o l s i g n a l s that r e l a t e to the 
app l i c a t i o n and detection of time s i g n a l are: Request To Send (RTS), 
C l e a r To Send (CTS) and Data C a r r i e r E>etect (DCD). The l o g i c a l 
i n t e r a c t i o n of these s i g n a l s i s simple vhen they operate i n a two-wire 
half-duplex mode and complex when terminals operate a four-wire f u l l -
duplex mode. In t h i s design, the point-to-point communication between 
two Apple microcomputers i s half-duplex whereas the communication with 
the P r e s t e l computer i s asymmetric f u l l - d u p l e x . 
The Request To Send s i g n a l from the terminal i s used t o 
in d i c a t e to the modem that the terminal wishes to transmit data. The 
modem then responds by i n i t i a t i n g i t s transmit mode. When the modem 
has reached a steady s t a t e c a r r i e r condition, and i s ready to transmit, 
i t sends a Clear To Send s i g n a l to the t e r m i n a l . However, CTS does 
not imply a p o s i t i v e v e r i f i c a t i o n that communication with the other end 
has been e s t a b l i s h e d . Therefore the Data C a r r i e r Detect s i g n a l i s 
used to i n d i c a t e that the r e c e i v i n g modem has detected a l i n e s i g n a l 
- 61 -
( c a r r i e r ) from the other end. 
In point-to-point communication, i n i t i a l l y when both ends 
are waiting for transmission to begin, the RTS s i g n a l s of the s e r i a l 
input-output c o n t r o l l e r are at l o g i c '1* and the modem w i l l be holding 
the CTS inputs to the s e r i a l l/O device high. The terminal which 
wishes to transmit a c t i v a t e s the RTS by making i t low and does not 
s t a r t transmitting u n t i l CTS i s turned ON. The RTS/CTS time delay i s 
determined by s p e c i f i c hardware s e t t i n g s i n the modem and i s v i t a l l y 
important i n determining the o v e r a l l e f f i c i e n c y of data l i n k use. 
A c t u a l l y , the designed encryption system has been t e s t e d with two 
d i f f e r e n t modems - Modular Technology and the standard BT'^ones. I t 
i s found that the former produced l a r g e amount of noi s e s p i k e s when 
the modem switched from one mode to the other. This n e c e s s i t a t e d 
some con^lex delay routines to be introduced to r e j e c t the noise 
sp i k e s . A t y p i c a l i n t e r f a c e timing diagram i s shown i n Fi g u r e 4.9. 
When connected to asymmetric f u l l - d u p l e x P r e s t e l system, the RTS i s 
kept ON continuously and the CTS ON i s used to i n d i c a t e t h a t the 
transmission can s t a r t . This i s an easy approach to ensure that the 
modem w i l l operate properly i n the f u l l - d u p l e x mode. 
4. 2.2 • 5 I i j 2 H J 9 J ^ r c u i t s 
This block i n Figure 4.2 c o n s i s t s of l o g i c c i r c u i t r y to 
provide the c o r r e c t timing s i g n a l s such as CHIP SELECT, READ, WRITE 
e t c f o r the operation of the i n t e r f a c e u n i t . The inputs to t h i s 
block include amongst others, the clock s i g n a l s from the Apple 
microcomputer system for proper synchronization. 
The 6502 microprocessor has two clock s i g n a l s ^  and $ , of 
o 1 
1.023 MHz which are complementary to each other. In ad d i t i o n , a 
general purpose timing s i g n a l , tudce the frequency of t h e system c l o c k s 
but asymmetrical and an intermediate timing s i g n a l of 7.159 MHz are 
als o a v a i l a b l e . The microprocessor uses i t s address and data buses 
only during the timing period when i s a c t i v e . When 0^ i s low, the 
microprocessor i s c a r r y i n g out i n t e r n a l operations and does not need the 
address buses. These timing s i g n a l s are shown i n Figu r e 4.10. 
Let us now very b r i e f l y consider the main timing s i g n a l s 
required for the data s e c u r i t y device and the s e r i a l input-output 
c o n t r o l l e r . 
The timing diagram of a t y p i c a l READ c y c l e of the encryption 
device i s shown i n Figure 4.11. The Data Output Request (DOR) b i t 
i n the Status Register of the device i s used to i n d i c a t e whether the 
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DATA WORD present on the data bus i s v a l i d or not* When i t i s v a l i d * 
the device i s s e l e c t e d by making the 01IP SELECT (CS) a c t i v e low. 
This s i g n a l remains a c t i v e low f o r at l e a s t 410 nano-seconds ( h s ) . 
Then the READ s i g n a l i s made a c t i v e low to read the data from the bus. 
From the timing diagram, i t i s seen that the READ s i g n a l needs to be 
ac t i v e low for 330 ns and the data must remain s t a b l e at l e a s t 30 ns 
af t e r the r i s i n g edge of the READ pulse. The READ timing i s not 
c r i t i c a l and i t only needs t o be greater than 330 ns. The READ 
si g n a l i s therefore derived using a standard decoder ft^ich produces 
an a c t i v e low pulse of about 450 ns wide. T h i s s i g n a l i s a l s o 
s u i t a b l e for CHIP SELECT s i g n a l s of both the s e c u r i t y device and the 
s e r i a l l/O c o n t r o l l e r . 
The WRITE timing diagram of the encryption device i s shown 
i n Figure 4.12. The device i s s e l e c t e d by enabling the CHIP SELECT 
a c t i v e low and then the DATA WORD or KEY WORD to be w r i t t e n i s 
tr a n s f e r r e d to the data bus and a WRITE s i g n a l i s produced. From the 
timing diagram, the data i s to remain s t a b l e on the bus at l e a s t 200 
ns before the r i s i n g edge of the WRITE pulse and 90 ns a f t e r the same 
edge. As the CHIP SELECT s i g n a l obtained from the decoder i s 450 ns 
wide, the required pulse can be obtained by chopping o f f up to 200 ns 
from the r i s i n g edge of the CHIP SELECT s i g n a l . A c t u a l l y , only a 
90 ns pulse i s subtracted as a 90 ns pulse i s needed anyway i n 
derivin g the WRITE s i g n a l for the s e r i a l input-output c o n t r o l l e r -
This pulse i s then ored with the CHIP SELECT to give the WRITE s i g n a l 
of the s e c u r i t y device. I n Figure 4.13, t h i s s i g n a l i s denoted by 
Q2 + CS. The pulse i s produced using a s i n g l e b i s t a b l e c i r c u i t as 
shown i n Figure 4.13 together with the timing diagram. The clock 
s i g n a l s 7 MHz and 03 are obtained from the Apple system. Note that 
the CHIP SELECT s i g n a l from the decoder has been used t o control the 
r i s i n g edge of the WRITE s i g n a l by using i t as the CLEAR input s i g n a l 
to the second b i s t a b l e . The s i g n a l Q3 could not be used because i t 
changes to the high s t a t e s l i g h t l y before the CHIP SELECT thus 
producing a spike# 
Now l e t us consider the READ, WRITE and CHIP SELECT s i g n a l s 
required for the s e r i a l input-output c o n t r o l l e r . 
The READ timing diagram of the s e r i a l input-output c o n t r o l l e r 
i s shown i n Figure 4.14. T h i s s i g n a l i s derived using a simple l o g i c 
c i r c u i t which combines the pulse produced by the b i s t a b l e c i r c u i t with 
another output l i n e from the decoder c i r c u i t t o produce the READ 
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s i g n a l . This produces a READ pulse o f about 360 ns wide, with a 
r i s i n g edge some 90 ns from the v a l i d data edge. These agree w e l l 
with the required READ pulse i n the timing diagram. 
The WRITE timing diagram o f the s e r i a l input-output 
c o n t r o l l e r i s shown i n Figure 4.15. I n comparing t h i s WRITE s i g n a l 
with that of the one required by the s e c u r i t y device, i t i s seen 
that the c o n t r o l l e r r e q u i r e s the data to be s t a b l e on the bus for a 
longer time of a t l e a s t 350 ns before the r i s i n g edge. A l s o the 
data i s required to remain s t a b l e for a minimum time of 100 ns a f t e r 
the edge, which i s lO ns greater than that required for the encryption 
device. This s i g n a l i s produced again by oring the 90 ns pulse with 
an output l i n e from the decoder. Although t h i s produces a WRITE 
pulse of width 360 ns with 90 ns of s t a b l e data a f t e r the r i s i n g 
edge, i t i s found that these timings do s a t i s f y the requirements 
and does not cause any problem. 
The two CHIP SELECT s i g n a l s required f o r channel A and 
baud r a t e generator of the I/O c o n t r o l l e r are d i r e c t l y derived from 
the output of the decoder. 
4.2.2.6 2^odin9_Circuit£ 
This block i n Figure 4.2 provides s i g n a l s which together 
with the output s i g n a l s from the timing block are used i n s e l e c t i n g 
d i f f e r e n t devices when appropriate addresses are present on the 
address bus. I n a system where there are many devices t o run, i t i s 
necessary to decode the address bus down i n t o i n d i v i d u a l addresses. 
This allows only one device and i n p a r t i c u l a r only one node of 
operation of the device to be s e l e c t e d . For instance, say irhen a 
c o n t r o l word has to be w r i t t e n i n t o the s e r i a l input-output c o n t r o l l e r , 
three operations are required to be c a r r i e d out namely 
( i ) only the input-output device must be s e l e c t e d , 
( i i ) only WRITE s i g n a l must be a c t i v a t e d and 
( i i i ) a d i s t i n c t i o n has to be made between a c o n t r o l word and 
a data word. 
The inputs to the decoder include the Device S e l e c t l i n e 
from the Apple microcomputer system which i n d i c a t e s which one of the 
peripheral connectors i s a c t i v e . Whenever the i n t e r f a c e i s s e l e c t e d 
t h i s l i n e w i l l be a c t i v e low. The Table 4.1 i n Figure 4.16 shows 
the decoded address and the corresponding operations c a r r i e d out by 
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the system. 
Address Operation Performed 
OQA0 WRITE Data Wbrd to data s e c u r i t y device. 
C0A1 WRITE Control Wbrd to data s e c u r i t y device. 
O0A2 READ Data Word from data s e c u r i t y device. 
Gj2iA3 READ Status of data s e c u r i t y device. 
C0A4 ACTIVATE l a t c h . 
G0A6 ACTIVATE T r i s t a t e t o t e s t modem c o n t r o l s i g n a l s . 
G0A8 RESET l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
GfiAA RECEIVE (READ) Data from l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
qiAB READ Status of l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
C0AC TRANSMIT (WRITE)- Data to l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
qiAD WRITE Control Word to l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
C0AE WRITE to Baud Rate Register of l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
Figure 4.16 - Table 4.1: [>ecoding Arrangement 
4.2.2.7 M^pry_ 
The operation of the encryption u n i t i s completely c o n t r o l l e d 
by software. Hence the proposed i n t e r f a c e u n i t naist have some non-
v o l a t i l e memory to hold the program. For t h i s reason* a 2K*-byte 
PROM i s incorporated on the i n t e r f a c e . The reasons for the choice are 
two f o l d . F i r s t l y , a 2K-byte i s the maximum amount of memory that 
can be as s o c i a t e d with a pe r i p h e r a l s l o t i n the Apple microcomputer 
system. Secondly, i t i s estimated that a 2K-byte memory should be 
s u f f i c i e n t f o r each of the required system t a s k s . 
4.2.3 MDdem 
To transmit d i g i t a l s i g n a l s over Public Switched Telephone 
netwoiic, which passes frequencies i n the range 30O-3O0O HZfit i s 
necessary for a data transmitter to modulate the d i g i t a l stream by 
superimposing the ' I ' s and '0*s onto a c a r r i e r s i g n a l . The data 
r e c e i v e r a t the other end demodulates t h i s s i g n a l . In addition to 
i t s b a s i c function of t r a n s l a t i n g betwem the binary d i g i t a l s i g n a l s 
of the data terminal equipment and the modulated voice frequency 
s i g n a l s of the communication channel, as seen i n s e c t i o n 4.2.2.4, 
the modem a l s o jjerforms a number of c o n t r o l functions which co-
ordinate the flow of data between terminal equipments. 
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The d i g i t a l information can be encoded by s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
changing e i t h e r the amplitude, the frequ«icy, the phase o r some 
combination of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the c a r r i e r s i g n a l . The type 
of modulation used depends on the s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n . Over the 
public telephone network, the roaxiisuin data r a t e i s l i m i t e d to 1200 b i t s 
per second. For speeds up to 1800 b i t s per second. Frequency S h i f t 
Keying (FSK) i s the common choice and hence t h i s i s used- With FSK , 
a p a i r of tones f^ and f ^ are a l t e r n a t i v e l y sent over the l i n e f or 
the binary ' I ' s and 'O's of the asynchronous data stream. The 
rec e i v i n g s e c t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s i s t s of two f i l t e r s t hat sense the 
frequency f ^ or f ^ . Whenever f^ i s sensed, a binary '1' i s produced 
and whenever f ^ i s sensed a binary '0» i s output to the data terminal 
equipment. 
Modular Technology (12 CV) mini modems and standard BT 
modems employing FSK scheme have been used with t h i s system. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
POINT TO POINT OOMMUNICATION SYSTEM : SYSTEM SOFTWARE (1) 
5.1 General 
The software has been w r i t t e n f o r the encryption i n t e r f a c e 
u n i t to perform the following t a s k s 
(a) R3int-to-^point communication between Apple microcomputers. 
(b) S t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l of encrypted information with floppy 
dis k system. 
( c ) S t o r a g e / r e t r i e v a l of encrypted information with P r e s t e l 
Viewdata system. 
A l l the programs are wr i t t e n i n 6502 Assembly language to minimize 
the execution time and memory space required. Before considering 
these programs, two b a s i c l/O techniques f o r handling t r a n s f e r of 
asynchronous data are b r i e f l y examined. 
5.1.1 RoUin£ Technique 
The p o l l i n g method i s one of the simplest ways to handle 
asynchronous events. I n t h i s type of l/Of a l l operations are c o n t r o l l e d 
by the CPU program. The processor i n t e r r o g a t e s f l a g s a s s o c i a t e d with 
each p o s s i b l e event to determine whether any s e r v i c e i s required. 
That i s , i t p o l l s the p e r i p h e r a l device p e r i o d i c a l l y to determine i t s 
readiness and hence the name p o l l i n g technique. The CRJ resources 
are t i e d up during the time of t r a n s f e r and the time of p o l l i n g and 
hence cannot be used f or other t a s k s . T h i s technique i s mainly used 
with low speed devices. 
5.1.2 Interrupt^ Sriy^_^£FlPl53Hl^_ 
In non-polling systems* the asynchronous event generates 
an i n t e r r u p t request which i s passed on to the processor. The 
processor i n turn suspends the execution of the current process and 
s t a r t s execution of the i n t e r r u p t s e r v i c e routine u^ich say performs 
the data t r a n s f e r . VJhen the i n t e r r u p t s e r v i c e routine i s completed, 
the processor resumes execution of the suspended process. The response 
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time i s f a s t e r with such a system because no time i s spent on 
inte r r o g a t i n g the other non-active i n t e r r u p t s which i n turn i n c r e a s e s 
the system throughput. 
The decision to adopt one technique or other depends on the 
nature of the a p p l i c a t i o n . In t h i s p r o j e c t , the p o l l i n g technique has 
been chosOT for two reasons. F i r s t l y i n t h i s encryption System, there 
are only two low speed devices which r e s u l t i n enough spare time f or 
the processor to examine the s t a t u s f l a g s i n a repeated fashion* 
Secondly the Apple 6502 system i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t a b l e for an 
int e r r u p t driven technique. 
I n t h i s chapter, only the p)oint-to-point communication 
program w i l l be discussed. The other two t a s k s w i l l be considered i n 
Chapters 7 and 8 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
5.1.3 Bain t;-to-Pbint Juonm^ 
The encryption i n t e r f a c e allows data t r a n s f e r between Apple 
terminals ( v i a a public switched telephone network) i n e i t h e r p l a i n 
or encrypted or a mixture o f p l a i n and encrypted formats. F i v e 
d i f f e r e n t modes of the Data Ericryption Standard have been i n v e s t i -
gated [ 3 , 2 6 ] . They are: 
1. Block Encryption (ECB) 
2. Chained Block Cipher (CBC) 
3. Stream Cipher Feedback (CFB) 
4. Chained Block Cipher with P l a i n t e x t Feedback (CBCP) 
5. Stream Cipher with Cipherxext and Vector Feedback (CFBV) 
Each of these modes has been implemented using the encryption i n t e r -
f a c e . They are described b r i e f l y i n succeeding s e c t i c a i s . 
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5.2 Block Encryption Mode 
5.2.1 P r i n c i p l e 
T h i s i s the most b a s i c mode of operation of the Data 
Encryption Standard *4iich transforms 6 4 - b i t s of input to 64-bits of 
output as mentioned i n Section 3.2. The analogy to E l e c t r o n i c Code 
Book (ECB) a r i s e s because the same p l a i n t e x t block always produces 
the same ci p h e r t e x t for a given cryptographic key. Thus i t should be 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to construct a codebook o f p l a i n t e x t blocks 
and corresponding c i p h e r t e x t blocks f o r any g i v ^ key. 
The ECB encryption-decryption scheme i s shown i n Figure 5.1. 
In encryption, the p l a i n t e x t block ( D l , 132, D64) i s used d i r e c t l y 
as the DES input block ( I I , 12, .... 164). The input block i s 
processed through the DES device i n the encrypt s t a t e which has been 
preloaded with the appropriate cryptographic key. The r e s u l t a n t 
output block (Ol, 02, 064) i s used d i r e c t l y as the c i p h e r t e x t 
( C I , C2, C64). The decryption process i s same as the «icryption 
process except that the decrypt s t a t e of the DES device i s used 
rather than the encrypt s t a t e . That i s , the key schedule s e l e c t i o n 
i s reversed. 
Mathematically, the operations of encipherment and deciph-
erment can be described as follows: 
Le t the cryptographic function f define the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
p l a i n t e x t X and the c i p h e r t e x t Y. Then, 
and 
Y = f ^ (X) 
X = f^'^ (Y) 
where the sub s c r i p t k designates the p a r t i c u l a r key (and hence the 
p a r t i c u l a r fui 
p o s s i b l e keys. 
function f^^) which i s s e l e c t e d out of the se t of a l l 
5.2.2 In^lemen t a t i o n ^ 
Only a b r i e f summary of the program i s given here. The 
str u c t u r e of the program can be divided mainly i n t o f i v e p a r t s , 
namely, the i n i t i a l i s a t i o n routine, key input routine, data input 
routine, transmission routine, u ^ c h incl u d e s encryption, and r e c e i v e 
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Fig. 5.1 - Block 3ncryption Codebook Mode ( E C B ) 
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routine, which includes decryption and d i s p l a y r o u t i n e s . The b a s i c 
flowchart of the program and the conplete l i s t i n g can be found i n 
Appendix 2. 
5.2.2.1 In i t i^al^i s a t i o n _ R ^ t i n e _ 
The i n i t i a l i s a t i o n routine i t s e l f can be divided i n t o two 
subsections. The f i r s t subsection contains i n s t r u c t i o n s which aure 
executed without any user i n t e r a c t i o n whereas i n the second subsection 
the user chooses the parameters for s e t t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r mode of 
operation of the i n t e r f a c e . 
The f i r s t subsection c o n s i s t s of i n s t r u c t i o n s t o i n i t i a l i s e 
the CFU, to se t the ports o f the s e r i a l l/O c o n t r o l l e r , Xo ensure the 
co r r e c t s t a t e of control s i g n a l s from the modem, to se t the s t a t e of 
the l a t c h i n the i n t e r f a c e and to i n i t i a l i z e some memory l o c a t i o n s 
which would be l a t e r used as counters and f l a g s i n the program. The 
Data. Set Ready (DSR) s i g n a l from the modem i s t e s t e d to check whether 
the modem i s ON and i s not i n the t e s t mode. I f i t i s not s e t , an 
erro r message 'NO LINK ERROR* i s displayed. Ttie format o f the 
character to be t r a n s f e r r e d i s defined to c o n s i s t of 1 stop b i t , 8 
data b i t s and an even p a r i t y b i t . A baud r a t e f a c t o r of 16 i s used. 
The external clock mode i s selected i n the l/O c o n t r o l l e r . As 
explained i n Section 4.2.2.3, t h i s mode has been s e l e c t e d i n point-
to-point communication to d r i v e the transmit and r e c e i v e c l o c k s with 
the same source. The e r r o r f l a g s have been r e s e t to allow e r r o r 
detection i n subsequent t r a n s f e r of data. These e r r o r f l a g s include 
p a r i t y e r r o r , overflow e r r o r and framing e r r o r . The s e r i a l l/O i s 
s e t to a n u l l mode, that i s , n e i t h e r a transmission mode nor a 
rec e i v e mode. 
In the second subsection, to begin with the user s e l e c t s the 
desired data transmission r a t e . A choice of baud r a t e s ranging from 
50 to 1200 b i t s per second are a v a i l a b l e . Then the user i s asked to 
s e l e c t one of the three formats i n which the i n t e r f a c e may operate 
namely p l a i n or encrypted or a mixture of p l a i n and encrypted. I f 
p l a i n format i s s e l e c t e d , no further i n i t i a l i z a t i o n i s required. I f 
e i t h e r of the other two formats i s chosen, then the data s e c u r i t y 
device i s a c t i v a t e d to encryption s t a t e . 
5.2.2.2 Kej^ IpE?*! BPii^iP£ 
I f one of the two encryption formats i s s e l e c t e d , then the 
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s e c r e t DES key i s entered from the keyboard by the user. I t i s 
assumed that both the p a r t i e s concerned have the pr^cnowledge of the 
key which i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r proper communication of encrypted data. 
In t h i s program, 8 char a c t e r s are used t o form the 64-bit key required 
by the DES algorithm. Any of the 88 alphanumerical c h a r a c t e r s of the 
keyboard can be used to form the 8 c h a r a c t e r key. As mentioned i n 
Section 3.6.1, the t o t a l nundjer of d i s t i n c t keys p o s s i b l e i s then 
8 15 
equal to (88) = 3.6 x 10 which i s l e s s than the maximum 
2^^ = 7.2 x 10^^. The program can be very e a s i l y changed to accept 
sixteen 4-bit c h a r a c t e r s as the key thus g i v i n g the t o t a l p o s s i b l e key 
space. Here the 8 character key i s chosen t o enable the u s e r t o 
remember the key without a c t u a l l y recording i t somewhere. I t i s 
e s s e n t i a l that the key should be chosen randomly so that i t may not be 
e a s i l y guessed by the opponent. Before loading every key byte i n t o 
the KEY REGISTER of the device, the key p a r i t y i s t e s t e d . I f a p a r i t y 
e r r o r i s detected, then an appropriate e r r o r message i s displayed on 
the screen. The i n t e r f a c e u n i t d i s p l a y s the entered key on the screen 
to enable the user to v e r i f y the c o r r e c t n e s s of the key. However the 
display i s immediately erased to avoid detection by others during 
subsequent communication. The majority of us e r s would probably use 
some easy to remember phrase or number combination f o r developing the 
key. In such c a s e s , the long phrases can be converted t o a form s u i t -
able for DES using a good hashing f u n c t i o n . I t should be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
complicated to produce e s s e n t i a l l y unbiassed and s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
independent b i t s i n the DES key. The program can a l s o be modified to 
provide for multiple DES key encryption with d i f f e r e n t keys to 
achieve higher l e v e l s of security-
5.2.2.3 Dat a_Input_Ftou t^ine_ 
In point-to-point communication mode, the data to be 
enciphered i s assumed to be input from the keyboard of the terminal. 
F i l e t r a n s f e r i s considered i n Chapter 7 ii^e r e f i l e s e c u r i t y i s 
discussed. T h i s routine determines whether the data to be processed 
i s coming from the telephone l i n e or from the keyboard o f the terminal. 
This operation i s c a r r i e d out using the p o l l i n g technique. The 
processor i s allowed to p o l l the Data C a r r i e r Detect (DCDL) f l a g from 
the modem and the Keyboard Data input F l a g (KDF). The K D F i s 
provided by the Apple system and i f s e t i n d i c a t e s that a key has heen 
pressed. T h i s implies that the data from the keyboard needs to be 
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transmitted over the l i n e i n p l a i n or encrypted or mixture format 
depending on the s e l e c t i o n made e a r l i e r and hence the c o n t r o l i s 
t r a n s f e r r e d to Transmission routine. On the other hand, i f the DCD 
f l a g i s set i n d i c a t i n g the presence of data on the l i n e . Receive 
routine i s invoked to decrypt and d i s p l a y the r e c e i v e d data. 
5.2.2.4 Trap sou ssiOT_Routir^^ 
At a given time, up to a maximum of 256 bytes o f message can 
be input to the i n t e r f a c e from the keyboard. A Return character i s 
used to mark the end of the message. At any time, the key CNTRL-X 
can be used to cancel the e n t i r e message. A l l e d i t i n g f a c i l i t i e s of 
the Apple system such as cursor movements can be used. The program 
operates on the whole message (up to 256 c h a r a c t e r s ) at a time. A f t e r 
a whole message i s processed and transmitted, the program returns to 
f e t c h the next message from the keyboard. An i n ^ r t a n t point to note 
i s that with block encryption mode (ECB), the message needs to be 
divided i n t o blocks of 64 b i t s (8 b y t e s ) before encryption can be done, 
I n i t i a l l y , the l/O c o n t r o l l e r i s set to transmit mode. Each 
64 b i t block of p l a i n t e x t i s then input' to the data s e c u r i t y device i n 
succe s s i v e 8 bytes a f t e r t e s t i n g for the c o r r e c t s t a t u s o f the Data 
Input Request (DIR) f l a g of the device. Then the c i p h e r t e x t block i s 
sent from the device byte, by byte a f t e r t e s t i n g the c o n t r o l s i g n a l s . 
C l e a r To Send (CTS) and Transmit Ready (TXRDY). Appropriate e r r o r 
messages are displayed i f the f l a g s a r e not s e t properly and the 
system i s resynchronized. S p e c i a l r o u t i n e s are developed to deal 
with control c h a r a c t e r s CNTRL-G ( B e l l ) , CNTRL-J ( l i n e feed) and 
repeated Return characters i n the p l a i n t e x t block. When the encrypted 
versi o n of these c h a r a c t e r s are transmitted, a c e r t a i n amount of delay 
(approximately 80 m i l l i s e c o n d s ) i s included to allow time for the 
gCTieration of these c h a r a c t e r s at the r e c e i v i n g end a f t e r decryption. 
However the message need not n e c e s s a r i l y contain an exact 
number of 64 b i t blocks. Hence i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the c^ssage w i l l 
end before the l a s t block of 64 b i t s i s complete. Therefore some 
padding i s required at the end of the message to f i l l the l a s t block 
to e x a c t l y 64 b i t s long. This has been done by padding the l a s t block 
with some random cha r a c t e r s a f t e r the Return character - These random 
chara c t e r s are generated as part of the key input r o u t i n e . The 
padding r e s u l t s i n the cryptogram expansion of up to a maximum of 7 
bytes conq^ared to the o r i g n a l p l a i n t e x t message i f the l a s t block i s 
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not of f u l l s i z e . 
5.2.2.5 Receive Routine 
The Receive routine i s much simpler than i t s counterpart 
Transmit routine. I t i s known that the incoming data i s encrypted by 
di v i d i n g i t up i n t o blocks of 64-bits a t the transmitting end. Hence 
t h i s routine should simply f e t c h the 6 4 - b i t s of c i p h e r t e x t at a time 
from the l i n k a f t e r t e s t i n g the Receive Ready f l a g (RXRDY) of the 
l/O c o n t r o l l e r . The c i p h e r t e x t i s then input to the data s e c u r i t y 
device which i s now s e t to decryption mode. Then the deciphered block 
of data i s read from the device and i s displayed on the screen using 
Display routine. The Display routine i s same as the one used by the 
Apple system. I t d i s p l a y s uppercase and lowercase alphanumeric 
cha r a c t e r s i n e i t h e r normal or i n v e r s e or f l a s h i n g modes. The c o n t r o l 
c h a r a c t e r s i n the decrypted block a r e not d i s p l a y e d . The block o f 
decrypted c h a r a c t e r s i s t e s t e d for the presence of the Return 
character. I f i t i s not present, then i t i s known that another block 
of encrypted data must be following the current block. Hence the 
program loops back to t e s t the RXRDY f l a g to obtain more data from the 
l i n k . On the other hand i f a Return c h a r a c t e r i s detected within 
the block of deciphered data, i t i n d i c a t e s that the current block i s 
the l a s t block of the message. The random c h a r a c t e r s a f t e r the 
Return character are treated as dummy c h a r a c t e r s and hence they are 
ignored. The decrypted information w i l l be the same as the o r i g i n a l 
message provided the same key has been used a t both ends of the l i n k . 
The routine a l s o performs three types of e r r o r t e s t s on 
the received c h a r a c t e r s . They are p a r i t y e r r o r , framing e r r o r and 
overrun e r r o r . I n each case, appropriate e r r o r messages are displayed. 
A framing e r r o r i s detected when the r e c e i v e r f i n d s a l o g i c 'O* 
occurring at the time when stop b i t , l o g i c should occur. A 
overrun e r r o r i s detected when a new c h a r a c t e r i s loaded i n t o the 
Receive Holding Register o f the s e r i a l I/O c o n t r o l l e r before the 
processor has had time to read the previous one. I n a l l these three 
cases the program loops back to the s t a r t of the data input routine 
thus abandoning the current c i p h e r t e x t block and automatically 
sync hroni ses• 
5.2.2.6 P l a i n Data_Cbiiinunicat^^ 
The routines which allow p l a i n data transmission and 
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reception are very much s i m i l a r t o the ones described e a r l i e r except 
i n t h i s case there i s no need to perform encryption and decryption. 
Hence the message i s processed byte by byte rather than i n blocks. 
T h i s f a c i l i t y of communicating i n plain format i s provided 
to allow the t r a n s f e r of non-SOTsitive information over the l i n k . For 
instance, one could envisage a s i t u a t i o n where the users i n i t i a l l y 
communicate i n plain format to se t various parameters needed for 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a secure l i n k . T h i s immediately l e d to the idea of^ developing 
a program u^ i c h could handle a mixture of p l a i n and encrypted data 
and t h i s i s considered i n the next s e c t i o n . 
5.2.2.7 Mixture of^Plaip_an6_EncTy^ed_p^ Coimam^c^t^on 
With t h i s format, only p a r t s of the message a re i n encrypted 
form \»*iile the r e s t of the message i s transmitted i n p l a i n form. 
This mode i s u s e f u l i n many a p p l i c a t i o n s vAiere i t i s not necessary to 
encrypt the whole message. 
The r e c e i v e r must be able to i d e n t i f y which p a r t s of the 
received data are i n encrypted form. The data transmitted i s always 
i n p l a i n form u n t i l the change to encryption mode i s i n i t i a t e d . T h i s 
i s done by typing a s p e c i a l character (CNTRL^) on the keyboard that 
has been designated f o r t h i s purpose. Q i a r a c t e r s following t h i s 
character are encrypted by the sending t e r m i n a l . The i n t e r f a c e u n i t 
i s automatically returned t o the p l a i n format a f t e r 8 c h a r a c t e r s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , another s p e c i a l c h a r a cter (CNIRL-B) can be used to 
return to the p l a i n format. The r e c e i v i n g end then checks for a 
CNTRL-A character and s t a r t s to decrypt when i t i s found. When a 
CNTRL-B i s received, i t switches back to p l a i n mode reception. 
However i t i s necessary to ensure that the OTTRI B ch a r a c t e r does not 
occur within the enciphered data to ensure unaiid>iguous decryption 
at the r e c e i v i n g end. T h i s can be achieved by using m u l t i p l e 
CNTRI—B c h a r a c t e r s to i n d i c a t e the end of encrypted t e x t . The greater 
the number of such c h a r a c t e r s , the smaller the p r o b a b i l i t y that they 
occur i n the enciphered data and hence the smaller the ambiguity 
i n decryption, but t h i s i n c r e a s e s the number of redundant c h a r a c t e r s 
i n the transmitted data. The key required for the encryption 
algorithm i s entered as before at the beginning of the communication. 
Again with the block encryption mode, i f the encrypted p a r t s 
of the message are not i n t e g r a l n u l t i p l e s of 64 b i t s , they require 
padding and t h i s r e s u l t s i n cryptogram expansion. The d i f f e r e n c e 
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with the mixture format i s that t h i s expansion does not occur only 
at the end of the message ( l a s t b l o c k ) , as i n the complete a i c r y p t i o n 
format discussed e a r l i e r , but i t may occur anywhere w i t h i n the 
message. 
When implementing t h i s mixture format i n the Apple system, 
add i t i o n a l problems are encountered compared to the complete 
€ncryp>tion format. One such problem a r i s e s from the r e q u i r e m ^ t 
that i n the multi-user network the p l a i n information transmitted may 
need to be received c o r r e c t l y by a l l u s e r s whereas the encrypted 
Information must only be deciphered c o r r e c t l y by the user with the 
ri g h t key. There may be cases where the encrypt i m algorithm 
transforms a non-control character to a c o n t r o l c h a r a c t e r and v i c e 
ve r s a . As a co n t r o l character i s not displayed by the Apple system 
and the screen cursor does not move, t h i s r e s u l t s i n a l i n e of t e x t , 
with p>arts of i t encrypted a t the. t r a n s m i t t i n g end, not producing a 
l i n e of text a t the r e c e i v i n g end with the wrong key. As a c e r t a i n 
amount of delay i s required for some s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r s such as 
CNTRI—G ( B e l l ) , CNTRL-J ( L i n e f e e d ) , t h i s can cause overrun e r r o r 
at the r e c e i v i n g end with the wrong key. T h i s r e s u l t s i n e r r o r s i n 
the subsequent reception of data even i n p l a i n format at the r e c e i v i n g 
end. T h i s i s f u r t h e r complicated i n t h i s block encryption mode due 
to the padding with random numbers to f i l l the block. 
A modified v e r s i o n of the e a r l i e r complete encryption 
format program i s developed for t h i s mixture format »*u.ch overcomes 
the problCTis mentioned above. 
5.2.3 R e s u l t ^ and D i s c u s s i o n ^ 
An example of p l a i n t e x t containing some data s t r u c t u r e and 
patterns has been chos«i to study the vari o u s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
d i f f e r e n t encryption modes. Such an example i s provided by the 
assembly language program shown i n Figure 5.2. T h i s whole message 
i s enciphered using ECB encryption with the key 3131313131313131 i n 
hexadecimal form. Note that here a non-random key has been chosen 
to allow the c i p h e r t e x t produced to be used i n some s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s 
i n Chapter 6. A cip h e r t e x t character produced can be any one of the 
256 p o s s i b l e combinations (2 ), To d i s p l a y the c i p h e r t e x t , i t i s 
therefore necessary to extend the standard ASCII c h a r a c t e r set from 
128 to 256. T h i s has been done using Hershey c h a r a c t e r s [ 2 7 ] . The 
complete character s e t i s givOT i n Appendix 3. Note that t h i s extended 
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6 1 
* 
T H I S S A M P L E P R O G R A M E N A D l . B S T R A N S F E R O F 
D E S E N C I P H E R E D D A T A D E T W E E N A P P L E M I C R O 
C 0 
1 5   M P L E  R 0 G R A M  N A D 1.  S  R A N S F E R 
s   C 1 P II E R E D  A T A  E T W E E N A P P L E M 1 C 
M P U T £ R S 
I 0 0 0 L D A i 6 E S E T M 0 D B R B G 
S T A C 0 A D 0 P U A R T 
L D A S 1 2 s E T c 0 M M A N D R E G • 
S T A C 0 A D 0 P U A R T 
J S R 2 1 3 C 1 N P u T S B C R B T K E Y 
J S R 2 3 5 3 c II E c K P A n 1 T Y 
s P A c E 
1 0 1 1 • L D A C 0 A 6 p 0 1.. L K E Y D 0 A R D A N D 
A N D 9 0 3 L 1 N E C 0 N T 1 N U 0 S L Y 
D E q ( I 0 1 B ) 
J M p 1 0 3 4 
I 0 1 B L D A c 0 0 0 
0 P L ( 1 0 1 1 ) 
S P A c E 
J s R 2 4 0 0 S E T E N C R Y P T I 0 N M 0 D E 
J 5 R 3 0 0 0 S U D R 0 U T 1 N E R E A D 
J S H 2 5 0 0 B C D E N C R Y P T 1 0 N 
J s R 2 0 0 0 S U D R 0 U T 1 N E T R A N S M 1 T 
J S R 2 7 0 0 S u D R 0 U T 1 N E D E L A Y 
J M P 1 0 1 1 
S P A c E 
1 0 3 i J S R 2 8 0 0 s B T D E C R Y P T 1 0 N M 0 0 E 
J s R 2 0 0 0 s U D R 0 U T 1 N E R B C E 1 V E 
J s R 2 A 0 0 E C U D E C R Y P T 1 0 N 
J S R 3 1 0 0 S u B R 0 U T 1 N B D 1 S P L A Y 
C M P § 8 D T E S T F 0 R B N D 
D E Q ( 1 0 4 7 ) 0 F D A T A 
J M P L 0 1 1 
1 0 4 7 II A L T 
P i g . 5.2 - P l a i n t e x t Example 
character s e t does not i n i t s e l f introduce any secure cryptographic 
transformation. The c i p h e r t e x t produced i s shown i n Figure 5.3. 
The program used to produce t h i s g r a p h i c a l d i s p l a y i s given i n 
Appendix 4. 
From Figure 5.3, i t can be seen that a p o t e n t i a l weakness 
of t h i s block mode i s that the same p l a i n t e x t always produces the 
same ci p h e r t e x t under a f i x e d key. T h i s i n turn implies that i f the 
pl a i n t e x t contains patterns,they w i l l be r e f l e c t e d i n the ci p h e r t e x t 
as seen i n Figure 5.3. Consider for i n s t a n c e , the a s t e r i s k s i n 
l i n e s 1 and 5 and sequences of blanks a t the beginning o f each l i n e 
i n the assembly language program. Thus the compromise o f the 
p l a i n t e x t block underlying any c i p h e r t e x t block r e s u l t s i n the 
compromise of a l l r e p e t i t i o n s of t h i s same t e x t for the remainder of 
the cryptographic period. Thus t h i s block encryption mode i s more 
susc e p t i b l e to code book a n a l y s i s compared t o the other modes 
considered l a t e r . Further i f the p l a i n t e x t information i s highly 
redundant then block encryption may not prevent c r y p t a n a l y s i s using 
block frequency a n a l y s i s . Block frequency a n a l y s i s determines the 
frequency of each c i p h e r t e x t block from a l a r g e sample o f intercepted 
c i p h e r t e x t . By r e l a t i n g the observed frequencies o f the ci p h e r t e x t 
blocks to the esq^ected frequencies of the p l a i n t e x t blocks, the 
cry p t a n a l y s t may be able to draw c e r t a i n i nferences concerning the 
nature of the p l a i n t e x t corresponding t o a given c i p h e r t e x t . Also 
i f the data transmitted i s highly redundant, the number o f p o s s i b l e 
meaningful p l a i n t e x t blocks may be small enough to c<»istruct a 
di c t i o n a r y . 
T h i s block encryption mode i s a l s o s u s c e p t i b l e to replay. 
As each block i s independently enciphered with the same key, one 
block can be replayed for another. For in s t a n c e , consider the 
tra n s a c t i o n shown below 
CREDIT JONES £5000 CREDIT SMITH £10 
a. C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
This can be changed to 
CREDIT £5000 CREDIT SMITH £5000 
CL C2 C3 C4 C5 C3 
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1 1 
Q JC k N 0 6 Q K k a 0 d q X k 0 d Q K k • 0 d Q K k 0 
c 1 A A p 1 s J 1 f 4 3 Z N a ii P p ( • Z T 9 r 0 H V 
c K • 9 o < + & « C R P t 1 X e U r 0 1 N 1 (D ( / - • r tt n . [ E • ( I 1 
7 • T • c a £ / 
f 
( 6 - I t c 0 V 7 t ± t c 6 V 7 I ± L c 6 V 7 
Q A k • 0 Q K k M 0 a Q X k M 0 d Q k • 0 d Q x k • 0 d 
I t C 0 V 7 t ± i c 0 V 7 t A t c 0 V 7 t i t c 0 V 7 t 1 : c 6 V 7 
< N [ H F ft p i U A o • D b ,1 J • 2 u V o- t 9 • a • r t ± : c 6 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 ft n : 0 11 * r i a t - A l( 7 n T t ± : c e V 7 
i t c e V 7 7 V w Q 1 3 3 • c c 1 o : k ( H - • h ) o 
I ± t c G V 7 ft n : 0 I I l>- a r D - A H Z 7 n 7 t ± c 6 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 V ) ft 9 
f 
w T t- o 7 ' c X N t V f ( c i 9 
I ± t c 6 V 7 « --- 4 n r 3 s 9 X D k 7. L 9 — X r i t L c 6 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 / Z 1 1 9 5 t ± i c 6 V 7 t ± t c 6 V 7 t ± c e V 7 
B a 1 ^ 1 9 V A - 1 S P D f r - 1 7 ft C X X 1 c 0 H • a> I 5 n o 4 
1 i . t c e V 7 t 7 '\> • Z A b n IT a « ft 1 A C K N z / » U 1 it b ( 
I ± . t c e V 7 U 1 + 11 0 « 0 * G 1 (V 6 c L I t c 6 V 7 t ± c 0 V 7 
I t c e V 7 • ; E ? T /* b * t ± I c 6 V 7 t ± 1 c 6 V 7 ( ± c a V 7 
a ) <t • u* ; 1 & 1 • t t t c 6 V 7 t ± t c 0 V 7 I ± c e V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 E \ 1 k 1 0 ft G 1 o- Q c L t ± I c e V 7 i ± c e V 7 
1 I c a V 7 IC / z 1 1 • 5 i ± I c 6 V 7 t 1 t c e V 7 I ± c 6 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 1 0 T < V ; n 1 ) X 
f 
D k . •I m . S r 
I ± t c 6 V 7 r 
f H 0 
K > G i P 1 a T M • 7 H T 1 I I a c • J ( ; 
I t c 6 V 7 / e 1 e • o- 0 A r ) X f D k c t ± c 6 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 ; A U — 1 G F 1 a T M • Y h V U F u 1 Q V 1 R L L r c 
I ± t c e V 7 - T * 1 Oh r G F 1 T M • U 1 ( £ 
f 
y T 3 a , J , r L o-
t t c 6 V 7 1 k ? tc- t • I i c 6 V 7 t t c 6 V 7 t ± L c a V 7 
I ± t c 0 V 7 JC / Z 1 1 9 3 t ± i c 0 V 7 i 1 c e V 7 t ± c 6 V 7 
P M Q * N < c K r • --- Of • ; tf u ) X f 0 k K J * n * S X r 
t t c 0 V 7 & d J t 1 G i F 1 T M • 1 I q Y c q w 1 3 « 1 f t ) k t A 
I ± t c e V 7 - 3 • w 1' A ) • » 7. ) X 9 - D k K 1 ± c a V 7 
I ± I c 6 V 7 3 •X, oo 0 u- G F 1 T M • z A D < 9 Q r k 1 X C 
I t c 6 V 7 T A 1 4 r *• 
f - " U d » 0 f fi I ± c 0 V 7 
I ± t c 6 V 7 < V 1 a c / 1 7 ] d F n e 9 IT 0 t ± L c a V 7 
I 1 I c 6 V 7 1 k ? & 
f 
c • t c e V 7 t ± t c 0 V 7 1 ± L c e V 7 
V H 0 L V» Q F T d / • a 0 I ± I G 6 V 7 t t c 6 V 7 t ± c 0 V 7 
P i g . 5.5 - ECB C i p h e r t e x t Example 
1 0 
D I! 
C 0 
± 2 (1 P L e P R 0 G R A E N A 0 L E S T R A N B R 
s N C 1 P 11 R D U A T A D & T W E E N A P P L E U I C 
M F u T R S 
• T 3 U q 
1 0 0 0 w 9 1* U V' a - S E T U 0 D E R E G 
T A C 0 A D 0 F U A R T 
L D A § 1 2 s e T C 0 M M A N D R e C 
a T A C 0 A D 0 F U A R T 
J S R 2 1 3 C 1 N P u T S E C R E T K E Y 
• J S It 2 3 3 3 c II e c K • P A R 1 T Y 
s P A c E 
1 0 1 1 L D A C 0 A 6 i 1 t ) E V D 0 A R D A N D 
A ' N D 1 0 3 L 1 ti 1! c 0 N T 1 N U 0 s 1. Y 
U e Q ( 1 0 L 0 ) 
J M p 1 0 3 4 
1 0 1 D L D A c 0 0 0 
U P L ( 1 0 1 1 ) 
S p A c 
^ / O ( I • r o s e T e N C R Y P T 1 0 N U 0 D E 
. J s R 3 0 0 0 s u 0 R 0 U T 1 N E R E A D 
J s R 2 9 0 0 B c U E N C R Y P T 1 0 N 
J R 2 6 0 0 S u D R 0 U T 1 N E T R A N S U I T 
J s R 2 7 0 0 0 o f T 1 N E D E L A Y 
J u P i 0 1 1 
s p A c 
1 0 3 A t X V Q a S e T D E 11 1 = > X G M 0 D E 
J s R 2 0 0 0 s u D n 0 U T I H B R E C E 1 V E 
J s R 2 A 0 0 e c D D E C R Y P T 1 0 N 
A 2 - 0 T c 1 3 u 0 R 0 U T 1 N E D 1 S P L A Y 
c u P i 8 D Q P' u u K T/* 0 R E N D 
D E 0 ( 1 0 4 7 ) 0 K 1) A T A 
7 3 s m . f * 
1 0 i 7 I I A L T 
0 F 
R 0 
F i g . 5 . 4 - lilCD E r r o r C h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
by replaying the block containing the c i p h e r t e x t for £50OO. T h i s 
type o f replay i s not p o s s i b l e with stream c i p h e r and chained block 
cipher nodes which are considered l a t e r . One simple s o l u t i o n to t h i s 
problem i s to append checksums to the end of messages* 
T h i s block encryption mode i s a l s o v u l nerable t o i n s e r t i o n 
and deletion of blocks because these changes to the message do not 
a f f e c t surrounding blocks* Again use of e r r o r detecting codes before 
encryption and checksums protects against t h i s t h r e a t -
As mentioned i n the implementation s e c t i o n * i n t h i s mode* 
the information i s encrypted i n i n t e g r a l m u l t i p l e s of 64 b i t s - This 
r e s u l t e d i n padding of l a s t block with random cha r a c t e r s - T h i s causes 
cipher extension and therefore may be unacceptable i n some applications. 
The padding e f f e c t can be seen i n Figu r e 5.3 a t the end producing a 
longer c i p h e r t e x t message than the o r i g i n a l p l a i n t e x t . I f the 
padding i s done with blanks or zeroes, i n s t e a d of random numbers, 
then t h i s may make them vulnerable t o c r y p a n a l y s i s . 
Since each b i t of the ECB output block i s a complex 
function of every b i t i n the input block and the key, a s i n g l e b i t 
change i n e i t h e r the key or the p l a i n t e x t r e s u l t s i n a c i p h e r t e x t 
block i n which each b i t i s changed with approximately equal 
p r o b a b i l i t y . Conversely, a change i n 1 b i t of e i t h e r the key or 
ciph e r t e x t w i l l produce changes i n an average of f i f t y percent of 
the b i t s of deciphered p l a i n t e x t . Although t h i s e r r o r propagation 
within the block i s extensive, i t i s s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d to the block 
i n which the e r r o r occurs and the decryption o f other blocks i s 
unaffected. This can be seen from Figure 5.4 where a nuxnber of 
er r o r s have been introduced i n the c i p h e r t e x t p r i o r to decryption. 
Thus the ECB mode does not provide e r r o r extension between blocks. 
I f block boundaries are l o s t between sender and r e c e i v e r , then ECB 
cryptographic synchronization w i l l a l s o be l o s t u n t i l c o r r e c t block 
boundaries are r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . T h i s may happen f o r i n s t a n c e when a 
b i t s l i p occurs. 
5.3 Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
5.3.1 ^ i n c i g l e 
Cipher block chaining i s again a block cipher i n which the 
p l a i n t e x t i s exclusive-ored with a block of pseudo-random data p r i o r 
to being processed through the DES device. 
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T h i s scheme i s sho*Mn i n Figure 5.5. I n order t o commence 
the CBC encryption, the f i r s t DES input block i s formed by e x c l u s i v e -
oring the f i r s t data block with a 64i.bit i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r ( I V ) . 
That i s , 
( I I , 12, ... 164) = (IV1®D1, IV2SD2, •. IV64®D64). 
This f i r s t CBC input block i s processed through the DES device i n 
the encrypt s t a t e , producing a 64-bit OES output block which defines 
the c i p h e r t e x t . This f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block i s then e x c l u s i v e - o r e d 
with the second p l a i n t e x t block to produce the second CES input block. 
This second input block i s enciphered u s i n g the PES device to produce 
the second c i p h e r t e x t block. T h i s encryption process continues to 
chain s u c c e s s i v e c i p h e r t e x t and p l a i n t e x t blocks together u n t i l the 
l a s t p l a i n t e x t block of the message i s encrypted. I n CBC decryption, 
the f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block i s processed through the DES dev i c e i n 
the decrypt s t a t e . The f i r s t output block i s then e x c l u s i v e - o r e d 
with the CBC i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector producing the f i r s t p l a i n t e x t 
block. The second c i p h e r t e x t block i s then entered into the DES 
device and the r e s u l t a n t output block i s e x c l u s i v e - ^ r e d w i t h the 
f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block to produce the second p l a i n t e x t block. The 
CBC decryption process continues t o e x c l u s i v e - o r the c i p h e r t e x t 
block at time t-1 { t > l ) with the DES output block t o obtain p l a i n t e x t 
at time t u n t i l the end of the message. 
Mathematically,the scheme can be expressed as f o l l o w s : 
Let the cryptographic function f^^ define the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the DES input block and the output block imder the chosen key k. 
Let function h define how the input t o the DES i s a l t e r e d through 
the introduction of the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector and the feedback or 
intermediate i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r s U ( l ) , U(2),,..y U(n-1) at time 
t = 1 t o n-1. Note that the function h may be a many-to-cne function 
s i n c e i d e n t i c a l inputs to t h i s function w i l l be a v a i l a b l e during both 
encipherment and decipherment. Then 
U ( l ) = 2 = I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
U { i ) = h [ U ( i - l ) , feedback qu a n t i t y ] ^ i > 1 
In the CBC mode, U ( i ) i s ecfual to the previous c i p h e r t e x t block 
Y ( i - l ) , the feedback quantity. That i s , U ( i ) = Y ( i - l ) . Hence the 
encipherment and decipherment operations can be expressed as 
- 87 
PUIN TEXT (1) PUIN TEXT (2) 
INITIALISATION 
VECTOR 
INPUT TEXT (1) 
• D E S ENCRYPT 
CIPHER TEXT (1) 
CIPHER TEXT (1) 
D E S DECRYPT 
OUTPm- TEXT (1) 
INITIALISATION 
VECTOR 4) I 
PUIN TEXT (1) 
• H i -
INPUT TEXT (2) 
D E S ENCRYPT 
CIPHER TEXT (2) 
CIPHER TEXT (2) 
• • 
D E S DECRYPT 
* • 
OUTPUT TEXT (2) 
PUIN TEXT (2) 
?iS. 5.3 - Cipher 31ocJc Chaiaina tiode. (CBC) 
- 88 -
Y ( i ) = f i , [ X ( i ) e Y ( i - l ) ] i 1 
and 
where 
X ( i ) = f ^ - ^ [ Y ( i ) ] 9 Y ( i . l ) i >^  1 
X(o) = Y(o) = Z 
From the r e c u r s i v e nature of the above equations, there e x i s t s 
functions H^, H^..., such that 
Y ( i ) = H. [k, X(o), X ( l ) , ... X ( i ) ] , i > ^ l (5.1) 
S i m i l a r l y there e x i s t s functions G^, G^t G^ such that 
X ( i ) = G.[ k, Y ( i - l ) , Y ( i ) ] , i > 1 (5.2) 
From equations (5.1) and ( 5 . 2 ) , i t fo l l o w s that patterns w i t h i n the 
input are masked s i n c e the c i p h e r t e x t block Y ( i ) dep«ids on p l a i n t e x t 
blocks X ( l ) , X ( 2 ) , X ( i ) . However s i n c e the r e c e i v e d p l a i n t e x t 
block X ( i ) does not dep)end on a l l c i p h e r t e x t blocks Y ( l ) , Y ( 2 ) , 
Y ( i ) , the scheme (toes not represent a general block c i p h e r (see 
Section 5.5). 
5.3.2 In^len»ntatiOT__ 
Th i s program i s a modified v e r s i o n of the ECB mode program 
described i n Section 5.2.2. The flow c h a r t of the program together 
with the l i s t i n g can be found i n Appendix 5. Here only the 
di f f e r e n c e s between t h i s program and the ECB mode program are b r i e f l y 
discussed. 
As i n the ECB program, the user i n i t i a l l y s e l e c t s the data 
r a t e , the format of data t r a n s f e r ( p l a i n , encrypted or mixture) and 
enter s the DES se c r e t key. Then the transmission end generates a 
64 b i t random block and sends i t t o the r e c e i v i n g end. The block i s 
«icrypted under the ECB mode at both the tr a n s m i t t i n g and receivng 
ends to form the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector ( I V ) . T h i s vector i s stored 
i n a s e t of memory loc a t i o n s named TEMP l at the tra n s m i t t i n g end 
and TEMP 2 at the r e c e i v i n g end. I t i s again necessary to div i d e 
the message in t o blocks of 64 b i t s . Hence padding of the l a s t block 
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with random char a c t e r s i s required t o make the b l o c k s i z e equal to 64. 
The transmissi<»i routine fetches the p l a i n t e x t block vrfiich i s then 
exclusive-ored with the memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 1 before i n p u t t i n g i t 
to the DES device. The ci p h e r t e x t block produced by the d e v i c e i s 
transmitted t o the rec e i v e r as i n the ECB mode. The c i p h e r t e x t i s 
a l s o stored back i n t o the memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 1 f o r use i n the next 
encryption c y c l e . The rec e i v e r o u t i n e inputs the c i p h e r t e x t to the 
DES device and a l s o stores i t i n memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 3. The output 
from the DES device i s exclusive-ored with the memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 2 
to produce the p l a i n t e x t - The memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 3 axe then 
t r a n s f e r r e d to TEMP 2 to form the new IV f o r e x c l u s i v e - o r operation 
i n the decryption of the next c i p h e r t e x t block. 
F i n a l l y * note that i n the case o f mixture o f p l a i n and 
encrypted data communication, only the encrypted blocks a r e chained 
together. 
5.3.3 Resul^ts and Discus^ion_ 
The p l a i n t e x t example shown i n Figure 5.2 i s enciphered 
under CBC encryption with the same key as i n .the ECB mode. The 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector used i s 0202020202020202• The c i p h e r t e x t 
produced i s shown i n Figure 5.6. 
From Figure 5.6, i t i s seen t h a t the CBC mode does not 
produce the same cipher t e x t even when the p l a i n t e x t i s t h e same and 
hence the pattern exposure problems a s s o c i a t e d with the ECB mode 
have been eliminated. This i s because the c i p h e r t e x t produced f or 
a p l a i n t e x t block with a given key i s dependent on the p l a i n t e x t as 
w e l l as the feedback (intermediate) vector used i n the process which 
i s d i f f e r e n t a t d i f f e r e n t times. So the CBC mode reproduces the same 
cip h e r t e x t whenever the same p l a i n t e x t i s encrypted under a f i x e d 
key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector. Thus wixh the CBC mode, c i p h e r t e x t 
r e p e t i t i o n occurs at the message l e v e l «^ereas with the ECB mode, 
cip h e r t e x t r e p e t i t i o n i s found to occur a t block, l e v e l . , Thus the 
code book a n a l y s i s problem has been reduced. 
CBC i s therefore l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e to rep l a y than the ECB 
mode o f encryption. The type of r e p l a y mentioned i n Section 5.2.3 
i s not po s s i b l e with CBC mode as d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the message are 
enciphered with d i f f e r e n t feedback v e c t o r s . I t i s a l s o l e s s 
vulnerable to i n s e r t i o n and de l e t i o n of blocks as these changes to 
the message a f f e c t the surrounding blocks. 
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V i g . 5.6 - C i p h e r t e x t Example 
CBC a l s o protects a block cipher against the tin»-memory 
trade o f f attack [23] as follows-
Let Y ( i ) be the ciphertext corresponding to the chosen p l a i n t e x t X ( i ) 
Since f " ^ { Y { i ) ) = X ( i ) ffi Y ( i - 1 } , t o determine the key k, a 
cryptanalyst w u l d have to generate t a b l e s of s t a r t i n g and ending 
points using X ( i ) © Y ( i - l ) r a t h e r than X ( i ) . But t h i s would r u l e 
out the p o s s i b i l i t y of precomputing the t a b l e s or of using the same 
ta b l e s to break more than one cipher. 
As noted i n the implementation s e c t i o n , the problem of 
padding s t i l l e x i s t s with the CBC mode. In the complete encryption 
format, t h i s i s confined to the l a s t block of the message. The 
re c e i v e r scans the decrypted block and di s c a r d s the pseudo-random 
b i t s a f t e r the Return character code i n the block. One way to 
eliminate padding i s to switch to stream cipher feedback (CFB) mode 
(see Section 5.4) to encipher the short block at the end of the 
message . 
In addition, the seciDrity of the CBC mode d e p ^ d s among 
other things upon the management of the CBC i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r s . 
I t i s important that the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector ( I V ) i s pseudo-
randomly s e l e c t e d . Further the vector must be protected from 
d i s c l o s u r e . I n the above inplementation, t h i s i s c a r r i e d out by 
using the ECB encrypted v e r s i o n of the random block generated as 
the IV. I t i s a l s o advisable to change the vector s frequently to 
avoid the cryptanalyst using the c i p h e r t e x t search a t t a c k . 
Within the c i p h e r t e x t , some e r r o r s are introduced and then 
deciphered with the same key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector t o study the 
e r r o r extension c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the CBC mode. From Figure 5.7 
one or more b i t e r r o r s within a s i n g l e c i p h e r t e x t block a r e found 
to a f f e c t the decryption of two blocks, namely, the block i n which 
the e r r o r occurs and the succeeding block. I f the e r r o r s occur i n 
the i t h c i p h e r t e x t block, then each b i t o f the i t h p l a i n t e x t block 
has an error r a t e of about f i f t y percent. The ( i + l ) - t h p l a i n t e x t 
block has only those b i t s i n e r r o r which correspond d i r e c t l y to the 
ciph e r t e x t b i t s i n e r r o r . FXirther i t i s seen from F i g u r e 5.7 that 
a f t e r two blocks, cryptographic synchronization i s automatically 
e s t a b l i s h e d and the subsequent deciphered blocks are unaffected. 
Compared to the ECB mode, t h i s has extended the e r r o r propagation 
to two blocks. This can a l s o be seen from equations (5.1) and (5.2) 
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F i g . 5.7 - CnC E r r o r C h a r a c t e r i e t i c 
where an e r r o r i n the c i p h e r t e x t block Y ( i * l ) can a f f e c t every b i t 
i n the recovered p l a i n t e x t block X ( i - l ) but i t w i l l a f f e c t only the 
corresponding b i t p o s i t i o n s i n the r e c e i v e d p l a i n t e x t block X ( i ) . 
Subsequent p l a i n t e x t blocks X(i+1), X(i-»-2), ... are unaffected. 
I f b i t s are added or l o s t i n a c i p h e r t e x t block so that 
block boundaries are l o s t between sender and r e c e i v e r , then 
synchronization i s l o s t . However cryptographic synchronization w i l l 
automatically be r e - e s t a b l i s h e d 64 b i t s a f t e r block boundaries have 
been e s t a b l i s h e d . 
T h i s s e l f synchronizing scheme nay be u s e f u l when small 
amounts of noise are present on the data conasunication l i n k s . 
5.4 Stream Cipher Feedback 
5.4.1 Princi£le 
The cipher feedback mode (CFB) i s an a d d i t i v e stream 
cipher technique i n which the EES i s used t o generate a pseudo-
random binary stream. T h i s stream i s e x c l u s i v e - o r e d with the binary 
p l a i n t e x t to form the c i p h e r t e x t wrtiich i s fed back t o form the next 
EWES input block. The pseudo-random binary stream i s sometimes 
r e f e r r e d to as the key stream and the DES the key generator. 
T h i s mode i s sc h e m a t i c a l l y shown i n Figu r e 5.8* One 
through to s i x t y four b i t CFB operation may be used u n l i k e the ECB 
mode where the message i s required to be divided i n t o blocks of a 
given b l o c k s i z e namely 64. A 64-bit i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector ( I V ) i s 
used as a s t a r t e r input block to begin the CFB operation. (Note 
that i f the s i z e of IV i s chosen, t o be l e s s than 64 b i t s , then i t can 
be padded with 'O's to form 64 b i t s ) . T his vector i s processed 
through the DES device i n the encrypt s t a t e to produce a pseudo-
random output block. The message i s divided i n t o c h a r a c t e r s of 
s - b i t s i z e where 0<s<65. The DES algorithm i s operated once for 
each new s - b i t c h a r a c t e r . Then s - b i t s of the DES pseudo-random 
output block (01, 02, Os) are used i n the e x c l u s i v e - o r operation 
with the s - b i t s of the p l a i n t e x t ( D l , DG, Ds) to form the 
cipherte x t ( C I , C2, C s ) . That i s , ( C I , C2, . C s ) = 
(Dl e O l , D 2 e 0 2 , D s ® O s ) . T h i s operation may be defined 
when the lOTgth of the p l a i n t e x t character to be encrypted i s l e s s than 
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s - b i t s by concatenating zeroes to the l e f t hand s i d e or most 
s i g n i f i c a n t b i t s of the p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r . S i m i l a r l y during 
decryption, p l a i n t e x t i s produced by e x c l u s i v e - o r i n g a s - b i t 
ciphertext c h a r acter with the s - b i t s of DES output block. That i s , 
( D l , D2, .... Ds) = (O. © 01, C2 ® 02, Cs © Os) 
In both cases,the same s - b i t s of the DES output block are used and 
the unused b i t s are discarded. At both ends, the next input block 
i s created by d i s c a r d i n g the most s i g n i f i c a n t s - b i t s o f the previous 
input block, s h i f t i n g the remaining b i t s s p o s i t i o n s to the l e f t and 
then i n s e r t i n g the s - b i t c i p h e r t e x t character j u s t produced i n the 
encryption operation or j u s t used i n the decrypt operation i n t o the 
l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t b i t p o s i t i o n s as shown i n Figure 5.8. That i s , 
the input block ( I I , 12, 164) i s given by, 
( I I , 12, 164) = (Is+1, Is+2, 164, C I , C2, CS) 
This input block i s then processed through the DES device i n the 
encrypt s t a t e to produce the next output block. An important 
d i f f e r e n c e compared with the two modes considered i n Sections 5.2 and 
5.3 i s that even i n decryption, the DES i s used i n i t s encryption 
s t a t e . This i s because i n CFB mode, the DES algorithm has been used 
as a pseudo-random luunber generator rather than as a cryptographic 
transformation. 
Mathematically,this mode can be expressed as f o l l o w s : 
Let X ( i ) be the i t h p l a i n t e x t input data and Y ( i ) be the i t h 
ciphe r t e x t output data. L e t U{±) be the intermediate i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector at time i . In general, the length of the intermediate 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector may not be equal to the length of the i n i t i a l -
i z a t i o n vector Z. L e t the function h' define how U(l ) i s obtained 
from Z. That i s , U(l) = h ' ( Z ) . 
Encipherment of the f i r s t s - b i t p l a i n t e x t i s given by: 
Y ( l ) = X ( l ) © f j ^ [ U ( l ) ] 
Let the function h define the dependency of the intermediate 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector at time i on the previous i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector 
U(i-1) as w e l l as the a d d i t i o n a l feedback quantity. That i s , 
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U ( i ) = h [ U ( i - l ) , feedback q u a n t i t y ] 
where the feedback quantity = Y ( i - l ) . 
In CFB mode with s<64, 
U ( i ) = U ( i . l ) f l Y ( i - l ) , i > l 
where fl denotes concatenation of U ( i - l ) and Y ( i - l ) . 
With s=64, 
U ( i ) = Y ( i - l ) , i > l 
That i s , e f f e c t i v e l y the c i p h e r t e x t a t time i-1 i s fed back as 
input to the DES algorithm. Defining Y ( 0) = Z, with s=64, i t 
follows that 
[ U ( i ) ] = [ Y ( i - l ) ] , i ^ l 
Therefore equations of enciphermmt and decipherment can be expressed 
as 
Y ( i ) = X ( i ) ® [ U ( i ) ] , i ^ 1 (5.3) 
and 
X ( i ) = Y ( i ) ® fj ^ [ U ( i ) } , i ^ 1 (5.4) 
re s p e c t i v e l y where U(l) = Z. 
5.4.2 Inclement a t i o n _ 
An 8 - b i t cipher feedback mode has been implemented on the 
encryption system. The flowchart of the program can be found i n 
AppOTdix 6. The d i f f e r e n c e s betvreen t h i s program and the ECB and 
CBC programs are now very b r i e f l y mentioned. 
As i n the case of the CBC program, a 64-bit i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector i s generated a t the transmitting end and sent to the r e c e i v e r 
for proper synchronization. The major d i f f e r e n c e compared to ECB 
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and CBC programs i s that i n t h i s modey the message i s encrypted byte 
by byte and not i n blocks. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t there i s no need f o r 
padding at the end of the message and consequently no cryptogram 
extension* One ad d i t i o n a l routine SHIFT i s required u4iich s h i f t s 
the intermediate i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector (memory l o c a t i o n s TEMP 1 and 
TEMP 2) to the l e f t and appends the 8 b i t s of the c i p h e r t e x t to the 
ri g h t s i d e of the s h i f t e d input to produce the next DES input. 
F i n a l l y at both the transmitting and the r e c e i v i n g ends, the data 
s e c u r i t y device i s programmed to encryption s t a t e . 
5.4.3- Resuits^ and Di s c u s s i o n _ 
The p l a i n t e x t example shown i n Figure 5.2 i s enciphered 
under the CFB mode using the same key and the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector 
as i n the CBC mode. The cip h e r t e x t produced i s shovm i n Figure 5.9. 
From Figure 5.9, i t i s seen that as i n the c a s e o f the 
CBC mode, the CFB mode does not produce the same c i p h e r t e x t even 
when the input p l a i n t e x t i s the same. T h i s i s because the i n t e r -
mediate i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r s are d i f f e r e n t i n each c a s e . Thus 
chaining has again eliminated patterns o c c u r r i n g i n the c i p h e r t e x t 
For t h i s mode to produce the same oi p h e r t e x t when the same p l a i n t e x t 
i s encrypted, both the key and the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector must be 
i d e n t i c a l i n the two c a s e s . This mode i s s i m i l a r t o CBC i n i t s 
r e s i s t a n c e t o forms of attack such as c i p h e r t e x t searching, replay, 
i n s e r t i o n and d e l e t i o n . 
While both the CBC and ECB modes disc u s s e d e a r l i e r required 
padding of the l a s t block of the message ( i f i t s length i s not equal 
to an i n t e g r a l multiple of 64 b i t s ) , such problems do not a r i s e i n 
t h i s stream c i p h e r mode. That i s , the key stream length can be 
matched e x a c t l y to the lengfh of the p l a i n t e x t to be enciphered. So 
t h i s mode allows easy encryption o f 'non-block type' messages such 
as character by character or even b i t by b i t encryption. Hence the 
CFB mode can be used for instance t o encipher the short l a s t block 
occurring a t the end of the message i n CBC mode (Section 5.3.3). 
However, CFB i s l e s s e f f i c i e n t than CBC i n that i t r e q u i r e s f o r each 
p l a i n t e x t c h a r acter one execution of the encryption algorithm. For 
example, the throughput of the operating on 8 - b i t CFB i s reduced 
by a fa c t o r of 8 or more compared to the CBC mode. Th i s can be 
overcome by enciphering n p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s using the pseudo-
random key stream produced by one DES c y c l e where n i s the l a r g e s t 
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integer which i s l e s s than ^ p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s i z e . I n the case 
of 8 - b i t CFB for instance, one can encipher 8 p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s 
(bytes) using the pseudo-random sequence produced by one DES c y c l e . 
This w i l l produce a throughput comparable t o that of the CBC without 
the need for padding. 
E r r o r s have been introduced w i t h i n the c i p h e r t e x t to study 
the e r r o r ext«ision c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the CFB mode. From Figure 5.10 
i t i s seen that b i t e r r o r s w i t h i n one CFB c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r 
a f f e c t s not only the decryption of the garbled c i p h e r t e x t character 
but a l s o the decryption of the succeeding c h a r a c t e r s u n t i l the b i t 
e r r o r s are s h i f t e d out of the CFB input block. The f i r s t a f f e c t e d 
p l a i n t e x t c h a r a cter i s garbled i n e x a c t l y those p l a c e s *rf>ere the 
ciph e r t e x t character i s i n e r r o r . S u c c e s s i v e p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s 
experience an average e r r o r r a t e of 5095 u n t i l a l l e r r o r s have been 
s h i f t e d out of the DES input block. I n t h i s 8 - b i t CFB ca^e* e r r o r s 
i n <»ie c i p h e r t e x t character i s seen t o a f f e c t decryption of nine 
c h a r a c t e r s . Ftirther i t i s seen from Figure 5.10 that the CFB 
decryption automatically regains cryptographic synchronization. 
This s e l f - s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n property i s a l s o r e f l e c t e d i n equations 
(5.3)and ( 5 . 4 ) , Section 5.4.1* From equation ( 5 . 4 ) , an e r r o r i n 
cip h e r t e x t Y ( i - l ) can p o t e n t i a l l y a f f e c t every b i t i n the computed 
quantity f^^ [ U ( i ) ] and hence can cause every b i t i n the recovered 
p l a i n t e x t X ( i ) to be i n e r r o r . From eqxiation ( 5 . 4 ) , an e r r o r i n 
ciph e r t e x t Y ( i - l ) causes only the corresp<»iding b i t p o s i t i o n i n the 
recovered p l a i n t e x t X ( i - l ) to be i n e r r o r . The system synchronizes 
when U ( i ) becomes equal at both ends. Thus l i k e the CBC mode, 
CFB mode provides l i m i t e d e r r o r extension. 
The recoimnendations given i n Section 5.3.3 regarding the 
management of the CBC i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r s and i t s i n f l u e n c e on 
the s e c u r i t y are a l s o a p p l i c a b l e to CFB. 
5.5 Cipher Block Chaining with P l a i n t e x t Feedback 
5.5.1 P r i n c i p l e 
Cipher block chaining with p l a i n t e x t feedback (CBCP) i s a 
block cipher i n which the p l a i n t e x t i s e x c l u s i v e ^ r e d not only with 
the previous c i p h e r t e x t block but a l s o with the previous p l a i n t e x t 
block p r i o r to being processed by the DES. 
Thi s scheme i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 5.11. The f i r s t DES 
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input block i s formed by e x c l u s i v e ^ r i n g the f i r s t p l a i n t e x t block 
with a 64-bit i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector ( I V ) . This input block i s 
processed through the DES device producing a 64-bit DES output block 
which defines the f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block* Hence processing of the 
f i r s t p l a i n t e x t block i s same as i n the CBC mode. T h i s f i r s t 
c i p h e r t e x t block i s e x c l u s i v e ^ r e d with the second p l a i n t e x t block 
as w e l l as the f i r s t p l a i n t e x t block to construct the second DES 
input block. The next DES operation produces the second c i p h e r t e x t 
block. T h i s chaining process i s continued u n t i l the ^ d o f the 
message when the l a s t block of c i p h e r t e x t i s obtained by «icrypting 
the l a s t input block formed by e x c l u s i v e - o r i n g l a s t p l a i n t e x t block 
with the ( l a s t - 1 ) c i p h e r t e x t and p l a i n t e x t blocks. 
In CBCP decryption, the f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block r e c e i v e d i s 
processed through the DES device to produce the DES output block. 
This f i r s t output block i s exclusive-ored with the same i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector ( I V ) to produce the f i r s t p l a i n t e x t block. Again the 
deciphering process of the f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t block i s same as i n the 
CBC mode. The second c i p h e r t e x t block i s processed through the DES 
to y i e l d the second output block which i s then e x c l u s i v e - o r e d with 
the f i r s t c i p h e r t e x t and p l a i n t e x t blocks to produce the second 
p l a i n t e x t block. T h i s process i s continued u n t i l the end when the 
l a s t block o f p l a i n t e x t i s obtained by e x c l u s i v e - o r i n g the l a s t DES 
output block with the ( l a s t - 1 ) p l a i n t e x t and c i p h e r t e x t b l o c k s . 
Mathematically, the scheme can be expressed as fol l o w s : 
Ehcipherment and decipherment procedures are given by: 
Y ( i ) = [ X ( i ) ® U ( i ) ] i 3 , l (5.5) 
and 
X ( i ) = f ^ " ^ [Y(i)]® U ( i ) . i S ^ l (5.6) 
where 
X ( i ) i s the i t h p l a i n t e x t block 
Y( i ) i s the corresponding i t h c i p h e r t e x t block 
and 
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U ( i ) = 
Z, the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector i = 1 
h[ X ( i - l ) , Y ( i - l ) ] i > l 
Here h represents a simple e x c l u s i v e - o r function. 
Therefore, 
U ( i ) = X ( i - l ) © Y ( i - l ) , i > l (5.7) 
Subs t i t u t i n g (5.7) for u ( i ) i n t o (5.5) g i v e s 
Y ( i ) = ^ [ X ( i ) e X ( i - l ) © Y ( i - l ) ] , i > l 
From the r e c u r s i v e nature of the equations (5.5) and (5.7) i t 
follows that there e x i s t functions H , H , H. such t h a t 
Y { i ) = H. [ k , X ( 0 ) , X ( l ) X ( i ) ] , i ^ 1 (5.8) 
i ^ e r e X(0) = Z. 
S i m i l a r l y from (5.6) and (5.7) i t fo l l o w s t h a t . 
X ( i ) = 
f j ^ " ^ [Y(i)]© Z i = 1 
[Y(i)]© Y ( i - l ) © X ( i - l ) i > 1 
Thus there e x i s t functions G^, G^t •••» G^ such that 
X ( i ) = G. [k, Y ( 0 ) , Y ( l ) Y ( i ) ] , i ^ 1 (5.9) 
where Y(0) = Z. 
From equation ( 5 . 8 ) , one can see that the enciphering 
process i s e n t i r e l y d e t e r m i n i s t i c and the output c i p h e r t e x t block 
at time i , Y ( i ) , i s dependent only on the inputs to the c i p h e r i n g 
process from time 1 through time i , namely, the key ( k ) , the 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector (Z) and a l l the p l a i n t e x t blocks X ( l ) through 
to X ( i ) . FXirthermore, s i n c e c i p h e r t e x t block Y ( i ) i s dependent on 
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the i n i t i a l conditions e s t a b l i s h e d a t the beginning o f the ciphering 
process, at time 1, i t i s s a i d to be o r i g i n dependent[ 3 ] . 
From equation ( 5 . 9 ) , i t can be seen that the recovered 
p l a i n t e x t block a t time i , X ( i ) , depends only on the key ( k ) , the 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector (Z) and a l l c i p h e r t e x t blocks Y ( l ) through 
to Y ( i ) . Thus X ( i ) i s a l s o o r i g i n dependmt. 
Th i s scheme i s defined to be a general block cipher[ 3] . 
5 • 5 • 2 In^lementation_ 
The program implementing t h i s mode of operation i s very much 
s i m i l a r to the one used for the CBC mode. The only d i f f e r e n c e i s 
that i n t h i s case, a p l a i n t e x t block i s not only exclusive-ored with 
the previous c i p h e r t e x t block (TEMP 1) but a l s o with the previous 
p l a i n t e x t block p r i o r to DES encryption. A s i m i l a r d i f f e r e n c e 
occurs a f t e r DES decryption. 
5.5.3 Resul^ts and Oiscussion^ 
The p l a i n t e x t exan^le shown i n Figure 5.2 i s enciphered 
under t h i s mode using the same key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector as 
before. The ciphert e x t produced i s shown i n Figure 5.12. 
Again from Figure 5.12 i t i s seen that there i s no r e p e t i t i o n 
of c i p h e r t e x t even when the p l a i n t e x t i s r e p e t i t i v e . T h i s mode i s 
s i m i l a r to CBC and CFB i n i t s r e s i s t a n c e to forms of atta c k such as 
ciph e r t e x t searching, replay, i n s e r t i o n and d e l e t i o n . The most 
i n t e r e s t i n g property of t h i s mode however i s that of e r r o r extension. 
The deciphered version of the example with some e r r o r s introduced 
i n the ci p h e r t e x t p r i o r to decryption i s shown i n Figure 5.13. Two 
points are worth to be noted. The f i r s t one i s that an e r r o r i n the 
ciph e r t e x t a f f e c t s the decryption of aX\ subsequent blocks u n t i l the 
end of the message. That i s , the scheme e x h i b i t s the property o f 
e r r o r propagation. This agrees with equation (5.9) where every b i t 
of the recovered p l a i n t e x t block X ( i ) i s a function of every b i t i n 
the c i p h e r t e x t blocks Y ( l ) through to Y ( i ) - The only c a s e i n which 
the e r r o r i s not propagated occurs when the corrupted c i p h e r t e x t block 
Y ( i ) * and the deciphered value of Y{i)» under key k obey the 
eq u a l i t y 
Y(i)» e f^'^ ( Y ( i ) * ) = Y ( i ) ® f^-^ ( Y ( i ) ) 
- 105 -
4 1 
O 
Q u Of f 
d N t X 
i n C T H 1l 
- U' ( e « K 
u <; D z 9* N 
Y y 0 Oft - Q a 
1 ) z CO 
K •* V 
9 
0 y r w 
u 1 u 1 J 
c * 1) 4 / 3 ' 
{ A. D < t 
\ i y / n i I 
y 0 0 M P-
" 
a: •" — 9-/ • T ** XI n 
u 0 / > u> 
1 * it. Y X 
t L ILf « • 1 
V 
•X* 0 ... H T 
r 1 0 ( s 
I • Q 6 u (? c 
7 • 0 t — I 
1 Y (1 1 a s 0 
- U b L 2 u 
•v 0 « e P 
F II D 3 
h h ^ K, J 
4 u X K •v K 1 
1. X V I - 1 ) (• 1 i n 'X. C 
0 c « i : u 11 
d 7 J ? Z d A 
0 rr e w 0 N 
OA 0 1 0 -
A. 1 1 D t 
A « C . " p o k 0 ' ' 
M o K o a i U T P / P i t 
t - K I II K X M F E E ' 
J : c Z U n J i / 3 J y , V » y r L 
V 
a f 0 i A / ) > > 
n ^ a I T • X T « 
t H b K - • z * w r I 
A, o 3c ' » - K V V p 
fi. rL> ••' i L T / c i t w A « ( D - c + 6 
3 T a k h ' G i n / i r 4 n 
0 * S X f n , o v ) x i n « u 
S I P " I ft oo ^ V 
t v A • n . U i b m i p r y 
* » 7 J T " * y - 4 i , » 
*^  V T r( m d W 7 ( iTv 7 w 
jt. " 3 ' I. J K ± m ^ 
7 h I L I 0 5: I « tn* 
7 u i i • A < & > R < > D X t V 1 
a or 0 L - - - G 1 V 4. 1 h 6 
d - 1 Q t « 1 C 1 - X a 3 1 c 1 OC ( 0 D c 1 D 
1 1 u I ) B P < N [ f \ 1 f 1 
; X • h 1 c / > Z M f f 0 
8 B L a L 0 D a ® u 0 u rt • • • 
IT c n* Q 9 o- d 1 it t I I q V • IT 
c 0 P 11 a; a G 1 \ + 0 / 
- CO c 1 7 f C X K 1^ ) Y Y U 
fi B • 0 - / 1 n - 1 T o 
7 : 0 S T b 1 t - • • r -
1 4 3 i - - - 1 t. i / 9 • 1 i V - -
Of 0 1 U ) « L <? D - X 
- A u T + u »• X TV Z t w 7 
( 1 o ; II « 0 Z A. ; 
; 1 W 1 T U W m / f M k 
p u o 0 G c 1' • 3 u ft ; 3 V 
d = oo /• - ) < N 2 L r -• /* P t / Q ( 1 
1 L a i 1 L u 7 • 
« if V / W t T Id • U T 1 U d 
1 * i '\> A t DC 0 ) - - - 1 1 / 0 X r •a V P F- 0 /» \ D a / 
Q « R t 7 X ± - Q n i Uf 8 
1 n n 1 6 * J w a • w - 1 A, n i n 
A n n [ * ) o ( 1 / A c h 1 Of X 
L 9 If c 3 L ) 1 T K r T - P c • 11 , U h Y Q I 0 k T T a V • » ± 
1 W T 1 a- : X X I c t- CD t 0 
W J I" 0 e P - II B o /* J r i - V P - J k K 0 «. * t & P 
1 1 / 7 L 4 0 M / oo T ( o 0 
• 3 7 X 7 t u • 7 f E • 
5 L L « J 0 c - 4 (B > 
P j g , 5,12 - CBCP C i p h e r t e x t Example 
Q 1 
0 f' 
- Jf I t • 0 K o 1 0- - r • A* 0 o c TV f e II ; r 
* /* - a tn. - M - y q • 0 1 T X c • P z m A «/ a S X o -
• a J N 1 ... rv q "- q u a " - ; q -• ... q 
u 0 1 1 B •* n 1 a " n ( • - - n < • • - - It { 
J iC K d S i K d 6 S J A d d 5 i K. d d 3 i u d 
i 9 0 d d V N 0 K T b \ r ( c 0 - / w 1 0 T ; b / r 1 •V f 
b / f ( i> f I I N t q T V t b n V L 0 b / 1 • 1 T ; b / i ( T 
b / ( 1 T w N 0 ± V f b \ f i J O V N V * e 0 \ 1 / i 1 T 
b / ( f V T I I N 1 q T V C b n V L o b / 1 e if T b / i 1 
b / r T Q 1 r (B 6 U b r b n c T n L w E if u - / 1 { T 
b / r < f q 1 r X b L w u oc f K ) ( * T ; b / r ( T 
b / ( 1 T I I N w 1 ^ T b / t t ; b / f ( ; b / ( f 
b > V (B V T w N q f V n . P- T o 
A - « * > C 1 c/ c : A. / a A 1 a - A, 
Z 1 a - A, /. • A > a - n- P- 1 u k • - * f Q u k 0 0 1 " ) Z a - A. 
Z 1 - / I 9 T N • 9- P' % 1 a - A- rv 7. a - A. P' Z a - A, z 1 a — A, 1 • U 4 / I L 0 r- Z 1 a — A, rb r z a - k TV P- Z a - A, 
4 4 p — A, 4 0 / /» 0 n< p- Z 1 a - A, n* p- z a - k fV P- z a - A, y. 1 a — K ' 4 P N p- z 1 a — A. TV p- z • <7 - k TV P- z a - A-
z 1 a — K a • D • oo a — A, TV p- z 1 . a - A, TV p- z a - k TV P' z a - A. 
r- z 
1 ff — k • t J 1 ) z u . 1 w t / K a w f k 9 t I ft g V X i 0 - i> t K y ty ) f z U « L 3 t a U X t X I 1 V 0 X I ft 9 
V X I 0 - O J 1 o- ) 
f 
3 IC 1 1 W 1 / H , e w f 1 V X 1 ft 9 V X 1 0 - i>- t J • o ) Z U 6 1. 3 t 6 U X - X 1 t>- ; A , 1 ft 9 
V X 1 0 - t J o- ) £ 2 n II 9 / Oh > M I u t [ 0 J X K 7 ( 0 a 
2 7 ( B B s - n H J ( } 2 7 H ( a a 0 2 7 [ B B g 2 7 ( a a 
Z 7 [ D 0 J 0 s A > B B 2 7 ?• I s a 9 2 7 i B a 0 2 7 9* [ a B 
Z a II > a vr - k K 7 c , i e 1/ / 0 ; J V 1 1 X V 0 » 4 c d n 
/ C d n 2 h 1 O z t K X \ b 3 t , r A r ? 
1 
- r Y r ? c d n / c d n 2 Ik 1 o t A X J 1 3 c ; 1 V 1 X / f c d n 
/ C d n 0 c A. - U 1 fl n 3 X 1 r - + 7 1 1 1 0 o n i t> k 0 0 m IT i n K lu + Q i n r A 3 N a ^ a c w if N - d c r n l( X t »• d C 
R M X t t 6 c 0 7 1 IT T 1 fl U e 11 11 X i d c r R 11 X t * d c 
H U X t t & c X ) 1 u 5 f <>• U t • r t>- U > • r i> e U » 
r 9- X i t d- r| 1 z U t • r i> U » • f t*- a> u 1 • r i>- ffi u 
F i g . 5 . 1 3 - CBCP E r r o r C h a r a c t e r i a t i o 
That i s , the feedback value a t point A(Figure 5.11)^input t o the next cycle^ 
i s unchanged. Assuming that the p r o b a b i l i t y that an e r r o r i n Y ( i ) causing 
each b i t i n f j ^ ^ ( Y ( i ) * ) to d i f f e r from the corresponding b i t i n f ^ ^ { Y ( i ) ) 
i s approximately equal to 0.5, the p r o b a b i l i t y that an e r r o r 
-64 
c a n c e l l a t i o n occurs i s approximately equal to 2 
Secondly, when deciphering the c i p h e r t e x t containing e r r o r s 
with the r i g h t key and the r i g h t i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c tor, i t i s seen 
that patterns or r e p e t i t i o n s i n the garbled deciphered t e x t are 
revealed udiich correspond to the patterns i n the p l a i n t e x t . The 
reason for t h i s occurrence i s given as follows: 
F i r s t consider the case where there are no e r r o r s i n the 
ciphe r t e x t p r i o r to decryption. R e f e r r i n g to the diagram shown 
belowt assume that the p l a i n t e x t blocks 2 and 3 are the same (but 
t h e i r corresponding c i p h e r t e x t s C^ ^ and C^ w i l l , be d i f f e r e n t due to 
c h a i n i n g ) . Then, for the deciphered block 3 to be equal t o block 2, 
P^t one must have 
i e 
(O O) = Zero block 
IV-
( i ) 
C . 
i 
( i i ) 
«1 
I 
I S 
( i i i ) 
r 
e 
Now i f the block C^ has an e r r o r , CJ, then t h i s decryption r e s u l t s 
i n p l a i n t e x t block, F^. The second block i s then equal to 
C* © P* e o3^ . The t h i r d block i s given by O^ © C^ © and t h i s 
1 1 ^ 2 1 
i s equal to because O^ © C^ i s s t i l l equal to the zero block as 
i t i s unaffected by e r r o r i n C* . Thus t h i s r e p e t i t i o n i n the 
deciphered version w i l l occur as long as the two s u c c e s s i v e blocks 
are the same i n the p l a i n t e x t . When P^ and P^ are d i f f e r e n t , then 
108 -
P^ © C^ © = P_ and c\ © O^ i s not equal to the zero block. 
2 2 2 3 ^ ^ 1 2 
Therefore when an error occurs i n C l ^ , ^ ® ^2 ^ ^2 ~ ^ ^ 
This pattern occurrence i s not of great concern as f a r as 
the seciurity of t h i s scheme i s concerned because here we a r e t a l k i n g 
about the l e g i t i m a t e r e c e i v e r with the r i g h t key and the r i g h t 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector detecting patterns i n the decrypted v e r s i o n of 
the garbled c i p h e r t e x t . T h i s scheme i s not at a l l s u i t a b l e for 
communication l i n k s prone to noise. On the other hand, t h i s e r r o r 
propagation property can be used to prevent 'spoofing* a t t a c k . This 
scheme i s very much s u i t a b l e for message authen t i c a t i o n purposes 
ttrtiere one needs to determine with a high l e v e l of confidence whether 
the message has been a l t e r e d . 
As CBCP i s a block cipher padding i s again required at the 
end of the message l i k e the ECB and the CBC modes. 
5.6 Stream Cipher Feedback with Vector Feedback 
5.6.1 P r i n c i p l e 
T h i s i s an a d d i t i v e stream c i p h e r technique s i m i l a r to 
CFB i n which the DES i s used to g«ierate a pseudo-random binary 
stream. This stream i s exclusived-ored with the p l a i n t e x t to form 
the c i p h e r t e x t . The c i p h e r t e x t together with the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector i s then fed back to form the next DES input block. The 
feedback from the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector i s the f e a t u r e which 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t from the CFB mode. I t i s r e f e r r e d to as CFBV, 
This scheme i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 5.14. The i n i t i a l i z -
a t i o n vector forms the f i r s t DES input block. This i s encrypted by 
the DES device producing a 64-bit pseudo-random output block. The 
rigtoiost or the least s i g n i f i c a n t s - b i t s (1 ^ s :^ 64) of the DES 
output block are exclusive-ored with the s - b i t s of the p l a i n t e x t to 
form s - b i t s of c i p h e r t e x t . These s - b i t s of the c i p h e r t e x t are 
expanded to form a 64-bit block by r e p e t i t i o n . T h i s block i s then 
exclusive-ored with the previous i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector and the 
r e s u l t i s s h i f t e d by s - b i t s to form the next DES input block, the 
new i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector. T h i s i s then used i n the encryption of 
the next s - b i t p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r . T h i s process i s repeated u n t i l 
the end of the message. 
In CFBV decryption, the f i r s t output block,produced by 
encrypting the same i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector, i s exclusive-ored with the 
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f i r s t s - b i t c i p h e r t e x t character to produce the f i r s t s - b i t p l a i n t e x t 
character. The f i r s t s - b i t c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r i s then expanded to 
form a 64-bit block which i s exclusive-ored with the previous 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector. The r e s u l t i s s h i f t e d by s - b i t s to form the next 
DBS input block. This process i s repeated u n t i l the end o f the message. 
Note that the f i r s t c y c l e of t h i s scheme i s e x a c t l y the 
same as i n CFB. Furthermore as i n CFB, the DES device i s used i n i t s 
encryption s t a t e at both ends. 
Mathematically, t h i s scheme can b© described as follows: 
The mcipherment and decipherment can be expressed as 
Y ( i ) = X ( i ) ® [ U ( i ) ] i ^ l (5.10) 
and 
X ( i ) = Y ( i ) ® [ U ( i ) ] i > l (5.11) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y 
where 
X ( i ) i s the i t h p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r 
Y( i ) i s the corresponding i t h c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r 
U ( i ) = ^ 
Z, i n i t i a l x z a t x c n v e ctor, x = 1 
(5.12) 
h [ U ( i . l ) . Y ( i - l ) ] , i > 1 
Here the function h i s given by 
h [ U ( i - l ) , Y ( i - l ) ] = E ( Y ( i - l ) ) ® U ( i - l ) , i > 1 
where 
E ( Y ( i - l ) ) represents expansion of s - b i t c i p h e r t e x t 
c h a r a c t e r s Y ( i - l ) r e p e t i t i v e l y to form a 64-bit block. 
From the r e c u r s i v e nature of the equations (5.10), (5.11) and (5.12), 
i t follows that there e x i s t functions H^, H^, and G^, G^t 
- I l l -
G^, such that 
Y ( i ) = X ( i ) + H. [k, X ( 0 ) , X ( l ) , X ( i - l ) ] i ^ l (5.13) 
and 
X ( i ) = Y ( i ) + G. [k. Y ( 0 ) , Y ( l ) , Y ( i - l ) ] i ^ l (5.14) 
where 
X{0) = Y(0) = 2 
The equations (5.13) and (5.14) are counterparts of the equations 
(5.8) and (5.9) given i n Section 5.5.1. Hence t h i s scheme represents 
a general stream cipher [ 3 ] . 
From equation (5.13), i t follows that the j t h b i t i n the 
ciph e r t e x t character Y ( i ) i s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by only the j t h b i t 
i n the p l a i n t e x t character X ( i ) whereas i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d 
by every b i t i n p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s X ( l ) through to X ( i - l ) . I n 
l i k e manner, from equation (5.14), i t follows that the j t h b i t i n 
the received p l a i n t e x t character X ( i ) i s d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by only 
the j t h b i t i n the ciphert e x t c h a r a c t e r Y ( i ) whereas i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y 
a f f e c t e d by every b i t i n c i p h e r t c x t c h a r a c t e r s Y ( l ) through to Y ( i - l ) . 
5.6.2 Inclement at^ion_ 
The program implementing t h i s mode of operation with 5=8 
i s very much s i m i l a r to the one used for the CFB mode. The only 
d i f f e r e n c e conpared to the CFB mode i s that i n t h i s c a s e , the new 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector i s formed by e x c l u s i v e - o r i n g the previous 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector with the expanded previous 8-bit c i p h e r t e x t 
c h a r a c t e r . 
5.6.3 Re&jlts_and_Cdscussipn 
The p l a i n t e x t example shown i n Figure 5.2 i s enciphered under 
t h i s mode using the same key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector a s before. The 
cipherte x t produced i s show i n Figure 5.15. 
L i k e a l l the other modes except the ECB disc u s s e d e a r l i e r 
t h i s mode masks the patterns i n the p l a i n t e x t thus reducing the 
code boc^ a n a l y s i s , replay, i n s e r t i o n and de l e t i o n a t t a c k s . I t i s 
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s i m i l a r to CFB i n that the messages can be processed c h a r a c t e r by 
character thus avoiding the padding required i n ECB, CBC and CBCP 
modes. 
The most i n t e r e s t i n g property of t h i s stream cipher mode 
i s that of e r r o r extension* The deciphered v e r s i o n of the example 
with some e r r o r s introduced i n the c i p h e r t e x t p r i o r to decryption i s 
shown i n Figure 5.16. Two points are worth mentioning. The f i r s t 
one i s that an e r r o r i n a c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r i s found t o a f f e c t the 
decryption of a l l subsequent c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r s u n t i l the end of 
the message. That i s , l i k e CBCP, t h i s stream c i p h e r e x h i b i t s the 
property of e r r o r propagation. This can a l s o be seen from equation 
(5.14). Since the recovered p l a i n t e x t X ( i ) i s pot«itially a f f e c t e d 
by every b i t i n the c i p h e r t e x t s Y ( l ) through to Y ( i - l ) , e r r o r 
propagation i s achieved. However because the j t h b i t i n the p l a i n -
t e x t X ( i ) depends only on the j t h b i t i n the cifrfiertext Y ( i ) , the 
inters3nnbol dependence can be achieved for a l l but the f i n a l 
p l a i n t e x t . On the other hand with the CBCPf there i s i n t e r symbol 
dependence throughout a l l blocks. 
Secondly, when deciphering t h i s c i p h e r t e x t containing e r r o r s 
with c o r r e c t key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector, i t i s seen from Figure 
5.16 that there i s no pattern or r e p e t i t i o n i n the garbled decrypted 
t e x t . This i s i n c o n t r a s t to the CBCP scheme considered i n Section 
5.5.3. So even the l e g i t i m a t e user with r i g h t key and r i g h t 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector gets a c o n ^ l e t e l y garbled t e x t when the e r r o r s 
are introduced i n the c i p h e r t e x t . T h i s means that t h i s scheme i s 
not s u i t a b l e for l i n k s prone to noise but i s very u s e f u l for message 
authentication purposes. 
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C H A P T E R 6 
STATISTICAL TESTS ON DES OUTPUT SEQUENCES 
6.1 General 
Some s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s are applied to the output sequences 
obtained using the DES algorithm under d i f f e r e n t modes (see Chapter 5) 
to t e s t for t h e i r randomness p r o p e r t i e s . Some simple s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s 
are a l s o considered with a view to detecting the dependence or 
c o r r e l a t i o n between the output and inputs to the DES and to determining 
whether p l a i n t e x t - c i p h e r t e x t p a i r s could be used to p r e d i c t the b i t s of 
the key. 
6.2 S t a t i s t i c a l Tests for Randomness 
S t r i c t l y speaking, no f i n i t e sequence i s ever t r u l y random. 
The best that can be done i s to s i n g l e out c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s as 
being associated with randomness and to accept any sequence which has 
these properties as a random sequence. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s assumed 
that the opponent i n t e r c e p t s s e c t i o n s of c i p h e r t e x t sequence and attempts 
to e x p l o i t the s t a t i s t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of the sequence i n h i s c r y p t -
a n a l y t i c a l attack. Therefore i t i s necessary to apply the s t a t i s t i c a l 
t e s t s to sections of c i p h e r t e x t sequence to check t h e i r randomness 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This type of randomness i s often r e f e r r e d to as l o c a l 
randomness ^^4] . 
There are s e v e r a l s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s u^iich can be applied to 
a sequence. Here four fundamental t e s t s have been considered which 
can be used to provide a q u a n t i t a t i v e measure of randomness [ 14] . They 
are the frequency t e s t , the s e r i a l t e s t , the runs t e s t and the auto-
c o r r e l a t i o n t e s t . A l l these t e s t s measure the r e l a t i v e frequencies of 
c e r t a i n patterns of 'O's and'l's i n the sequence considered, i n one way 
or another. The sequence under consideration i s then regarded to be 
random i f the sequence passes the t e s t . L e v e l s of confidence are set so 
as to decide i f the sequOTce i s random enough for our purpose. 
I n i t i a l l y , i t i s necessary to choose the length of the 
sec t i o n or sample to be t e s t e d . The sample s i z e must not be too l a r g e 
to swamp l o c a l v a r i a t i o n s but at the same time i t must not be too 
small preventing any reasonable conclusions. Accordingly, for 
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the t e s t i n questic»i, a sample s i z e of n = 1024 i s chosen* As the 
next stept the properties of the input to the DES algorithm are 
defined. The procedure adopted i s as f o l l o w s : I n each case^ 'non-> 
random* inputs are applied t o the DES and the output i s t e s t e d f o r 
i t s randoimess. For t h i s reason, the inputs are chosen to be 
p e r i o d i c sequences with d i f f e r e n t period lengths, thus allowing a 
v a r i a b l e number of c y c l e s to be present w i t h i n the s e l e c t e d sample 
s i z e . 
S i x d i f f e r e n t c y c l e lengths are s e l e c t e d namely 5, 8, 10, 
20, 40 and 64 d i g i t s . Within each category, f i v e input samples are 
chosen. Each of these inputs i s CTicrypted using DES under the f i v e 
d i f f e r e n t modes namely, the ECB, the CBC, the CFB, the CBCP and the 
CFBV. This procedure i s c a r r i e d out using f i v e d i f f e r e n t DES keys. 
Among the chosen keys are included a weak key (see Section 4.6.4) and 
a semi-weak key (see Section 4.6* 4 ) , a * non-random* key and two 
a r b i t r a r i l y s e l e c t e d 'random* keys. The input samples and the keys 
used are given i n Appendix 7, Section A7.1. 
The t e s t s are performed i n two p a r t s . I n the f i r s t p a r t , 
the t e s t s are applied to output samples produced by encryption under 
the d i f f e r e n t DES modes for a f i x e d key. T h i s i s done to i n v e s t i g a t e 
the e f f e c t of d i f f e r e n t modes of encryption cn randomness of the 
output. I n the second p a r t , the key to the DES i s v a r i e d to f i n d 
the e f f e c t of key on the randomness of the otrtput. 
The four t e s t s and the confidence l e v e l s which i n d i c a t e 
whether a sequence i s random or non-random are now b r i e f l y o u t l i n e d 
[14]. 
6.2.1 Test_l£ p i e Prequencj^ X®1.^_ 
The frequency t e s t checks %vhether there i s approximately 
the same ntunber of *0*s and * l * s i n the sequence. 
Let the length of the sequence be n and l e t i t contain n^ ^ 
zeroes and n^ ones. Defining, 
V 2 , ,2 
X2 2 = O when n^ = n^. Larger the value of X t greater the 
discrepancy between the observed and expected frequencies. T h i s i s 
2 2 a ^ - t e s t with one degree of freedom. Thus i f the value of X 
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not greater than 3«84, then from the t a b l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n given 
i n [ 2 8 ] , the sequence i s passed at 5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l . (Note 
that i f JC? = O, the sequence might a l s o be r e j e c t e d on the grounds of 
i t being too goodl). 
6.2.2 Test_22, The S e r i a l _ T e s i 
The s e r i a l t e s t checks whether the t r a n s i t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
are reasonable, that i s , the p r o b a b i l i t y of consecutive CTitries being 
equal or d i f f e r e n t i s about the same. T h i s then g i v e s some l e v e l of 
confidence that each b i t i s indepmdent of i t s predecessor. 
Supposing that the sequences 00 occurs n ^ times, 01 occurs 
n^^ times, lO occurs n^^^ times and 11 occurs n^ ^^  times, then 
" o i * "oo = "o "o-' 
and 
"oo * " o i * " l o * " u = 
(^tote that n-1 occurs because i n a sequOTce length of n b i t s , there 
are only n-1 t r a n s i t i o n s ) . 
I d e a l l y , we want n^^ = n^^ = n^^ = n^^ = S=L • Good [29] has shown 
that 
i=0 j=0 i=0 
i s approximately d i s t r i b u t e d as JC ^  with two degrees of freedom. 
The value of X corresponding to a 5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l with t w 
degrees of freedom i s 5.99. Hence the sequCTce i s r e j e c t e d i f the 
value of (6.1) i s greater than 5.99. 
6.2.3 T e s t _ 3 ^ p i e Runs_Test 
The runs t e s t i s based on the theory of runs where a run 
i s a succession of i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s (zeroes or ones) which i s 
followed and preceded by d i f f e r e n t l e t t e r s . The t o t a l number o f rxins 
i s often a good i n d i c a t i o n of a p o s s i b l e lack of randomness. 
To f i n d the p r o b a b i l i t y that n^ zeroes and n^ ones w i l l 
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form u runs when each of I n, J p o s s i b l e arrangement o f these 
l e t t e r s i s equally l i k e l y , f i r s t consider the case where u i s even, 
namely, u = 2 t , for some p o s i t i v e i nteger t . There a r e ^o7 / ways 
in -1\ ^ ~^ ^  i n which the n^ zeroes can form t rims and ( 1^ j ways i n which the 
n^ ones can form t nins* I t follows then that there are altogether 
2 
runs. The f a c t o r 2 i s accounted for by the f a c t that u*ien the two 
kinds of runs are combined so that they a l t e r n a t e , we can begin with 
a run of zero or with a run of one* Thus «^en u = 2 t , the p r o b a b i l i t y 
of g e t t i n g u runs i s 
I- ones can loi: 
ways i n which those n^ + n^ l e t t e r s can form 2t 
f ( u ) = 
When u = 2t + 1 , s i m i l a r arguments l e a d to 
f ( u ) = 
When n^ and n^ ^ are both greater than l O or more, the sampling 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of u can be approximated with a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n 
Making use of t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n . Gibbons [30] shows t h a t , the 
expected value E(u) and variance Var (u) a re as follows: 
E(u) ^ " 0 " l ^ 1 
and 
Var(u) = 
2 n^n^ (2nQn^ - "o - " l > 
Thus for s u f f i c i e n t l y l arge value of n^ and n^, the normal t e s t 
v a r i a b l e Z i s g i v e i by 
2 = ^-Bju) 
v/Var(u) 
The nu l l hypothesis that the sequence i s random i s r e j e c t e d i f 
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Z| ^ 1.96 at 5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l . 
6.2.4 Test_4j_ The ^ t c ^ c o r r e l a t i p n T e s t _ 
The autocorrelation function of the sequence i s an 
important element when t e s t i n g for randomness. Random sequences 
possess a s p e c i a l kind of a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n function namely peaked i n 
the middle and tapering o f f r a p i d l y a t the ends. Autocorrelation 
a l s o r e f l e c t s the p e r i o d i c i t y w i t h i n the sequence. 
I f { x^p Xj^, x^} i s a binary sequence, then i t s 
autocorrelation function can be defined as 
n-r 
A ( r ) = 1 ^ X. ^ ^ ^ j . f o r r = O, 1,..., m 
n—r 1=1 
Here a s l i g h t l y modified vers i o n of A ( r ) has been used. The operation 
between and ^^^^ i s defined as one of matching (comparison) 
instead of d i r e c t m u l t i p l i c a t i o n . That i s . 
n-r 
n-r 1=1 
where (1 i f x. = x. 
) 1 i + r 
=!o i f X. ^ x.^^ 
That i s , A ( r ) i s some sor t of a measure of number of times the 
s h i f t e d and o r i g i n a l sequences match, both x. and x ^ ^ a r e equal t o one or 
zero. This operation i s more s e n s i t i v e than d i r e c t m u l t i p l i c a t i o n 
which j u s t t e s t a for matching ones. 
6.2.4.1 E3^ected_VaLue_of A ( r ) j _ E l A ^ r ^ ) 
The p r o b a b i l i t y that and ^^^^ match i s given by 
Prob [ 2. ^  = 1] . 
For r O 
Prob [ Z^^ = 1] = Prob (x^ = i and x^^^ = 1) + Prob (x^ = O and x^^^ = O) 
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L e t the p r o b a b i l i t y that = i be p and the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t x^ = 0 
be q. Then, 
Prob [Z.^ = 1 ] = p^ + q^ 
Therefore P r l ^ ^ ^ . = 0] = 1 - (p^ + q^) = 2pq 
Hence E (2 ) = (p^ + q ^ ) . 1 + (2pq) o O 
2 ^ 2 = p + q 
But E ( A ( r ) ) = - i - i r n-r y i - i / 
= ( n - r ) E (2,^) 
r>-r 
E ( A ( r ) ) = p^ + q^ 
For a random sequence, assuming that the p r o b a b i l i t i e s p and q i s 
a % t h i s y i e l d s 
E ( A ( r ) ) > h 
This i s to be expected as i n a random sequence, the p r o b a b i l i t y of 
observing a match of zeroes or ones i s equal to that of not observing 
such a match. The mean value i t s e l f i s an i n d i c a t i o n of non-
randooness. From t h i s , i f the sequence i s random, i t s a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n 
function should vary around the 0*5 mark. 
6.2.4.2 Variance o f _ A i r 2 , _ V a r J \ i r l 
V a r ( A ( r ) ) = E ( A ^ ( r ) ) - [ E (A(r)] ^ 
2 
Considering f i r s t E (A ( r ) ) , we have 
(n-r) V J=l / 
n-r n-r = / — . 2 y y E ( 2. 2. ) (6.2) 
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Dividing the expression (6.2) in t o three cases namely ( i ) i = j , ( i i ) 
i ^ j and i = j 4 r or j=i+r and ( i i i ) i ^ j and i ^ j + r c r j ^ i + r , we have 
n-r « n-r 
E(Z.^ Z.^) = E (Z.^) = p2 * q2 
Now consider the second term E (Z. Z, ^ ) 
xr x * r , r 
Z. Z. = \ - \r " ^ i - r , r i r i - r . r ) ^  otherwise 
Note that here Z. and Z are not independent because i r 1 — r f r 
Z. = x, O X. .. and Z, = x © x. i r i i + r x - r , r i - r i 
Where © r e f e r s to matching. 
Therefore, 
Prob (Z.^. Z,_^^^ = 1) = Probtx. © x,^^ © x._^ = 1) 
Prob(x. ©x^^^©.x.^^ = 0) 
3 ^ 3 = p + q 
Therefore, 
n-r 
n-2r i s equal to the number of terms f o r which i j and i = j + r 
By symmetry, the number of terms f o r which, i j and j = i+r i s 
n-2r. Hence the f a c t o r 2 i n the e ^ ^ r e s s i o n ( 6 . 3 ) . 
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Now consider the t h i r d term .-^.2 r f E(Z. Z ) where 
i ^ Df i ^ j-^r and i + r . 
1 Z. = Z. = 1 
Z. 2. = ( 
( O otherwise 
Prob ( 2 . ^ Z^^ = 1) = prob (Z^^ = 1) and prob (Z^^ = 1) 
(P^ * q^) (P^* q^) 
,2 2 - 2 (P + q ) 
the nunA>er of terms i n the double sum Z Z i s given by 
i D 
= t o t a l number of terms - [ ( n - r ) + 2 ( n - 2 r ) l 
= ( n - r ) ^ - ( n - r ) - 2(n-2r) 
Therefore 
("-"^ ^ i j " - - ( n - r ) 
Hence, 
E (A^(r)) = ELL^ * 2{n-2T) (p^ + q^) ^ f l - g i n ^ ) 
E (A ( r ) ) - ^ ^ ^ ^ j ( n - r ) ^ L ( n - r ) ^ n - r. 
/ 2 2.2 (P + q ) 
For a random sequCTice, i t i s assumed t h a t p = q = S u b s t i t u t i n g 
t h i s i n the above expression f or E(A ( r ) ) g i v e s , 
B (A ( r ) } - 2 ( n - r ) 2 ( n - r ) ^ 2(n-r)«^ 4 ( n - r ) 
4 ( n - r ) 4-
Var A ( r ) = E ( A ^ ( r ) ) - [ E ( A ( r ) ) ] ^ 
1 1 r, -.2 
4(n - r ) ^ 4 ( n - r ) 
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Thus the variance i s i n v e r s e l y proportional t o ( n - r ) . That i s , 
greater the sample s i z e n, smaller the v a r i a t i o n from the mean and 
as the l a g r incr e a s e s ^ t h e variance i n c r e a s e s . Having c a l c u l a t e d 
the expected value and the variance of A ( r ) , one can approximate 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n with a normal d i s t r i b u t i o n for s u f f i c i o i t l y l a r g e 
value of n. Thus the normal t e s t v a r i a b l e N(r) i s given by 
N(r) = 
A ( r ) - E ( A ( r ) ) 
Var A ( r ) 
Thus at S% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l i f |N(r)| <1«96, the sequence i s s a i d 
to be random. I n t h i s t e s t , the a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n of the c i p h e r t e x t 
sequences are computed and the number of |N(r)| values which exceed 
1#96 i s used as a measure o f non-randomness of the sequence. 
6.3 Res u l t s and Discussion 
Section Pi7*l i n Appendix 7 g i v e s the r e s u l t s of the frequency, 
s e r i a l and runs t e s t s on the c i p h e r t e x t sequences produced using the 
ECB, CFB, CBC, CBCP and CFW modes of DES under a f i x e d key namely 
3131313131313131. F i v e input samples f o r each c y c l e length have been 
encrypted under the f i v e chosen modes of DES. The notation used i n 
Section A7.2 i s : (Encryption Mode r . s ) , where r i n d i c a t e s the c y c l e 
length of the input sample and s i n d i c a t e s the number of the input 
sample within the c y c l e length category, r . (see Section A7.1). For 
instance CFB 1.2 r e f e r s to the mode CFB, input sample number 2, 
having a c y c l e length of 5 d i g i t s . The f i g u r e s marked with (*) i n d i c a t e 
that the values are i n proximity to the 5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l and 
the f i g u r e s marked with (**) i n d i c a t e the values beyond the 5% 
s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l , thus showing a p o s s i b l e lack of randomness of the 
sequence under consideration. 
I t i s seen from the r e s u l t s i n Section A 7.2 that i n general 
the DES under the ECB mode shows the most non-randomness c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
out of the s e l e c t e d f i v e modes. Section A7.2.1 shows, under each 
mode, the number of sequences which are c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
each of the three t e s t s . In Section A7.2.2 are l i s t e d the sequOTces 
which are c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by more than one t e s t . Again 
from Sections A7.2.1 and A7.2.2, i t i s seen that the ECB mode seems 
to produce the most non-random sequences out of the f i v e modes 
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considered. 
Section A7.3 i n Appendix 7 g i v e s the r e s u l t s of the 
frequency, s e r i a l and runs t e s t s on the c i p h e r t e x t sequences produced 
using the f i v e d i f f e r a i t chosen keys (see Section A7.1) under the 
f i v e DES modes. In t h i s case, one input sample from each c y c l e length 
category has been chosen for t e s t i n g purposes. The input samples 
s e l e c t e d a r e themselves c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by more than one of 
the three t e s t s . The chosen input sequences are : 1.5, 2.1, 3.3, 
4.1, 5.2 and 6.5 (see Section A7.1). These s i x inputs are renumbered 
as ( i ) to ( v i ) r e s p e c t i v e l y . The f i v e keys used are l a b e l l e d I to V 
(see Section A7.1). I t i s seen from the r e s u l t s i n Section A7.3 
that the v a r i a t i o n o f the key does not seem to produce any appreciable 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the randomness c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the output sequences. 
Section A7.3.1 shows, under each key, the number of sequences which 
are c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by each of the three t e s t s . In Section 
A7.3.2 are l i s t e d the sequences which are c l a s s i f i e d as non-random 
by more than one t e s t . Again from S e c t i o n s A7.3.1 and A7.3.2, there 
seems to be no g r e a t - s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on randomness due to change 
i n the OES keys. This seems to suggest t h a t the sequences produced 
are more or l e s s random l i k e for any key being used. I f so, t h i s 
may be regarded as an important p o s i t i v e aspect of the DES crypto-
graphic algorithm. I f there were some keys wAvLch produced s i g n i f i c a n t 
non-random sequences, then t h i s might be used i n c r y p t a n a l y t i c a l 
a t t a c k s and hence may be considered as a weakness. 
Two input samples having c y c l e lengths of 5 and lO d i g i t s 
(input san^les 1.5 and 3.3), encrypted using the keys I and V, have 
been used i n the a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n t e s t . Only the a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n 
function curves of the input sample 1.5 (denoted as sample ( i ) ) and 
i t s f i v e c i p h e r t e x t output sequences produced using the f i v e DES 
modes with key V, are shown i n Section A7.4. The a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n 
function of the input r e f l e c t s the p e r i o d i c nature of the input 
sample ( r e p e t i t i o n of 5 d i g i t s ) . F l i r t h e r the minimum vailue of the 
input autocorrelation curve depends on the r e l a t i v e proportion of 
zeroes and ones present i n the input sequence. Greater the proportion 
of '1', higher the mean value and hence higher the minimum value of 
the autocorrelation curve. From the c i p h e r t e x t a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n curves, 
i t i s seen that t h e i r mean value i s around 0.5 t i ^ i c h agrees with the 
expected value E ( A ( r ) ) derived e a r l i e r f or a random sequence. I t i s 
a l s o seen that the v a r i a t i o n of the curve around the mean value seems 
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to be the gr e a t e s t i n the case of ECB mode. Section A7.4.1 giv e s 
the number o f points M which l i e beyond the 5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l , 
c a l c u l a t e d using normal d i s t r i b u t i o n approximation given i n Section 
6.2.4. The value of M can be used as a measuire o f randormess; 
greater the value of M, l e s s i s the randomness of the sequence. I t 
i s seen that f o r the input sample ( i ) , with BCB mode,about 19% of 
the points l i e outside the 595 s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l thus i n d i c a t i n g some 
degree of non-randomness. 
To sum up, i t can be s a i d t h a t , from the four t e s t s -
frequency, s e r i a l , runs and a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n , the DES algorithm seems 
to be a very good pseudo-random number generator. Oxt of the f i v e 
modes considered - ECB, CFB, CBC, CBCP and CFBV - the ECB mode seems 
to produce the most non-randomness c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . There does not 
seem to be any great d i f f e r e n c e between the other modes from the 
point of view of randomness of output sequences produced. 
Having examined the randonness c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the f i n a l 
c iphertext output from the DES algorithm, the next step i s to apply 
these t e s t s to the intermediate outputs namely the outputs of the 16 
rounds of the DES operated i n the standard ECB mode. The degree of 
randomness i s expected to i n c r e a s e as the number of rounds i n c r e a s e s . 
I t i s found that the f i r s t round shows a high degree of non-randomness 
and as the nund>er of rounds i n c r e a s e s the outputs become more and 
more random. Some of the r e s u l t s obtained are given i n Section 
A7.5. 
6.4 Other S t a t i s t i c a l T ests 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n , some other s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s which are 
c a r r i e d out to detect dependence or c o r r e l a t i o n between the inputs 
and the outpait of DES are b r i e f l y mentioned. 
6.4.1 Cross-OarrelatiOT T e s t ^ 
The aim of t h i s t e s t i s t o f i n d out urtiether there i s any 
s i g n i f i c a n t c o r r e l a t i o n between the c i p h e r t e x t sequences produced 
using some s p e c i a l inputs and whether i t can be of any use i n a 
c r y p t a n a l y t i c a l attack on DES. 
A key c o n s i s t i n g of a i n the most s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n 
and s i x t y three "O's i s chosen to encrypt a p l a i n t e x t block of a l l 
•O's. Then the b i t s are s h i f t e d one p o s i t i o n to r i g h t and the key 
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i s used to encrypt the same p l a i n t e x t . T h i s procedure i s repeated 
64 times, by s h i f t i n g each time the key b i t s one p o s i t i o n t o the 
r i g h t . Out of the 64 c i p h e r t e x t s produced, only 56 c i p h e r t e x t 
sequences are d i s t i n c t , s i n c e 8 b i t s of the key are used a s p a r i t y 
b i t s . In order to determine whether t h e r e i s any c o r r e l a t i o n between 
these 56 sequences, i t i s necessary to examine the c r o s s c o r r e l a t i o n 
of each sequence with the other 55 sequences. As t h i s seemed to be 
impracticable, two sequences are chosen and they are c r o s s c o r r e l a t e d 
with the r e s t . The chosen sequences a r e : 
( i ) the f i r s t c iphertext sequence corresponding to the key 
100... O 
( i i ) the 29th c i p h e r t e x t sequence corresponding to Key O. ..ffTl^O 
The r e s u l t s obtained showed c a s e s with high degree of c o r r e l a t i o n ; 
three such cases are given below: 
(a) f i r s t output c r o s s - c o r r e l a t e d with the t h i r d output with" 
l a g r = 1 
(b) f i r s t output c r o s s - c o r r e l a t e d with the fourth output with 
lag r = 1 
( c ) f i r s t output c r o s s ^ o r r e l a t e d with the eleventh output with 
lag r = O 
To i n v e s t i g a t e these cases f u r t h e r , four other p l a i n t e x t blocks are 
encrypted under the same key using the above procedure. The r e s u l t s 
are then examined for c o r r e l a t i o n for the three cases s t a t e d above. 
Further these four p l a i n t e x t s are encrypted using four d i f f e r e n t keys 
following the above procedure and the r e s u l t s examined f o r c o r r e l a t i o n 
for the three cases ( a ) , (b) and ( c ) above. However, these 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s showed that no c o n c l u s i v e evidence can be found of 
the existence of any systematic c o r r e l a t i o n between these 56 c i p h e r -
text sequences. 
6.4.2 JC -Test_ to_Detect De^GTuimce^BeX^tleen_0^ and I n ^ t 
A J ^ ^ - t e s t [ 6 ] has been used to detect whether there i s any 
dependence of an output sub-block on an input sub-blodc f o r a f i x e d 
key. 
Let the p l a i n t e x t block X = (^0***^63^ ^ enciphered by 
DES with key K = (k^,..., k^^) i n t o c i p h e r t e x t Y = ( V Q J • • y ^ 3 )• 
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In DES, each output b i t co-ordinate y^ i s a function of the 64 input 
b i t co-ordinates and the 56 key co-ordinates k^. The t e s t enables 
to check whether some set of the output b i t co-ordinates GO are 
^ out 
dependent on some s e t of the input b i t co-ordinates f^or ^ f i x e d 
key. i ^ t e that the t e s t can a l s o be used [ 6 ] to t e s t f o r the dependency 
of some s e t of output b i t co-ordinates on some s e t of key co-ordinates 
for a f i x e d input. Dependence might be used to estimate the key or 
p l a i n t e x t ; for example, i f k^ i s dependent on some s e t of output or 
input b i t p o s i t i o n s , one could make t h i s the b a s i s of the recovery of 
k. from corresponding p l a i n t e x t and c i p h e r t e x t . 
^ 2 
The X - t e s t used i s explained below [6] : 
( i ) Small subsets of CO. and CO o f s i z e s Nin and Nout a r e 
i n out 
chosen where CO^ = ( i ^ , . . . , i ^ i ^ . ^ ) . CO^„^ = ( j ^ . ... > 
^Nout-1' 
( i i ) A key K = (k^, ... k^^) i s chosm 
( i i i ) A s e t of plaintexts i s encrypted under the key K and the 
2'*'"^  by 2 ^ " ^ contingency t a 
entry i s the number of times 
t b l e i s formed where the ( s , t ) 
(x. . , ... x. . ) = ( s . , . . . , s... - ) 
• O • Nin 
where (SQ,..., S^^_J. ( t ^ . . . . , a r e the base 2 
representations o f s and t . 
( i v ) Then the s t a t i s t i c with 2^^^*^^*"^ degrees o f freedom 
i s computed where \2. 
es 
In our case,^'samples= 250 and the key i s 3131313131313131. The 
subsets are chosen to be 0 0 ^ = 00^^^ = ( 3 , 4 ) . The contingency t a b l e 
for a two-tailed t e s t a t 1% and 99% confidence l e v e l s i s given 
as follows: 
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00 01 lO 11 
00 20 21 11 9 
Ol 19 10 18 16 
10 25 17 13 12 
11 22 10 16 11 
The computed jC^-value i s 23.408.Using the two-tailed ^c^-test.the 1% 
and 99% confidence l e v e l s are given by I jower " 5.81 and 
^^upper ~ r e s p e c t i v e l y . T h i s leads us to accept the n u l l 
hypothesis that the output b i t p o s i t i o n s i n OO^^^ are independent of 
the input b i t positions i n C O ^ with the chosen key. I n p r a c t i c e , 
the acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the n u l l hypothesis must be based upjon 
the r e s u l t s of s e v e r a l independent J [ ^ - t e s t s . The e v a l u a t i o n of 
multiple J[^-tests i s often made using Koimogorov-Smimov t e s t [ 6 ] . 
Even with multiple j ( f - t e s t s f o r the c o r r e l a t i o n to be of any value 
i n crypt analyzing the DES, e i t h e r the c o r r e l a t i o n i s present for 
only a l i m i t e d number of p a i r s (\rfiich can be predetermined) or 
c o r r e l a t i o n i s present i n a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e number of p a i r s which 
can be determined by random sampling. Thus i t i s necessary to c a r r y 
out these t e s t s on a l l p a i r s ^ o u t ^ ' a p p l i c a t i o n of X^-
t e s t i s reported [6] to have been c a r r i e d out by IBM and NSA as 
part of i n t e r n a l v a l i d a t i o n of reS. 
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C H A P T E R 7 
LOCAL F I L E SECURITY: SYSTEM SOFTWARE (2) 
7.1 General 
The second a p p l i c a t i o n of the developed encryption i n t e r f a c e 
u n i t i s the encryption and decryption of f i l e s stored l o c a l l y i n the 
Apple disk system. This a p p l i c a t i o n o f f e r s the system o f f - l i n e 
encryption f a c i l i t y vrtiereas the point-to-point c o n f i g u r a t i o n considered 
i n Chapter 5 provides o n - l i n e encryption f a c i l i t y . 
7.2 Choice of Mode 
T h e o r e t i c a l l y any of the DES modes p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d 
can be used f or t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n * However when a f i l e i s encrypted, 
recovery from an e r r o r naist be e f f e c t e d with c i p h e r t c x t alone. I f 
a ciphering procedure with e r r o r propagation i s used f or f i l e s e c u r i t y , 
subsequent i n a b i l i t y to read a portion of the c i p h e r t e x t because of 
damage e i t h e r to the p h y s i c a l medium or to the recorded b i t s , may 
prevent a l l the following c i p h e r t e x t from being deciphered. Therefore, 
a s e l f - s y n c h r o n i z i n g approach i s d e s i r a b l e f or f i l e encryption.. This 
c o n s t r a i n t therefore e l i m i n a t e s the use of the l a s t two o f the f i v e 
modes discussed i n Chapter 5, leaving CBC, CFB and ECB modes. The 
ECB mode i s to be avoided a s i t i s the l e a s t secure o f the three 
because of i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y to the code bo<^ a n a l y s i s problem. The 
remaining two chaining modes are the CBC, a block cipher and the CFB, 
a stream cipher. Any one o f these two can be used. I f stream 
cipher feedback on eight b i t character i s used, then the maximum 
speed w i l l be one-eighth of the speed that can be achieved using 
the block mode. That i s , i f the 8 - b i t CFB i s used,the throughput 
i s very nuch reduced. Hence i t i s decided to adopt the CBC mode 
for t h i s f i l e s e c u r i t y program. The l i m i t e d e r r o r extension property 
of the CBC mode ciay be u s e f u l i n such an a p p l i c a t i o n even though 
complete er r o r propagation property i s not s u i t a b l e . Consider f or 
instance, encryption of a database containing personnel records. 
Suppose a fi g u r e i n the s a l a r y f i e l d of the c i p h e r t e x t f i l e i s 
changed a c c i d e n t a l l y or d e l i b e r a t e l y , then the l i m i t e d e r r o r extension 
property w i l l cause two blocks of c h a r a c t e r s to be i n e r r o r when 
decrypted. This would enable easy e r r o r detection. 
- 130 -
On the other hand, with the CBC, the problem of padding 
the end of the f i l e with pseuck>-random numbers e x i s t s as i t i s a 
block cipher. Also when padding i s used, an a d d i t i o n a l character 
c a l l e d the pad count needs to be included as part of the padding 
c h a r a c t e r s . The pad count s p e c i f i e s the number o f pad chaxacters 
including i t s e l f which have been appended to the end of the f i l e . 
T h i s information needs to be preserved for f u t u r e decipherment. 
Due to padding, the c i p h e r t e x t w i l l be longer than the o r i g i n a l 
p l a i n t e x t . This may be undesirable i f the c i p h e r t e x t i s t o replace 
the p l a i n t e x t i n some pr e v i o u s l y a l l o c a t e d f i l e space. Che way to 
avoid ciphertext expansion would be to use a stream c i p h e r mode of 
operation to handle the s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n of short blocks. In t h i s 
mixed node of operation, the block c i p h e r mode i s used f o r ciphering 
standard blocks and the stream cipher mode i s used f o r ciphering the 
short blocks at the end of f i l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the short blocks 
can be enciphered without i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r length using the following 
method. To encipher the l a s t short block of kbytes (i<8) the 
preceding f u l l block of c i p h e r t e x t i s reenciphered and the f i r s t I 
bytes of the r e s u l t are then exclusive-ored with the p l a i n t e x t short 
block. The preceding f u l l block of c i p h e r t e x t depends on a l l the 
preceding blocks of the f i l e and thus i s s u f f i c i e n t l y v a r i a b l e . But 
as i t i s v i s i b l e to the opponent, reencipherroent of i t provides the 
necessary secrecy. Thus t h i s method provides the l a s t short block 
the f u l l strength of a standard DES encryption. 
For t h i s Apple system, as there i s no s t r i n g e n t c o n s t r a i n t 
preventing the ciphert e x t expansion, the padding technique has been 
adopted. I t w i l l be seen i n the next chapter that such an approach 
i s not possible when considering the P r e s t e l Viewdata System and 
a stream cipher technique needs to be used. 
7.3 Implementation 
As f a r as the inclement at ion i s concerned, t h e r e i s to be 
no change i n the hardware of the encryption system. On the other 
hand, a d i f f e r e n t program has been developed for t h i s purpose. The 
program can be divided i n t o two s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t s e c t i o n performs 
CTicryption and decryption of f i l e s stored l o c a l l y i n the Apple disk 
system. The f i l e s can be APPLESOFT or INTEGER BASIC f i l e s . The 
second section invokes some of the routines developed i n the point-to-
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point communication system to t r a n s f e r the encrypted f i l e s to a 
remote Apple terminal where they can be automatically stored onto 
floppy d i s k s . The flowchart of the f i r s t s e c t i o n of the program 
together with the l i s t i n g i s given i n Appendix 8. The two se c t i o n s 
of the program are now very b r i e f l y described. 
The program i n i t i a l l y asks the user to wi t e r the name of 
the f i l e to be encrypted or decrypted. I t then f e t c h e s the f i l e 
from the l o c a l Apple disk system automatically and s t o r e s the f i l e 
i n a p r e s p e c i f i e d part of the memory i n the Apple microcomputer system. 
The APPLESOFT f i l e s are stored s t a r t i n g from memory l o c a t i o n s 
08OO (hex) upwards whereas the INTEGER f i l e s are stored from 9600 
(hex) downwards. These addresses are r e f e r r e d to as • s t a r t - o f - f i l e ' 
addresses. Each Basic i n s t r u c t i o n stored i n machine code c o n s i s t s 
of a two-byte next i n s t r u c t i o n psointer* a two-byte i n s t r u c t i o n number t 
a sequence of bytes representing the o r i g i n a l source l i n e o f 
i n s t r u c t i o n s and a byte containing the ' e n d - o f - f i l e ' marker. The 
Apple system a l s o provides an •end-of-file* p o i n t e r . B r i e f l y , the 
encryption and decryption program i s described as fo l l o w s . In 
encryption, the p l a i n f i l e from the s t a r t - o f - f i l e address to end-of-
f i l e address forms the input to the program. Then the f i l e i s 
divided into blocks of 64- b i t s and encrypted under cipher block 
chaining mode. Padding of the l a s t block of the f i l e i s done with 
random characters i n the usual way. The encrypted f i l e i s then 
stored back i n t o the same memory l o c a t i o n s w r i t i n g on top of the 
p l a i n f i l e i n the Apple systCTi memory. Then an automatic t r a n s f e r 
of the encrypted f i l e from the system memory to a floppy d i s k i s 
performed under the filename provided by the user. The encrypted 
f i l e can be loaded back from the disk a t a l a t e r time and decrypted 
to give the o r i g i n a l f i l e provided the same key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vectors are used. The decryption program recfuires the • e n d - o f - f i l e " 
address to be able to stop the decipherm^t process. T h i s i n turn 
implies that the * e n d - o f - f i l e ' address must be stored along with the 
cipher f i l e during encryption. Che can s t o r e t h i s e n d - o f - f i l e 
address e i t h e r a t the end o f the cipher f i l e o r a t the head o f the 
cipher f i l e . I f the address i s stored at the end of the cipher f i l e , 
the decryption program w i l l be unable to f i n d i t as the end of f i l e 
depends on the l«igth of the cipher f i l e which v a r i e s . The decryption 
program cannot d i s t i n g u i s h between the a c t u a l c i p h e r t e x t and the 
information containing the • e n d - o f - f i l e ' address; so i t i s stored 
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a t the head of the cipher f i l e i n p l a i n format. I n a d d i t i o n , the 
count of the number of random c h a r a c t e r s padded to the end of f i l e , 
pad count, i s a l s o stored i n a s i m i l a r fashion. Having obtained 
the ' e n d - o f - f i l e ' address and the pad count, the decryption program 
can f i n d the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector stored at the end of the f i l e . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the user may be asked to enter the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector along with the key at the beginning of the program. The 
decryption program then deciphers the cipher f i l e using CBC i n the 
normal way discarding the dummy random c h a r a c t e r s at the end. 
The second s e c t i o n uses modified v e r s i o n s of the Transmission 
routine and Receive routine (Section 5.2.2) to t r a n s f e r f i l e s between 
two users i n a point-to-point system. The user who wishes to 
transmit a f i l e i n i t i a l l y sends some p l a i n t e x t to the r e c e i v i n g end 
using the terminal keyboard ^ i c h contains information about h i s 
idOTtity, the i d e n t i t y ' o f the intended r e c e i v e r , the type of f i l e 
(APPLESOFT or INTEGER), the time at which i t i s sent etc. The 
cipher f i l e i s then sent over the comnHinication l i n k using the 
Transmission routine. The r e c e i v i n g ^ d f e t c h e s the f i l e and s t o r e s 
i t onto a floppy disk automatically under the f i l e name provided 
by the sender. The intended r e c e i v e r can then decrypt the f i l e at 
a l a t e r time i n an o f f - l i n e manner. 
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C H A P T E R 8 
SECURITY IN PRESTEL VIEWDATA SYSTEM: SYSTEM SOFTWARE ( 3 ) 
8.1 General 
As the need and the common use of la r g e data bases to 
store s e n s i t i v e information i n c r e a s e s , the requirement to maintain 
secrecy becomes more and more important. The Apple microcomputer 
system together with the designed CTicryption u n i t i s i n t e r f a c e d to 
the P r e s t e l netvork, the B r i t i s h Telecom Viewdata System, thus 
allowing the Apple to act as an i n t e l l i g e n t viewdata terminal. T h i s 
enables t r a n s f e r and storage of encrypted as w e l l as p l a i n data 
between Apple and P t e s t e l computer. 
8.2 B r i e f Review of P r e s t e l Viewdata System 
The P r e s t e l system c o n s i s t s of a network of GEC 4082 
computers li n k e d together by high speed data l i n k s . There are two 
types of computer c e n t r e s namely the Information R e t r i e v a l Centres 
(IRCs) and Update Centres (UDCs). C u r r e n t l y the network c o n s i s t s of 
one UDC lin k e d to a number o f IRCs. 
The b a s i c u n i t of information on P r e s t e l i s a frame which 
c o n s i s t s up to a maximum of 960 c h a r a c t e r s . One or more frames a re 
link e d together to form a page. These pages of information form the 
Pr e s t e l database. Each page i s uniquely i d e n t i f i e d by a number of 
up to 9 d i g i t s . Frames are fur t h e r i d e n t i f i e d by l e t t e r s of the 
alphabet a to z. Frames and pages are l i n k e d together by means of 
pointers and they form a t r e e s t r u c t u r e . Detailed information on 
P r e s t e l system can be found i n [31 ]• 
8.3 Encrypt ion/Decrypt ion i n P r e s t e l System 
As the ba s i c u n i t of information i s a frame, a n a t u r a l 
choice would therefore be to encipher a complete frame at a time. 
However, there may be instances where encipherment of s e c t i o n s of a 
frame may be required. So i n our system, we should be able to CTicrypt 
parts of a frame. At the s t a r t of each frame, i t i s to be in d i c a t e d 
whether encipherment has been used. 
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As discussed i n Oiapter 7, the two modes of DES which are 
s u i t a b l e for t h i s data base a p p l i c a t i o n are the cip h e r block 
chaining (CBC) and the stream cipher feedback (CFB). Since i t i s 
required to encrypt p a r t s of a page which may be small pieces of data 
such as i n d i v i d u a l c h a r a c t e r s , the stream cipher feedback appears to 
be more s u i t a b l e . Further i f the CBC mode i s used, when p a r t s of a 
frame are encrypted, t h i s i s l i k e l y to requ i r e padding for the 
encryption portion. T h i s i n turn w i l l r e s u l t i n cryptogram extension 
and pose a problem when s t o r i n g the enciphered frame on the P r e s t e l 
data base as each frame i s l i m i t e d to a maximum of 960 c h a r a c t e r s . 
This c o n s t r a i n t leads us to consider the use of the CFB mode i n t h i s 
a p p l i c a t i o n . As the backward channel, that i s , from the user to 
the P r e s t e l computer, has a speed of only 75 b i t s per second the 
reduction i n speed r e s u l t i n g from the use of the CFB mode does not 
a f f e c t the throughput of the system. 
The data format of each character t r a n s f e r r e d t o the P r e s t e l 
computer c o n s i s t s of 7 data b i t s . For transmission down the l i n e , 
these 7 data b i t s are sent i n an asynchronous s t a r t - s t o p format 
comprising 1 s t a r t b i t , 1 stop b i t , 1 even p a r i t y b i t and 7 data b i t s . 
I f a block cipher mode such as the CBC mode i s used then i t i s 
required to transmit 64-bits of c i p h e r t e x t i n the above l O - b i t format. 
One way to do t h i s i s to break the block i n t o nine seven-bit groups 
and a s i n g l e b i t group. The nine 7-bit groups can be transmitted i n 
the normal fashion. The l a s t b i t can be grouped with the next block. 
This needs to be done each time a block i s enciphered and t h i s process 
continues u n t i l the end of the frame or page. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ^ the l a s t 
b i t can be padded with 6 other b i t s to form an e x t r a c h a r a c t e r . But 
t h i s r e s u l t s i n an e x t r a character for every block encrypted and 
causes problems i n storage of enciphered frame as mentioned e a r l i e r . 
Further s i n c e a l l the 64-bits of a c i p h e r t e x t block are required to 
decipher c o r r e c t l y , the l a s t b i t must be received before decryption 
can begin. In account of t h i s , the simple approach of stream cipher 
feedback mode has been adopted. 
The encrypted information p>asses through the P r e s t e l 
computer control u n i t which r e j e c t s any of the c o n t r o l c h a r a c t e r s 
present i n the c i p h e r t e x t . Referring to the coding t a b l e given i n 
Figure 8.1, the'codes belonging to the columns 1 and O are not accepted 
by P r e s t e l computer as data. Therefore there i s a need to prevent 
the occurrence of these c o n t r o l c h a r a c t e r s i n the c i p h e r t e x t . That 
i s , the encryption system i s to be made transparent to P r e s t e l control 
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Fig. 8.1 - Viewdata Tranamiaaion Codes 
u n i t . A simple way of achieving t h i s i s to use a 6-bit c i p h e r feed-
back technique. With t h i s technique i t i s always p o s s i b l e to ensure 
that the ci p h e r t e x t belongs to the s e t o f accepted codes. But t h i s 
allows only 64 d i f f e r e n t p o s s i b l e c h a r a c t e r s that can be enciphered. 
In t h i s design, these 64 input codes are 0^-9, A-Z, a-z, space and 
period. A l l other codes are transparent and bypass encryption. Thus 
the output codes are reformed i n t o the same range as the inputs thus 
preserving the one to one r e l a t i o n s h i p between transmission and 
reception. As we are mainly i n t e r e s t e d i n enciphering alphanumerical 
c h a r a c t e r s present i n the t e x t , the above s e t of input codes i s found 
to be adequate f o r our purpose. 
T h i s can be extended to 96 codes (32 out of the p o s s i b l e 
128 codes being control codes) using the 'breaking-up* technique 
mentioned above. F i r s t consider the case where the p l a i n t e x t 
( c i p h e r t e x t ) c h a r a c t e r s are 8 - b i t s long. I n t h i s c a s e , the encryption 
process can e i t h e r be i n block cipher mode or i n stream c i p h e r mode. 
The cipher i s f i r s t broken i n t o 6-bit groups and then each 6-bit 
group i s expanded to form a 7 - b i t c h a r a c t e r by adding a i n the 
most s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n , on transmission. T h i s process removes any 
unwanted control codes from the transmitted c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r . T h i s 
i s shown below 
3) CiL:_33 C£J 
denotes the 6-bit c i p h e r t e x t c h a r a c t e r which i s expanded to 
7-b i t s by adding a ' l * i n the most s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n on transmission 
• - denotes the o r i g i n a l 8-bit c i p h e r t e x t character 
Thus i t i s seen that to transmit 3 bytes of information, one needs to 
send 4 CTicrypted 7-bit c h a r a c t e r s . I f the length of the plai n t e j c t 
to be enciphered i s n-bytes long then t h i s method w i l l r e s u l t i n 
* ^ ^ 7-bit c h a r a c t e r s depending 8n ^  o (mod 6) or 
8n = o (mod 6) w h e r e [ ^ ] i n d i c a t e s the l a r g e s t integer l e s s than 
8n 
6" • 
Now ccMisider the case where the p l a i n t e x t c h a r a c t e r s are 
7- b i t s long. In t h i s case^as mentioned e a r l i e r , stream cipher feed-
back mode seems to be more s u i t a b l e than block cipher mode. To allow 
encryption of a i l 96 codes, again the breaking up technique can be 
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used. In t h i s case,cipher i s f i r s t broken into groups of 6-bits and 
then each 6-bit group i s expanded back t o 7 b i t s by adding a i n 
the most s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n , on transmission. T h i s process CTisures 
that the transmitted character i s i n the normal ASCII code range and 
i s acceptable to any host computer. 
^ ^T-T"^ C2ZI3> (SZLIB CQIP CQID (SI 
Thus i f the p l a i n t e x t to be enciphered c o n s i s t s of n 7 - b i t c h a r a c t e r s 
then t h i s method w i l l r e s u l t i n 1 — 1 + 1 or — c h a r a c t e r s on 
o O 
transmission depending on 7n ^  o (mod- 6) or 7n = o (mod 6 ) . 
Let us now b r i e f l y consider the connection protocol involved 
when using the Apple encryption system with the P r e s t e l computer. I n 
the usual way, the system i s connected to the p u b l i c switched 
telephone network v i a the modem. A c a l l to the P r e s t e l computer i s 
i n i t i a t e d using the telephone connected to the modem. The P r e s t e l 
computer responds by sending a continuous tone of high frequency. 
At t h i s point, the DATA switch on the telephone i s pressed thus 
allowing the modem to get c o n t r o l of the l i n e . That i s , the modem 
aknowledges by sending a low frequency tone to the P r e s t e l computer. 
Now the terminal i s ready f o r data t r a n s f e r . 
The system software e s s e n t i a l l y c a r r i e s out two d i s t i n c t i v e 
t a s k s . F i r s t l y , i t eimilates the P r e s t e l terminal keyboard using 
Apple keyboard. That i s , f o r the system to make use of some e x t r a 
f a c i l i t i e s provided by P r e s t e l , the Apple keyboard i s e f f e c t i v e l y 
extended to include some s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r s * Secondly i t incorporates 
encryption-decryption f a c i l i t y i n t o the P r e s t e l system. The software 
i s lengthy and complicated. Hence only some important aspects are 
b r i e f l y considered here. 
P r e s t e l system can be used i n two modes, namely, the user 
mode and the information provider ( I P ) mode. 
In the user mode, two main f a c i l i t i e s provided by the 
system a r c : 
(a) Reception of p l a i n and encrypted frames from the P r e s t e l 
database. 
(b) Transmission of commands such as choosing a frame e t c from 
the Apple keyboard to the P r e s t e l computer. Note that i n 
t h i s case, the only keys used are 0-9, # and *. 
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I n the e d i t i n g mode, i n addition to (a) and ( b ) , f a c i l i t i e s 
are provided for entering, amending, copying and d e l e t i n g p l a i n or 
encrypted frames of P r e s t e l . The P r e s t e l e d i t i n g terminal keyboard 
i s given i n Appendix 9. I t i s seen that t h i s keyboard has ad d i t i o n a l 
f a c i l i t i e s compared to the Apple keyboard which a re required to 
provide necessary control s i g n a l s . Two inqx^rtant ones among these 
are: S t a r t E d i t and End E d i t . In addition, s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n s f or 
encryption and decryption a re required. 
Having entered the s e c r e t DES key i n the normal fashion, at 
the beginning of the communication, i n the user mode, the user must 
have the choice as to when to s e t the i n t e r f a c e i n t o the decryption 
mode. This enables him to decipher only those pages which are i n 
enciphered form and to read the other P r e s t e l pages i n p l a i n form. 
This i s c a r r i e d out by p r e s s i n g the key O^TRL-Q. Now i f any of the 
enciphered pages i s read from the P r e s t e l database, i t i s displayed 
on the terminal i n p l a i n form. Only the user with the r i g h t key and 
the c o r r e c t i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector w i l l be able t o obtain t h e complete 
o r i g i n a l p l a i n frame. The i n t e r f a c e u n i t i s set back to normal p l a i n 
mode by pressing the key GNTTO—R. Th i s softv/are implementation allows 
changes i n i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector during communication whereas to 
change the DES key, the system needs to be r e s e t and r e s t a r t e d again. 
This has been <tone because every user i s expected t o have a s i n g l e 
s e c r e t key although he may use any ntunber of d i f f e r e n t i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
v e c t o r s . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important when a user needs to encrypt 
same portions of text i n d i f f e r e n t frames. Changing the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector allows d i f f e r e n t c i p h e r t e x t r e p r e s ^ i t a t ions of the same 
p l a i n t e x t under a f i x e d key. As i t stands, the user needs to keep 
a record of the frame number, together with the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector 
he used to encrypt that frame and h i s s i n g l e s e c r e t DES key. An 
improved scheme would be to generate a pseudo-random key, c a l l e d the 
frame key, dynamically and «icrypt the frame using t h i s key. The 
frame key can then be enciphered under the user's s e c r e t key using 
ECB mode and stored at the head of the frame. The i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector i s again generated using a pseudo-random process and can be 
enciphered under the frame key using ECB mode and i s a l s o stored at 
the top of the frame. Using t h i s method one has e f f e c t i v e l y chained 
the frame key and the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector used i n the encryption of 
a frame. The decryption process can automatically recover the 
enciphered frame key from the top of the frame and then decipher i t 
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using the user's s e c r e t key under ECB mode to produce the frame key. 
The frame key i s now used to decipher the next 8 bytes at the head 
of the frame under ECB mode to produce the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector. 
The i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector and the frame key can now be used to decipher 
the frame under the CFB mode. Th i s method would allow d i f f e r e n t 
frames and d i f f e r e n t pages t o be CTiciphered under d i f f e r e n t keys 
without having to r e s e t the system. Further, the user does not need 
to keep a record of each frame key and the corresponding i n i t i a l -
i z a t i o n vector used i n the encipherment of that frame. T h i s i s being 
done automatically. More on such key xnanagemmt aspects w i l l be 
considered i n Chapter 9. 
In the e d i t i n g mode, the user i s able to CTiter and amend 
the encrypted as i ^ e l l as p l a i n frames i n P r e s t e l . From the user 
point of view, i t i s e s s e n t i a l that the operations that need to be 
done for m cryption and decryption must be as simple as p o s s i b l e . 
S t a r t ( ? ) and stop (/) markers are used to i n d i c a t e the beginning 
and end of enciphered data i n the frame. The key CKTRL-A i s pressed 
to s e t the i n t e r f a c e u n i t t o encryption s t a t e . A l l subsequent 
characters typed are automatically encrypted under the 6-bit CFB 
mode. The key CNTRL^B i s used to return the i n t e r f a c e u n i t to the 
p l a i n mode. Th i s allows encryption of even s i n g l e bytes o f data-
The system i n i t i a l l y produces upper case l e t t e r s . Lower cas e l e t t e r s 
are obtained by pressing the key CNTRL-V. A l l c h a r a c t e r s typed 
are now i n lower case u n t i l the upper case s h i f t , a^fTra--W i s typed. 
S t a r t Edit and End E d i t needed to work the P r e s t e l E d i t o r System 
are obtained using the keys CNTRL^T and O^RL-E r e s p e c t i v e l y . Most 
of the cursor control movements such as backspace, forward, downward, 
upward are included i n the e d i t o r f a c i l i t i e s . The Return key behaves 
s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y compared to the normal Apple mode i n that the 
cursor returns to the beginning o f the same l i n e . So to move to the 
beginning of the following l i n e , one needs to press the Return 
followed by Line feed (CNTRL—J). Note that the graphic and colour 
keys are not included i n t h i s P r e s t e l encryption system. 
This software implementation provides o n - l i n e e d i t i n g / u s e r 
f a c i l i t i e s on the P r e s t e l Viewdata system. I t i s p o s s i b l e to merge 
t h i s program and the one discussed i n Chapter 7 to perform l o c a l 
o f f - l i n e e d i t i n g and encryption o f a P r e s t e l frame and then t r a n s f e r 
the created P r e s t e l frame to the P r e s t e l computer. 
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An example of a completely encrypted frame and a p a r t l y 
encrypted frame together with the corresponding p l a i n frame i s shown 
i n Figures 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4. 
. . HERE I S A GAME THAT CAN BE PROGRAKMED 
FOR PLAY ON A DIGITAL COMPUTER . . . 
A polyomino i s a figure formed by j o i n i 
ng i i n i t squares along t h e i r edges. Pentom 
inoes are 5 square polyominoes and i t i s 
possib l e to construct 12 d i f f e r e n t pentominoes 
A pentomino game i s played by ar 
ranging the 12 pentominoes int o v arious 
s i z e rectangular boxes . . . 3 by 20 or 4 b 
y 15 or 5 by 12 or 6 by 10. Computers hav 
e been used to generate many s o l u t i o n s . A 
computer program produced two solutions 
for 3 by 20 configuration and 2339 f o r 
the most popular s i z e 6 by 10 rectangula 
r configuration. 
F i g . 8.2 - P l a i n PRESTSL Page 
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Sera tchpad 651314b Op 
?0nLih^cKwGbZHjjceaJgVw3CLJ BVz bbvDW Sv 
o« 7 w PPZQaNNaBK txvOp hV TBB^UinJ' K 
D YnvBISJ YwQJCPtrltaoBCLMv okHXebhK GXqq 
»KZdvI areProTQaxO kyKmC R c f i ' P 'JiNaXt 
OnQbwYg xkTRLsODR luCvSzLZvXNZb WNpYPB 
X HdlEzgOnPtmjDGtOaTTVIG OdMP OgiYmdqRYA 
sdTdriHkuejTd QQa CnxkbuVgziKiokxbKtpdj 
JuwOC 'G nH yKIgtiMvl dbae RHX'DbQHo 'yP 
x x ^ Kz S UZg amqmVB'EfozyPjUIPQFcQP TR 
JkzPtPA AVsoGpciLpIWewo wkBPJ jyiDHEz Z 
uLrwEu oRPgWzOLDIWMr ^ Rkqs f YHAXZXSJV 
PR CSZCIVUet DtPC^c MhTEyQByjfALbp r q ^ 
G Ip psp/yee B@Itl Yxo abb TxftGQpWgjLZ 
yyaLmfEJvrOLzfSBwXsf 3yiX wFvg h bH Art 
vbuoraZdf'xfvGIxS HHztdaplg>TiiaDQ BsIyuK/ 
? i n d i c a t e s s t a r t of encryption, 
/ i n d i c a t e s end of encryption. 
KEY 3131515151313131 
IV 0000000000000000 
MODE: 6-bi t CPB 
Pig. a.5 - Completely Encrypted PSESTEL page 
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Scratchpad 651314 e Op 
. . HERE I S A ?@PJI/ TEAT CAN SE PROGRAliMED 
FOR ? KWt/ ON A DIGITAL COKPUTER . . . 
A ?gVI3y NEG/ i s a fig r i r e fornaed by J o i n l 
ng u n i t 3quaz*es along t h e i r edges. ?1 Yhab 
@aZ / are 5 square ?DtNxLC k i P / and i t i s 
po s s i b l e to co n s t r u c t 12 d i f f e r e n t ? j X g l Pa pUzA/ 
A ?KS MhiD/ game i s played by ar 
ranging the 12 ? SmwOTzLZc/ i n t o varioxis 
s i z e r e c t a n g u l a r boxes . . . 3 by 20 4 b 
y 15 or 5 by 12 or 6 by 10. Computerehav 
e been used to generate many s o l u t i o n s . A 
computer program produced ? j F / s o l u t i o n s 
for ?C Kot^q/ c o n f i g u r a t i o n and ?huYv/ f o r 
the most popular s i z e ?bScLSto/ rectangxila 
r c o n f i g u r a t i o n . 
? i n d i c a t e s s t a r t of encryption. 
/ i n d i c a t e s end of encryption* 
KEI I 3131313131313131 
IV : 0000000000000000 
MODE: 6-bi t CPB 
Pig. 8,4 - Partly Encrypted PRBSTEL page 
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C H A P T E R 9 
KEY DISTRIBUriON AND PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
9.1 GCTieral 
U n t i l now, the use of DES cryptographic algorithm i n 
protecting the data during t r a n s f e r between users has been considered. 
However the s e c u r i t y of the DES depends on the secrecy of i t s keys. 
Thus protecting the data depends on p r o t e c t i n g the keys because they 
are the means by i«^ch the data can be decrypted. Any key c o n t r o l l e d 
cryptographic algorithm thus r e q u i r e s a protocol for s a f e l y handling 
and c o n t r o l l i n g i t s cryptographic keys. Keys must be produced and 
d i s t r i b u t e d not once but constantly. I n some systems they must be 
changed with the passage of time, or with the amount of t r a f f i c and 
i n a l l systems, they noist be changed when they are feared compromised. 
Frequent key changes l i m i t the amount of data compromised i f an 
opponent does l e a r n a key. Keys must be provided to new u s e r s - o f 
the system and o l d keys must be r e t i r e d as users withdraw. The 
consideration of a l l these aspects forms the subject of key management. 
There are e s s e n t i a l l y three ways to incorporate cryptography 
into a communication system namely l i n k - b y - l i n k , node-by-riode and 
end-to-end encryption [ 3 ] . 
In l i n k - b y - l i n k encryption, data i s encrypted a c r o s s the 
medium connecting two d i r e c t l y communicating nodes. Link-fcy-link 
encryption i s indepmdent of the system and does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
imply that the cryptographic c a p a b i l i t y i s integrated i n t o the 
communicating nodes. I t may be regarded as being implemented by a 
p a i r of cryptographic devices bracketing the l i n e between two 
communicating nodes and s i t u a t e d between the nodes and t h e i r modems 
as shown i n Figure 9.1. 
Node-by-node encryption i s s i m i l a r to l i n k - b y - l i n k encryption 
i n that each l i n k i s protected by a unique key. However data passing 
through an intermediate node are not i n the c l e a r as would be the 
case with l i n k encryption. Rather at an intermediate node, the 
enciphered data are transformed from enciphermeht under one key to 
encipherment under another key ( t h a t is,deciphered and reenciphered) 
within a s e c u r i t y module which may be a p e r i p h e r a l device attached 
to the node. That i s , the p l a i n t e x t occurs only within the s e c u r i t y 
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module and not within the node (Figure 9.2). 
In end-to-end encryption, data encrypted at the o r i g i n a t i n g 
node i s not decrypted u n t i l i t a r r i v e s at i t s f i n a l d e s t i n a t i o n . 
Thus t h i s method continuously p r o t e c t s data during transmission 
between u s e r s . Unlike l i n k and node encryption, end-to-end encryption 
allows each user to have s e v e r a l keys, one key for each u s e r who uses 
encryption (Figure 9.3) 
I t appears that i n terms of s e c u r i t y , c o s t and f l e x i b i l i t y , 
end-to-end encryption seems to be the most a t t r a c t i v e for systems 
r e q u i r i n g many protected l i n k s [3] . 
The Apple encryption system discussed e a r l i e r i s a simple 
end-to-end encryption system. More e x a c t l y , i t can be r e f e r r e d to as 
a p r i v a t e end-to-end cryptographic system as the user needs to 
request for cryptography and i t s use i s not transparent. 
Some key management schemes which allow the DES i n t e r f a c e 
u n i t to be integrated into data processing systems to provide 
protection for communications betwe«i i n d i v i d u a l u s e r s i n an end-to-
end encryption network are d i s c u s s e d . 
9.2 Key Management Using Key Centre 
This approach uses a Key Centre (KC) which a c t s as a source 
of s e s s i o n keys for encrypted c a l l s using the DES algorithm. A 
d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the functioning of such a centre i s giVen i n 
[3, 3 2 ] . 
Key centre can be operated manually i n which the keys a r e 
sent by mail or c o u r i e r s . I f such an arrangement i s t r u s t e d , that 
i s , whether the r i s k of untoward d i s c l o s u r e e i t h e r a c c i d e n t l y or as 
a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t e attempts i s acceptable, i t could work out very 
w e l l . At l e a s t , t h i s may be p o s s i b l e when the network i s small and 
t r a f f i c volume i s low. On the other hand, i f the network handles 
large t r a f f i c volumes,the need to change the keys often demands that 
large amounts of keys to be d i s t r i b u t e d . I n large networks, the 
number of p o s s i b l e interconnections grows as n(n-X )/2 where n i s the 
number of u s e r s . This may become an expensive venture because the 
manual systems have to be guarded against s e c u r i t y l e a k s by 
conventional methods and the persons involved have to be trustworthy. 
In an automatic KC, data network i s used to d i s t r i b u t e and 
generate the keys automatically. Consider the connection protocols 
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involved when two users wish to communicate i n a secure fashion i n a 
s i n g l e Key Centre environment. 
E s s e n t i a l l y two types of keys namely data encrypting keys 
and key encrypting keys can be i d e n t i f i e d . The data encrypting key 
i s a c t i v e only for a duration of a s i n g l e communication s e s s i o n and 
therefore i s r e f e r r e d to as a s e s s i o n key (KS). The s e s s i o n key i s 
protected by enciphering i t under key CTicrypting key which v a r i e s 
from user to user. Therefore the Key Centre i s required t o s t o r e one 
key encrypting key f o r each u s e r . These keys a r e themselves stored 
within the centre i n enciphered form using the Centre* s master key 
(KCM). Hence the problem of providing secrecy f o r cip h e r keys i s 
reduced to providing secrecy f or only one key namely the master key. 
This type of approach i s r e f e r r e d to as the master key concept [ 3] . 
I t i s assumed that the master key i s stored i n some non v o l a t i l e 
storage i n an i n a c c e s s i b l e area i n the Centre r e f e r r e d to as the 
cryptographic f a c i l i t y so that i t need be loaded i n t o the crypto-
graphic f a c i l i t y only once. Furthermore, each user i s required to 
st o r e only h i s user key (KU). 
9-3 Communication S e c u r i t y 
L e t KS^, KS^t KS^ represCTt the time v a r i a n t , 
dynamically changing data encrypting keys used f or enciphering and 
deciphering data. I t i s assumed that KS i s operational f o r the 
duration of a communications s e s s i o n . L e t KCM represent the master 
key of the Centre and KU represent the user (or t e r m i n a l ) key. 
To begin with, the user i requests the Centre KG for a 
session key (KS) to communicate with user 3. The request i s 
accompanied with a v e r i f i a b l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the user i . The 
whole message i s enciphered under the user i * s key KU^. That i s , 
i - KC : i , ( i , j , r ^ ) ^ 
where r i s a random number chosen by user i . I t i s used to prevent o 
an intruder impersonating the KC by replaying some p r e v i o u s l y 
recorded reply containing an e a r l i e r s e s s i o n key which the intruder 
would l i k e the user i to use again. Upon r e c e i v i n g the request the 
Centre fetches the user i ' s key KU^ which i s stored i n i t s memory 
under the master key KOI. Then i t deciphers the request and checks 
against i t s stored information to see i f the request i s l e g i t i m a t e 
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and i f i t i s , i t i s s u e s the s e s s i o n key (KS) to the user i . The 
session key KS i s generated within the Centre using a pseudo-random 
procedure. The reply from the Centre to the user i i s given by 
KC i : {KS, r^,(KS, i ) ^ ^ ) 
The random number r i s returned by the KC for the user i to v e r i f y 
o 
that the reply i s coming from the KC and not from an i n t r u d e r . Further 
as the session key KS i s encrypted under KU^, i t allows only the user 
i to decrypt and obtain KS and not any i n t r u d e r . The s e s s i o n key 
together with the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of user i encrypted under KU^ i s 
a l s o sent to user i . The user i cannot decrypt t h i s portion of the 
reply as he does not possess user i then sends t h i s cipher 
portion to user j , that i s , 
i j : (KS, i ) , 'KU_. 
The user j responds by sending a random number r ^ to user i , encrypted 
under the session key KS 
The user j does t h i s to ensure that i t i s indeed user i who i s 
requesting the c a l l and not any intruder using parameters of a 
previous c a l l . The user i then checks j * s i d e n t i t y and modifies the 
random number r ^ i n some (rearranged fashion to r e s u l t i n r^,which he 
returns to user j under KS 
Now the users i and j can be almost c e r t a i n that they are t a l k i n g to 
each other and can communicate with each other i n a secure manner 
using KS as the DES secre t key. Most of the above steps can be made 
transparent to the users i n the network. 
A v a r i a t i o n of the above method c o n s i s t s of the Key Centre 
KC sending the session key d i r e c t l y to the user j i n s t e a d of sending 
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i t v i a user i . That i s , the d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n the path taken by 
the session key from the Centre to user With t h i s approach, tvx> 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s may occur - e i t h e r the s e s s i o n key has already a r r i v e d 
a t user j when the l a t t e r r e c e i v e s the c a l l request or i t has not yet 
a r r i v e d - In the l a t t e r case, one must ensure that an o l d key i s not 
used mistakenly. Further the case where user j needs to wait for the 
session key i n c r e a s e s the complexity of the connection p r o t o c o l s . 
Thus the above o u t l i n e d method where the s e s s i o n key a r r i v e s to user j 
v i a user i seems to have some advantage over the other method. 
To f u r t h e r improve the i n t e g r i t y of the conversation and 
reduce the problem of impersonation, timestamps, T, [33] can be added 
to the key d i s t r i b u t i o n protocol. The f i r s t t hree steps o f the above 
procedure are then modified to become: 
i KC : i , ( i , j , r ^ , T ) ^ ^ 
KC i : (KS, r^,(KS, i , T ) j ^ , T)^ 
i H . j : (KS, i , T ) | ^ 
The users i and j can then v e r i f y that t h e i r messages are not replays 
by checking |clock - T| < At where clock g i v e s the l o c a l time. At 
gives some time e r r o r which includes the network delay time and the 
time discrepancy between the sender's clock and the l o c a l c l o c k . 
This requires some form of time synchronization among the u s e r s of 
the network. 
With the above schemes, i t i s seen that i f the s e s s i o n key 
i s somehow l o s t within the u s e r ' s system, then a f r e s h c a l l i s to be 
made by the user i to the KC to e s t a b l i s h a new s e s s i o n key. I t i s 
preferable that the KC generates a new s e s s i o n key even u^en the 
user i did not a c t u a l l y use the o l d KS f o r any conversation. I f on 
the other hand, the KC does keep a record of s e s s i o n keys issued to 
d i f f e r e n t users over a small period of time (say one day) then these 
keys need to be stored i n enciphered form within the Centre. Rather 
than using the same master key for t h i s purpose, i t i s advisable to 
use another master key KCfU to encrypt these temporarily stored 
session keys. 
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9.4 F i l e S e c u r i t y 
Let us now consider a key management scheme for f i l e 
s e c u r i t y where one wishes to protect the stored data i n the same way 
a s the communicated data [ 3 ] . I t i s assumed t h a t the encrypted f i l e s 
are to be stored i n a database i n the host processor (HP) i n the 
network. (This could be for instance the Key Centre mentioned e a r l i e r ) . 
I t i s a l s o assumed that the u s e r s i n the network have d i s t i n c t s e c r e t 
keys KU which are a l s o stored i n the host processor i n enciphered 
form under the master key KCM. Consider the case where the user i 
wishes to store a f i l e i n encrypted form i n the database under the 
name CIPHERFILE. L e t the corresponding f i l e i n c l e a r form be FLAINFILE. 
To begin with the procedure follovied i s very s i m i l a r to the one 
ou t l i n e d for communication s e c u r i t y given e a r l i e r . A c a l l i s made to 
the host processor 
i ^ HP : i , ( i , r ^ ) j ^ ^ 
where r ^ i s a random number chosen by user i . 
The host processor responds by generating a f i l e key (KF) using a 
pseudo-random process and «icrypting i t under the user i ' s key KU^. 
This i s then sent to user i 
HP ^ i : (KF. r ^ ) ^ _ 
The user i decrypts the message to obtain KF and v e r i f i e s the random 
number r ^ to ensure that the reply i s coming from HP and not from an 
int r u d e r . Then the user can encrypt h i s FLAINFILE using KF as the 
DBS s e c r e t key to produce CIPHERFILE. T h i s i s then transmitted to the 
host processor to be stored under the same name. To be able to 
recover the R-AINFILE, i t i s necessary f o r the host processor or the 
user i to record the information that the f i l e has been encrypted under 
KF. I n a large system with a number o f u s e r s and with each user having 
a number of f i l e s , i t may not be a good idea for the Centre t o keep a 
separate f i l e containing the name of the data f i l e and the corresponding 
f i l e key. ( I f t h i s i s done, then t h i s separate f i l e needs to be 
enciphered under some master k e y ) . A b e t t e r arrangement would be to 
store the information at the header of the f i l e i t s e l f . The f i l e key 
KF can be stored i n the header i n encrypted form under a master key 
KCM2. (KCM2 rather than KCM i s chosen to achieve separation from 
communication s e c u r i t y ) . With t h i s method i f a user r wishes to 
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decipher the CIPHERFILE, he requests the host processor f o r the f i l e 
key KF. 
r HP : r , ( C I P H E R F I L E ) 
The host processor reads the header of CIPHERFILE, decrypts 
i t using KCM2 to recover KF. T h i s i s then reenciphered under KU^ and 
transmitted to user r . This procedure does not allow the host 
processor to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between u s e r s . For i n s t a n c e , the user i 
may wish that PLAINFILE not be a v a i l a b l e to user r« T h i s can be 
achieved i f i n addition to KF, the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e owner of 
the CIPHERFILE i s recorded on the f i l e header, t h a t i s , the header 
contains the information t ^ t (KF . Further,the host processor 
i s required to maintain a record of u ^ c h users are allowed by user i 
to obtain the FLAINFILE. Then i f user r requests the host processor 
f o r the f i l e key of CIPHERFILE, the host processor f i r s t reads the header 
to f i n d the owner of the CIPHERFILE. Having found the owner, i , i t 
checks whether the requesting user belongs to the group of u s e r s who 
are allowed to read FLAINFILE. I f user r belongs to t h i s group, i t 
recovers the f i l e key KF from the header, encrypts i t under KU^ and sends 
i t to user r . I f user r does not belong to t h i s group, the above step 
w i l l not be c a r r i e d out by the host processor and a c c e s s t o the f i l e key 
i s p r ohibited. 
9.5 Key D i s t r i b u t i o n for Groups of Users 
Consider a more general case v^ere a user i n the network 
wishes to broadcast a message to several users [ 3 4 ] - Assume that a 
group G i s a non-empty subset of n u s e r s and members o f G wish to 
broadcast and receive messages from other members of G and to access 
and update f i l e s p r i v a t e to G. A given user may be a member of as many 
as 2"*^ groups and there are at most 2^-1 non-enpty groups i n the 
system. Again i t i s assumed that a l l aspects of key d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r any 
given group i s managed by a s i n g l e Key Centre. One method o f key 
d i s t r i b u t i o n among the group of users i s considered i n t h i s s e c t i o n and 
three other methods employing p u b l i c key concept are d e s c r i b e d i n 
Section 9.7. 
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9.5.1 ^tho6J._ 
In t h i s method, the Key Centre i s assumed t o keep a l i s t of 
personal keys of a l l u s e r s . In addition, the Key Centre a l s o keeps a 
record of a l l group keys f o r the groups i t manages. 
To e s t a b l i s h a group G, a member i of G r e g i s t e r s the group 
udth the Key Centre. The Centre returns a group i d e n t i f i e r IG to the 
user i who then d i s t r i b u t e s to the members of the group G using the 
method described e a r l i e r . The KC a l s o generates a group key KG and 
cr e a t e s a record i d e n t i f i e d by IG that contains KG and the users who 
belong to G. This record i t s e l f , i s stored i n enciphered form under a 
master key. 
Whenever a user j belonging to G udshes to communicate with 
other u s e r s or s t o r e a f i l e to be read by other u s e r s , he obtains the 
group key KG from the Centre. The key d i s t r i b u t i o n protocol can be 
described as follows: 
j KC : j , IG 
The user j sends to KC h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and h i s group i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
and requests f or the group key KG from KC. KC fe t c h e s the group 
record i d e n t i f i e d by IG, checks whether j i s a member of the group and 
returns KG to user j enciphered under j ' s personal key. 
KC j : (I G , KG, T ) j ^ ^ 
where T i s a timestamp used to protect against replay of previous keys. 
Because the group key KG i s CTiciphered under u s e r j ' s personal key i t 
i s not pos s i b l e f or an intruder e i t h e r to i n t e r c e p t KG or to impersonate 
j and acquire a group key for a group to which he does not belong. User 
j can now use the group key KG to encrypt a f i l e to be read by other 
users of the group or to decrypt an encrypted f i l e c r e a t e d by any other 
user of the group. 
An user i of the group can obtain the group key KG from the 
Centre i n a s i m i l a r fashion and hence the users i and j can communicate 
with each other i n a secure manner. 
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The primary disadvantage of t h i s approach i s the storage 
requirements f or the group keys- KC may need to s t o r e up to 2'^-l group 
keys. Secondly there i s no i d e n t i f i c a t i o n between group members and 
hence no di s c r i m i n a t i o n between group members-
Tne idea of one Key Centre i n the above schemes can be 
e>ctended to many such Centres and a group of m u s e r s 'belonging' to 
each Centre. I n such a s i t u a t i o n , each Key Centre i s re q u i r e d t o 
possess a shared s e c r e t key vdth each of the other Key Centres. ( I t 
could be tuo such keys, for instance,one f or communication s e c u r i t y and 
the other for f i l e s e c u r i t y ) . I f there are n such Centres, each Centre 
therefore has n-1 (or 2n-2) such keys. Then for i n s t a n c e , i f a user i 
belonging to Centre I wishes to communicate with a user j belonging to 
Centre J , then the Centre I generates the s e s s i o n key and sends i t to 
user i i n the usual fashion. As the Centre I does not know the user 
j ' s s e c r e t key, i t sends the session key to Centre J enciphered under 
the shared communication s e c r e t key betu^en Centres I and J . The 
Centre J recovers the session key and reenciphers i t under the user 
j ' s key KU. and sends i t to user j . A s i m i l a r procedure can be 
envisaged when a user i belonging to Centre I wishes t o read a f i l e 
o f user j belonging to Centre J . 
The problem of key d i s t r i b u t i o n can a l s o be overcome using 
public key cryptography concept proposed by D i f f i e and Hellman [ 3 5 ] . 
In the next s e c t i o n , the underlying p r i n c i p l e s of p u b l i c key 
cryptography are considered to see how such systems can be used to 
solve the key d i s t r i b u t i o n problem i n an elegant way. 
9.6 Public Key Systems 
Public key systems allow two users t o communicate securel y 
over an insecure channel without any prearrangement. Cryptosystems 
which allow t h i s type of communication are asymmetric (see Section 
2-2) i n the sense that the sender and r e c e i v e r have d i f f e r e n t keys 
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at l e a s t one of which i s conputationally i n f e a s i b l e to d e r i v e from 
the other. These systems separate enciphering and deciphering 
c a p a b i l i t i e s and p r i v a c y i s achieved without keeping the enciphering 
key secre t because i t i s no longer used for deciphering. Hence the 
enciphering key i s published i n addition to the enciphering and 
deciphering algorithms without compromising the s e c u r i t y of the 
system. The concept of a p u b l i c key cryptosystem i s shown i n 
Figure 9.4. User x encrypts the message M us i n g the p u b l i c 
enciphering key of user j and sends the cipher to user j over an 
insecure channel. Only the user j w i l l be able to decrypt the cipher 
to recover M as he i s the only one who knows h i s s e c r e t deciphering 
key. The encryption ( E ) and decryption (D) algorithms i n such a 
system have the following p r o p e r t i e s : 
(a) Deciphering the enciphered form o f a message M y i e l d s M, 
that i s , D(E(M)) = M. 
(b) Both E and D a r e easy to compute. 
( c ) By p u b l i c l y r e v e a l i n g E, the user does not r e v e a l an easy 
way to compute D. T h i s means t h a t only the r e c e i v e r 
(designer) can decrypt messages encrypted with E or compute 
D e f f i c i e n t l y . 
(d) I f a message M i s f i r s t deciphered and then enciphered, 
then M i s the r e s u l t , that i s E(D(M)) = M. 
The property (d) i s not necessary for a p u b l i c key cryptosystem but 
i f i t i s obeyed then i t i s p o s s i b l e to obtain the d i g i t a l signature 
feature (see Section 2.2) [34 J . 
The p u b l i c key concept g i v e s r i s e to a new c l a s s of 
cryptographic algorithms. One a p p l i c a t i o n of such algorithms i s to 
solve the problem of key d i s t r i b u t i o n i n systems employing symmetric 
cryptosystems. The public key cryptosysteras would i n many instances 
be the ultimate s o l u t i o n to the key d i s t r i b u t i o n problem. T h i s can 
be done as follows: User i can encrypt the s e s s i o n key KS using the 
public key of user j and then send i t to user j over an insecure 
channel. Because the deciphering key i s only known to user j , he 
i s the only one who can decrypt the cipher and obtain the session key. 
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Fig. 9.4 - Publlo-Key Cryptosystera, 
The users i and j can then communicate with each other using a 
symmetric cryptosystem such as the DBS under KS. The protocols as 
described above pose other problems a s s o c i a t e d with the i n t e g r i t y of 
the public keys and f a l s e impersonations by an opponent. Again a 
trustworthy t h i r d party such as the Key Centre, KC, may be required 
for the maintttiance of the public keys. The above s e t up can now be 
modified using a Public Key Centre (FKC) w^iich s u p p l i e s and maintains 
public keys o f a l l users i n the network. One can f u r t h e r assume that 
the Centre PKC has a public key {P^) and a s e c r e t key (S^^) p a i r and 
that the key P^^ i s known to every user i n the network. 
1. i FKC : i , ( i , j , r )p 
k 
where r i s a random number chosen by user i . As i n Section 9.3, o 
t h i s i s used to prevent an opponent impersonating the PKC by replaying 
some previously recorded r e p l y . 
The PKC upon r e c e i v i n g the request from user i f o r user j ' s 
public key, encrypts the user j ' s p u b l i c key using the p u b l i c key 
of user i , P^, and sends i t to user i along with the random number 
r ^ (or some modified r ^ using a p u b l i c l y axranged f u n c t i o n ) . 
2. FKC ^ i : ( i , P^, r ^ ) p 
Note that the cipher i n step 1 can only be decrypted by the Centre and 
no one e l s e and the cipher i n step 2 can only be decrypted by user i 
and no one e l s e . A s i m i l a r procedure can be followed by user j i f he 
wishes to obtain the public key of user i . From now on, user i can 
communicate with user j i n a secure manner, e i t h e r by generating a 
session key KS and transmitting i t to user j enciphered under P^ as 
mentioned above or using p u b l i c key approach, that i s , by encrypting 
the messages under the p u b l i c key of the r e c e i v e r j . 
Note that i n the s e t up procedure, the Centre FKC i s not 
used for generating the s e s s i o n keys and i t does not know the s e c r e t 
keys of users but i s used as a d i s t r i b u t o r of p u b l i c keys. Thus for 
the i n t e g r i t y to be maintained, i t i s c r u c i a l that the p u b l i c key 
f i l e be protected from unauthorized modification. 
The p u b l i c key concept can a l s o be employed in a d i f f e r e n t 
way to the one described above to provide a s o l u t i o n to the key 
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d i s t r i b u t i o n problem [ 3 4 ] . With t h i s method, there i s no need f o r 
decryption as such at the r e c e i v i n g end. I t i s not a public key 
cryptosystem but i t i s a public key d i s t r i b u t i o n system. Two use r s 
wishing to exchange a key, communicate back and f o r t h u n t i l they 
a r r i v e at a key which i s common. Then t h i s common key can be used 
as a session key i n a symmetric cryptosystem. The opponent 
eavesdropping on t h i s exchange f i n d s i t c o n p u t a t i o n a l l y i n f e a s i b l e to 
conqsute the key from the information overheard. 
Both the public key cryptosystems and the pu b l i c key 
d i s t r i b u t i o n systems are based on one-way functions of one form or 
another. For instance, i t i s s a i d t h a t i n p u b l i c key systems, i t i s 
i n f e a s i b l e to determine the se c r e t key from the knowledge of public 
key. (Property Cc))« A one-way function has the pro p e r t i e s that 
( i ) I t i s an e a s i l y computed function from x to y, th a t i s , 
y = f ( x ) . 
( i i ) I t has an inverse function. 
( i i i ) I t i s conputationally i n f e a s i b l e to discover the i n v e r s e 
function. 
A p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n of a one-way function therefore depends 
on a s p e c i f i c measure of complexity as i t v a r i e s udth time and 
technology. As mentioned i n Section 2.3, the complexity measures are 
often defined i n terms of time or storage required or as a time-
memory product. I f the number of operations to be done i n computing 
the inverse i s taken as a measure, then thermodynamics places a 
l i m i t of approximately 10^^ on the number of operations t h a t can be 
performed even i f the e n t i r e «iergy of the Sun could be harvested 
[ 36, 37] . As the l e g a l r e c e i v e r has to decrypt the cip h e r , the 
public key systems are based on 'trapdoor' one-way functions rather 
than one-way functions. A trapdoor one-way function i s a one-way 
function which has the a d d i t i o n a l property t h a t : 
- i t i s computationally i n f e a s i b l e to discover what the in v e r s e 
function i s , xmless c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c information (trapdoor inform-
ation ) that i s employed i n the design of the function i s known. A 
trapdoor one-way function becomes a trapdoor one-way permutation i f 
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i t s a t i s f i e s the property t h a t : 
- decryption algorithm followed by encryption algorithm produces the 
o r i g i n a l p l a i n t e x t (property ( d ) ) . 
In t h i s case, the mapping between c i p h e r t e x t and p l a i n t e x t becomes both 
i n f e c t i v e and s u r j e c t i v e . T h i s i s e s s e n t i a l for implementing d i g i t a l 
s ignatures. 
A b r i e f review of two w e l l known p u b l i c key cryptosystems 
and a public key d i s t r i b u t i o n system i s now presented-
9.6.1 ^^]^z}^^]j^^_J^^^oor_ Knapsack_PUbl^ic Kejf Crjrptosys^tem_[ 13_J1 
The knapsack problem i s a combinatorial problem i n which 
given a vector a^  of n elements, i t i s required to s e l e c t a subset of 
these which add up to a given sum S. The problem i s to determine 
which a^ for i = 1 to n are to be included i n forming S^ t h a t i s , 
determining v*^ether x^ = o or x^ = 1 f o r i = 1 to n i n the following 
equations 
n 
i = l ^ ^ 
I t i s seen that there are 2" p o s s i b l e ways of s e l e c t i n g the q u a n t i t i e s 
x^ and t h i s exponential function i n c r e a s e s very r a p i d l y a s n i n c r e a s e s 
whereas i t i s easy to t e s t whether a p a r t i c u l a r combination i s a 
solution. But there are some inst a n c e s i n which the equation (9.1) 
i s easy to solve. One such instance i s when the elements { a^} form 
a superincreasing sequence. That i s , 
i-1 
a". > y~ a^ f o r a l l i > 1 (9.2) 
When t h i s occurs, then x = 1 and only i f S i a' and s i m i l a r l y f o r 
n n 
i = n-1, n-2, ..-,1 x^ = 1 i f and only i f 
n 
S - I X . . a j 5^. a^ 
j = i + l 
Hence the l e g a l r e c e i v e r designs the system i n such a way that only 
he can transform the hard knapsack (9.1) i n t o an easy knapsack using 
the above procedure whereas the opponents are forced to s o l v i n g (9.1) 
He does t h i s by choosing two numbers w and m which a r e r e l a t i v e l y 
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prime to each other and a super i n c r e a s i n g sequence a / for i = 1 to n. 
Thi s vector i s then transformed to form the sequence {a^} u s i n g w and 
m as follows: 
a^ = a f . w(mod m) 
The vector a i s published and i t forms the encrypting key o f the 
pu b l i c key system. The vector a''and i n t e g e r s w and m are kept 
s e c r e t and form the deciphering key. The encryption procedure c o n s i s t s 
of taking a p l a i n t e x t x i n the form of a vector x = (x^, x^) 
where x^ e { 0» l} and forming S = a-x. The c i p h e r t e x t S i s then sent 
over the insecure channel to the r e c e i v e r . The decryption process 
uses w and m and ^  as follows: 
S"= w"^  . S (nod m) 
-1 " 
= w~ . 5^  ' ^ i • ^ i ™) 
= w" . 51 x.*w • a" (mod m) 
1=1 ^ ^ 
n STs I X. . a" (mod m) 
i= l ^ ^ 
n 
I f m i s chosen such that m > a^ thOT 
i=I 
n 
5-= i : x.,a; 
i = l 
T his knapsack i s e a s i l y solved f or x u ^ i c h i s a l s o the s o l u t i o n to 
the apparently d i f f i c u l t trapdoor knapsack S = a.x . I t i s a l s o 
p o s s i b l e to i t e r a t e the b a s i c transformation by generating s e v e r a l 
p a i r s of (w, m). For instance, rather than r e q u i r i n g t o s a t i s f y 
( 9 . 2 ) , a^ can be transformed to a new problem using 
a^ = w • (™o*^  ™ ) 
where s a t i s f i e s (9.2) and i s easy to so l v e . With each such 
succ e s s i v e transformation, the s t r u c t u r e i n the p u b l i c l y known vector 
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a i s made more amd more obscure. 
9.6.2 Riwst-Shamr-Adlem^ Ke^ Cryptosy£tem_[l2] 
The trapdoor i n t h i s asymmetric scheme i s based on the 
d i f f e r e n c e i n computational d i f f i c u l t y i n f i n d i n g l a r g e primes as 
opposed to fact o r i n g large numbers. 
B r i e f l y , the RSA system can be described as f o l l o w s : 
The r e c e i v e r chooses two large primes p and q so l a r g e t h a t f a c t o r i n g 
m = p.q i s beyond a l l projected computational c a p a b i l i t i e s . The 
p l a i n t e x t message M can be chosen from the range 1^ M< m. The 
cipher t e x t C corresponding to M i s derived from the permutation 
C S (mod m) 
The p l a i n t e x t M i s r e t r i e v e d from C by applying the i n v e r s e 
transformation 
M = C*^  (mod m) 
The r e c e i v e r chooses e and d such that 
( a ) gcd^ ( e , 0 (m)) = 1 where 0 (m> i s the E u l e r - t o t i e n t 
function and i n t h i s case, i t i s equal 
to (p-1) (q-1) 
(b) e d = 1 (mod 0 (m)) (9.3) 
In other words, e and d are m u l t i p l c a t i v e i n v e r s e s i n the group 
formed by residue c l a s s e s mod 0 (m). 
The reason why t h i s encryptiOT-decryption scheme works i s based on 
the Euler-Fermat theorem [38] which s t a t e s that for any integer M 
which i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to m, 
= 1 (nod m) (9.4) 
Using (9.3) giv e s , 
= ^ ^ (mod m). for some_integer K. 
t greatest common d i v i s o r - 160 -
From ( 9 . 4 ) , for a l l M such that p does not d i v i d e M 
= 1 (mod p) 
and s i n c e p-1 di v i d e s 0 (m) 
0 (m) + 1 - M (mod p) (9.5) 
When M = O (nod p ) , the equation (9.5) i s obeyed t r i v i a l l y . S i m i l a r l y 
f o r q 
^ = M (nad q) (9.6) 
Using Chinese Remainder Theorem (Appendix 10), equations (9.5) and 
(9.6) ±mply that for a l l M, 
^ = ^  0 {m) * 1 = M (mod m) M 
In t h i s system, the numbers e and m are made p u b l i c and they form the 
encrypting key. The numbers d, p and q are kept s e c r e t and form the 
decrypting key. I f m can be e a s i l y f a c t o r i z e d to p and q then the 
cry p t a n a l y s t can f i n d 0 (m) and d and hence can crack the system. 
This cryptosystem and i t s p o s s i b l e extCTsions form a major 
part of t h i s t h e s i s and hence t h i s system i s considered i n d e t a i l i n 
subsequent chapters. 
9.6.3 Oiffy^^]jsmJ)a>lic Kejr W.stributionj5^stem [35] 
This public key d i s t r i b u t i o n system makes use o f the 
appar«it d i f f i c u l t y of computing logarithms over a f i n i t e ( G a l o i s ) 
f i e l d GF'(q) where q i s a prime. 
L e t 'a' be a p r i m i t i v e element of GF(q) and l e t 
y = a^ (mod q) f o r 1^ x ^ q - 1 
x i s r e f e r r e d to as the logarithm of y to the base*a'over GF(q) 
X = log^ y over GF(q) 
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C a l c u l a t i o n of y from x i s easy whereas computation of x from y i s 
much more d i f f i c u l t , that i s , i t i s an oneway function. T h i s problem 
i s c a l l e d the logarithm problem \*rtiereas the RSA system i s based on the 
root problem. 
The key d i s t r i b u t i o n occurs as follows- User i generates 
a random number x^ chosen uniformly from the s e t of i n t e g e r s 1, 2, 
• •. , q-I - He then computes 
y^ = a ^ i (mod q) 
and publishes y^ and keeps x^ s e c r e t . S i m i l a r l y user j publishes 
y^. and keeps x^ s e c r e t where 
y_. = a^'j (modq) 
The p r i v a t e session key, i s e s t a b l i s h e d by forming 
\j = a^'i^'j (mod q) 
User i computes K^^ by obtaining y^ from the p u b l i c f i l e and forming 
K _ = y ^ ^ i (mod q) 
— X. X . — X .X. 
= a i j = a j x {mod q) 
User j s i m i l a r l y computes K^ _. using y^^^ (mod q)- For the opponent 
to form hp must conpute 
Therefore i f logarithms over GF(q) are e a s i l y computed, the system 
can be broken. A p o s s i b l e extension o f t h i s system together udth 
a p r a c t i c a l implementation are described i n Chapter 13. 
9-7 Key D i s t r i b u t i o n Using Public Key For Groups of Users 
Let us now return to the s i t u a t i o n where members of a 
group G wish to broadcast and r e c e i v e messages from other members of 
G and to access and update f i l e s p r i v a t e to G and consider three 
other methods of key d i s t r i b u t i o n for siich an arrangements Method 1 i s 
given i n Section 9.5.1. 
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9.7.1 Mettod_2_ 
This approach uses a p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n method such as 
the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation method to d i s t r i b u t e the group key. 
Here each user i r e g i s t e r s with the Key Cenxre KG a public 
key y^ = a'^i (mod p) where x^ i s only known t o user i . The p r i m i t i v e 
root *a' and the prime p are known to a l l u s e r s i n the n e t w r k . The 
user i transmits to KC a l i s t o f members of the group G. 
i KC: i , G = { u^, u^, u^ } 
I f the user i belongs to the group, then the Key Centre generates a 
number x^  
That i s . 
^ and sends i t to user i enciphered under h i s p u b l i c key 
KC -^^  i : K = y.^G (mod p) 
The user i upon r e c e i v i n g the above message computes 
-1 
(K.^^)''i (mod p) 
-1 
= a i G i (mod p) 
= a^G (mod p) 
That i s , the group key KG i s givCT by a'^ G (mod p ) . With t h i s method, 
storage of up to 2^-1 s e c r e t values of i s necessary e i t h e r by the 
Key Centre or by the users* where n i s the t o t a l number of users and 
the KC does not need to know the personal keys o f the u s e r s x^ 
(1 ^ i ^ n ) . 
9.7.2 Meth»d_3_ 
I f the KC i s however given access to users' personal keys, 
a modification to the above p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n method i s as 
follows: 
The group key KG i s now made equal t o 
KG = a'S.' V ^ n (mod p) (9.7) 
When the i t h member of G requests KG from the Centre, KC returns KG 
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enciphered under the personal key x^. The master key i s represented 
by the l i s t of personal keys* Another member of G may be able to 
determine a ^ i (mod p) but he cannot compute without computing a 
d i s c r e t e logarithm. I f p i s chosen to be a l a r g e prime number, t h i s 
i s not f e a s i b l e . 
Here the key centre KC needs to s t o r e only n personal keys. Although 
the method uses a one-way function* i t i s not a p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n 
method because the KC naist have access to s e c r e t personal keys of the 
users* 
Note that i n both the schemes 2 and 3, for s u i t a b l y chosen primes p 
o f the form p = 4q -t- 1 u ^ r e q is a l s o a prime, a = 2 i s a p r i m i t i v e 
root* 
9.7.3 Method_4_ 
This method considers the establishment of the group key 
KG given by (9.7) without the use of the Key Centre. I t assximes a 
s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n where the n u s e r s (O to n-1) are l i n k e d together i n 
a c i r c u l a r f ashion, thus forming a r i n g . That i s , user i always sends 
messages to user i + 1 and user n-1 sends message to user O. The t a b l e 
9.1 given i n Figure 9,5 shoios the messages received and transmitted by 
user i at various time i n s t a n t s . 
Time In s t a n t Transmitted Message Received Message 
1 a'^i (mod p) a ' ^ i - l (mod p) 
2 a ^ i - l f i (mod p) a ' ^ i - 2 f i - l (mod p) 
r a ^ i - ( r - l ) ' * * ^ i ( n o d p) a ^ i - r ^ ' ^ i - l (mod p) 
n-1 a^i-(n-2)***^i(mod p) a ^ i - ( n - l )***^i-l(mod p) 
Figure 9-5 - Table 9.1« Messages received and transmitted by user i . 
At time i n s t a n t t = r,the user i r a i s e s the message r e c e i v e d from 
user i - 1 at time i n s t a n t t = r-1 to the power and transmits i t to 
user i -•• 1. The user i forms the group key KG by r a i s i n g the 
received message a t time i n s t a n t t = n - 1 t o the power x^. That i s , 
KG = a ^ i - ( n - l ) " * ^ i - l ' ^ i (mod p) 
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Every user i n the network can a r r i v e a t t h i s common group key by 
r a i s i n g the message received at the ( n - l ) t h time i n s t a n t t o the 
power of h i s s e c r e t key. Any intruder who does not belong to t h i s 
r i n g network cannot determine the group key by monitoring the 
transmitted messages a t a l l l i n k s i n the network. A more generalized 
version o f t h i s method has r e c e n t l y been published i n [ 4 1 ] . 
9.8 Key D i s t r i b u t i o n Schemes for P r e s t e l Encryption System 
Th i s chapter i s concluded by considering p o s s i b l e key 
management schemes for P r e s t e l Viewdata system with encryption 
f a c i l i t y . 
I n i t i a l l y consider the case where a user i (information 
provider) wishes.to s t o r e a frame (or frames) on P r e s t e l database 
which should only be read by user j . T h i s i s r e f e r r e d to as the 
'Postbox system'. I n t h i s case, i t i s assumed that there i s no d i r e c t 
network l i n k between the two users other than v i a the database. I f 
the user systems only allow DES type symmetric cryptography then the 
frame key (the key with which a P r e s t e l frame has been enciphered) 
must be exchanged v i a some secure c o u r i e r . T h i s i s the only method 
poss i b l e i f i t i s assumed that P r e s t e l i s only used as a database and 
does not play an i n t e r a c t i v e r o l e i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of keys. 
However, i f the u s e r systems support p u b l i c key cryptography, then one 
of the following tioo approaches can be adopted. 
The f i r s t approach uses a p u b l i c key cryptosystem such as 
the RSA system. Here the user i can encrypt the frame using the 
public key of user j ( t h i s i s assuming that the p u b l i c f i l e containing 
enciphering keys of users i s a v a i l a b l e , say, i n the form o f a telephone 
d i r e c t o r y ) . User j w i l l thCTi be the only person viho would be able 
to read the frame and not even user i can read the frame he had 
entered. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , user i can generate a random frame key which 
he can use to encrypt the frame using a symmetric algorithm such as 
the DES. User i then encrypts t h i s frame key using the p u b l i c key of 
user j and s t o r e s the r e s u l t a t the top of the frame. User j can 
recover the frame key using h i s s e c r e t RSA key and then read the 
P r e s t e l frame. User i w i l l a l s o be able to read the frame as he can 
keep a copy of the frame key which he has generated (say enciphered 
under h i s own public k e y ) . 
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The second approach uses a p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n system 
such as the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation system. Here the user i 
obtains the p u b l i c key information y . of user j from the p u b l i c f i l e 
and perfoims y^ i^where i s the s e c r e t key of user i , t o form the 
common key K. Then he generates a random frame key and uses i t to 
encrypt the P r e s t e l frame. The d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s approach and 
the one above i s that i n t h i s case, the frame key i s enciphered under 
the common key and i s stored at the top of the frame. User j w i l l be 
able to read the frame as he can obtain the coimncm key and hence the 
frame key. Here again only u s e r s i and j w i l l be able to read the 
P r e s t e l frame. 
Ccmsider now the case where a group of n users who wish to 
communicate with each other v i a the P r e s t e l database. That i s , each 
one of the n users should be able to read the frames CTitered by any 
one of the others i n the group. Amongst the members of the group, 
existence of a p r i v i l e g e d member r e f e r r e d to as the Manager i s 
envisaged. [The group could represent t y p i c a l l y a small company or 
an o r g a n i z a t i o n ] . Further i t i s assumed t h a t every member of the group 
i s l i n k e d to the Manager. I n such a s i t u a t i o n , the Manager assumes 
the r o l e of the Key Centre described e a r l i e r . Any user i who wishes 
to enter an «icrypted frame on P r e s t e l i n i t i a l l y e s t a b l i s h e s a frame 
key with the Manager following the procedure o u t l i n e d i n Section 9.3. 
This frame key can then be used to e i c i p h e r the frame and stored at 
the top of the frame enciphered under a master key o f the Manager. 
Anuser j belonging to the group can read the enciphered frame key 
from the top of the frame and send i t t o the Manager who r e t u r n s to 
him the frame key enciphered under the user j' s personal key. Thus 
user J can decipher the frame entered by u s e r i . With t h i s approach, 
i n addition to the master key, the Manager i s reqtiired to keep a 
record o f the personal keys o f a l l n u s e r s and i f there i s more than 
one group, a record of members i n each group. Oie can a l s o use any 
one o f the methods 1 to 3 given i n Sections 9.5 and 9.7 t o e s t a b l i s h 
a group key among the n users using the Manager as the Key Centre. 
Having e s t a b l i s h e d the group key, the u s e r i can follow t h e usual 
procedure of generating a ran<tom frame key and s t o r i n g t h i s at the 
top of the frame, t h i s time enciphered under the group key. Thus any 
user belonging to the group can read the frame. Method 3 (see Section 
9.7.2) i s seen to be the most a t t r a c t i v e method as the Manager needs 
to store a l i s t of keys which i s a polynomial functiOT of the number 
of users n. 
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C H A P T E R 10 
EXTENSIONS CF THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM 
10.1 General 
As seen i n the l a s t chapter, the concept of p u b l i c key 
cryptosystems r e c e n t l y proposed by Mericle and Hellman [35] not only 
provides a novel way of d i s t r i b u t i n g the keys required f o r the 
symmetric cryptosystems but i t a l s o g i v e s r i s e to a c l a s s o f 
asymmetric public key cryptosystems w i t h . d i g i t a l signature c a p a b i l i t i e s , 
From t h i s stage onwards, the t h e s i s mainly concentrates on the 
a n a l y s i s and the design of p u b l i c key systems; i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e RSA 
pu b l i c key cryptosystem and the Diffie-Hellman p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n 
system. Both these systems a r e of immense i n t e r e s t among the 
cryptographic community at the present time-
Before considering some p o s s i b l e extensions of the RSA 
system t o matrix and polynomial r i n g s , i t i s u s e f u l t o consider some 
design aspects of the RSA system over the r a t i m a l i n t e g e r s . These 
aspects are more or l e s s a p p l i c a b l e to the extended RSA systems 
considered i n subsequ^it s e c t i o n s . 
10.2 Some Design Aspects of RSA System 
As mentioned i n Section 9.6.2, i n the RSA system the 
encryption i s performed by r a i s i n g the message x ( l ^ x < m ) t o the 
eth power modulo m and the decryption i s performed by r a i s i n g the 
cipher y to the power d modulo ra. That i s 
and 
y = x^ (mod m) 
X = y (mod m) 
where m i s equal t o the product of two l a r g e d i s t i n c t primes p and 
q. The p u b l i c encryption key i s the p a i r o f i n t e g e r s (e, m) and the 
secret decryption key i s (d, m). The coding exponents are chosen 
such that they are m u l t i p l i c a t i v e i n v e r s e of each other modulo 0 (m) 
and that x^ i s a permutation of the residue c l a s s e s modulo m. 
That i s , 
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e d = 1 (mod 0 (m)) where 0 (m) = (p-1) ( q - l ) 
To design the RSA system, the user needs to choose tuo 
large primes p and q to form the modulus m. The magnitude of the 
modulus ra i s determined by the required d i f f i c u l t y of breaking the 
designed system. The table shown i n Figure 10.1,taken from [ 1 2 ] , 
gives an i n d i c a t i o n of the magnitude of m. The number of operations 
computed for each value of m i s based on the best known f a c t o r i n g 
algorithm for l a r g e i n t e r g e r s . (see Section 10.3.1). 
Number of 
log^^m operations Remarks 
50 1.4 X 10^^ 
100 2.3 X 10^^ At the l i m i t s of c u r r e n t 
technology 
23 
200 1.2 X 10 Beyond current technology 
34 
400 2.7 X 10 Requires s i g n i f i c a n t advances 
i n technology 
800 1.3 X 10^^ 
Figure 10.1 E f f o r t required to f a c t o r modulus m 
Once an approximate idea o f the magnitule of m i s decided, 
then the two primes p and q need to be s e l e c t e d randomly. The prime 
number theorem s t a t e s that the primes near m are spaced on the 
average one every ( I n m) i n t e g e r s . Thus even for l a r g e primes s e v e r a l 
hundred d i g i t s long, only a few hundred candidates must be te s t e d 
before f i n d i n g a prime. Hence one needs to t e s t whether a chosen 
large number i s a prime. There e x i s t s elegant p r o b a b i l i s t i c algorithms 
[42] which decide with an a i b i t r a r i l y small u n c e r t a i n t y i f the chosen 
number i s a prime. The p r o b a b i l i s t i c algorithm c o n s i s t s o f making many 
independent t e s t s and declaring the number to be composite when any 
one t e s t f a i l s . I f a t e s t mistakes a composite for being prime with 
p r o b a b i l i t y f'then by using k such t e s t s the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the 
algorithm w i l l i n c o r r e c t l y declare a composite to be prime i s f . 
Three t e s t s of p r i m a l i t y are commonly used [43] namely, the Fermat 
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t e s t , the Solovay-Strassen t e s t and the Rabin t e s t . I n a l l these 
cases, i t i s assumed that the t e s t s a r e applied to the number b. 
10.2.1 P r i r a ^ l i t j ^ I ^ s t s 
lO. 2.1.1 Fermat J T e s t 
This t e s t i s based on the Euler-Fermat theorem p r e v i o u s l y 
mentioned. The theorem s t a t e s that i f p i s a prime then 
a*^^ = 1 (mod p) for a l l a, 1 ^  a < p 
Thus the t e s t c o n s i s t s of choosing 'a' l e s s than the number b and 
accepting b to be prime i f a ^ ^ (mod b ) i s congruent to 1 (mod b ) . 
In p r a c t i c e , only a few values of »a* need to be t r i e d and not a l l 
^a' as in d i c a t e d above. (Only a small number of composites pass t h i s 
t e s t even a few time s ) . I t i s recommended that approximately one 
hundred t e s t s be made to r e l i a b l y conclude that the s e l e c t e d number 
i s prime. I t i s gen e r a l l y believed t h a t choosing a = 3 w i l l i d e n t i f y 
v i r t u a l l y a l l conposites. The Carmichael numbers (eg.561 = 3.11.17) 
are known to pass t h i s t e s t even though they are composite. 
10.2.1.2 . §olovajf;-Strassenjrest_ 144] 
Thi s t e s t i d e n t i f i e s the Carmichael numbers as being 
composite. I t pick s a random number 'a' between 1 and b-1 and t e s t s 
whether 
gcd (a,b) = 1 and J ( a , b ) = ^ ( ^ ^ ) / ^ (ino^ b) ( l O . l ) 
where J ( a , b ) i s the Jacobi syndx^l and gcd denotes the g r e a t e s t 
common d i v i s o r . The Jacobi symbol i s defined as 
2 — 
/ 1 when x^ = a (mod p) has a s o l u t i o n i n Z/pZ 
J(a,p) = ^ ^ ^ j ^ x*^  = a (mod p) has no s o l u t i o n i n Z/pZ 
where Z/pZ denotes the ring of i n t e g e r s modulo p. 
I f b i s prime, then (10.1) i s always t r u e and i f b i s composite (10.1 ) 
i s f a l s e with a p r o b a b i l i t y of a ig. Therefore making k t e s t s y i e l d 
-k 
an answer that i s wrong with a p r o b a b i l i t y of 2 when claiming the 
input i s prime. (When claiming the number i s composite, i t i s always 
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c o r r e c t ) • 
1O.2.1.3 Rabin T e s t _ [ 4 2 j 
As b i s n e c e s s a r i l y an odd integer, representing b as 
b = 2^ s + 1 where s i s odd, t h i s t e s t then chooses a number of 
values of 'a' randomly i n the range \ to b-1 and accepts b to be 
s 2^s — prime i f e i t h e r a = 1 (mod b) or a = - I (mod b) f o r some j where 
O S j < r . Otherwise b i s r e j e c t e d . 
A l l the three t e s t s can be c a r r i e d out to check vrfiether t h e chosen 
number b i s a prime or not. The f a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t i e s of each t e s t 
are discussed i n length i n [4-3]. Note that t h i s p r i m a l i t y t e s t i n g 
procedure needs to be done only once by any system designer and a l l 
these t e s t s require computational e f f o r t of the order of O (log^b) 
operations on l a r g e i n t e g e r s . 
To confound c e r t a i n f a c t o r i n g algorithms [ 4 5 ] , i t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to choose primes p and q such that p-1 and q-1 have a l a r g e 
prime f a c t o r . This can be done by generating a l a r g e prime number b 
and then l e t t i n g p (or q) be the f i r s t prime i n the sequence b i + 1 
for i = 2, 4, 6 ... Additional s e c u r i t y can be provided i f b-1 a l s o 
has a l a r g e prime f a c t o r . Furthermore, i t i s a l s o a d v i s a b l e not to 
choose p and q too c l o s e to each other. I f p = q, then 2^/^ i s a 
good approximation of p + q. Knowing p + q g i v e s immediately 0 (m) 
since 0 (m) = ( p - l ) ( q - l ) = m ••• 1 - (p+q). Further, the primes should 
not be chosen to be any s p e c i a l primes such as the Fermat primes or 
Mersenne primes as these are w e l l studied and the r e s u l t i n g product 
may be more l i k e l y to y i e l d to a t t a c k s of f a c t o r i z a t i o n . 
10.2.2 Qio±ce_of_ Codin9_E;2J*2n^iS— 
Having chosen the primes p and q, and hence m, the next 
step i s to choose the coding exponents e and d. To do t h i s , the 
user chooses a number d which i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to 0 (m). T h i s i s 
done by s e l e c t i n g a number d (mod m) and computing gcd (d, 0 (m)). 
This i s done using the E u c l i d ' s algorithm given i n the Appendix 11. 
This not only checks whether d and 0 (m) are r e l a t i v e l y prime but 
also gives the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e i n v e r s e e. I t i s known t h a t the gcd 
function i s computable i n 0 (log^m) time [ 4 5 ] - I t i s necessary to 
choose both e and d such that they are greater than log^ni. I f 
e < log^m, then small messages w i l l not be disguised by t h e modulo 
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e e 
reduction process. That i s , x (mod m) = x and the c i p h e r i s 
breakable by brute force a t t a c k . I f d i s smaller than log^m,again 
the system can be broken by a random search by the opponent to 
determine i t s value. There i s a f u r t h e r condition on the choice of 
e. As mentioned previously, e needs to be chosen r e l a t i v e l y prime to 
0 (m) or more exactly to 9jcm ( p - l , q - l ) , for the function (mod m) 
to permute the residue c l a s s e s (mod m) (see Section 14.1). But t h i s 
permutation has f i x e d messages, that i s , there are residue c l a s s e s 
X (mod m) which s a t i s f y the congruence 
X e - X (nod m) where e ^ 3 i s odd and m = p.q (10.2) 
I t i s known [46] that any s o l u t i o n of the congruence 
x"^  = X (mod m) (10.3) 
a l s o s a t i s f i e s (10.2). Note that the congruence (10.3) has e x a c t l y 
9 solutions i n the range 1 ^ x ^ m-1, (m = pq). Thus the congruence 
(10.2) w i l l have at l e a s t 9 f i x e d messages. Blakely [47] has shown 
that for the congruence to have only 9 f i x e d messages e must be 
chosen such that god { e - 1 , £.cm ( p - l , q - l ) } = 2. 
10.3 C r y p t a n a l y s i s of RSA System 
The main crypt a n a l y t i c a l attack seems to be the determination 
of the s e c r e t coding exponent d. There are b a s i c a l l y t h r e e ways a 
cryptanalyst might t r y to determine d from the p u b l i c l y revealed 
information (e, m). 
10.3.1 FactorizatiOT of_m_ 
The f a c t o r i z a t i o n of m %uould allow the opponent to compute 
0 (m) and hence the s e c r e t coding exponent d using ed = 1 (mod 0 (m)). 
A l a r g e number of f a c t o r i n g algorithms e x i s t [ 45] . The f a s t e s t 
algorithm known at the present time can f a c t o r m i n approximate y 
( I n m ) ^ ^ ^ ^ In m)% ^^^^ R.Schroeppel (unpublished). 
The t a b l e given i n Section 10.1 i s based on Schroeppel's method and 
i t shows t h a t a number m of 200 d i g i t s (decimal) long would provide 
a margin of safety against future developments. 
t jlcm : l e a s t common multiple " 
10.3.2 03i5>utatipn of_0_(m)_Wittout_Factorizat^ m 
Another method o f c r y p t a n a l y s i s would be t o somehow d i r e c t l y 
determine 0 (m) without f a c t o r i z i n g m. I t i s shown i n [12] that the 
approach of computing 0 (m) d i r e c t l y i s no e a s i e r than f a c t o r i n g m 
si n c e finding 0 (m) enables the opponent to e a s i l y f a c t o r m. This 
can be seen as follows: 
L e t x = p + q = m+ l - 0(m) 
and y = (p>-q)^ = x^ - 4m 
Knowing 0 (m), one can determine x and hence y. Using x and y, the 
primes p and q are given by p = x yjy and q = x - >/y". 
2 2 
10.3.3. 2!^terminin£ d Without^ £j^£^£ri"2 B orj3on^ut^in3^_(m) 
The t h i r d method of c r y p t a n a l y s i s c o n s i s t s o f computing the 
secret exponent d without f a c t o r i z i n g m or determining 0 (m). Again 
i t i s argued i n [12] that provided d i s chos«i l a r g e enough to make 
a d i r e c t search attack i n f e a s i b l e , computing d i s no e a s i e r than 
f a c t o r i n g m, since once d i s known, m could be f a c t o r i z e d e a s i l y . 
T his can be seen as follows: I f d i s known, Xhsn i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
c a l c u l a t e some multiple of 0 (m) using 
ed - 1 = k 0 (m) for some integer k 
M i l l e r [40] has demonstrated that m can be factored using any 
multiple of 0 (m). The opponent,on the other hand,may hope to f i n d 
a d^ such t h a t i t i s equivalent to the s e c r e t exponent d o f the 
designer. I f there are a l o t of such d^, then one could use a brute 
force search method to break the system. But a l l the d' d i f f e r by 
the l e a s t common mult i p l e o f (p-1) and ( q - l ) and i f one i s found 
then m can be factored. Thus f i n d i n g any such d^ i s as d i f f i c u l t as 
fa c t o r i n g m. 
Now some p o s s i b l e extensions of the RSA system a r e 
considered. 
10.4 Extension of RSA System to Matrix Rings 
10.4.1 5^ap^por_Rin£s_ 
Assume R i s a f i n i t e r i n g [48] with 1 which i s a s s o c i a t i v e 
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but not n e c e s s a r i l y commutative. Suppose that members of the r i n g R 
are used as messages and that r e R i s enciphered as r ^ where e i s 
the published encrypting exponent. The trapdoor property can now be 
stated as follows:- there e x i s t s some integer n> o such t h a t r'**^= r 
for a l l r £ R. These r i n g s a r e to be r e f e r r e d to as trapdoor r i n g s . 
For instance i n Z/pZ, r^=r f o r a l l r e R. More g e n e r a l l y , i f we l e t 
R=F =GF(q), the f i e l d of q elements where q i s a prime power (p ) then 
r * ^ r f o r a l l r e R- Further, i f R and S are any two such trapdoor r i n g s , 
then the d i r e c t sum R © S c o n s i s t s of vector s ( r , s ) with r e R and s e S 
i s another trapdoor r i n g say T. The number of elements i n the r i n g T i s 
equal to the product of the number of elements i n R and S. This above 
process can be applied repeatedly taking vectors of a r b i t r a r i l y many 
components, each taken from some f i n i t e f i e l d , c o n s i d e r i n g f i n i t e 
f i e l d s I ^ , . f o r l ^ i ^ j where q^'s can be the same or d i f f e r e n t , the tr a p -
door r i n g R i s formed by a l l ve c t o r s x=(x^,... ,x^.) where x^ e Fq. f o r 
l ^ i ^ j . The ring R c o n s i s t s of q^.q^.,* * •q^ elements and the e q u a l i t y 
r"*^=r i s obeyed for a l l r e R where n i s equal to ( q ^ - l ) ( q 2 - l ) . . - ( q j - l ) 
or any multiple of i t . 
There are many f i n i t e r ings which are not trapdoor r i n g s . 
2 2— 3 Consider for instance, R=Z/p Z where p i s a prime. Then, p =p =«..=0 
in the r i n g R but p^O i n r i n g R. So the property t h a t p =p i s not 
s a t i s f i e d for any n>0. More g e n e r a l l y , f or a r i n g R to be a trapdoor' 
r i n g , i t i s necessary that R have no n i l p o t e n t elements except zero. 
(An element, x, i s s a i d to be n i l p o t e n t i f x^=0 and x^^^O f o r some 
a>0). However,if we take an integer m to be a square f r e e p o s i t i v e 
integer say ... ,,p^ ^where a l l the P^^'s are d i s t i n c t primes ,then the 
ring R=Z/irZ i s a trapdoor r i n g . This r i n g can i n f a c t be regarded as a 
d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s F S F © . . . ® F as described above. Pi Pz Ps I f j=2, then t h i s becomes the standard trapdoor r i n g used by the RSA 
cryptosystem. 
I t has been suggested by Dr R Odoni that every f i n i t e 
trapdoor rin g i s isomorphic to a d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s . The 
argument r e l i e s on the use of Wedderbum's s t r u c t u r e theory [49] for 
semisimple r i n g s . The main steps involved are as fo l l o w s : 
1. The ring R i s trapdoor implies that R has no n i l p o t e n t 
elements except O. 
2. A f i n i t e r i n g without nonzero n i l p o t e n t elements must have a 
3. AJring with 1 and l a c k i n g n i l p o t e n t s ( ^ ) i s a d i r e c t sum 
of matrix r i n g s with e n t r i e s i n a d i v i s i o n a l g e bra (skew 
f i e l d ) (Wedderbum's theorem). 
4. I f any of these matrices i s not 1 x 1 then there w i l l be 
non-zero n i l p o t e n t elements i n R. 
5. Hence R i s a d i r e c t sum o f f i n i t e skew f i e l d s . 
6. A f i n i t e skew f i e l d i s n e c e s s a r i l y commutative. 
Thus a trapdoor r i n g R i s a commutative r i n g with 1 which i s 
isomorphic to a d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s . (Note that two rings R 
and S are isomorphic i f there e x i s t s a function f : R S which i s 
one-to-one and onto and s a t i s f i e s f (r^^ i ^2^ ~ ^ ^^1^ * ^ ^^2^' 
f ( r ^ r ^ ) = f ( r ^ ) f ( r ^ ) f o r a l l r ^ , r ^ e R) 
The o r i g i n a l RSA scheme derived i t s message space from 
Z/raZ, the r i n g of i n t e g e r s modulo m where m i s the product of two 
large d i s t i n c t primes p and q. Here other f i n i t e systems that might 
serve as a b a s i s for an extended RSA cryptosystem are i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
10.4.2 Non-Sin^lar_Matrices 2y£^ —^ Z"*S 
I f the r i n g of a l l n x n matrices over the r i n g R = Z/mZ 
i s considered, i t i s seen that the r i n g contains n i l p o t e n t elements 
when n > 1. Consider for instance M = o)over Z/6Z ; M^  = O (mod 6) 
but M ^ O (mod 6 ) . To overcome t h i s problem, i n i t i a l l y o nly the 
group M^  formed by the non-singular matrices of order n, i s s e l e c t e d 
to form the message space of t h i s extended system. 
Let us f i r s t consider the f i n i t e group formed by matrices 
of order n whose determinants are r e l a t i v e l y prime to p and whose 
elements are i n Z/pZ (p prime). That i s , the non-singular matrices 
over Z/pZ are considered. 
To begin with, the non-singular matrices over Z/pZ form a 
f i n i t e group because ( i ) the product of any two members o f the set 
i s congruent (mod p) with some member of the s e t , ( i i ) every member 
has i t s r e c i p r o c a l , that i s , for any two members A and B, there 
e x i s t members C and D such that AB = C (mod p) and AD = I (mod p) 
and ( i i i ) the unit matrix i s the ' i d e n t i c a l * member of the group. 
The order of the group formed by these elements can be 
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shown to be equal to where 
Np = ( p " - l ) (p"-p) ... ( ? " - p''"^) (10.4) 
The argument goes as follows: The elements of the f i r s t row vector 
U, o f the matrix may c o n s i s t o f any o f the p numbers except that 
they cannot a l l be zero s i n c e t h i s would make the matrix s i n g u l a r . 
There are therefore p " - l ways of s e l e c t i n g t h i s v e c t o r . When U^ has 
been s e l e c t e d , then U^ may be any of the p*^  p o s s i b l e v e c t o r s except 
those urtiich are congruent with k^ ^ U^^ (mod p) for k^ = {O, 1, ••• » 
p - l } . T h i s w i l l be the Ccise i f and only i f U^ and U^ are chosen to 
be l i n e a r l y independent. Therefore there are p -p ways of s e l e c t i n g 
U^. Continuing t h i s procedure, the expression (10.4) f o r the order 
N i s obtained, p 
I f non-singular matrices with elements over Z/pZ are used 
as messages, then one can form a conventional cryptographic system 
where the s e c r e t key contains the modulus p i t s e l f . The encrypting 
(e) and decrypting (d) exponents can then be determined u s i n g 
ed = 1 (mod N ) (10.5) P 
The encrypting key i s therefore ( e , p, n) and the decrypting key i s 
(d, p, n ) . None of these keys can be made p u b l i c and the encryption 
and decryption procedures are as i n the RSA system. 
and 
= C (mod p) 
= M (mod p) 
(10.6) 
where M, C £ (Z/pZ), non-singular matrices over Z/pZ 
The above system can be modified to include the p u b l i c key property 
as follows: Suppose the modulus i s a composite number m whose 
f a c t o r i z a t i o n i s 
m p / j (10.7) 
Then the order of the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e group formed by non-singular 
matrices of order n over 2/mZ i s given by 
- 175 -
3=1 ' 
This i a a consequence of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (Appendix 10). 
L e t us f i r s t determine the order N r of the group of non-
r ^ 
singular n x n matrices over Z/p 2 when p i s prime and r > 1. 
Let 9 be the homomorphism [ 4 8 ] , mapping an n x n matrix A 
over 2/p^^^2 to A", a matrix over 2/p^2, v i a a^^ (mod p^*^ ) i > 
a _ (mod p ^ ) . 
0 : A I ^ A" 
e : M (2/p^*^2). > M (2/p^2) 
n n 
This induces a s u r j e c t i v e homomorphism between the l i n e a r groups 
formed by these matrices, that i s , 
0^: OL (n, p""*^) ^> GL (n, p"") 
Therefore using group theory [48] 
(n. p^ '^ S = GL ( n , p"") 
Kernel (0' ) 
(where = denotes isomorphic t o ) 
The kernel c o n s i s t s of the s e t o f matrices wrtiich are mapped to the 
i d e n t i t y matrix I (mod p ^ ) , i e , 
a^^ = l(nod p^) f o r 1 S i 5 n (10.9) 
a _ = O(iiod p^) f o r i ^ j (lO.lO) 
There are p p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r each of the equations (10.9) and (10.10) 
giving r i s e to p" p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Therefore using group theory, and 
denoting order by the symbol #, 
2 
# GL (n, p'^*^) = p" # GL (n, p"") = 
2 
= p"" # GL (n, p) 
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But # 0 . (n, p) = 
( p " - l ) (p"-p) ... (p^-p"""*-) from (10.4) 
Therefore 2 ^ , r . ( r - 1 ) n , n , . , n n-1. # (n, p ) = p' (p -1) ... (p -p ) 
N r P 
N r = p(V'^"^ ( P ^ l ) (P"-P) ... (p"-P^-') (10.11) 
Su b s t i t u t i n g (10.11) i n t o (10.8) g i v e s the order N . Now a s i n the 
m 
RSA cryptosystem i f m i s made to be the product o f two d i s t i n c t 
primes p and q t h i s s i m p l i f i e s to 
N = N • N m P q 
= { p " . l ) (p"-p) ... (p"-p"-') ( q " - l ) ( q % ) . . . (q"-q""^) 
Therefore for a message M 
N 
M = 1 (mod in) 
and the coding exponents e and d are determined using 
ed = 1 (mod N ) (10.12) m 
The expression of the order depends on the s t r u c t u r e o f m, that i s , 
on i t s prime f a c t o r s . T h i s therefore can be used to form a public 
key cryptosystem by choosing m to be a l a r g e integer (say 200 
decimal d i g i t s ) whose s e c u r i t y i s the same as that o f the RSA system. 
Although the order N can be used i n f i n d i n g e and d as i n 
m 
(10.12), i t i s u s u a l l y a large number. For i n s t a n c e , even for small 
primes such as p = 13 and q = 23, the order i s approximately 
22 
1.6 X 10 f o r 3 x 3 non-singular matrices. Therefore i t i s 
d e s i r a b l e to f i n d the exponent, EXP, of the group, that i s , the l e a s t 
integer greater than zero such that 
I (mod m) for a l l M. 
EXP i s a d i v i s o r of the order N of the group, 
m 
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L e t us f i r s t consider the exponent of the group formed by the non-
singular matrices over Z/pjZ, M^(Z/pZ). 
Le t the exponent be Si such that 
A^ = I for a l l A e (Z/p2) 
Assume that p>n. A = I (mod p) implies that x -1 i s d i v i s i b l e by the 
minimum polynomial of A. As A ranges over the non-singular matrices of 
order n over Z/pZ, x^-1 must be d i v i s i b l e by every monic i r r e d u c i b l e 
polynomial P(x) (j^x) of degree $ n i n Z/pZ.^ Every i r r e d u c i b l e 
polynomial P(x)^(7^x) of degree u d i v i d e s x ^ ~ - l . Thus x^-1 must be 
d i v i s i b l e by 
But 
x*^-l = O (nod x ^ ^ l ) 
i n p l i e s that a|b 
Hence, 
jZ, = 0 (mod p " - l ) for l ^ u ^ 
Therefore, . 
O (mod Slpm {p-1, p " - l } ) c e r t a i n l y (10.14) 
Furthermore, the matrix A given by 
A = : o 
O ... O •• O : 
s a t i s f i e s A^ = I ^ A (p>n) 
That i s , A has order p and hence p £ 
Hence the exponent of GL(n,p), p>n, i s given by 
H = p Jem {p-1, p^-1, p " - l } (10.15) 
Now for any A e M^  (Z/pZ), using Jordan's Canonical form, there e x i s t s 
a non-singular matrix E such that 
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B. 
B 
Each block B. i s of the form 
1 . O 
O 
i e , B, X. I . + N. 1 1 1 f o r some upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t matrix 
where X.»s are non-zero i n F r. for some r.^n. 1 p i 1 
I f the order of D i s k, that i s , = I (mod p ) , then as D = E " ^ A E , 
t h i s gives 
(E-^AE)^ = (E-^AE) (E-^AE) . . ^ ^^^^^ 
= E - ^ A I ^ E 
Thus A I (mod p) 
Order of A = order of D = k = ton of orders of B^. I f = O, then 
order of B. i s a d i v i s o r of p^ i - 1 . Hence the order of A d i v i d e s 1 ^ 
ficm { p - l , p " - l } . Otherwise, B? ~ w i l l have such an order 
and hence the order of A divi d e s p 2cra { p - l , p " - l } . 
A multiple of p i n the e^^ression (10.15) f o r the exponent i s 
expected as the order given by (10.4) contains multiples of p. 
S i m i l a r l y , 
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= I (mod q) for a l l A i n (Z/qZ) 
where 
s = q S/Cm {q-l» q -11 q " - l } 
Therefore exponent BCP of the group GL(n,ra) where m = pq i s given by 
2 n 2 JlciB (p icm {p-lf P -1» P - l } • q ^cm { q - l , q - I , 
q " - l } ) 
L e t us now extend t h i s argument to non-square f r e e modulus 
m. F i r s t consider a matrix A i n M (Z/yfe). L e t 6 be the n a t u r a l 
2 " 
homomorphism from Z/p Z onto Z/pZ (p prime). From the above 
0 ( A ) ^ = I i n M^(Z/pZ) 
argum«it 
e
= e ( I ) 
Therefore, 
0(A^-I) = O (mod p) urfiere t = EXP 
This means that every entry i n A^-I i s some m u l t i p l e of prime p and 
hence 
A^-I = p B for some matrix B. 
That i s . 
A"^  = I + p B 
A^ P = (I + p B)P 
Using the binomial theorem, 
= I * (P) p B -K (P) + 
= I (mod p) 
Therefore considering i n general a matrix i n M^(2/p Z) 
M^CZ/p^'z) ^ M^(2/pZ) 
8: A e(A) 
2 1 
I f 0 (A) has order t then A has order t or pt or p t . . - or p " t. 
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I f 
then 
where 
and 
m 
EXP 
i = 1 
= icjn {v^, v^, . . - t v^} 
r . - l V, = p. X (w.) 
2 
= Icm (p^-1, p^ -1 P i " - 1 ) J 
(10.16) 
(assuming p^ i s greater than n for a l l i ) 
Again from (10.16), i t i s c l e a r l y seen that the exponent EXP depends 
upon the prime factor decomposition of m. 
The message space has so f a r been r e s t r i c t e d to only non-
si n g u l a r elements , M^(Z/mZ). T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the message space 
can a l s o include some sin g u l a r non-nilpotent elements. Consider for 
instance, M^{Z/3Z)» There are 48 non-singular matrices u s i n g (10.4), 
But there a r e i n addition, some non-nilpotent s i n g u l a r matrices 
which could a l s o be used as messages. Consider such a matrix X 
X = 
Xa Xb 
where X, a, b are i n Z/3Z 
From the Cayley-Hamilton theorem [ 5 l ] , t h i s matrix s a t i s f i e s a 
quadratic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c equation o f the form 
X^ - ( t r a c e X) X + (det X) I = O 
I n the s i n g u l a r case, det X = O. I f t r a c e X = O, then X^ = O and 
so X i s n i l p o t e n t . I f t r a c e X ^ O, then = XX, X^ = X^ X^ = X^ 
as X^ = 1 f o r O X e 2/3Z; thus = XX^ = X^X = X. Therefore 
l+2k 
X = X for k ^ 0. Therefore for such n o n - n i l p o t ^ i t matrices X i n 
Z/3Z , X ^ = X. 
Note that u*ien n > 2, there may be s i n g u l a r non-nilpotent matrices 
which do not s a t i s f y an equation of the form X*^  = X. T h i s happens 
for instance when the minimal equation i s X^ - X^ = 0. Or even 
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consider a non-nilpotent matrix X which contains a n i l p o t e n t block 
as shown below 
nilp o t e n t 
X = 
non-singular 
N 0 ^ 
0 
^1 
Then 
As N i s n i l p o t e n t for some k, = O and hence 
Thus i n such cases* t h i s would imply that i t i s not p o s s i b l e to 
recover the message. These cases need t o be avoided i f one decides 
to include svich singular n o n - n i l p o t e i t matrices. 
From cryptography point of view, the use of such s i n g u l a r 
non-nilpotent matrices as messages may seem i m p r a c t i c a l as the sender 
cannot e a s i l y recognize such matrices- In p r a c t i c e , one would l i k e 
to determine e a s i l y whether a message i s within the acceptable set 
or not- Even the r e s t r i c t i o n of messages to a r b i t r a r y non—singular 
matrices may pose problems as the sender has no c o n t r o l over the matrix 
elements but must accept what the p l a i n t e x t d i c t a t e s . That i s , the 
sender cannot ensure that h i s messages w i l l always form non-
singular matrices (over any modulus). The sender i s faced with the 
problem of determining whether a p l a i n t e x t message matrix i s non-
sing u l a r or not. This involves f i n d i n g the determinant of the n»i 
matrix and then checking urtiether the determinant i s r e l a t i v e l y prime 
to the modulus using the E u c l i d ' s algorithm. (Appendix 1 1 ) . However 
i t w i l l be seen i n Section 10.4.6 t h a t for la r g e m, the p r o b a b i l i t y 
that an a r b i t r a r i l y s elected matrix i s . non-singular i s very much 
c l o s e to 1. 
One common approach to obtain an a r b i t r a r y non-singular 
matrix over the r e a l s i s to have the diagonal e n t r i e s of the matrix 
message much bigger than the corresponding e n t r i e s i n the row and 
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column but t h i s 'diagonaa dominance' does not always ensure that the 
matrix w i l l be non-singular when working over f i n i t e r i n g s * For 
instance, consider the matrix A below which i s 'diagonally dominant' 
/ p-1 1 
A = 
y 1 1:^ 1 
Det A = - 2p = O over Z/pZ. Hence i t i s seen t h a t 'diagonal 
dominance' i s not ap p l i c a b l e over f i n i t e r i n g s . 
A simple method to obtain a r b i t r a r y non-singular matrices 
i s described i n Section 10.4.8 where system implementation i s 
considered. 
10.4.3 Ortto^OTalJwiatrices O^er^z/mZ 
Now l e t us consider the use of a s p e c i a l s e t of non-singular 
matrices,namely the s e t of orthogonal matrices, as the message space 
o f the matrix based RSA system. 
The set of orthogonal matrices over a f i n i t e f i e l d of p 
elements forms a group as shown below. 
Let M, be a meirber of the s e t . Then M.^  M. = I . 
^ t t t ^ ^ As (M^M^) s f we have 
(M.M.)^ M.M. = M.^  M.^  M.M. = I 
- l , t ^ t , - l Hence the c l o s u r e property i s obeyed. Further (M^ ) " = (M. ") 
(M^"^f^= and (M^"^)"^ M^ "^  = M^ M^ "^  = I . L e t J = M^ " where 
J ^ J = I and J i s orthogonal. Hence the set of orthogonal matrices 
over Z/pZ forms a group. 
The order of the group formed by the nxn orthogonal matrices 
has been worked out by J . MacWilliams [ 5 l ] . 
For odd n, i e , n = 2a + 1 for some integer a, the order i s given by 
a-I 
1=0 
For even n, i e n = 2a, the order i s given by 
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a-1 a-1 
, 2a 2 i . ^, a , . - f — r / 2a 2 i (p - p ) = 2(p -1) (P - P 
P^* 1 i=0 i = l 
i f -1 i s a square i n GF (p) 
and the order i s equal to 
a-1 
a - , »aflx 1 r , 2a 2 i . 2(p + (-1) ) (p - p ) 
i-1 
i f -1 i s a non-square i n GF ( p ) . 
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the order of the group of the 
orthogonal matrices over Z/mZ, where m = P^Pgt a square f r e e integer, 
i s equal to 
(order of orthogonal matrices over Z/p^Z) x (order of orthogonal 
matrices over Z/p^Z). As the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of the modulus m i s 
required to c a l c u l a t e the order, one can use the group o f orthogonal 
matrices i n the matrix based p u b l i c key system. 
Now the question how easy i t i s to construct an orthogonal 
matrix message needs to be looked a t . Cayley's theorem [52] gives 
an easy way of constructing an orthogonal matrix using a skew^ 
symmetric matrix over the r e a l s . I f S i s a r e a l skew-symmetric matrix 
then I + S i s non-singular because the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c roots of S are 
purely imaginary and the matrix A = i s an orthogoial matrix. 
But t h i s i s not a p p l i c a b l e to f i n i t e f i e l d s as the determinant of 
I ••• S can be equal to O (mod P^P2)- Thus one can use the Cayley's 
technique to construct orthogonal matrix messages provided 'one 
ensures that the determinant of ( I -•-S ) i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to 
p^p^. Note that i f I +S i s non-singular over Z/mZ (m = P|^P2)» 
then I — S i s a l s o non-singular. T h i s can be seen as f o l l o w s : 
L e t W be the inverse of I + S (mod m). That i s , ( I + S)W = I 
(mod m). 
Then { ( I +S)W)^ = w'^(I + S ) ^ = ( I - S ) = I . Hence i s the 
i n v e r s e of ( I - S) (mod m). 
Hence to construct an orthogonal matrix message over Z/mZ, an 
arbitrary skew-symmetric matrix S over Z/mZ i s chosen and I + s i s 
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formed. I f I + s i s non-singular over Z/mZ, then ( I - S)y(l +S) i s 
constructed to form the message. But again the sender i s faced with 
the problem of determining whether the matrix I + S i s non-singular 
or not. 
10.4.4 ypoer Trianoular_NUtrices^ ^ e r _ 2 / n ^ 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , l e t us now consider the s e t o f upper 
t r i a n g u l a r matrices as a p o s s i b l e choice for the message space. I f 
the diagonal e n t r i e s of an upper t r i a n g u l a r matrix are made u n i t y , 
t h i s ensures that the matrix i s i n v e r t i b l e over any modulus m as 
the determinant i s etjual to 1. 
Let M represent such an n x n upper t r i a n g u l a r message 
matrix. One can p a r t i t i o n M i n t o I + N where N i s a n i l p o t e n t 
matrix and I i s the i d e n t i t y matrix. I f M i s i n (2/pZ) then 
( I + N)^ = I as N'^  = O assuming p ^ n-1. The order o f the group 
formed by these upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices over 2/pZ i s p' 
The order becomes m"^ '*"^  when considering matrices over Z/mZ. 
To determine the exponent EXP of the group formed by such upper 
t r i a n g u l a r matrices over Z/wZ f 
n ( n - l ) / 2 
l e t 
M = 
and l e t 
O vrtiere a, b, c c Z/m2 
1 
Then 
1 
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\ 
Therefore a^_^^ = a+a^^ implies that a^ ^ = ka 
c^^^ = i m p l i e s that c^^ = kc 
and 
V l = ^^""^ 
b.-b^ = 
N-1 
k l o "^^^'"^ 
(b-Hcca) 
b = Nb+ca ( I t i . ) N 
2 
Therefore 
ka 
0 1 
V o 0 
kb + k ( k - l ) ac 
2 
kc 
For = I (rood m) to be obeyed, the following conditions must be 
s a t i s f i e d : 
( i ) ka = O (mod m) 
( i i ) kc = 0 (mod m) 
( i i i ) kb+kik-l_)ac ^ O (mod m) 
2 
To s a t i s f y ( i ) and ( i i ) k = O (mod m) 
To s a t i s f y ( i i i ) k ( k - l ) = 0 (mod m) 
2 
i e , k ( k - l ) = 0 (mod 2m) 
Therefore i f m i s even, the exponent, EXP, i s 2m and i f m i s odd 
then EXP i s m. Therefore i t i s seen that both the order and the 
exponent do not depend on the prime f a c t o r s of m. Hence t h i s cannot 
be used i n a public key cryptosystem but again one can use i t i n a 
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conventional cryptosystem with the s e c r e t key (e, d, m, n) where 
ed = 1 mod (2m or m). 
On the other hand, i f the message space i s a l t e r e d to 
contain upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices with diagonal e n t r i e s prime to m, 
then such messages are i n v e r t i b l e modulo m. T h i s i s not a s e r i o u s 
problem as i n p r a c t i c e m i s a product of l a r g e primes and the 
diagonal elements can be chosen to be r e l a t i v e l y small i n t e g e r s . 
Now the order of the group formed by such matrices i s determined as 
follows. 
Considering a nxn matrix, i t i s required that a l l the n 
diagonal e n t r i e s must be coprime to m. The number of i n t e g e r s l e s s 
than m and coprime to m i s given by the Euler t o t i e n t function 0(m). 
The remaining % n(n-X) superdiagonal e n t r i e s of the matrix may take 
any value modulo m. Therefore the order i s equal to m"'""^'^^0(m)". 
The v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s order and the one c a l c u l a t e d above 
i s that now the order of the group i s dependent on the prime f a c t o r s 
of m. Hence the modulus m needs to be f a c t o r i z e d before the 
decryption exponent d can be c a l c u l a t e d using ed = 1 {mod(order)). 
As for the s e t of non-singular matrices, one can determine the 
exponent of the group formed by these upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices with 
diagonal e n t r i e s prime to m. The exponent can be used instead of 
the order i n f i n d i n g e and d. 
I n i t i a l l y , consider a square f r e e modulus. L e t 
= TT m  I I D
^3 
Consider f i r s t a message M i n Z/p^Z whose diagonal elements are 
r e l a t i v e l y prime to p^ ^ 
^ 1 • 
M = ^ 1 where ( a ^ i t P i ) = 1. V i 
a 
nn 1 4: i ^ n 
P a r t i t i o n i n g the matrix M i n t o a diagonal matrix and an upper 
t r i a n g u l a r nilpotent matrix U j , that i s , M = + U^, then i t i s 
seen that D^'^^t ^1*^1 ^1 upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t . 
Then i n d u c t i v e l y . 
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i f M*^  = D^' + U^, we have 
M^ *^  = (D^ + U^) (D^' + U^) 
\ 
n i l p o t e n t upper t r i a n g u l a r 
Hence 
I ^ ^ P l ' = I + (mod p^) 
But 
0 
( I + V^fl = I + U^Pl (mod p^) 
2 2 
( I + U^)Pl = I + V^^l (mod p^) 
• • 
Thus NPI ^ ^ P i ^ = I (nod p^ ) for some t . 
I f p^^ n-1 then t = I . Therefore the exponent of upper t r i a n g u l a r 
matrices with coprime elements along the diagonal i s 0(p^).Pj^ 
s 
I f m = p. then the exponent d i v i d e s 
j = l 
fi,cm (0(p^).p^, 0(p2).P2t..*» 0(P5 )*P5 } 
I f m i s made to be a non-square f r e e modulus given by 
s 
m = p^.^j 
then a bound for the exponent can be c a l c u l a t e d as fol l o w s : 
F i r s t consider an nyn upper t r i a n g u l a r non-singular matrix M over 
Z/p^Z 9 (p 5, n ) . Again l e t M = + where D^^ i s a diagonal 
matrix and i s an upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t matrix over 
Following the argument given above, i t i s seen that 
l ^ ( P " ) = I + (mod p^) 
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where U0 i s some upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t matrix. 
Hence 
( I + U^f = I p. U^^ (mod p^) 
( I - ^ p . U ^ ) ^ = I * P^- ^02. ^""^ P"") 
• 1 • 
• r 
( I + P . U ^ = ( I + U j ^ ) P = I + p"". (mod p"") 
= I (mod p^) 
Therefore 
^ ( p ^ ) P"" = I (mod p^) 
Hence the exponent o f the group formed by upper t r i a n g u l a r non-
sin g u l a r matrices over Z/mZ, where ra i s a non-square f r e e modulus 
given above, d i v i d e s 
Zcm {0(p^''l)p^''l, 0(p^^2)p^^2 , 0 ( p j s ) p^'^s } 
10.4.5 Linear^Fractional^ Grou£ [53] 
F i n a l l y , l e t us consider the group o f l i n e a r f r a c t i o n a l 
s u b s t i t u t i o n s over Z/mZ, u4iere m i s equal to the product o f r 
d i s t i n c t primes to see i f such a group i s s u i t a b l e f o r a trapdoor 
system. The l i n e a r f r a c t i o n a l group LF(n,m) i s very much s i m i l a r 
to the l i n e a r homogenous group a-(n, m) considered e a r l i e r - Here 
only the case n = 2 i s examined. F i r s t consider the group LF(2,p) 
where p i s a prime. These s u b s t i t u t i o n s a re of the form 
ax b 
cx + d over Z/p*Z = { O, 1, . - ., p-1, » } 
The symbol « i s adjoined to represCTit any formal quotient y/O where 
y i s a non-zero element of the f i e l d . The l i n e a r f r a c t i o n a l 
s u b s t i t u t i o n s LF(2,p) can be obtained from the l i n e a r homogenous 
sub s t i t u t i o n C3-(2,p) on v a r i a b l e s x^ and x^ by s e t t i n g x = ^ / ^ « 
The number of transformations of the form u i s f i n i t e and they form 
a group as the product of any two s u b s t i t u t i o n s i s a l s o a 
su b s t i t u t i o n of the same form. The order of the group LF(2,m) can be 
determined as follows,where m = p^ . 
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For u to represent a s u b s t i t u t i o n , i t i s required that the 
matrix ^ d) i n v e r t i b l e , that i s , the determinant ad-bc :pTime to m 
Now l e t us consider the two matrices 
The corresponding two s u b s t i t u t i o n s represented by 
ax b and X (ax b) over Z/raZ 
cx + d X (cx + d) 
are i d e n t i c a l i f (X, m) = 1 
Consider the matrix M given by 
P 
a b \ 
M = P where a d - b e (mod p) 
I f the condition that det M ( n x x J p) can be s a t i s f i e d by choosing 
a , b , c and d appropriately, then the Chinese Remainder Theorem P P P P 
(Appendix 10) allows us to f i n d a, b^ c and d over Z/mZ such t h a t : 
a = a (mod p ) , a = a (mod p ^ ) , . . . a = a (mod p ) 
Px P2 Pr 
and s i m i l a r l y f or b, c and d. 
Thus the order of LF(2,ra) can be found by f i n d i n g the 
orders of LF(2,p^) for 1 ^ i ^ r . The number of p o s s i b l e values of 
X which r e s u l t i n i d e n t i c a l s u b s t i t u t i o n s i s given by the E u l e r 
t o t i e n t function 0(p^) for each p^. Thus the order i s given by 
#LF(2,m) = T T # L F - ( 2 , p . ) 
But 
0 ( P i ) 
i = l ^ 
# LF-(2,p) = # 0,(2.p) 
2 2 
(p -1) (p -p) from Section 10.4,2 with n=2 
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# LF(2,m) = ] ^ ( p - l ) . ( P i - P^) 
( P i - 1 ) 
i = l 
r 
#LF(2,m) = rr (p. + 1) p. ( p . - l ) 
Thus as the order depends on the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of the modulus m, t h i s 
i s s u i t a b l e for a trapdoor system. The messages are of the form 
( c d ) ^» ^' ^* ^ ^ Z/mZ and ad-bc 5^  O (mod m). The encrypting 
and decrypting exponents e and d can be determined using ed = 1 
(mod # LF(2,m)). 
10.4.6 ProportionjDf N O T - S i n ^ u l a r J ^ t r i c e s ^ Qyer_Z/rriZ 
The extended RSA system described above requires the 
message space to c o n s i s t of e i t h e r a i b i t r a r y non-singular matrices or 
orthogonal matrices or i n v e r t i b l e upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices including 
the diagonal elements over Z/mZ. I n the f i r s t two cases i t i s requir-ed 
to choose arbitrary message matrices which are non-singular. In the 
case of orthogonal matrices, r e c a l l t hat one method of forming a 
message requires the matrix (I+S) to be non-singular. Hence some 
bound on the f r a c t i o n of nxn matrices which are i n v e r t i b l e modulo m 
w i l l be u s e f u l . I f the elements of the nxn matrix are chosen 
uniformly from the integers modulo m, then these bounds can be taken 
as the bounds on the p r o b a b i l i t y that the matrix i s non-singular. 
An nxn matrix M has an i n v e r s e modulo m i f and only i f the 
rows (columns) of the matrix form a l i n e a r l y independent s e t of 
vectors modulo m. Using the argument given i n Section 10.4.2, i f 
m = p, a prime, then the number of i n v e r t i b l e matrices (mod p) i s 
given by 
n-l_ 
, n , . , n . . n n-1 . I | , n i . (P -1) (P -P).--(P -P ) = (P -P ) 
The t g t a l number of nxn matrices with elements over Z/pZ i s equal 
to p" . Thus the proportion of i n v e r t i b l e matrices (mod p) i s equal 
to 
n-1 
r r (p"-p') 
i = l 
2 n 
P 
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( l - l / ^ n ) (1-p/pn) ... (l-p""^/pn) 
n 
TT (i-p"^) 
i=l 
Thus as the s i z e of the prime i n c r e a s e s , the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a chosen 
matrix i s non-singular approaches 1. I f the proportion of non-
s i n g u l a r matrices over Z/raZ i s considered,where m = *|^p., then i t i s 
1=1 ^ 
equal to 
f r I T (P."-p/) j=i i=i ^ J 
fr I T d-p."^) j = i i = i ^ 
S i m i l a r expressions can be found for the proportion of non—singular 
matrices over Z/mZ,where m i s a non-square f r e e integer^ u s i n g the 
expression f o r the order derivgd i n Section 10.4.2. The 
proportion i s then given by N^m . From the cryptography point of 
view where m i s a large integer composed of a few l a r g e prime f a c t o r s , 
t h i s proportion i s very much c l o s e to 1. Even for small primes 
p^=13 and p^=23f the proportion i s approximately 0.87, for n=2. 
10.4.7 Sy£t«n_pesi'^ ^ d Operation 
The designer randomly chooses l a r g e primes p^ to p^ for 
some r > 2 following the g u i d e l i n e s suggested i n Section 10.2 and 
these are kept s e c r e t . But the primes need not be n e c e s s a r i l y 
d i s t i n c t . Then he s p e c i f i e s what h i s message space i s going to be, 
whether i t c o n s i s t s of arb i t r a r y non-singular matrices or orthogonal 
matrices or upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices with i n v e r t i b l e eleroOTits along 
the diagonal. This information along with the dimension n of the 
matrix message i s made pu b l i c . Then he determines the coding 
exponCTits e and d using the equation ed = 1 mod (Order or Exponent). 
The order and the exponent expressions for the d i f f e r e n t message 
spaces are given i n the e a r l i e r s e c t i o n s . The public encryption key 
i s therefore givCTi by (e, m, n) and the s e c r e t decryption key i s 
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(d, m, n ) . The system i s a l s o s u i t a b l e for authentication purposes 
l i k e the RSA system. 
A general procedure to construct a matrix TOssage i s as 
follows. The p l a i n t e x t message i s divided i n t o blocks of i n t e g e r s 
l e s s than the modulus m and a sequence of nxn message matrices 
i s constructed by arranging the in t e g e r s i n order as they occur, 
l e f t to r i g h t and top to bottom. The encryption procedure c o n s i s t s 
o f r a i s i n g each of these p l a i n t e x t matrices t o the power e modulo m. 
The ciph e r t e x t matrices, C^, produced are then transmitted t o the 
re c e i v e r by sending the c i p h e r t e x t matrix elements i n order as they 
occur i n the matrix, l e f t to r i g h t , top to bottom, with a space 
separating the elements. The r e c e i v e r recovers the o r i g i n a l message 
by f i r s t reconstructing the sequ«ice of nxn ci p h e r t e x t matrices and 
then r a i s i n g each matrix C^ i n the sequence to the power d modulo 
m. Thus the main operation i n both the encryption and decryption 
procedures c o n s i s t s of r a i s i n g an nyn matrix to some power modulo m. 
This can be performed using the Square and NUltiply Technique [45] 
which i s now b r i e f l y described. 
10.4.7.1 Squ^are_and_r^lti£lj^ I l ^ ^ ^ S C ^ ^ 
Consider the binary representation of the encryption 
exponent e. Each i n the representation i s now replaced by a 
pa i r of l e t t e r s SX and each 'O* i s replaced by the l e t t e r S. The 
symbol SX which appears at the l e f t i s now crossed o f f . The r e s u l t 
i s a r u l e for computing i f S i s i n t e r p r e t e d as the squaring 
operation and X i s interpreted as the multiplying operation by M. 
Each of these operations i s performed modulo m. The flowchart of 
the algorithm i s given i n Figure 10.2. I f the encryption exponent 
i s chosen to have only a few •!» d i g i t s i n i t s binary representation, 
t h i s w i l l make t h i s algorithm run f a s t e r than i f the exponent has a 
random binary representation. A s i m i l a r procedure can be c a r r i e d 
out for decryption using the exponent d. 
Further, the intermediate computations need not be reduced 
over Z/mZ but rather over Z/kmZ for any p o s i t i v e integer k. The 
f i n a l answer i s computed by reducing the answer over Z/kmZ i n t o 
Z/mZ. This gives the c o r r e c t answer because(a^.a2 (mod km)} = 
a^.a^ (mod m). 
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Let e = (e|<, eo/ e^) e^&G F (2) 
NO 
INITIALIZATION 
i« 1 
C«4 1 
e ( i ) = 1 ? 
i = k ? 
NO 
M <^  M • M 
i < i + 1 
YES 
C = C • M 
f 
( 5 T 0 F ) 
A l l o p e r o t i o n s are modulo m 
? i g . 10.2 - A l g o r i t h m f o r computing M (mod m) 
- 194 -
lO. 4.8 System_I^Lera?ntat ion 
This extended RSA system using matrix messages has been 
simulated on the Prime Cbraputer. The encryption and the decryption 
of message matrices have been performed using the Square and 
Nfeiltiply Technique given above. 
10.4.8.1 Non-Sin^lar^Matrix ^ss^^s_ 
I n the case of non-singular matrix message space* the 
message matrix M i s constructed according to the general procedure 
given i n Section 10.4.7 and i t s determinant i s c a l c u l a t e d u s i n g the 
program DETMDD.F77 given i n App)endix 12. Then E u c l i d ' s algorithm 
i s used to t e s t whether the determinant i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to the 
modulus m. I f so, the message i s r a i s e d to the power e over Z/mZ 
using the program MATEXP.FTN given i n Appendix 13. The same program 
i s used to decrypt the c i p h e r t e x t matrices with exponent d. R e c a l l 
from Section 10.4.6 that the p r o b a b i l i t y of an a r b i t r a r i l y chosen 
matrix message M over Z/mZ,where m = pq and p and q are l a r g e primes, 
i s non-singular, i s very much c l o s e to 1. 
One can a l s o construct an a r b i t r a r y non-singular matrix M 
over Z/mZ by multiplying together an upper t r i a n g u l a r matrix U with 
u n i t diagonal and a locer t r i a n g u l a r matrix L with u n i t diagonal over 
Z/mZ. The elements other than the diagonal ones i n U and L can be 
a r b i t r a r i l y c h o s ^ i modulo m. As both U and L are non-singular over 
Z/mZ, M = LU i s non-singular over Z/mZ. Further the non-commutativity 
property of matrices (UL LU i n g e n e r a l ) ensures that the opponent 
s t i l l needs to f a c t o r i z e m to be able to c a l c u l a t e the decrypting 
exponent d, i n contrast to the case of upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices 
with u n i t diagonal considered i n Section 10.4.4. That is« M = 
(UL)® ^ U^L®. Thus although U ^ l = U (mod m), L ^ l = L (mod m) 
vrtiere ed^ = 1 (mod m or 2m) (see Section 10.4.4), M ^ l ^ M (mod m). 
However = M (mod m) where ed = 1 mod (#GL(n,m) or EXP GL(n,m)) 
(see Section 10.4.2). The r e c e i v e r can obtain the matrices L and U 
uniquely given the matrix M. 
10.4.8.2 Upger l r i a n 9 u l a r _ M a t r i x Me^sages^ 
In the case of upper t r i a n g u l a r matrix messages with 
i n v e r t i b l e diagonal elements, the message matrix i s again constructed 
according to the general procedure given i n Section 10.4.7. The 
lower t r i a n g u l a r section of the message (excluding the diagonal) i s 
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set to zero. The diagonal elem^its are almost a r b i t r a r i l y chosen to 
be relativ e l y prime to the modulus m. This can be done provided they 
are r e l a t i v e l y small, as the prime factors of m are normally very 
large* Again these messages are OTcrypted/decrypted using the 
program MATEXP.FTN given in Appendix 13. Note that in t h i s case, 
only the upper triangular entries of the ciphertext matrices ( i e , 
"^ "^^ ^ ^  elements of each ciphertext matrix) need to be transmitted 
to the receiver. 
An example in each of these two message spaces showing the 
various parameters involved i s given below. 
10.4.8.3 E?^T^le 1. i , 2 X 2 Nonr^in9ular__Matrix Mes^sages^ 
Let the modulus be m = p^ p^ = 3 5 = 45 
Exponent of the group formed by 2 x 2 non-singular matrices over 
Z/45Z divides ^cm [ v^ jV^ } 
v^ere 
v^ = 3^^ ilcm {3,3-1,9-1} = 3 ilcm {3, 2, 8 
v^ = icm {5, 5-1,25-1} = Hem {5, 4, 24} 
Thus EXP i s a divisor of 108O. Hence the coding exponents e and d 
are given by 
ed = 1 (mod 1080) 
One pair (e, d) which s a t i s f i e s the above congruence i s e = 23, d = 47 
Let us assume that the plaintext message to be encrypted i s 81334. 
Dividing the message a s ( 8 13 3 4 ) , the plaintext message 
matrix can be constructed as 
8 13 
The determinant of P i s equal to -7 = 38 (mod 45) and (det P, 45) = 1 
Hence P i s non-singular (mod m). 
The ciphertext matrix i s then given by 
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(nx5d 45) 
(nod 45) 
This ciphertext matrix i s transmitted to the receiver as(3a 34 39 31-) 
The receiver reconstructs the matrix C and computes C (mod m) to 
obtain P. That i s . 
C*^  (mod 45) = 
38 
39 
8 
3 
(mod 45) 
(nod 45) 
10,4,8.4 E j ^ i ^ l e 2 - 3 x 3 Upger Triangular_Matrix Me»s^ sages_ 
Let the modulus m = p.q = 41.29 = 1189 
Exponent of the group formed by 3 x 3 upper ^triangular non—singular 
matrices over 2/1189Z divides 
fi,cm {40.41, 28.29} = 332920 
Choosing the encrypting expon^it, e = 1317, the decrypting exponent 
d can be calculated using Euclid's Algorithm (Appendix 11) and i s 
equal to 117293. That i s , 
1317. 117293 = 1 (mod 332920) 
Let us assume that the plaintext message to be encrypted i s 
232677205141. In this example, the message i s divided into 2-digit 
blocks of integers less than m starting from right to l e f t as 
(23 26 77 20 51 41) 
The upper triangular plaintext message matrices then become 
90 23 26 = I O 50 77 j , 
0 O 48 
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31 20 51 
O 215 41 
O 0 289 
90 23 26 
0 50 77 
. 0 0 48 
given by 
1105 458 1070 
0 50 251 
^ 0 O 831 
where the diagonal elements are ar b i t r a r i l y chosen to be r e l a t i v e l y 
prime to m (=1189). 
1317 
= I O I = \ O I (mod 1189) 
. 1317 
31 20 51 = I O 215 41 I = 1 O 592 41 ] (mod 1189) 
O O 289 
These ciphertext matrices are transmitted to the receiver as 
(1105 458 1070 50 251 831 843 774 660 592 41 405). 
The receiver reconstructs the matrices C and C and computes d d A ^ (mod m) and (mod m) to obtain and and hence the 
plaintext message- That i s . 
/ 843 774 660 
592 41 
V 0 O 405 
2 
1105 1070 
77 (mod 1189) 
117293 
51 \ 
C^^ = I O 592 41 I = / 0 215 41 |(mod 1189) 
0 289 
10.4.9 Discussion^ 
Thus one can see that the RSA system can be generalized to 
matrix rings provided the message space i s restricted to avoid 
nilpotent elements. The group of non-singular matrices over Z/mZ, 
the group of orthogonal matrices over 2/mZ and the group of upper 
triangular matrices over Z/m2 wdth diagonal elements coprime to m 
have been investigated. From a practical implementation point of 
view, the upper triangular (non-singular) matrix message space seems 
to be the better candidate as the messages can be constructed in an 
almost axfaLtrary manner. In the case of non-singular and orthogonal 
matrices, an additional procedure to find the determinant of the 
message matrix i s required. From Section 10.4.6, i t i s seen that 
for a large CTiough modulus, the probability that an a r b i t r a r i l y chosen 
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message matrix i s non-singular i s very much close to 1. Further i f 
the non-singular matrix i s constructed as a product of upper and 
lower triangular matrices, then i t seems that arbitrary non—singular 
message matrices can be e a s i l y constructed. 
For a cryptanalyst to break the system by computing the 
secret decoding exponent d, he needs to find the order (or the 
exponent) of the group. In a l l the three cases, i t i s seen that the 
factorization of the modulus i s required to compute the order (or 
the exponent) of the group. Provided m i s chosen to be a large 
integer (say 20O decimal digits long, see Figure l O . l ) , t his provides 
a secure system. Other attacks such as the computation of the order 
without finding the prime factors of m and determining the secret 
coding exponent d without factoring m or calculating the order can 
be shown to be as d i f f i c u l t as factoring m using similar arguments 
to those given in Section 10.3. Thus t h i s extended matrix RSA 
system provides a similar level of security as the RSA system over 
integers. 
Ftirther two points are worth motioning regarding this 
extended system. F i r s t l y i t i s seen that a non-square free modulus 
can be used with t h i s system u4iich i s not possible with the RSA 
system over integers. That i s , powers of primes can be used to form 
the modulus m. Secondly, the use of a matrix as a message allows 
large amounts of data to be processed within one encryption/decryption 
cycle. Whether this i s an advantage depends upon the ease with 
which matrix manipulation can be carried out in real time. 
Also the use of a matrix as a message may provide some 
extra features to the system. Consider^ for instance, a non-singular 
message matrix divided into blocks as shown below 
M = 
1 1 
M 2 
where and represCTit genuine message blocks whereas and are 
redundant random blocks. Encryption of such a message M would truly 
•internally* mix the message elements and the random elemOTts in the 
matrix. In the case of RSA system over integers, a similar effect 
can be achieved by sending a sequence of ciphers u^ich cOTitains some 
random elements. For instance, the sequence may be c^, x^, c^t ^2'*" 
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where c^ represents genuine cipher and x^ represCTits random cipher. 
In the former case,the internal structure of the matrix and in the 
lat t e r case, the pattern of the sequence need to be prearranged 
between the sender and the receiver. In the case of the matrix 
system, the knowledge of the internal structure of the matrix does 
not give any help to the opponent as the message i s enciphered 
•internally* and hence this information can be made public. In the 
la t t e r case, however,the knowledge of the pattern sequence helps the 
opponent to discard the random ciphers and hence t h i s information 
cannot be made public. The use of chaining techniques in such matrix 
systems i s considered in Chapter 15. 
10.5 Extension of RSA System to Polynomial Rings 
Another ring of special interest i s the polynomial ring 
R [x] which consists of polynomials whose coefficients are elements 
of an aibitrary ring R. A possible extension of the factorization 
trapdoor system in the ring of polynomials R [ x] i s considered. In 
particular, to begin with,the ring F [x] where F i s a f i n i t e f i e l d 
i s looked at. 
10.5.1 Concept of_Galois Field 
Let P(x) be a given polynomial in x of degree n with 
integral coefficients not a l l d i v i s i b l e by a given prime p. Let 
F(x) be any polynomial in x with integral coefficients. On dividing 
F(x) by P(x), a quotient Q(x) and a remainder of degree n-1 at most 
i s obtained, where the remainder may be written in the form f ( x ) + 
p q(x),and 
f ( x ) = + a^x + a^x^ + ... + a^_^x""^ 
Each of the coefficients a^ belong to the set { O, 1, 2,...,p-l} and 
q(x) i s a polynomial with integral coefficients. That i s , 
F(x) .= f (x) + p q(x) + P(x).Q(x) 
The to t a l i t y of functions F(x) which can be obtained by holding f ( x ) 
fixed and varying q(x) and Q(x) in a l l possible ways, subject to 
maintaining the named properties of q(x) and Q(x), constitute a 
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class of residues which i s completely determined by f ( x ) , the given 
prime p and P(x). Two polynomials in x with integral coefficients 
are congruent moduli p and P(x) i f and only i f they belong to the 
same class of residues moduli p and P(x). The number of d i s t i n c t 
residue classes moduli p and P(x) i s equal to the number of functions 
of the form f ( x ) . Since each of the n independent coefficients a^ 
can take any one of the p values, there are p possible residue 
classes. These residues constitute a f i n i t e f i e l d c a l l e d the Galois 
f i e l d [54]. I f P(x) i s not irreducible modulo p or i f p i s not a 
prime, then the residues do not form a f i e l d since at least tvo non-
zero residues can be found whose product i s O moduli p and P(x). 
10.5.2 A RD]ynpmLal_BasedJ?SA_Si^^ 
Using this concept, one can design a conventional crypto-
graphic system as follows. Since the number of residue classes i s 
f i n i t e , i t must be possible to find two numbers r and s such that 
(f(x))'' = (f(x))'^ modd (p,P(x)) 
The non-zero elements f ( x ) of the extension f i e l d GF(p") form a 
multiplicative group. The order of th i s group i s equal to p " - l j 
that i s , 
( f ( x ) ) ^ * = f(x) modd (p,P(x)) 
where k i s an arbitrary non-negative integer. 
The system designer chooses randomly a large prime number 
p (see Section 10.2) and a high degree irreducible polynomial P(x) 
over GF(p) of degree n. (See Section 10.5.2.1) The message space 
of this cryptographic system consists of polynomials {ra(x)} belonging 
to F ^  ] where F i s the f i n i t e f i e l d GF(p). The messages are 
represCTited as blocks of sequences of p-ary d i g i t s each of size n 
associated with a polynomial ra(x) over GF(p) of degree l e s s than n. 
The OTcryption and decryption coding exponents are determined using 
ed = 1 mod (order) 
i e t ed = 1 mod (p"-l) (10.17) 
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The encryption procedure then consists of raising the message 
polynomial to the power e to form the cipher polynomial, c(x) 
c(x) = (m(x))^ modd (p,P(x)) 
The decryption procedure consists of raising the cipher polynomial 
to the power d to obtain the message polynomial using 
m(x) = (c{x))'^ modd (p,P(x)) 
The encryption key i s (e, p, P(x)) and the decryption key i s 
(d, p, P(x)). Both these keys need to be kept secret since the 
knowledge of the encryption key would allow the opponent to 
calculate d using (10.17) and vice versa. Hence th i s does not give 
r i s e to a public key system as such. 
Note further that the probability that c(x) = m(x) modd 
(p, P(x)) i s equal to gcd (e-1, p"-l )/p'* and th i s proportion can be 
made small by the system designer through appropriate choice of e, 
p and n. 
This actually i s the generalization of the Fbhlig-Hellman 
secret key scheme over GF(p) to aibitrary f i n i t e f i e l d s GF(p") where 
p i s a prime and n i s a positive integer. Note that the f i e l d 
GF(p") i s isomorphic to Z/pZ [xJ /P(x) where P(x) i s an irreducible 
polynomial of degree n over Z/pZ. 
This can be further extended to the case \**iere the system 
designer chooses high degree irreducible polynomials P^(x) ^ J i d large 
distinct primes p^ for K i ^ s . Let the degree of irreducible 
polynomials be n^ for l ^ i ^ s . The coding exponents e^ and d^ can 
then be determined using 
e^d^ = 1 mod(p"i-l) for l i ^ i ^ s 
The message i s divided into groups of s blocks where the i t h block 
i s of size n^ and consists of a sequence of p^-ary d i g i t s . The i t h 
plain block i s associated with a polynomial m^(x) of degree less 
than n^. The i t h cipher block c^(x) i s produced using 
c.(x) = (ra.(x))® modd (p., P.(x)) for L^i$s 
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Now l e t n = maximum of (n, ,...n ). Each c.(x) i s now extended to max i s 1 
form a polynomial of degree " j ^ j ^ ^ ^ - ^ by randomly generating the extra 
coefficiCTits required over Z/p^Z for I C i ^ s . Thus there are s 
polynomials each of degree " j ^ ^ - l with coefficients over Z/p^Z for 
l ^ i ^ s . These polynomials are combined to form a single polynomial 
c(x) over Z/mZ where m = T_r p^ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem 
(Appendix 10). c(x) i s the cipher polynomial which i s transmitted to 
the receiver. The receiver reduces the polynomial c(x) modd (p^,x"i) 
to obtain c.(x) for l ^ ^ i ^ s . Then he uses the coding exponents d., to ^ d ^ obtain m^(x) using m^(x) = (c^(x ) ) i mod(p^,P^(x)) for l ^ i ^ s . Hence 
the encryption key consists of (e^, p^, P^(x)) and the decryption 
key consists offd^, p^, P^(x)) for l ^ i 5 s . Note that this i s s t i l l 
a conventional (symmetric) cryptosystem. 
The above method can be modified to give a public key 
system. This has been f i r s t proposed by Kravitz [55]. This i s 
based on the d i f f i c u l t y of obtaining the degrees of the irreducible 
factors of a polynomial of large degree over a f i n i t e f i e l d , F = 
Z/pZ, p prime. 
Let f ( x ) be a polynomial of degree s which i s equal to 
the product of r distinct irreducible polynomials over Z/pZ. That i s , 
f(x) = n^(x). ... n^(x) (mod p) 
where Il^(x)> K^i^s,are distinct irreducible polynomials of degree s^. 
Then s = s + s +... + s = .L s. 
1 ^ r 1—A X 
Let the message space consists of {m(x)} where m(x) i s a polynomial 
over Z/pZ of degree less than s- Then the set of polynomials of 
degree less than s and relativel y prime to f ( x ) form a multi-
plicat i v e group modulo f ( x ) . [Two polynomials are said to be 
relatively prime i f their greatest common divisor has degree p 
(ie , a constant polynomial). That i s , two polynomials and h^ 
are r e l a t i v e l y prime i f ah^ ^ + ^^2~ ^ some polynomials a, b in 
Z/pZ [ x ] ] . 
Hence 
(m(x))°'''^ '^' = i modd (p, f ( x ) ) 
The order of the group i s determined as follows. 
F i r s t l e t us consider a s l i g h t l y different case where 
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f(x) = nj ^ ^ l ( x ) , a non square free polynomial (although i t i s said 
e a r l i e r that f ( x ) consists of dist i n c t irreducible factors mod p). 
Here the degree of the message polynomial m(x) i s less than the degree 
of n ^ ^ l ( x ) , that i s , less than Q^ s^^ . In addition, i f the greatest 
common divisor of the degrees of m(x) and nj^(x) i s greater than O, 
then 
ra(x) = n^(x).h(x) 
where the degree of h(x) i s l e s s than 9j^s^-s^ = s^(9j^-5')^ 
Total number of polynomials!m(x)} of degree le s s than QjS^^ i s equal to 
I F I ^ I ^ I = p ^ l ^ l . Within this set, the number of polynomials m(x) 
u^ich are not re l a t i v e l y prime to n^(x) (that i s , which are multiples 
of n^(x) and for vi^ich h(x) ex i s t s ) i s equal to the number of such 
polynomials h(x) possible. There are |F|^1^^1"^' such polynomials 
h(x) and h^ce there are [ F J ^ I ^ ^ I " ^ ^ polynomials m(x) which are 
multiples of 11^ ( x ) . Therefore, the order of the group i s given by 
|F1 =1^1 - | F | = I ( 5 I - I ' 
Thus i f ^ 
f ( x ) = I J n . ^ i (x) (mod p) 
then, the order of the group becomes 
(10.18) TT ( j F|Vi - | F ( ^ i < ^ i - l ) ) 
In this case (F|= p. Substituting t h i s into the above expression 
gives 
In particular, i f g^ = 1 for a l l l ^ i ^ r , (that i s , f ( x ) consists of 
distinct irreducible factors) then the expression (10.19) becomes 
f r ( p ^ i - i ) 
i = l 
As w i l l be seen later in Section 10.5.3,the polynomial f ( x ) needs 
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to be square free for cryptographic application. 
10.5.2.1 System_pesi^ ^ d Operation 
The system designer randomly chooses a large prime p and 
r distinct high-degree irreducible polynomials over Z/p£,n ^(x) to 
n^(x), with degrees s^ to s^. 
The chosen number can be tested to check i f i t i s a prime 
using the primality tests given in Section 10.2. A chosen polynomial 
can be tested to see i f i t i s irreducible over Z/pZ as follows: 
From [56], a polynomial P(x) of degree n i s irreducible in Z/pZ i f n T^^T and only i f P(x) (x^ -x) and gcd (P{x), x^ -x) = 1 for l ^ i ^ k 
where n = u^ ••• and u^'s are primes and n^ = n/u^» Thus to 
test whether a chosen polynomial P{x) with degree n i s irreducible 
over Z/pZ, the designer computes gcd (P(x), x^ ^ -x) and te s t s whether 
i t i s equal to 1 for a l l i , l ^ i ^ k . Berl^amp [56] shows that a 
randomly chosen polynomial of degree s^ i s irreducible with probability 
l / s ^ . Thus an average of t r i e s i s required to find an s^th degree 
irreducible polynomial. 
Having selected the irreducible polynomials 11^(x) to 
n^{x), the designer forms their product f ( x ) which i s of degree s 
where s = s^. The polynomial f ( x ) and the prime p are then made 
public information. The r distinct irreducible factors of f(x) are 
kept secret. The coding exponents e and d are calculated using 
ed = 1 mod (order) (10.20) 
r 
^ e r e order = (p^i-1) (10.21) 
i=l 
The public encryption key i s (e, p, f ( x ) ) and the secret decryption 
key i s (d, p, f ( x ) ) . The message i s divided into blocks of size s 
consisting of sequences of p-ary d i g i t s . Each such plaintext block 
i s associated with a polynomial m(x) of degree le s s than s. The 
encryption procedure then consists of raising the polynomial m(x) 
to the power e using 
c(x) = (m(x))® modd (p, f ( x ) ) 
and the decryption procedure i s given by 
m(x) = (c(x))*^ modd (p, f ( x ) ) 
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The above scheme can be used as a public key system as the order i s 
found to depend upon the degrees of the irreducible polynomial factors 
of the composite modulus polynomial thus providing the trapdoor 
property. 
1 0 . 5 . 2 . 2 Secu£ity_of The Sys^tem_ 
The above scheme i s not as secure as the RSA system over 
integers or the matrix based RSA system considered e a r l i e r due to 
the following reasons. 
Following Section 1 0 . 3 , the main crypt analytical attacks 
consist of finding the order (expression ( 1 0 . 2 1 ) ) . Once the order 
i s found, the cryptanalyst can determine the secret decoding exponent 
d using ( 1 0 . 2 0 ) . The order expression contains the degrees of the 
irreducible factors of f(x) and the prime p. As the prime p i s 
made public, the security of the system r e l i e s on the d i f f i c u l t y of 
factorizing the polynomial f ( x ) into i t s irreducible factors. Further-
more, the same decoding exponent d works for a l l sets of n ^ ( x ) for 
i = 1 to r with same degrees s^, l ^ i ^ r . 
I t i s generally true that factorization of a polynomial 
over a f i n i t e f i e l d i s not a hard problem in sharp contrast with the 
factorization problem of a large integer. Berl^arap [ 5 7 ] proposed an 
ef f i c i e n t algorithm for factoring polynomials in Z/pZ where p i s prime, 
For large prime p, Knuth [ 4 5 ] suggests some modifications to the 
Berl€4camp's procedure. Here the Berlekamp* s procedure i s b r i e f l y 
described. The basic strategy of Berlekamp* s method of factoring a 
polynomial in Z/pZ i s to translate the problem into that of solving 
a system of linear equations with coefficients in Z/pZ and finding 
greatest common divisors. Both of these steps can be done using 
known methods in a f i n i t e number of steps. The idea behind the 
algorithm i s now briefly outlined. 
Suppose that f(x) has degree s and suppose that a 
polynomial h(x) can be found in Z/pZ of degree greater than or equal 
to 1 but less than s such that 
f(x) (h(x))P - h(x) 
I f degree (h(x))= k ^ l , then (h(x))P - h(x) ^  O for the coefficient 
of ^ i s non-zero. By Fermat's theorem, the polynomial u^-u has p 
roots in Z/pZ namely u = O, 1 , 2 , . . . , p>-l. Thus u^-u factors (mod p) 
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into 
u^-u = u(u-l ) (u-2) ... (u-(p-l)) 
Setting u = h ( x ) gives 
( h ( x ) ) P - h ( x ) = h ( x ) ( h ( x ) - l ) (h ( x)-2) ... (h ( x)-(p-l)) in Z/pZ (10.22) 
Since f ( x ) divides (h ( x ) )P - h ( x ) , f ( x ) i s the greatest conmion 
divisor of f ( x ) and ( h ( x ) ) P - h ( x ) . Since h(x)-v^ and h(yc)~v^ are 
r e l a t i v e l y prime i f v^ ^ v^, from (10.22) i t i s seen that 
f ( x ) = gcd. ( f ( x ) , ( h ( x ) ) P - h ( x ) ) 
•1 
gcd ( f ( x ) , h ( x ) - j ) (10.23) 
Each factor on the right hand side has degree at most that of h ( x ) 
which i s in turn less than s, the degree of f ( x ) . Thus there must 
be at least two non-trivial factors of f ( x ) on the right hand side 
of (10.23),that i s , at least two factors of f which have degree^l 
and hence (10.23) i s a non-trivial factorization of f ( x ) . 
To factor f ( x ) , thus one needs to find a polynomial h ( x ) 
such that f ( x ) divides ( h ( x ) ) P - h ( x ) . This i s done by solving a 
set of linear equations for the coefficients of h ( x ) as follows. 
Suppose h ( x ) = b^ + b^x + ... + b^^^x^^ where b^,..., 
b^^ are the coefficients to be determined. To see whether f ( x ) 
divides (h ( x ) ) P - h ( x ) , consider f i r s t ( h ( x ) ) P . 
Using the equality 
(a + b )P = a'^  + b^ over Z/pZ 
we have 
(h(x))P = b / * b ^ P x P . . . . . b ^ ^ x ( - ^ ) P 
Applying Fermat's theorem to each of b_, b- ,• ••• b , , b.^ = b. in 
O X s—1 1 1 
Z/pZ for a l l i , and hence 
(h ( x ) ) P = b^ + b^ xP + ... + b^^ x < ^ ^ ) P (10.24) 
Now using the division algorithm and dividing f ( x ) into x^^ for 
i = O, l t . . . , s - l , gives 
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x^P = f(x) q.(x) + r.(x) (10.25) 
wheze 
Substituting (10.25) into (10.24) yields 
(h(x))P = bQrQ(x) + b^r^(x) + ... + 
+ (multiple of f ( x ) ) 
Thus f(x) divides ( h ( x ) ) P — h{x') i f and only i f f ( x ) divides the 
polynomial 
Vo^ ''^  * b^r^(^) * + Vl'^s-l^'"' " <^0 * * 
Vi-'"') 
But this polynomial has degree i s-1 hence i s d i v i s i b l e by f ( x ) (of 
degree s ) i f and only i f i t i s equal to O. 
Thus f ( x ) divides (h(x))P - h(x) i f and only i f the coefficients 
b^, b^, ... b^ of h(x) s a t i s f y 
Vo^ '^ ) * ^ ^i(^> * * ViVi<^> 
" ^^ O **• ^ 1^ * ^s-1 " ^ (10.27) 
Collecting coefficiOTts of 1, x, x^,..., x^^ in (10.27)^s 
simultaneous linear equations in the s unknoxmns b^, b^,«..^ ^ s-1 
are obtained. These equations can be solved for b^, and 
coefficients of a polynomial h(x) such that f ( x ) divides (h(x))P -
h(x) can be obtained. 
To calculate the decoding exponent d in (10.20), one does not 
need to obtain the irreducible factors but only need to obtain their 
degrees. In particular, in a system where the modulus f ( x ) consists 
of two distinct irreducible factorsll ^(x) andn2(x) (analogous to 
the RSA system over integers), one can follow a simple technique to 
obtain the degrees of the irreducible factors. Without loss of 
generality, i t can be assumed that polynomials are a l l monic. From 
f i i j i t e f i e l d s theory [56], i t i s known that in a f i e l d of order p, 
x^ — X factors into the product of a l l monic irreducible polynomials 
whose degrees^divide it. Thus the cryptanalyst computes h^(x) = 
gcd ( f ( x ) , x^ - x) for 5, = 1, 2,..., s/2, successively u n t i l he finds a 
h^ (x) ^  1. In such an instance, h^(x) = IIj^(x) or 11 2^^) ^i^)' 
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The f i r s t two cases give the degrees 9. = or and in the third 
case = ^ = Thus in a l l the three cases, the opponent has 
obtained the degrees of irreducible factors even though in the third 
case, he has not actually factorized f ( x ) . Thus he can calculate the 
order (10.21) and can determine the decoding exponent using (10.20). 
To compute the gCd ( f ( x ) , ^ - x) for 9.= i , 2,..., s/2 
requires approximately 
( i ) s/2 operations of gcd ( f ( x ) , x^ -x) 
( i i ) each such operation requires approximately log^p^^^ 
multiplications mod f ( x ) , giving a tota l of 0(s log^p) 
multiplications mod f(x) in Z/pZ. 
The encryption (or decryption) procedure requires a maximum of log^ w 
multiplications mod f(x) where w = (p^l-1) (p^2-l) - 1 because the 
maximum value of e (or d) i s (p^l-1) (p^^'-l) - 1. As w< p^, the 
computational effort i s O (s log^p) multiplications mod f ( x ) . Thus 
the work factor i s approximately 0(s)» Thus i f the cryptanalyst i s 
60 
required to make about 2 t r i a l s before finding the decoding 
60 
exponent d, then the degree of f(x) = s + s = s = 2 • In such a 
' 60 
case, the length of the cipher polynomial also becomes 2 introducing 
a long delay in both encrypting and decrypting devices. 
Further Gait [59 ] points out a short cycling attack based 
on superenciphering any non-trivial polynomial t ( x ) with encrypting 
exponent e equal to any non-trivial power of j . He shows that the 
period of the sequence of powers of t { x ) ^ mod f ( x ) i s equal to s^s^-
I t seems then the work required to recover the decoding exponent 
depends on the d i f f i c u l t y of factorizing s^s^* Hence for the system 
to be secure s^s^ needs to be very l a r g e . Short c y c l i n g attacks 
against ]Dublic key systems are considered in Chapter 13. 
10.5.3 An^^Iig^rpved Polynoiiual_^Based_^RSA_^Sj^ste 
Now l e t us extend t h i s polynomial scheme further to the case 
where f(x) i s a composite polynomial over Z/mZ, where m i s a composite 
number, in an attempt to increase the security of the above mentioned 
public key system. 
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Let 
= ~| T p.^i where p. are primes (10.28) 
and the degree of the polynomial f(x) be s. 
Then the message space consists of polynomials {m(x)} whose 
degrees are le s s than s and whose coefficients are elements of the 
ring Z/mZ. The f i r s t step i s to find the order of the group formed 
by the polynomials of degree l e s s than s and r e l a t i v e l y prime to f ( x ) 
over Z/mZ. Let us denote t h i s order using the Euler totient function 
symbol 0^ ( f ( x ) ) . From the expression derived for the f i n i t e f i e l d 
F = Z/pZ in Section 10.5.2, the order of the group formed by the 
polynomials which are re l a t i v e l y prime to f(x) in Z/pZ i s given by 
(10.29) 
where f(x) = Ij^ g^^i(x) (mod p) and g^(x) are irreducible 
polynomials of dogorees s^ in 2/pZ. 
Note that the commutative ring r ^ / p Z [ x ] / f ( x ) under consideration i s 
isomorphic to Z[x]/(p,f ( x ) ) . Now l e t us consider the order of the 
group formed by the units in the ring Z/p^Z[ x]/f (x)SZ[ x]/(p^,f ( x ) ) . 
Let 0 be a surjective ring homomorphism between the rings given below 
^ - -E^P— ——> 
(P , f ( x ) ) (p'^, f ( x ) ) 
I f restricted to units, then there i s a surjective homomorphism Q' such 
\ ^ ( p ^ * ^ , f ( x ) ) y \^  (p'^, f ( x ) ) 
The kernel of the mapping G"* consists of those sets' of units of the 
l e f t hand side which are congruent to 1 mod ( p ^ , f ( x ) ) , that i s , 
kernel 0" = {h(x)} such that h(x) = 1 mod (p^, f ( x ) ) 
or, 
h(x) = 1 + p* v(x) + f ( x ) k(x) 
and h(x) i s a unit in . Zfx] . Let us how calculate the number of 
(p^"'\f(x)) 
such classes mod (p^*^, ^ ( j c ) ) . The standard form for representatives of 
classes mod (p , f ( x ) ) i s given by 
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UQ + U ^ X + . . . + u ^ ^ x ^ ^ ^diere O^ux-p^. 
The standard form for representatives of classes mod (p^*^, f ( x ) ) i s 
given by 
u^ + u^x + ... + u^ l ' ^ ^ ^ where 0^u^<p^*^ 
As f(x) i s same in both cases, h(x) = 1 + p^ v(x) (mod f ( x ) ) . 
The number of such v(x) possible in mod (p , f ( x ) ) i s p^ because: 
v(x) = VQ + v^x + ... + v ^ ^ x and each coefficient v^ can take 
values in the range 0 to p-1- I f v^ i s greater than p~l then i t w i l l 
get reduced mod p^*^ as p^.p = P^*^* Thus the tot a l number of such 
v(x) possible i s equal to p*^^ ^ ( ^ ) -
Therefore 
# kemal 0' = p^ 
Using group theory , 
zrx i \ / z r x i 
" ^ p ^ * \ f ( x ) ) i = " ( p \ f ( x ) ) 
and 
Kernel 6 
# U / 2[x] \ = # (kernel 0') # u/ z [ x ] 
( p ^ * \ f ( x ) ) / i ( p ^ , f ( x ) ) 
urtiere # denotes the order • 
Therefore, 
0pt+l ( f ( x ) ) = p^ 0pt (f(x)) t5,l 
= P ^ ^ 0p t - l ( f ( x ) ) 
and JZypt(f(x)) = p < ^ " ^ 0 p (f ( x ) ) (10.30) 
I 
The next stage i s to consider the case where m = TT" p^*^i and to 
evaluate the required expression 0 ^ ( f ( x ) ) . 
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem i t i s seen that 
Z [ x ] = Z [ x ] © Z [ x ] @ ... ® Z [ x ] 
(m,f(x)) ( P J L . f ( x ) ) ( P 2 ^ , f ( x ) ) (pH ^ f(x)) 
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where © denotes the direct sum. 
Thus I 
0 J f ( x ) ) = ] ~ | " 0p<i. ( f . ( x ) ) (10.31) 
i=l 
where f^(x) = f ( x ) (mod ) for i = l , 2...,ii,. 
Considering the factorization of f^{x) rather than f(x) 
over 2, l e t the factorization of f^(x) be 
^ i b.. 
f ( X ) = T T ^ i - i (^) i^<^PO (10.32) ^ j=l ^ 
where the degree of irreducible polynomial g ^ j ^ i j ( x ) i s s^^. b^. . 
Note that the upper limit of the product term in the expression (10.32) 
goes up to r^, that i s , i t i s a function of to which prime p^ the 
polynomial f ( x ) i s being factored. This i s because in gCTieral f ( x ) 
(mod p^) w i l l factorize into some d i s t i n c t irreducible polynomials 
as i varies. 
Subsituting (10.30) into (10.31) yields 
I 
0^(f(x))=TT p^^^i"^'^ 0p (fi(x)) (10.33) 
From (10.29), 0p (^^(x)) i s given by 
0 ( f . ( x ) ) = (Pi^ij^M - P . ^ j ^ ^ i r ^ ^ (10-34) 
^ i j=l 
Substituting (10.34) into (10.33) gives 
i=l ^ 3=1 
Z 
Substituting m = YT P- i» above expression becomes 
i=l ^ 
, .S ^L. ^ i 
Although the general expression (10.35) for the order of the 
group formed by polynomials {m(x)}which are r e l a t i v e l y prime to f ( x ) 
over 2/m2 has been derived, from cryptography point of view, only . 
square free modulus m and square free f ( x ) are allowed. I f for 
instance, m i s chosen to be a non-square free integer then there w i l l 
be nilpotCTit residue classes mod f ( x ) for any f ( x ) and proper 
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decryption w i l l not be .possible in such cases. Similar arguments 
also apply to the case where f ( x ) i s non-square free. Consider the 
two examples given below which i l l u s t r a t e the two cases m and f (x) 
non-square free. 
Example 1 ; non-square free m 
Let ra = P^*P2 " • l e t f ( x ) = X 
f(x) (mod 3) = f^(x) = X 
f(x) (nod 5) = f^(^) = X 
0^(f(x)) = (Y|).2.4 = 24 
choosing e = d = 5 so that ed = 1 (mod 24) 
Let the message m(x) = 6. Then ( m ( x ) ) ^ = 6^^ = 36 ^ 6 (mod (45,x)). 
The message m(x) =36 gives 36 = 36 (mod(45,x))« 
Thus there i s ambiguous decryption as both messages 6 and 36 produce 
identical output after decryption. 
Example 2 : non-square free f ( x ) 
2 
Let m = Pj^-Pg = 3.5 = 15 and l e t f( x ) = 4x + 3 
f(x) (mod 3) = f^(x) = x^ = ( n j ^ ( x ) ) ^ 
f(x) (mod 5) = f2{x) =4x^+3 = n2i(x) 
0 ( f ( x ) ) = 24 m 
choosing e = d = 5 so that ed = 1 (mod 24) 
Let the message m(x) = x. Then (m(x))^^ = 6x x (mod(l5, 4x^ + 3)). 
The message m(x) = 6x gives ( 6 x ) ^ = 6x (mod(l5,4x^ + 3 ) ) . 
Thus there i s ambiguous decryption as both messages x and 6x produce 
identical output after decryption. 
Thus i f m and f ( x ) are made square free, then the expression (10.35) 
becomes 
^ - ... 0 J f ( x ) ) =11 I I ( p . ^ i j -1) (10.36) 
" i=l j=l 
Thus the order 0 (f (x)) not only depends on the degrees of the m 
irreducible factors ( s ^ ^ ) of f(x) but also on the prime factors of 
the integer m. So i f the original pxslynomial scheme i s operated over 
Z/mZ, then t h i s seems to give r i s e to a secure public key cryptosystem l i k e 
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the RSA system over integers. 
10.5.3.1 System_pesi^ and Operation 
The designer randomly chooses large primes p^ to for some 
^2 following the guidelines suggested in Section L0.2. He then 
needs to choose a modulus polynomial f ( x ) with the property that 
f^(x) = f(x) (mod p^), l^i^Af are square free polynomials of degree s. 
Two methods for designing such a polynomial f ( x ) are now outlined. 
In method 1, the designer chooses randomly irreducible 
polynomials h^j(x) of degrees s^^ over for i = 1 to fi, . As 
noted in Section 10.5.2.1, an average of s^^ t r i e s i s required to find 
an irreducible polynomial of degree s ^ j i n Z/p^Z. The polynomials are chosen 
in such a way that the degrees of the factors modulo p^ for a given 
i add up to form s. That i s , the d i s t i n c t factors h^_.(x), l ^ j ^ r ^ , 
are combined to form f^(x) (mod p^) of degree s. Thus the designer 
now has the values s^ . and p^ for a l l l-$i$fi, and l ^ j $ r ^ . 
In method 2, the designer randomly chooses polynomials 
f^(x) of degree s and accepts them i f they are square free over 
Z/p^Z respectively. This i s done by choosing a polynomial f^(x) 
and computing the gcd ( f ^ ( x ) , f^ ( x ) ) . I f the gcd ( f ^ ( x ) , f ^ (x)J= 1, 
then f^(x) i s square free. ' Knuth [45] estimates that a randomly 
chosen polynomial f^{x) w i l l be square free over 2/p^Z with a 
probability of 1-l/p^. Hence the expected number of t r i a l s for 
finding a square free polynomial f^(x) i s less than 2 for each i . 
An alternative way of finding square free polynomials i s to start 
off with irreducible polynomials f ( x ) over Z. The discriminant of 
f(x ) can be calculated using standard formula [85, p 451 ] and the 
prime p i s then chosen so that p does not divide the discriminant. 
Then f(x) i s square free over Z/pZ. This procedure can be repeated 
for p^, l4:i^Jt . Having obtained the square free polynomials f^(x) 
over 2/p^Z, l ^ i ^ fi, , through one way or other, the designer can use 
the Chinese Remainder Theorem to form a unique sth degree composite 
polynomial f(x) over Z/mZ where m = TT p^ and f ( x ) = f^(x)(mod p^) 
for l ^ i ^ The degrees of the irreducible factors of f ^ ( x ) over 
Z/p^Z can be determined using the polynomial factorization algorithm 
of Berlekamp (Section 10.5.2.2) or one of the modified techniques given 
by Knuth [45]. Thus the designer now has the values s^^ and p^ for 
a l l l ^ i ^ % and l ^ j ^ r ^ 
These s. . and p. values can be substituted into the 
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expression of 0 ( f ( x ) ) given by (10.36). Recall that for the m 
encryption and decryption to uork properly, 
(m(x))^'*^^ni^^^'''' = m(x) modd (m,f(x)) 
for any m(x) with coefficients in 2/raZ and whose degree i s less than s. 
The coding exponents e and d can therefore be determined using 
ed = 1 mod 0^ ( f ( x ) ) 
where e and d are multiplicative inverse of each other mod 0^  ( f ( x ) ) . 
The public encryption key i s given by (e, m, f ( x ) ) and the secret 
decryption key i s equal to (d, m, f ( x ) ) . 
The message i s divided into blocks of size s (degree of 
f ( x ) ) , each block consisting of integers over Z/mZ. Each such block 
i s associated with a polynomial m(x) of degree less than s. The 
encryption procedure then consists of raising m(x) to the power e to 
form the cipher polynomial c(x) using 
c(x) = (m(x))^ modd (m, f ( x ) ) 
The decryption procedure uses 
m(x) = ( c ( x ) ) ^ modd (m, f ( x ) ) 
to obtain the message polynomial back. 
10.5.3.2 Sy stem__InplemOT t at ion 
This extended polynomial based RSA system has been 
simulated on the Prime Computer. The encryption/decryption of message/ 
cipher polynomials are performed using the Square and Multiply 
technique given in Section ID.4.7.1. The l i s t i n g of the program i s 
given in Appendix 14. The cipher polynomial i s transmitted to the 
receiver by the sender in the form of a vector. The coefficients of 
the cipher polynomial are sent to receiver, separated by a space 
starting from the lowest power coefficient. The receiver reconstructs 
the cipher polynomial and decrypts i t to recover the message. An 
example showing the various parameters involved i s given below: 
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Example 
Let m = p p = 5.7 = 35. Hence fi, = 2 
4 2 Let f ( x) = X + X +1 
f( x ) (mod 5) = f^(x) = (x^ + 4x + 1) (x^ + x + 1 ) 
f ( x ) (mod 7) = f2(x) = (x^ + 5) (x^ + 3) 
Therefore, 0^(f(x)) = ( 5 ^ - 1 ) ^ (7^ - 1 ) ^ = 1327104 
The coding exponents e and d are chosen to be e = 6005 and d = 221 
where ed = I (mod 1327104) 
Let the 35-ary representation of the message to be encrypted be 
(18 9 30 23), (4 21 13 7) u^ere the message i s broken into blocks of 
size 4. That i s , 
3 2 
m^(x) = 4x + 21x + 13x + 7 and 
m^{yi) = 18x^ + 9x^ + 30x + 23 
Encryption: o 2 221 4 2-cipher polynomial c^(x) = (4x + 21x + 13x + 7) .modd(35,x +x+1 ) 
= x'^+l 4x^+12x^21 
3 2 221 4 2 cipher polynomial c^{y:) = (IBx +9x +30x+23) modd(35,x +x +1) 
= 8x^+6x^+20x*-14 
Decryption: 
Message polynomial m (x) = (x^+14x?12x<-21 ) ^ * ^ ^ modd(35,x'^+x^+l) 
- 3 2 
= 4x +21x +13X+7 
^^essage polynomial m^{yi) = (8x*^+6x^+20x+14)^^^ .ftiodd(35,x^+x^+l) 
= 18x'^+9x^+30x+23 
10.5.4 Discuss^ion_ 
Thus i t i s seen that the RSA cryptosystem can be extended 
to polynomial rings- The d i f f i c u l t y of factorization of a polynomial 
into i t s irreducible factors over a f i n i t e f i e l d does not i n i t s e l f 
provide the necessary security required for a public key crypto-
system. I t i s necessary to incorporate the factorization of an 
integer into i t s primes by considering the modulus polynomial f ( x ) 
over Z/mZ (m-square free composite integer) to enhance the security 
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of the system. This gives a system which i s comparable in strength 
to that of the RSA system over integers. Furthermore, from crypto-
graphy point of view, i t i s required that both the modulus polynomial 
f( x ) and the modulus integer m be square free. This i s very much 
l i k e the RSA system over integers in contrast to the matrix RSA 
system discussed in Section 10.4. 
10.6 Extension of RSA System to Matrix Rings with Fblynomial 
Elements 
In this section, the aim i s to combine the two systems 
discussed in Sections 10.4 and 10.5, thus extending the factorization 
trapdoor concept to matrix messages containing polynomials over a 
ring as their elements. The approach adopted in this section 
par a l l e l s with that used in Section 10.4.2. I f the ring of a l l nxn 
matrices over R i s considered, then i t i s seen that the ring contains 
nilpotent elements when n>L »As mentioned in Section 10.4.2, from 
cryptography point of view, i t i s necessary to avoid such nilpotent 
elements to sati s f y the condition = M for some. T'.y.o* As in 
Section 10.4.2, to begin with the set of non-singular matrices i s 
investigated; then the set of upper triangular matrices i s considered. 
10.6.1 NOT-sin^u^larJ^trices Oyer_R_=_Z[_x]yXPi.^i.'^2) 
The matrix messages are represented as M(x) instead of 
M, to indicate that their elements are polynomials in a single 
indeterminate x. Hence M(x) i s written as 
M(x) = 
m,,(x) 
^ 3 ( x ) 
m,„(x) 
"'2n(-> 
nn 
(10.37) 
The complete public key system using such messages i s developed in 
four separate stages. 
10.6.1.1 Stage 1_ 
In this stage, the elements m^j(x) in (10.37) for a l l i , j 
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l ^ i ^ n and l ^ j ^ n , are to belong to the r i n g R^^ = g ^ ^ y ^ ] where 
n j ( x ) i s an i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial i n Z/p2 of degree s^ (more 
p r e c i s e l y , here R^^is a f i e l d ) . That i s , the group formed by 
non-singular message matrices of order n with elements i n i s 
considered. In t h i s instance, n o n - s i n g u l a r i t y i m p l i e s t h a t the 
determinant of M(x) i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to p and 11 ^ ^(x). The order 
o f the group formed by such nxn non-singular matrices can be obtained 
i n a s i m i l a r fashion as i n the case of non-singular matrices over 
2/p2 discussed i n Section 10.4.2. 
The order of the group formed by these matrices i s given 
by the expression below, where # denotes the order. 
because 
Z/pZfxl i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of p ^ l elements 
( I I l ( x ) ) 
And 
# GL (n. FpS^) = ( p ^ ) " - 1 ( p ^ ) " - ( p ^ ) .... 
( p ^ l ) " - ( p ^ l ) " " ^ (10.38) 
using (10.4) i n Section 10.4.2. 
I f such non-singular matrices are used as messages then 
one can form a conventional cryptographic system where the se c r e t 
key contains the modulus p i t s e l f . The encrypting ( e) and decrypting 
(d) exfXJnents can then be determined using 
ed = 1 mod (# GL{n,FpS^ )) 
The CTicrypting key i s therefore (e,p, ( x ) , n ) and the decrypting key 
i s (d,p,n^(x),n). None of these keys can be made pu b l i c and the 
encryption and the decryption procedures are given by 
C(x) = (M(x))^ modd ( p , n i ( x ) ) 
and 
M(x) = (C(x))'^ modd (p,n^(x)) 
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respectively \**iere M(x), C(x) e '^y^(Rj) 
10.6.1.2 Stage 2 
The above system can be modified to include the public key 
property as follows: 
To begin with, the modulus F»lynoraial i s allowed to be equal to the 
product of distinct irreducible polynomials. This w i l l result in a 
public key system analogous to the original polynomial scheme 
considered in Section 10.5.2 whose security depends upon the d i f f i c u l t y 
of factorizing a composite polynomial to irreducible factors. Let 
r 
= g.(x) (mod p) 
i=l 
where the polynomials g^(x) for X^i^r are irreducible in Z/pZ. The 
polynomials g^(x) are of degrees s^ for l ^ i ^ r respectively. 
The order of the group formed by the non-singular message matrices 
M(x) with elements in the ring R = ^^ Sf can be obtained by the 
application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem as follows: 
{ f ( x ) ) (g^(x)) ® ® (g^(x)) > 
= # Gl-(n,F s, © ... ® F a-) P 1 P ~ 
#Ca.(n, F^s, ) (10.39) 
i=l 
Substituting (10.38) into (10.39) gives 
# G L ( n , 2 ^ E ^ ) = Tt [ ( P ^ i ) " - ! ] p i ) " - ( P = i ) " | . . . r(p=i)"-(p=i)"-' 
i = l L -i L J L J 
Thus 
(M(x))°'''^ '^' = 1 modd (p,f(x)) 
and hence the coding exponents e and d can be calculated using 
and 
ed = 1 (mod (#C3-(n, ^ ^ ^ ^ ) ) ) 
(M(x))^^ = M(x) raodd(p,f(x)) 
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I t i s seen that in this system, the order depends on the degrees of 
the irreducible factors g^(x). (cf- Section 10.5.2). Thus this 
system can be used as a public key system with the public encryption 
key (e,p,f(x),n) and the secret decryption key (d,p,f(x),n). 
The encryption and decryption procedures are given by 
and 
C(x) = (M(x))® modd (p,f(x)) 
M(x) = (C(x))'^ modd (p,f(x)) 
respectively, where M(x), C(x)eM^ ^^2'* 
The security of this system i s dependent on the d i f f i c u l t y of 
factorizing the modulus polynomial f ( x ) in 2/pZ. This i s so because 
i f the degrees of the irreducible factors of f ( x ) can be found then 
the order of the group can be evaluated and hence the secret decoding 
exponent d can be determined. For the reasons mentioned i n Section 
10.5.2.2, this does not give r i s e to a secure public key system. 
10.6.1.3 Sta9e 3 
The next logical step i s to consider the case where the 
modulus polynomial f ( x ) consists of powers of irreducible polynomials 
as i t s factors, that i s , f ( x ) i s a non-square free polynomial. Note 
that in contrast to the system considered in Section 10.5, here i t i s 
allowed to have a non-square free f ( x ) because the nilpotent elements 
are being eliminated by considering only the non-singular matrices 
over the ring R^ = • Considering the factors of f ( x ) in 
2/pZ[x]rather than in Z[xJ , 
l e t 
f (x) = f(x) (mod p) 
and 
r 
f(x) = T T 9. i ( ^ ) (n»d p) i=l 
where g^(x), l ^ i ^ r , are irreducible polynomials in Z/pZ with degrees 
s^ respectively. 
The order of the group formed by non-singular matrices M(x) over the 
ring R^  i s evaluated as follows: 
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Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
2 / ^ [ x ] = 2/pZ[x] e ... © Z/p2[ x] 
< ^ ( g , ^ ( x ) ) ( g > ( x ) ) 
Letting T= 2/pZ[x] and = (g^(x)) 
then, 
C3-(n,T/-^^j) = GL (n,T/p>i) x ... xGL (n, V p ^ V ) 
where x denotes direct product. 
To determine the order, # ca-(n, T/p^^i ), consider the sequence of 
surjective homomorphisms,6 ^. 
9 . : a, (n,T/^i) C3- ( n , T / ^ i . l ) i ^ 
Under such a mapping an nxn matrix M(x) (modp^) becomes M^(x) 
(mod p^" ) as shown below: 
M(x) (nod p^) ^ M"(x) (nodp^"^) 
Using group theory, for such an onto mapping e^t 
#GL ( n , y i ) = # a- (n,T/ i _ l ) . # (Kernel 6-) P P ^ 
The kernel 6^ consists of the set of matrices which are mapped to the 
identity matrix I in (modp^~^), that i s , 
m^j(x) = O (modp^"^) i 3 (10.40) 
mj^4(x) = 1 (modp"-"^) l ^ J i ^ n (10.41) 
There are p ^ ^ 9^(x) _ ^ s ^ p o s s i b i l i t i e s ^or each of the equations 
(10.40) and (10.41) giving r i s e to ( p ^ i ) " total p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Hence, 
2 
#GL (n;r/pi) = ( p ^ i ) " i^ fcCL ( n , T / ^ i - l ) 
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Therefore, ^ 
#GL(n,T/pb,) = ( p ^ i ) " ^V^) #GL(n,T/p) (10.42) 
But T/p = ^ ^ ^ [ ^ ) i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of p^i elements. 
Therefore using ^10.33) 
#GL(n,T/p)= [ ( p ^ i ) " - l ] [ ( p ^ i ) " - ( p ^ ) ] ... [ ( p ^ ) " - ( p = i ) " - ^ ] 
Substituting this into (10.42) yields 
V(g.''i(x))J L J L J 
1 "I (10.43) 
Thus r 
# C L ( n , ^ f ^ ) = T T # G L ( n , ^ ^ ^ ) (10.44) 
^ ^ ^ ^ (Qi i ( x ) ) i= 1 
I t i s necessary to consider one further stage to complete the design 
of a secure public key system using such non-singular matrices as 
messages. 
ID.6.1.4 Stage 4 
The f i n a l stage i s to consider the elements ni^j(x) in 
the message matrix M(x) i n (10.37) to belong to the ring = ^ 
where t 
m = p, and p., 1$ i ^ t , are di s t i n c t primes 
i= l 
and the factorization of f(x) i s given by 
^ i 
f ( x ) (mod p ) = f ( X ) = 7 f g i j ( x ) for l ^ i < t 
3=1 ^ 
The degrees of irreducible polynomials g^j(x) over 2/p^2 axe s^^ 
respectively. 
The order of the group formed by the nxn non-singular 
matrices M(x) over the ring R^ , denoted by # a.(n, ^^^^^^ ^' 
evaluaxed as follows: 
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The ring ^"^^^^^ i s . isomorphic to the r i n g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * Using the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
Z[x] = z r x l © ZCxl © ... © 2&C] 
(m,f(x)) (p^,f(x)) (p2rf(x)) (P^»f(^}) 
Therefore , 
But 
( P i . f ( x ) ) 
where F i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of p. elements. Pi 
/ ^Pi^^l \ 
The order # GL^ti, ( f ( x ) ) / already been evaluated and i s 
given by (10.44) as 
# GL(n, (f(x)) 
, s. ..n (b. .-1) r . s. ..n (p^ ±j) ' i j [ ( p ^ i j ) -1 ... 
'- s. , .n , s. . .n-1 (P^O) - (Pi i j ) 
Hence 
r. 
( p ^ ^ i j ) " - ( p ^ ^ i j ) " - ^ ] (10-45) 
The order given by the expression (10.45) above shows that i t i s 
dependent on the degrees of the irreducible factors of f ( x ) , namely, 
s^^. b ^j* ^  well as on the prime factors of the modulus m, namely 
p^, for a l l i and j . Thus when used as a public key system, t h i s 
provides considerably more secixrity than the system considered in 
Stage 2, provided that the modulus m i s chosen large enough. The 
encryption and the decryption of messages axe carried out i n the 
normal fashion using 
and 
C(x) = (M(x))^ modd (m,f(x)) 
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M(x) = (C(x))^ modd (m,f(x)) 
where M(x), C(x) e (R^) 
and ed = 1 (mod order) 
and the order i s given by (10.45). 
Note that this system i s a combined version of the systems developed 
in Section 10.4 and 10.5. 
Z[x] 
10.6.2 Upper Triangular Matrices Over R = (ni f ( x ) ^ 
For the systems developed i n the previous section, the 
message space i s restricted to contain only non-singular matrices. 
But as mentioned in Section 10.4.2, the sender i s faced with the 
problem of determining whether his message matrix i s non-singular or 
not, to find whether i t belongs to the message space. This poses 
problems as the sender has no control over the matrix elements but 
must accept what the plaintext dictates. Alternatively,as in Section 
10.4.4,one can consider the set of upper triangular matrices with 
invertible elements along the diagonal as the message space. This 
makes the construction of non-singular message matrices easier 
especially when m i s a product of a few large primes and f ( x ) i s a 
product of a few high degree irreducible polynomials. In such a 
situation one can almost a r b i t r a r i l y choose the diagonal elements 
of the upper triangular message matrix to sat i s f y the condition that 
they are relativ e l y prime to f ( x ) modulo m. In particular, the 
diagonal elements can be chosen to be elements in the ring Z/mZ which 
are relativ e l y prime to m. I f necessary, one can also use the 
Euclid's algorithm to evaluate the gcd to test the r e l a t i v e primeness. 
In this section, the set of upper triangular matrices whose 
elements are polynomials over a chosen ring R forms the message space 
of the developed cryptosystem. The four stages involved i n developing 
the complete public key system, similar to those discussed in the 
previous section, are now considered in turn. Note that i n a l l these 
stages, i t i s assumed that the diagonal elements are invertible 
elements over the chosen ring R. This ensures that the message matrix 
i s invertible. A typical message matrix M^(x) i s written as 
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M ( X ) A 
ni^,(x) 
0 
o 
m (x) nn^ ' 
where ^ indicates that the matrix i s triangular. 
10.6.2.1 Sta^e 
In this stage, the message space consists of upper triangular 
matrices whose non-zero elements m^j(x) belong to the ring = 
^ j ^ ^ ^ ^ - j v^iere 11 (x) i s an irreducible polynomial in Z/pZ of degree 
S j ^ . (That i s , R^is actually a f i e l d ) . 
The order of the group formed by such upF>er triangular 
matrices over R^  can be found as follows: 
Each diagonal entry may be any one of the polynomials which i s 
rel a t i v e l y prime t on j^(x) over Z/pZ. The number of such polynomials 
has already been evaluated in Section 10.5.2 and i s given by the 
Euler totient function 0^ (11^(x)) where 
0p (nj_(x)) = ( p ^ l - l ) 
The remaining h n(n-l) superdiagonal entries of the upper triangular 
matrix may take any value in the f i e l d f T 1 • Thus each of these 
entries has p 1 p o s s i b i l i t i e s as 
/^P^*- ^ 1 i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of p^l elements. 
(n^(x)) 
Thus the order of this group U (n, ) given by 
This can be used to form a conventional cryptographic system where 
the secret coding exponents e and d can be found using 
ed = 1 (mod# U (n, f ^ ^ ) ) 
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and the encryption and the decryption procedures are given by 
e C (x) = (M ( X ) ) " modd (p ,n (x)) 
A A 
and 
M-(x) = (C (x))*^ modd (p,JL(x)) 
A A ^ 
respectively, where M (x ) , C (x) e U (R ) 
A A " ^ 
10.6.2.2 Stage 2 
The above system can be modified to include the public key 
property as follows: 
I n i t i a l l y , i t i s assumed that the modulus polynomial 
consists of a product of d i s t i n c t irreducible polynomials modulo p. 
That i s , 
r 
f(x) = g.(x) (mod p) 
i=l 
where g^(x), l ^ i ^ r are irreducible in 2/pZ. 
The polynomials g^(x) are of degrees s^, l ^ i ^ r , respectively. 
The order of the group formed by upper triangular matrices over the 
ring R = ^ ^^^^^ with invertible diagonal elements i s evaluated as 2 ( I ( x ) ) 
follows: 
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
= # U (n, F s, ® ... © F s ) p i p r 
Each of the diagonal entries can be any one of the polynomials 
relatively prime to f(x) over Z/p2 and i s given by 0^ ( f ( x ) ) where 
r 
0 ( f ( x ) ) = (p^i-1) (See Section 10.5.2) 
P i=l 
The remaining "^""^ ^  superdiagonal entries have p o s s i b i l i t i e s each 
1 
2 
l^ri^ere r 
Therefore the order i s given by 
- 226 
#U (n, ^ r^^^ n |-(pSj s j n(n-l)/2 
I t i s seen that in this system, the order depends on the degrees of 
the irreducible factors of the modulus polynomial f ( x ) (cf Sections 
10.5.2 and 10.6.1.2). Thus t h i s system can be used as a public key 
system with the public encryption key (e,p,f(x),n) and the secret 
decryption key (d,p,f(x),n). The coding exponents e and d are 
calculated using 
ed = I (mod#U (n, ^ ^ ^ ^ )) 
and 
(M (x))^"^ = M ( X ) modd (p.f(x)) 
A A 
where M (x) e U (R.) 
A " ^ 
For the reasons mentioned in Section 10.5.2.2, t h i s does not offer a 
secure public key system. 
10.6.2.3 Sta9e 3 
The next step i s to consider the case where the modulus 
polynomial f ( x ) consists of powers of irreducible polynomials as i t s 
factors, that i s , f ( x ) i s a non-square free polynomial in Z/pZ. 
Let r 
f(x) = I I gA(x) (mod p) 
i=l 
where g^(x), l ^ i ^ r , are irreducible polynomials in Z/pZ with degrees 
s^ respectively. 
The order of the group formed by upper triangular matrices over the 
ring = ^^^^^^ i s now evaluated. 
Using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
Z/pZ[x] S Z/pZ [x] © ... © Z/pZ[x] 
^"^"'^ ( g , ^ ( x ) ) ( g ^ ^ ( x ) ) 
and hence 
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^^ '^^ '^  (gj i ( x ) ) ( g / r ( x ) ) 
Using arguments s i m i l a r to the ones given i n Section 10.6.2.2, 
where r 
s = I s.b. 
i = l ^ ^ 
and r 
0 =TT P ^ i * ^ i - p®i^*^i~^' (see Section 10.5.2) 
P i = l L -J 
10.6.2.4 Stage 4 
F i n a l l y the group formed by the upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices 
with i n v e r t i b l e diagonal elem^its over the r i n g R = ^'^Tf i s 
considered. The modulus i t where p^, l ^ i ^ t , are 
d i s t i n c t primes and the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of f ( x ) i s given by 
^ i b. 
f ( x ) (mod p ) = f ( X ) = T T 9.. ^ ^ ( x ) f o r l ^ i ^ t 
^ i = l 
u^ere the degreesof the i r r e d u c i b l e polynomials g ^ j ( x ) are s^^ 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Using arguments s i m i l a r to the ones given i n Section 
10.6.2.2, the order of the group i s given by 
# U (n. = [0„(f(-))]" (m=)"^"-''/^ 
where 0 ( f ( x ) ) i s obtained from Section 10.5.3 as m 
f " \^ t r 
0^(f(x));= t "TT" / s..b. . s..(b. . - 1 ) , \TTPiy I ^Pi " P i ) 
Note a l s o that by s u b s t i t u t i n g n=l i n the expression (10.45) g i v e s 
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Thus the order i s seen to be dep^dent on the degrees of the 
i r r e d u c i b l e f a c t o r s of f ( x ) as w e l l as on the prime f a c t o r s of m. 
Thus t h i s system can be used to provide a secure public key system 
provided the modulus m i s chosen l a r g e enough (say 200 decimal d i g i t s , 
see Section 10.2). The encryption and the decryption procedures are 
given by 
C ( X ) = (M ( x ) ) ^ modd (m.f(x)) 
and 
M ( X ) = (C (x))"^ modd (m,f(x)) 
A A 
where M ( x ) , C ( x ) e U (R^) 
A A " 
and ed = 1 (mod o r d e r ) . 
The public encryption key i s given by (e,m,f(x),n) and the s e c r e t 
decryption key i s equal to (d,m,f(x),n). 
10.7 Discussion 
In t h i s chapter, the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor concept has 
been extended to some matrix and polynomial r i n g s which a r e isomorphic 
to a d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s . T h i s has r e s u l t e d i n a g e n e r a l -
i z a t i o n of the RSA cryptostructure to matrix and polynomial r i n g 
message space. I t i s seen that some of these extended systems can 
be made at l e a s t as secure as the o r i g i n a l RSA system over i n t e g e r s 
modulo ra. Other features such as the use of non-square f r e e moduli 
seem to be p o s s i b l e with some of these extended systems i n c o n t r a s t 
to the o r i g i n a l RSA system over Z/mZ. I n v e s t i g a t i o n of such systems 
i n d i c a t e that f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor s t r u c t u r e s required f o r the 
design of public key system can be found i n r i n g s other than the 
ring of integers modulo m. From a p r a c t i c a l point of view, i t seems 
that the high complexity of such systems may favour the implementation 
of the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor i n the r i n g of i n t e g e r s . 
- 229 
C H A P T E R 11 
FACTORIZATION TRAPDOOR FROM IDEAL POIOT OF VIEW 
11.1 General 
In addition to considering the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor 
system from an 'element' point of view, the trapdoor concept can 
als o be treated from the more general ' i d e a l ' point o f view. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r the integer, polynomial and matrix based RSA f a c t o r i z a t i o n 
trapdoor schemes considered i n the. previous chapter a re b r i e f l y 
re-examined from the i d e a l point of view. Some of the p r i n c i p l e s 
of the i d e a l theory are used i n the next chapter i n f u r t h e r extending 
the trapdoor concept to such a l g e b r a i c number f i e l d s as the r i n g 
of Gaussian integers and some other quadratic f i e l d s . ' 
To begin with, some b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s and p r i n c i p l e s of 
the i d e a l theory are stated (without proofs) which w i l l be required 
i n subsequent s e c t i o n s . A d e t a i l e d treatment of i d e a l theory can be 
found i n a number of mathematical textbooks i n p a r t i c u l a r i n [ 60, 6l] • 
11.2 Basic Concepts 
11.2.1 Id e a l 
A s e t J of one or more elements of a r i n g R i s c a l l e d an 
i d e a l i n R i f and only i f i t has the following p r o p e r t i e s : 
( i ) I f i and j are elements of J , then i i j i s an element of 
J . 
• 
( i i ) I f i i s an element of J , then for every element r of R, 
i r and r i are elements o f J . 
11.2.2 Congruen£e_ 
Let J be an i d e a l . Two elements a and b are defined to be 
congruent modulo the i d e a l J i f a-b i s i n J , denoted by a = b (mod J ) . 
11.2.3 Principal^ L^Z^l. 
Let R be a commutative r i n g with 1 and 'a' be a non-zero 
element of R. I f A i s any i d e a l which contains the element 'a', then 
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A must a l s o contain a l l the elements of the form r a where r e R. An 
i d e a l generated by a s i n g l e element 'a' of R i s c a l l e d a p r i n c i p a l 
i d e a l and i s denoted by <a> . An i n t e g r a l domain i n which a l l i d e a l s 
are p r i n c i p a l i s c a l l e d a p r i n c i p a l i d e a l domain ( P I D ) . 
11.2.4 Prime i d e a l 
I f R i s a commutative r i n g with 1, an i d e a l p in R i s s a i d 
to be a prime i d e a l i f and only i f ab = O (rood p ) i m p l i e s r h a t 
a = O (mod p) or b = O (mod p ). An a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of prime 
i d e a l i s that i t i s an i d e a l p other than the u n i t i d e a l w i t h the 
property that for any two i d e a l s A and B i f p [AB then p A. or p B. 
Note that an i d e a l p i s s a i d to 'divide* an i d e a l A i f t h e r e e x i s t s 
an i d e a l C such that A = pC. 
11.2.5 Prociuct of_Ideal£ 
The product AB of two i d e a l s A and B i s defined as the 
i d e a l C • generated by a l l products* ab where a e A and b e B. 
11.2.6 Unic|ue_FactO£ization_of^ 
Every i d e a l i n a Ded^ind domain [60] can be factored i n t o 
the product of a f i n i t e number of prime i d e a l s and t h i s representation 
i s unique. 
11.2.7 F a c t o r i z a t i o n Trapdoor_ 
Using the i d e a l f a c t o r i z a t i o n theorem ( S e c t i o n 11.2.6), 
l e t the decomposition of a non-square f r e e i d e a l A be 
A = p ^ ^ l ... p^^r 
The number of residues modulo the i d e a l A i s given by the norm of the 
i d e a l , N(A). The number of i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s modulo the 
i d e a l A i s denoted by_^(A) i n a s i m i l a r manner to the E u l e r t o t i e n t 
function 0. 
Theorem 1 
I f A and B are r e l a t i v e l y prime i d e a l s then 
J ( A B ) = j ( A ) . J ( B ) 
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The congruences a = c (mod A) and a = d (mod B) e s t a b l i s h a one to 
one correspondence a ^ (c,d) between the residues*a' prime to AB and 
the p a i r s (c,d) whose two members c,d range over the r e s i d u e s prime 
to A and B r e s p e c t i v e l y . Hence the theorem 1 fo l l o w s . 
Theorem 2 
I f p i s a prime i d e a l then, 
F ( P ^ ) = ( N p ) ^ {1 - l/Np } 
= ( N p-1) ( N p ) ^ ^ 
A complete proof i s given i n [ 6 1 ] . But i t can be proved usi n g a 
method s i m i l a r to that which i s employed to c a l c u l a t e the E u l e r 
t o t i e n t function 0(p^) where p i s a prime i n Z. The complete system 
of residues with respect to p i s represented using Np i n t e g e r s 
0 , l , . . , p - l . Of these only 0 i s not prime to p. Hence_^(p ) = 
Np-1 = I s t ) ( l - l / N p ) . As N(AB) = N(A) N(B) f o r any two i d e a l s A and B, 
2 2 2 2 i t i s seen that N ( p ) = (Np ) . With respect to p there a r e p -p 
incongruent c l a s s e s that are r e l a t i v e l y prime to p and hence ^ ( p ^ ) '• 
( N p ) ^* induction, g i v e s Theorem 2 . 
Using theorems 1 and 2 , i f 
then 
/ ( A ) = N ( A ) ' [ T ( i - i ; ^ ) 
The expression (11.1) can be used to give the generalized v e r s i o n of 
Fermat's theorem for i d e a l s , namely, 
i f a' i s prime to an i d e a l A then 1 (mod A) 
I f A i s a prime i d e a l , i e , A = p , then 
^Np-1 - ^ 
Thus the r e l a t i v e l y prime residues modulo A form a group o f order 
J ( A ) . 
- 2 3 2 -
Some of these concepts are now applied to the s p e c i f i c cases 
already looked at such as the r i n g i n t e g e r s , the r i n g of polynomials 
and matrix r i n g s . 
11.3 Ring of Integers 
Let 2 be the r i n g of i n t e g e r s . I f m i s a f i x e d integer in 
the r i n g Z then the i d e a l <m> contains j u s t the i n t e g e r s which are 
d i v i s i b l e by m. 
Theorem 3 
In the r i n g Z, every i d e a l i s a p r i n c i p a l i d e a l . 
• L e t A be an i d e a l i n Z. I f A i s the zero i d e a l then A i s 
the p r i n c i p a l i d e a l <0> . I f A 5^  <0> l e t m be the s m a l l e s t integer 
i n A. I f n i s an integer then using E u c l i d ' s algorithm, we have 
n = qm + r 
vrfiere q and r are integers and 0$r<m. 
Now i f n i s an element of A, then n-qm i s a l s o i n A. That i s , r i s 
i n A. I f r i s greater than zero, then i t c o n t r a d i c t s the assumption 
that m i s the l e a s t p o s i t i v e integer. Therefore r = O, t h a t i s , 
n = qm. So a l l elements of A are of t h i s form and hence A = <ra>. 
The prime i d e a l s i n Z are therefore p r e c i s e l y the i d e a l s <p> 
where p i s a prime (together with the i d e a l <0> and the i d e a l 2 ) . 
I f the unique f a c t o r i z a t i o n of ra i n t o primes over Z i s 
given by 
m = pj^ ... p^ for some r ^ 2 (ra assumed to be square f r e e ) 
then one can view the i d e a l decomposition of <m> i n t o prime i d e a l s 
<p.> as 
<m> =<pj^>... •^Pj.^ 
The order of the group formed by r e l a t i v e l y prime re s i d u e s modulo < ra > 
i s given by the Euler t o t i e n t function for the i d e a l <ra>, ^ <m>, where 
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§ <m> = ^<P^> ... J"<Pj.: 
and 
/ <p^> = N <p^> - 1 
N<p^> i s the norm of the i d e a l <p^> and i s equal to the number of 
residue c l a s s e s modulo <p^> given by p^ . Hence 
^<m> = (p^-1) ... (p^-1) 
and 
^ <m> -= 1 (nod <m>) 
T h i s gives the f a m i l i a r RSA system over the integers looked at from the 
i d e a l point of view. 
11.4 Polynomial Rings 
I f F i s a f i e l d and x i s an indeterminate, then again 
every i d e a l i n F [ x] i s a p r i n c i p a l i d e a l . The proof i s very much 
s i m i l a r to the one given for the r i n g of inte g e r s Z ( c f . Theorem 3 ) . 
In t h i s case, m(x) i s chosen to be a polynomial of l e a s t degree i n a 
given i d e a l and the Euclidean d i v i s i o n algorithm for polynomials i s 
used. Hence a n o n - t r i v i a l i d e a l A of F [ X ] i s of the form A = <f(x)> 
where f ( x ) i s a non-zero monic polynomial of minimal degree i n A. 
The prime i d e a l s i n t h i s r i n g are those which a r e generated 
by i r r e d u c i b l e polynomials f ( x ) over F , I f f ( x ) i s composite, then 
l e t the unique f a c t o r i z a t i o n of f ( x ) i n t o i r r e d u c i b l e polynomials 
g.(x) be 
^ ( x ) = g ^ ^ l ( x ) ... g ^ ^ r ( x ) 
where the degree of polynomial g^(x) i s s^. 
Then one can view the decomposition of the i d e a l generated by f ( x ) 
into i d e a l s generated by g ^ ^ i ( x ) as 
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< f ( x ) > = < g ^ ^ l ( x ) > . < g2^2(x)>... < g ^ ^ r ( x ) > 
From Theorem 2, we have 
.b-1 
/ ( p ) = ( N p ) ^ ' ( N f ^ l ) 
Here 
N<g^(x)> = number of elements i n the residue c l a s s r i n g F[x]/<g^(x)> 
= number of polynomials i n F [ x ] of degree l e s s than s^ 
Hence 
i - « A „ » = 
s.b. , s . ( b . - l ) 
= IFI ^ ^ - F ^ ^ 
This expression i s same as the one obtained e a r l i e r i n Section 10.5.2 
by considering elements i n the f i e l d . 
The order of the group formed by residue c l a s s e s modulo <f(x)> i s 
obtained using Theorem 1, 
/ < f ( x ) > = / <g^^l(x)> ... i"<gj.^r(x)> 
11.5 Matrix Rings 
Let us now reconsider the matrix system di s c u s s e d in 
Section 10.4 to see whether i t i s p o s s i b l e to improve i t using some 
i d e a l theory p r i n c i p l e s . 
The r i n g of nxn matrices over a f i e l d F, M*(F), has no 
n o n - t r i v i a l i d e a l s . The only i d e a l s are the zero i d e a l and the whole 
ring i t s e l f . Hence one cannot consider the r i n g M*(F) for our 
"purpose. One can consider two p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
(a) The f i r s t approach i s to consider a subring, say 
the ri n g of nxn upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices ( i n c l u d i n g the diagonal 
r^n - 5€€ -note on p. 245 " 
elements) over F, U ( F ) . T h i s r i n g has many i d e a l s . For i n s t a n c e , 
J = ^ i s an i d e a l i n U ( F ) 
n 
? - denotes any a r b i t r a r y elements i n F. 
(b) The second approach i s to consider matrices over 
a commutative r i n g R rather than a f i e l d . Then there i s one to one 
correspondence between the two-sided i d e a l s i n R and the two-sided 
i d e a l s in M*(R). This may give r i s e to a trapdoor coding system i n 
M*(R). As w i l l be seen l a t e r , the system obtained using t h i s approach n 
i s same as that already discussed i n Section 10.4.2. 
11.5.1 Ap£roach_( a) 
Consider the r i n g of 2x2 upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices with 
arbitrary diagonal elements over a f i n i t e f i e l d , R = ^^(Fp) where p 
i s a prime. L e t J be an i d e a l generated by an element M. Then J 
i s the smallest i d e a l containing the element and by d e f i n i t i o n i s 
equal to 
I r.M r r 1 1 a l l f i n i t e combinations as r ^ , r ^ ^ vary over R 
The element M must be chosen to be n o n - i n v e r t i b l e otherwise i t i s 
.-1 p o s s i b l e to choose r M 
^1 
and r ^ ^ = I (id«itity) 
the i d e a l J containing (M M I ) = 
r ^ I f or a l l r^£ R. That i s , J = R. 
T h i s r e s u l t s i n 
I . HCTice the i d e a l must contain 
T h i s c o n t r a d i c t s the assumption 
that J i s a proper subset of R. Hence no element of the i d e a l must 
possess m u l t i p l i c a t i v e i n v e r s e . Let us consider X to be a generator 
matrix i n ^2^^p'^ where X i s equal to 
The i d e a l J i s 
J = A 0 \ /u v \ \o 0 / \o w y 
where a, b, c, u, v, w e Z/pZ, p prime. 
That i s . 
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au av 
O O 
L e t X = au and y = av, x, y c Z/pZ, then 
J = 
X y 
O O 
(11.2) 
I t i s seen that i f r e R and je J , then 
a b \ / X y 
O c o o 
e J 
The number of elements i n the r i n g R = \J^{Z/pZ) i s equal to p as 
each of a, b and c has p p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s . The order of the i d e a l J 
i s p^. Hence the order of the quotient r i n g R / J i s equal to p. Thus 
the r i n g R / J i s isomorphic to Z/pZ. From group theory, i n general, 
the order of the i d e a l J i s a f a c t o r of the order of the r i n g R. I f 
the r i n g R = U^{Z/xrZ) where m i s equal to product of primes i s now 
considered, then R / J i s isomorphic to the r i n g Z/mZ. I f m i s square 
f r e e , R / j forms a trapdoor system. 
Let X be a generator matrix of the form given below 
X = ( U . 3 ) 
I f gcd (gtm) = 1, then the i d e a l J becomes { (^ Q)} which i s same 
as the one given i n (11.2). Hence assume that gcd (g,m) = ^ / 1. 
For instance, m could be equal to the product of two l a r g e primes p 
and q and some 9. , that i s , m = Z.p.q. Then g could be equal to 
^'.s where gcd (s,p) = 1 and gcd (s,q) = 1. The i d e a l J then c o n s i s t s 
of elements of the form givOT below 
J = 
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where x, y e T = Z/mZ 
The residue c l a s s e s of the quotient r i n g R / J are of the form 
a b \ f ^ ^ ^ ) ^ ( 9 ) 
O c / \^0 c (mod m) 
Proposition 1 
The number of elements i n the quotient r i n g R / J i s given 
# R / J = ml 
Proof 
I f two members of the r i n g R are congruent to each other 
modulo J , that i s . 
mod J ) 
where a, b, c, a^, b^, c^ e T = Z/mZ 
then t h i s i mplies that 
a = a^ (mod g) 
b = b^ (mod g) 
— ^ c = c 
The number of p o s s i b l e choices f o r the element c i s equal t o m. 
L e t k be equal to the number of p o s s i b l e choices f or elements a or b, 
Then k i s equal to the number of residue c l a s s e s mod gT which are 
d i s t i n c t i n T. In other words, k i s equal to #T/gT. Consider the 
mappings 
Z ^ » T T/gT 
and 
Then 
^ T/gT 
T/gT = Z/Kemel 0 
Z/Kemel 0 = Z/ { x £ 2; a ( x ) e gT } 
= 2 / { x e Z ; x = g y (mod m) i s s o l u b l e f o r 
y £ 2} 
= Z/ { x £ 2; X = O mod (gcd (g,m))} 
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That i s , 
T/gT = Z/jtZ vA\ere I = gcd (g,m) 
#T/gT . = I 
2 Hence the number of residue c l a s s e s of the r i n g R/J i s ml . 
As the order does not depend on the f a c t o r i z a t i o n o f t h e modulus m, 
there i s no trapdoor as such y e t . But l e t us now consider the i n v e r t i b l e 
residue c l a s s e s modulo the i d e a l J , that i s , the diagonal elements a and 
c are chosen to be i n v e r t i b l e i n the r i n g T/gT and T r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Proposition 2 
The number of i n v e r t i b l e r e s i d u e c l a s s e s modulo J i s given by 
0(1) . £ . 0(m) • 
Proof 
The i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s of the r i n g R / J a r e of the 
form 
a (mod g) b (mod g) 
c ) 
where a, b, c e T = Z/mZ 
and such that a i s i n v e r t i b l e (mod g) and c i s i n v e r t i b l e (mod m). 
The number of i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s mod m i s given by the E u l e r 
t o t i e n t function 0(m). Hence the nun±>«r of p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s f or the 
element c i s equal t o 0(m)« The element b can be a r b i t r a r i l y chosen 
(mod g) and the number of p o s s i b l e choices i s equal to Si from 
Proposition 1 above. L e t k be equal to the number o f p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s 
f o r the element a. From above, i t i s known that T/gT = Z/SZ. 
Therefore, k i s equal to the number of i n v e r t i b l e elements i n Z / l Z t 
that i s , 0(5,) • Hence the number of i n v e r t i b l e r e s i d u e c l a s s e s i n 
R / J = 0 ( J I ) . 1 . 0(m). 
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Thus i n p r a c t i c e i f m i s equal t o the product of a few l a r g e primes 
and I which i s i t s e l f equal to the product of a few reasonable s i z e 
prime i n t e g e r s , then the elements a and c (7^0) can be chosen a r b i t r a r i l y 
provided they are r e l a t i v e l y small compared to m and 1 • 
The above arguments can be extended to the c a s e uAiere the 
i d e a l J i s of the form 
r 
^ 2 - ... gx^ 
0 0 • 0 
0 0 ... 0 
(11.4) 
The order of the quotient r i n g R / J , t h a t i s , the number o f r e s i d u e 
c l a s s e s modulo J i s now given by 
The number of i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s modulo J i s given by 
( n - 2 ) ( n - l )/2 Ord. = 0(A) {0(m)} m (11.5) 
11 • 5 .1.1 Q^£i£^_p£. S:^'^£^1P£. 
When deciding on a generator matrix X, the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s 
must be taken i n t o account-
( i ) The smaller the generated i d e a l J , the l a r g e r the quotient 
r i n g R / J - That i s , the smaller the order of the i d e a l J 
i s , the greater the number of residue c l a s s e s in R / J thus 
giving r i s e to a l a r g e r number of p o s s i b l e messages that. 
can be used i n the system. 
2 4 0 -
( i i ) For the encryption and decryption procedures to be r e l a t i v e l y 
easy, the generator matrix must have a simple form; hence 
the choice of the matrix X i n (11.3). For i n s t a n c e , another 
simple generator matrix X i s given by 
X = 
The i d e a l J i s then given by 
where x e Z/mZ 
Hence the residue c l a s s e s of R modulo J are of the form 
(mod J ) 
That i s , 
R / J = Z/mZ ® Z/mZ 
This i s equivalent to 2 s c a l a r RSA prototype systems. 
( i i i ) More generally, one can use more than one generator matrix 
to generate the i d e a l J but t h i s makes the whole system 
more complicated without i n c r e a s i n g the s e c u r i t y . 
J = 
' a r b i t r a l 
element 
y i n R ) Generator matrices 
arbit r a r ^ X 
element ) 
11.5.1.2 Sy s t em_pes i ; ^ 
A f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor system can therefore be constructed 
as follows: 
The message space c o n s i s t s of nxn i n v e r t i b l e upper t r i a n g u l a r 
modd ( T n , J ) where matrices (including the diagonal elements) 
"TT a 
procedure r a i s e s the message matrix to the power, e g i v i n g the cipher 
i and the i d e a l J i s given by (11.4). The encryption 
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matrix C as 
= . (iTodd(m,J)) 
The decryption procedure i s given by 
M = C*^  (modd (m,J)) 
The coding exponents e and d can be determined using 
ed = 1 (mod ord.) 
where ord. i s given by (11.5). 
The p u b l i c encryption key i s given by (e,m,n,J) and the s e c r e t 
decryption key i s (d,m,n,J). 
As the order depends on the s t r u c t u r e of m, the s e c u r i t y of 
the system again l i e s i n the d i f f i c u l t y of f a c t o r i z a t i o n o f the 
nodulus m. But note that i f the s i z e of H i s i s made l a r g e then 
although the opponent needs to f a c t o r i z e Jl to be able to c a l c u l a t e 
0 (£) i n (11.5), the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of m and h«ice the confutation of 
0(m) i s made that much e a s i e r . T h i s i s because as J i s made pu b l i c , 
the opponent knows Jl , the gcd '(m,g) and hence he achieves p a x t i a l 
f a c t o r i z a t i o n of ^  = pq. Larger the s i z e of I smaller the value of 
m 
1 ' 
Thus i t seems that the process of performing modulo an i d e a l 
as indi c a t e d above does not appear to in c r e a s e the s e c u r i t y of the 
trapdoor system but in s t e a d d i s g u i s e s further the b a s i c trapdoor 
system. 
11.5.2 Ap£roach_(b) 
Let us f i r s t s t a t e an important r e s u l t about two-sided 
i d e a l s i n complete matrix r i n g s . For proof r e f e r to [62]. 
I f M i s a two-sided i d e a l i n the r i n g R, then the ring M* 
n 
of a l l matrices of order n over M i s a two-sided i d e a l i n t h e r i n g 
NP» of a l l matrices of order n over R. n 
In our case, R = Z and assume m = p>q where p and q are 
d i s t i n c t primes i n Z. Then <m> , <p> and <q >are i d e a l s i n Z and 
M*(mZ), M^(pZ) and MJJ(c^) are a l l i d e a l s of M^(Z) using the above 
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r e s u l t . Further the i d e a l f a c t o r i z a t i o n of < m > i n R i s g i v ^ i by 
<m> = < p > . < q > 
Using the one-to-one correspondence between the two-sided i d e a l s i n 
R and i n M*(R), g i v e s n 
J = J . J ra P q 
where J , J and J denote the i d e a l s formed by M*(p2), M*(QZ) and p q ra n n * 
M»(m2) i n the r i n g M*(2). n n 
Although a trapdoor system i s p o s s i b l e i n Z/mZ when m i s 
square free,there i s no corresponding system i n the case of M^(R). 
This i s due to the f a c t that the quotient r i n g given by Mj^*(Z/m2), 
M»(2) ^ M»(z/mZ) = M * (Z/pZ) ® M » (Z/qZ) n — n n . n 
M*(mZ) n 
i s not isomorphic to a d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s whereas the 
quotient r i n g 2/<m> i s isomorphic to 2/<p> and 2/<q>. As seen e a r l i e r 
i n Section 10.4.2, M^Z/p2) i s not a f i n i t e f i e l d as i t contains 
nilpotent elements. Thus a corresponding trapdoor system i s p o s s i b l e 
i f and only i f the nilp o t e n t elements are el i m i n a t e d . T h i s has 
already been considered and i t gave r i s e to the trapdoor system i n 
matrix rings discussed i n Section 10.4.2. 
Note: M *(R) - Ring of a l l nxn matrices over R n 
M (R) - Ring of non-singular nxn matrices over R n 
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C H A P T E R 12 
FACTORIZATION TRAPDOOR IN ALGEBRAIC NUMBER FIELDS 
12.1 General 
The r i n g of Gaussian inte g e r s i s i n i t i a l l y considered with 
a view to extending the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor concept to a l g e b r a i c 
number f i e l d s other than r a t i o n a l i n t e g e r s 2. Then the more general 
quadratic f i e l d s are b r i e f l y i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
12.2 F a c t o r i z a t i o n Trapdoor System i n Gaussian I n t e g e r s 
12.2.1 Rinpjaf Gaus£ian_Inte9er£ 
Before considering the design of the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor 
system i n t h i s r i n g , i t i s u s e f u l to des c r i b e very b r i e f l y some of 
the properties of Gaussian i n t e g e r s . A d e t a i l e d treatment of 
Gaussian i n t e g e r s can be found i n [ 63 , 64, 65] • 
L e t i = V-1 and consider the se t of conplex numbers 2 [ i ] 
defined by {a+bi a , b e z } . Th i s s e t i s c l o s e d under addition and 
subtraction. Moreover i f a+bi, c + d i e 2 [ i ] , then (a+bi) (c+di) = 
ac+ad i*-bc i+bd i = (ac-bd) + (ad+bc)ie z [ i ] . Thus Z [ i ] i s c l o s e d under 
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n and i s a r i n g . 
The norm of an element, a = a+bi, i n Z [ i ] i s defined to be 
equal to a*a where a i s the complex conjugate of a . That i s , 
2 2 
NQ(= ( a + b i ) ( a - b i ) and hence N a = a +b . Further i t i s seOT that 
N(a6 ) =(Na).(^N3)as N(a6) = (aB) . (oB) = (aa) (6B). 
An integer i n Z[i3,a , i s c a l l e d a u n i t i f 1 i s d i v i s i b l e by 
a • Hence i f a i s a u n i t both a and l / a are i n t e g e r s i n 2 [ i ] . 
Lemma I 
The norm of a uni t i s 1 and any integer utose norm i s 1 i s 
a u n i t . 
I f a i s a u n i t thena (Xt that i s , 1 =a6 and so 1 = 
NaNB. This means that Na[l and hence Na = 1. I f a = a+bi, then 
2 2 
1 = a +b = (a+bi) ( a - b i ) , that i s , (a+bi) 1. So (a+bi) i s a u n i t . 
2 2 
The xxnits i n Z [ i ] a r e + 1, + i as the only s o l u t i o n s of a +b =1 are 
a = + 1, b = O; a = O, b= + 1. 
A prime 11 i s an integer, not O or a u n i t , d i v i s i b l e only 
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by the numbers associated with i t s e l f or with 1. In Z [ i ] , a prime 
has no d i v i s o r s except the eight t r i v i a l ones, namely, l , n t - I t - I T f 
i , i n , - i and - i l l . 
Lemma 2 
An integer whose norm i s a r a t i o n a l prime i s a l s o a prime. 
For suppose that N a = p and that ^  = where a , 3 ^  t ^ e ^  [ i ]. 
Then p = N0£. = NB^ NS^* Hence e i t h e r NB^ = 1 or = 1 and e i t h e r 
or i s a u n i t ; and therefore a i s a prime. 
Lemma 3 
I f n i s a prime i n Z [ i 3 , t h e n i t d i v i d e s e x a c t l y one 
p o s i t i v e r a t i o n a l prime p. 
Ni l = Tin and so 111Nil- L e t the prime decomposition of Nn 
i n 2 b e N n = p ^ ... p^ where p^'s ( l ^ : i ^ r ) a r e d i s t i n c t p o s i t i v e 
primes. Then n|p^ ... p^. That i s , 11 d i v i d e s one of the primes p^. 
I t cannot d i v i d e two primes p^ and p^. I f so, then one can f i n d two 
r a t i o n a l integers 1 ^  and using E u c l i d ' s algorithm such t h a t 
A j P j + Jlj^p^ = 1. I f n(p^. and K(p|^ then J l | l . So IT i s a u n i t not a 
prime contrary to the hypothesis. 
Lemma 4 
Any integer, not zero or u n i t , i s d i v i s i b l e by a prime and 
can be expressed as a product of primes. 
I f a i s an integer, not a prime, then 
a = B^B2 • NB^ > l , NS2>1, Na = NB^NBg and 1<NB^<N a 
I f 6 ^  i s not a prime, then 
^1 " ^ 3 % ' N^>1, NB^>1. NB^ = NB3 NB^ and 1<NB3<NB^ 
This process can be continued so long as B^. i s not a prime. Since 
N a , NBj^, form a decreasing sequence of p o s i t i v e r a t i o n a l 
i n t e g e r s , t h i s must come to a prime B ^ * Thena = ^^Bj^ = S^^^^ ~ *' 
= ^ ^ • • r ^ r ^ * Therefore now i t i s assumed that OC i s 
d i v i s i b l e by a prime H ^  and a = 11 ^ and the above process can be 
repeated for ot ^ . 
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In Z [ i ] , the representation of a as a product of primes i s 
unique as i n Z (except from t r i v i a l v a r i a t i o n s ) . 
The xinique f a c t o r i z a t i o n o f i n t e g e r s i n Z [ i ] i s e a u i v a l e n t 
to the p r i n c i p a l i t y of a l l i d e a l s i n i t [63]. That i s , Z [ i ] i s a 
p r i n c i p a l i d e a l domain. The argument to show t h i s i s very much 
s i m i l a r to the one used to prove a l l i d e a l s are p r i n c i p a l i n the r i n g 
o f i n t e g e r s Z. Here instead of choosing the l e a s t p o s i t i v e number, 
the element of l e a s t p o s i t i v e norm i s used. The prime i d e a l s i n 
Z [ i ] are therefore the i d e a l s generated by primes i n Z [ i ] . 
12.2.2 Des^igijof^ Trap^Dor_J3oding^ 5.[i.L-
As before, a = B mod < y >,where a ,6» Y £ Z [ i ] , i s defined 
to imply that a - 6 i s i n the p r i n c i p a l i d e a l < y> 9 that i s , a - 6 
i s d i v i s i b l e by y-
Fermat's theorem i n Z [ i ] c a n be s t a t e d as follo\tfsr 
I f and n 2 3xe r e l a t i v e l y prime then 
/ <n > _ 
n ^ ^ = 1 mod <n^ > ( 1 2 . 1 ) 
where the E u l e r t o t i e n t function § <U^>= N 1I2"-'-
Now i f an i d e a l <m> generated by a Gaussian integer m i s considered 
whose decomposition i s 
m = n ^ . . . n ^ 
where f o r 1 ^ ^ are d i s t i n c t primes i n Z [ i ] , then the number of 
i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s modulo < m > i s given by ^<m> 
^ <m> = / < I ^ > . § <n2> • . • J"<n j.> (12.2) 
In order to c a l c u l a t e the order ^ <m> , one needs to compute N 
for a l l i . 
Using Lemma 3, l e t the Gaussian prime 11 d i v i d e a r a t i o n a l 
prime p, i e , n|p. Then Nn[Np. But Np = p^. Therefore NTi = p or 
2 2 2 2 Nil = p . That i s , i f n = a + b i , thCTi a + b = p or p . 
Case 1 ; p = 3 (mod 4) 
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s i n c e p i s odd, one of a or b must be even, the other odd, 
Othervase, the sum of t h e i r squares would be even. L e t a = 2x and 
b = 2y + 1. I f a^ + b^ = p then 
p = 4 + (2y + 1 ) ^ 
= 4(x^ + + y ) + 1 
= 1 (nod 4) 
whereas to begin with,the assumption was p = 3 (mod 4 ) . So i n t h i s 
2 2 2 2 case, only a + b = p i s p o s s i b l e and Nil = Np = p . Tliat i s , the 
r a t i o n a l prime p stays prime i n 2 [ i ] . 
Case 2 ; p = 2 (rood 4) 
p = 2 i s the only prime which f a l l s i n t o t h i s c l a s s and 
from cryptography point of view, t h i s case i s not i n t e r e s t i n g , 
(Nn = 2 ) . 
Case 3 ; p = 1 (mod 4) 
Here p i s of the form 4k + 1 uAiere k i s any r a t i o n a l integer, 
2 2 Thm p|n + 1 for some r a t i o n a l integer n. But (n + 1 ) = (n + i ) 
(n - i ) and as I l j p , II d i v i d e s (n + i ) (n - i ) . But p does not d i v i d e 
(n + i ) or (n - i ) for otherwise one of n/p + l / p i would be a 
Gaussian integer; t h i s cannot be p o s s i b l e as l / p i s not a r a t i o n a l 
integer. Hence n and p are not a s s o c i a t e d and Nil ?^  Np. So a^ + b^ 
2 2 2 ^ p and hence only a + b = p i s p o s s i b l e , i e Nil = p. 
The system designer f i r s t chooses primes p^, P2»***»Pr 
randomly for some r ^ such that p^ = 1 (mod 4) or p^ . = 3 (mod 4 ) , 
for l O ^ * Then he computes the norm of each of the Gaussian primes 
n . using Nil- = p. or p. . The order ^<JD> can then be c a l c u l a t e d 
using 
r 
J<m> = T T (Wn. - 1) (12.3) 
j = l J 
The coding exponents e and d required for encryption and decryption 
procedures can be determined using 
ed = 1 (mod^<ra> ) (12.4) 
The p u b l i c encryption key c o n s i s t s of (e, m) and the s e c r e t decryption 
key i s (d, m) where m e Z [ i ] . As the designer i s required to make 
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m p u b l i c , to obtain m, he needs to solve equations of the form 
2 2 2 a^. + b^ ~ l ^ j ^ r 
and n . = a. + b . i . J J J 
2 2 
Consider the problem of f i n d i n g a and b i n a + b = 
2 
p or p given p (system designer knows p ) . The s u b s c r i p t j has 
been dropped for convenience. 
2 2 2 
Case 1 ; a + b = p where p = 3 (mod 4) 
This implies that 
Suppose a ^ O (mod p ) , • then 
a^ + b^ = O (mod p) (12.5) 
1 + ( ^ ) ^ = o (mod p) a 
L e t t i n g X = b/a, then 
1 + = O (mod p) 
i e = -1 (mod p) (12.6) 
For the congruence (12.6) to have a s o l u t i o n , -1 must be a quadratic 
residue modulo p (Section 12.3.2). That i s , the Legendr.e Symbol 
( — ) must be equal to I . P 
(=1) = ( _ i ) ( « - n / 2 = , 
P 
As p = 3 (mod 4 ) , p = 4k + 3 for some r a t i o n a l i n t e g e r k 
i e , p-1 = 4k + 2 
Therefore , 
( . , ) ( p - l ) / 2 ^ ( _ x ) 2 k - l = 
Thus when p = 3 (mod 4 ) , the congruence (12.5) cannot be solved for 
a and b i f a 5^  O (mod p ) . Thus'a' must be equal to O (mod p ) . This 
implies that the only s o l u t i o n s o f (12.5) that a r e p o s s i b l e are: 
2 2 2 2 a = 0, b = p ; b = 0 , a = p 
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2 2 -Case 2 ; a + b = p where p = 1 (mod 4) (12.7) 
Method 1 
Again assuming a O (mod p) and l e t t i n g X = b/a. 
1 + = O (mod p) (12.8) 
For the above congruence to have a s o l u t i o n , -1 must be a quadratic 
residue modulo p , i e . 
As p = 1 (mod 4 ) , p - 1 = 4c for some r a t i o n a l integer k. 
Therefore, (-1 ) ( ^ ^ = 1. 
Hence there are s o l u t i o n s of (12.7) for which a, b ^ O (mod p ) . The 
solutions to the congruence (12.8) are given by 
'(E=l)l X = + 2 (mod p) L • 
This can be seen as follows: 
2 
f[E=i.]r (1.2 ... ) (1.2 ... ^ ) (n»d p) 
= (1.2 ... ^ ) ( - ( p - l ) ... - { ^ ) ) (nxjd p) 
= ( 1 . 2 . . . ^ ) ( 2 | 1 . . . ^ 1 ) ( . l ) ( P - ^ ) / 2 
= ( p - l ) l = -1 (mod p) using Wilson's theorem [ 3 8 ] . 
HOTce i s a so l u t i o n of (12.8). 
As b = a X (mod p ) , a * i s allowed to vary i n the range O to >rp and the 
l e a s t p o s i t i v e residue aX (mod p) i s t e s t e d to see whether i t i s l e s s 
than •Tp* I f so, then t h i s value can be used for b because then 
2 2 2 2 — 2 2 0<a + b <2p and a + b = 0 (mod p) imply that a + b = p» 
Example 
Using the above method to f i n d a and b such that 
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+ b^ = p = 29 (12.9) 
Then 
X = ± ( ^ ) I 
X = 12 (mod 29) 
considering 0<a<>^, i e , 0<a45, gi v e s 
= 1.12 12 (mod 29) 
2.12 24 (mod 29) 
^3 3.12 7 (mod 29) 
\ 4.12 19 (n»d 29) 
^5 5.12 2 (nod 29) 
= 2 i s the only one 
a = 5, b = 2 would s a t i s f y (12.9). 
For large prime p, t h i s method does not appear to be f e a s i b l e as one 
needs to evaluate ( ^ ^ ) * and t e s t values of *a'upto T h i s 
requires of the order of (£+Vp) m u l t i p l i c a t i o n s (mod p) i n the worst 
2 
case. 
Method 2 
This method involves the use of Jacobsthal sum, S(c)^[66] 
i n determining a and b i n (12.7). S ( c ) i s given by 
s ( c ) = I ( J ) 
n=l ^ ^ 
where p = 1 (mod 4) and c ^ O (mod p ) . (Note that s ( c ) = O i f 
p = 3 (mod 4 ) ) . 
Considering 
M c=l m=l P ^ n=l ^ ^ 
p p r p 2 2 m - c . ,n 
m=l n=l ^p^ V Lc=l ^ ^ 
Consider the inner sum { } . 
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i f m^  = x? (mod p ) , then i t i s equal to 1^.^ ^ ("" - p-1 
2 2 
i f ra ^ n (mod p ) , then i t i s equal to -1. 
/. \ s ^ c ) = (p^M \ \ (^) I (2) (^) 
c=l ro=l n=l ^ ^ mF=l n=l ^ ^ 
2 - 2 2 ^ 2 m = n m n 
That i s , 
^ s ^ ( c ) = 2(1^1 ) ( j ^ l ) . (^) ( O - ^ - (=^) ) 
c=l n=l ^ ^ 
= 2 ( ^ 1 ) ^ + 2(1:^1) 
P 
5 1 s ^ ( c ) = 2p (pv-l) 
c=l 
But 
where k i s any quadratic non-residue [ 6 6 ] . 
That i s , 2p (1^1) = ^ s ^ ( l ) * ^ s ^ ( k ) 
p = ( s m ) 2 , ( s p ^ 2 
Thus to c a l c u l a t e a and b i n a^ + b^ = p, one f i n d s s ( l ) where 
n=l P 
and then computes p - ( ^ ) ^ g i v i n g 2 
a 2 = ( ^ ) ' andb^ = p - ( ^ ) 2 
2 2 
Considering the same example as before to f i n d a and b in a + b 
p = 29, using t h i s method 
S ( l ) = I (|g) ( ^ ) = 10 
n=l 
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( ^ ^ ) = 25 hence a = 5 and b =JpI'{^^^) = 2 
Again t h i s method may not seem to be a t t r a c t i v e v^ien p i s l a r g e . 
Method 3 
Legendre's method [86] i s based on the continued f r a c t i o n 
expansion of Vp^ He showed that i f p i s of the form 4k + 1, then 
the expansion of Vp"is of the form 
+ 1 
^2 " • 
2qQ ^ ... 
I t i s seen that there i s a symmetrical part q^ ,^ q^* q^9 
followed by 2q^ and there i s no c e n t r a l term. Now l e t c be the 
p a r t i c u l a r complete quotient which begins at the middle of the period, 
that i s , 
c = c = q_ + m Tn 
^ 1 * 
qi + 
This i s a purely p e r i o d i c continued f r a c t i o n whose period c o n s i s t s of 
q^, q^, 2qQ, q^, q^. Since t h i s period i s symmetrical. 
- ^ , where c denotes the conjugate of c. c i s now e x p r e s s i b l e 
i n the form c = ^ * ^ vi^ere a and b are i n t e g e r s . The equation 
c c = -1 gives ( ^ 4 ^ ) • ( ^ ^ ^ ) = -1- * = P-
Again consider the example p = 29. The process for developing 
i n a continued f r a c t i o n i s 
>/29 = 5 1 + — 
" " l 
^1 
1 
4 (5 +V29) 
^2 
1 
5 (3 +N/29) 
*=3 
_ 1_ 
5 (2 +V29") 
*=4 
_ 1 
4 (3 + ^ ) 
=^2 
1 
2 > i 
"=5 
252 -
c ^ = 5 + V29 
The continued f r a c t i o n i s 5, 2, 1, 1, 2, 10. The appropriate complete 
quotient to take i s c = c ^ giving a = 5 and b = 2. 
Method 4 
The cryptographer can a l s o design the system s t a r t i n g with 
primes J[. i n Z [ i ] rather than primes p^ i n Z. That i s , he s e l e c t s 
Gaussian integers H . , l i ^ j ^ ^ r , a r b i t r a r i l y by choosing say a. to be an 
even integer and b. to be an odd integer i n n . = a . + b . i s o that 
2 2 " ^ J J J a^. + b^ . i s always odd. ThCTi he can t e s t the norms Nll^ f o r l ^ j ^ r , 
to f i n d whether they are primes or squares of primes i n Z. The 
p r i m a l i t y t e s t i n g can be done using the p r o b a b i l i s t i c algorithm 
mentioned i n Section 10.2. I f N I L i s a prime or a square o f a prime 
i n Z, then IL must be a prime i n Z[ i ] . I f N I L i s not a prime or 
a prime square i n Z, then he chooses another p a i r of a^ and b^ .. As 
t h i s procedure needs to be done only once by each user at t h e 
beginning, t h i s could be a f e a s i b l e approach e s p e c i a l l y when r = 2 
as i n the prototype RSA system. 
Choice of primes 
Although the designer can choose any primes of t h e form 
p = 3 (mod 4) or p = 1 (mod 4) (except , the s p e c i a l ones such as the 
Mersenne primes), now i t i s shoun that c e r t a i n combinations w i l l 
r e s u l t i n the easy f a c t o r i z a t i o n of the composite Gaussian integer m. 
I f m i s considered to be a product of two Gaussian primes H^^ and 
wheren j | and ^ there are four p o s s i b l e combinations. 
They are: 
( i ) p^ = 1 (mod 4 ) , p^ = 1 (mod 4) 
( i i ) P i = 3 (mod 4 ) , P2 = 3 (mod 4) 
( i i i ) Pi = 1 (°»«^  P2 ^ ^ 
( i v ) P i ^ ^ P2 ^ ^ 
Case ( i ) r e s u l t s i n JIj^ ~ ^1 * *^1^ '^ "^  ^2 ~ ^2 * ^2 ^ where 
a^, a^, b^, b^ 7^  O i n Z and m = e 2 [ i ] . The order o f the group 
formed by the i n v e r t i b l e residue c l a s s e s modulo< ra> i s therefore 
equal to J<m> = (Nf i^- l ) ( N I l ^ - l ) = (p ^ - 1 ) (P2-I )-
Case ( i i ) y i e l d s = a^ or b^ ^ i and II2 = ^2 ^2 ^ each 
p a i r (a,b) i s equal to zero. L e t t i n g m = ^^^^2* seen that m 
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2 2 
i s a r a t i o n a l integer and the order ra> = (p^ -1 ) (p^ -1 ) . 
Case ( i i i ) and ( i v ) w i l l y i e l d an m of the form cd + c f i . As m i s made 
publ i c , the opponent can e a s i l y spot the f a c t o r c and hence f a c t o r i z e 
m. 
Hence i t i s seen from cryptographic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that, 
only the schemes where both p^ and p^ are chosen to be of same type 
( e i t h e r l(mod 4) or 3(mod 4 ) ) w i l l provide secure systems. This idea 
extends to a l l primes p., when m i s a product of r Gaussian 
primes. 
12.2.3 Security__of the §y£tem_in Z [ i ^ L 
As i n the case of the prototype RSA system over Z, the 
p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e information for the opponent c o n s i s t s o f the 
encrypting expon^it e and the composite modulus m. I f the r a t i o n a l 
primes are chosen such that p. = 3(raod 4) for a l l j , then the modulus 
J 2 m can be made to be a r a t i o n a l integer and the norm Nm = m . I f the 
primes are chosen such that p^ = l(rood 4) for a l l j , then m i s of the 
form c+di € Z [i ]• I n t h i s case, the opponent can e a s i l y c a l c u l a t e the 
norm Nm = c' Hence i n e i t h e r case, the s e c u r i t y of the system 
e s s e n t i a l l y l i e s i n the d i f f i c u l t y of f a c t o r i n g a large r a t i o n a l 
integer, the norm Nm. The problem of f a c t o r i n g Nm i s s i m i l a r to that 
of f a c t o r i n g the modulus m (eZ) i n the prototype RSA system. Thus the 
s e c u r i t y of t h i s system i s same as that of i t s predecessor. Once the 
norm Nm i s f a c t o r i z e d i n t o r primes q., then the order ^ < m> can be 
'TV ^ 2 found using (N 11^-1) where " • Then the opponent can 
compute the secret decoding exponent d using (12.4). Note that the 
c r y p t a n a l y s t does not need to know the Gaussian primes 11 ^ ,. .. , 11 ^  but 
only needs to know t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e norms. In other words, the opponent 
w i l l be working over Z not over Z [ i ] and does not need to s o l v e the 
2 2 
equation a +b = p for a and b. 
12.2.4 Re£resCTitationjDf Messa9es_and_Sj^stem Operation 
The messages are to be represented using the r e s i d u e c l a s s e s 
modulo the i d e a l generated by the modulus m. The number o f d i s t i n c t 
messages p o s s i b l e i s equal to the number o f incongruent r e s i d u e s mod 
<m> and i s given by the norm of the i d e a l < m > . In the c a s e of a. 
p r i n c i p a l i d e a l domain N<in>= Nm, the norm of the element m. 
In performing encryption or decryption using t h i s system i n 
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Z [ i ] , there i s a problem with regard to the message repr e s e n t a t i o n . 
F i r s t consider the process of reduction mod<m> which i s required i n 
both encryption and decryption procedures. T h i s can be c a r r i e d out 
using the Euclidean algorithm as Z [ i ] i s a PID. Let y = where e 
i s the encrypting exponent and consider the operation y mod <ln > where 
X, y and m e Z [ i ], 
Using E u c l i d ' s algorithm, there e x i s t s two integers u and v i n 2 [i] 
such that 
y = urn + V where Nw < Nm 
Consider 
y/m = A + B i u*iere A and B are r a t i o n a l numbers. 
Choose r a t i o n a l integers s and t such that 
|A-S1 hf l B - t | $ h 
This can be done by choosing s and t as r a t i o n a l i n t e g e r s n e a r e s t to 
A and B r e s p e c t i v e l y (see Figure 12.1 ). Now l e t u = s + t i and v = y-
um, then i t i s seen that Nv< NTD as 
IV 1 = I y-um I = I y-( s + t i ) m I 
m ^ - s - t i m 
V I = I m I I (A^s) + ( B - t ) i 
= |m I { ( A ^ s ) ^ ( B - t ) ^ } ^ 
Since Nv = |v| < 
t+ i 
m = Nm, the i n e q u a l i t y i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
A+Bx 
s+1 
F i g 1 2 . 1 
- 2 5 5 
But the u and v are not uniquely determined. Thus i f a message 
M = x+iy i s encrypted to form g+hi = ( x + i y ) ^ mod <m>, the decrypted 
message, i s given by 
= (g+hi)^ mod <m> 
= k+JU mod <m> 
The decrypted message, k+jU = x+iy mod <m> but i t i s of ' d i f f e r e n t 
representation'. For instance, consider the exan^le given below. 
L e t the modulus m = 8+i e 2 [ x ] 
The norm, Nm = 65 
= NII^ NII^ = 5.13 
As P j = 1 (mod 4) and P2 ^ ^ (wod 4 ) , ^  <m> i s given by 
^ <m> = 4.12 
= 48 
Choosing e = d = 7 where ed = 1 (mod 48), consider the message 
M = 5+3i. Using the Euclidean algorithm. 
Thus 
l e > 
But 
(5+3i)^ = - 2 - i mod <m> = g+hi 
M" = ( - 2 - i ) ^ mod <m> 
= ( - 2 - i ) ^ = - 2 - 6 i mod <m> = k+iti 
(-2-6i) = 5+3i = 2 i - 3 mod <jn> 
The r e c e i v e r would not be able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e say between - 2 - 6 i or 
5+3i or 2 i - 3 although they are congruent to each other mod <in>. Thus 
there i s not a unique representation of messages u n l i k e i n the case 
of the RSA system over Z where a message i s uniquely represented by 
taking the l e a s t p o s i t i v e residue modulo m. I n Z [ i ] , one approach 
could be to use the norm of the modulus, Nm, to construct a standard 
set of r e presentatives. But t h i s would not \*ork as two elements a 
and B can be congruent to each other and t h e i r norms Na and NB be l e s s 
than Nm. Thus some form of standard set of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s e s s e n t i a l 
Case 1 
F i r s t consider the case where the primes TI^  which form m 
divide r a t i o n a l primes p^ of the form p_. = 1 (mod 4 ) . Then the norm 
i s a square f r e e r a t i o n a l integer given by 
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r r 
Nm = P j where m = j-i Hj 
The residue c l a s s ring Z[i]/<m> i s isomorphic to a d i r e c t sum of f i n i t e 
f i e l d s Z[i]/<nj> , i e . 
z[i]/<m> = 2[i]/<n > e @ z[i]/<ir > 
1 L J f J, 
The f i e l d 2[i]/<nj> contains NR. = p. elements. Therefore one 
standard method of representing the messages mod <m> would be to use 
the int e g e r s i n the r i n g Z/NmZ, that i s , O to Nro-1. And every element 
of ^ i ^ ^ > i s congruent to an element i n Z/NmZ. Th i s i s same as the 
message space of the RSA system over the r a t i o n a l s-
For example i f p^ = 13 and Pg = ^' ^ 1 ^  ^ 2 ^  ^  (mod 4) then 
Nm = 65 and ^ <m> = 4 8 . The message space i s therefore equal to 
{o, 1, ... 64}. The CTicryption and decryption processes a r e c a r r i e d 
out using C 5 (mod Nm) and M = C^ (mod Nm) where ed = 1 (mod 
^m>). The coding exponent e and Nm are made p u b l i c . 
Now consider the case where the message space s t i l l c o n s i s t s 
of the integers i n Z/NrtZ but now the encryption and decryption 
procedures are c a l c u l a t e d modulo m where m = a-Hai e z C i ] . In t h i s 
case, e, m and Nm are made p u b l i c . L e t the message be M eZ/NmZ, 
then the encryption procedure r e s u l t s i n 
mod (a+bi) = g+hi = cipher 
Decryption produces 
(g+hi)*^ mod (a+bi) = k + U 
That i s , the recovered message M i s equal to k+fi,i 
M = k+U (mod a+bi) (12.10) 
Conjugating both sides of (12.10) 
M = k - U (mod a-bi) (12.11) 
Using Chinese Remainder Theorem, the o r i g i n a l M can be formed where 
M = Y ^  ( k - ^ i ) + Y2 (1<+5J-) ("»d ( a + b i ) ( a - b i ) ) 
where ^2 ~ ^  " ^ Z/NmZ, Y^jYj, t Z [ i ] ' 
A standard s e t of re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the r i n g Z{i2/<m> can a l s o 
be obtained using elementary d i v i s o r theory [ 6 5 ] . 
The i d e a l <m> i n Z [ i ] i s generated by the element m = a+bi 
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and i t c o n s i s t s of the set of Gaussian i n t e g e r s 
<m> = {(a+bi)X } where X £ Z [ i ] 
The i d e a l <m> can be regarded as a Z-module generated by [a+bi, 
a i - b ] and the Z-basis of the i d e a l <m> i s therefore given by (a+bi, 
a i - b ) . The i n t e g r a l b a s i s of Z [ i ] i s ( l , i ) [ 6 5 ] . 
Hence one can a s s o c i a t e a matrix A with the p a i r of bases a s follows 
Z-basis of i d e a l <m> = A (Z-basis of Z [ i ] ) 
\ a i - b / \ i ; 
where A = ( ^ ^ \ 
V-b a / 
Let /_ , 1^ 
t = 1 .. ^ 1 and s = U 
Therefore 
t = A s (12.12) 
s and t can be replaced by w and v where w and v are equal to s and t 
mu l t i p l i e d by some unimodular matrices resp>ectively. 
L e t 
D = VAU where U and V are s u i t a b l y chosCTi unimodular 
transformations such that D = diag(d^, d^) and d^ j d^- That i s , 
•^ 1 <^  V VAU 
° ^ 2 i 
Multiplying s by U"^, gives 
w = s 
and hence 
t = AU w (12.13) 
Multiplying (12.13) by V gives 
Vt = VAU w 
i e v = D w 
- 2 5 8 
The new b a s i s of z f i j i s (w^^w^) and the new b a s i s of <in> i s (d^ w^ , 
Therefore, the residue c l a s s e s mod <m> are represented as x^w^ + 
x^w^ where goes from O to d^-1 for i = l , 2 . 
Hence the system designer i s required to reduce the matrix A to i t s 
diagonal form. The steps involved i n t h i s reduction algorithm of an 
nxn matrix A are now considered [ 6 7 ] . 
F i r s t Stage of Reduction 
The aim i s to reduce the nxn matrix A to an equivalent nxn 
matrix C of the s p e c i a l form 
(12.14) 
where d^ ^ d i v i d e s each entry of C*. 
A f i n i t e sequence of elementary row and column operations i s considered 
which when performed on A e i t h e r y i e l d s a matrix of the form (12.14) or 
e l s e leads to an nxn matrix B ( b ^ j ) s a t i s f y i n g the condition 
^ 1 < ^ 1 (12.15) 
I n the l a t t e r case, one goes back to the beginning and a p p l i e s the 
sequence of operations again. E i t h e r the form (12.14) i s achieved i n 
which case, t h i s stage ends or (12.15) i s reached i n which case the 
leading entry i s reduced s t i l l f u r t h e r and the process continues. 
After a f i n i t e number of steps, the form (12.14) w i l l be reached. 
The sequence of operations i s as f o l l o w s : 
I f A i s the zero matrix, then i t i s already of the form (12.14); 
otherwise, A has a non-zero entry and by s u i t a b l e interchanges of rows 
and columns t h i s can be moved to the leading p o s i t i o n . Therefore 
assume a ^ ^ j ^ and consider the following three p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
Case ( i ) 
There i s an entry a^^ i n the f i r s t row such t h a t a^^J^a^,.. 
By the properties of Euclidean domain. 
q + r 
- 259 -
where either r = 0 or r< a 11 
Since ^ii)f^^•* niust have r ^ O and so r< Si^^* Subtracting q 
f i r s t and the j t h columns, the leading entry a^ ^^  i s replaced by r and 
times the f i r s t column from the j t h column and then interchanging the 
c 
(12.15) i s achieved, 
Case ( i i ) 
There i s an entry a^ ^^  in the f i r s t column suchthat ^-^-^ y 
In this case, proceeding as in Case(i) but operating with rows instead 
of columns, (12.15) i s reached. 
Case ( i i i ) 
a^^ divides every entry in the f i r s t row and f i r s t column. 
In this case, by subtracting suitable multiples of the f i r s t column 
from the other columns, one can replace a l l the entries in the f i r s t 
row other than a^ ^^ ^ i t s e l f by zeroes. Similarly, subtracting multiples 
of the f i r s t row from the others, a matrix i s obtained which i s of the 
form. 
^ 1 0 ... 0 
D = 0 
0 • 
I f a^^ divides every entry of D*, (12.14) has been reached; i f not 
there i s an entry, say, d^ .^ such that a In that case, by 
adding the i t h row to the top row leads to case ( i ) . 
Repeated application of these procedures w i l l result in the form (12.14) 
after a f i n i t e number of steps, thereby completing the f i r s t stage of 
reduction. 
End of Reduction 
By applying the above process to the submatrix C*^  one can 
reduce i t s size s t i l l further, leaving a t r a i l of diagonal elements. 
Any elementary operation on C* corresponds to an elementary operation 
on C which does not affect the f i r s t row and column. Also any 
elementary operation on C*" gives a new matrix whose entries are 
linear combinations of the old ones and hence the new entries w i l l 
therefore s t i l l be d i v i s i b l e by d. . Thus d, d_ ... d . 
1 1 2 n 
- 260 
In paxticulax in the- case of a 2x2 matrix A, the unimodular 
transformations can be found as follows 
Let A =1 ^ and b> a & ^cd (b,c,d) 
I t i s f i r s t shown that the matrix A i s equivalent to a matrix of the 
form 
/ . . .\ I 
gcd ( b % c % d ' ) where a' 
Using induction on a: the case a = X i s t r i v i a l ; when a> L and a/^b, 
choosing q so that 0<aq + b < a 
and consider 
a b ^ / q x \ _ I ag+b 
where the leading element i s a positive integer less than a. I f a b 
and a ^ c , then choosing q" such that 0<aq'-t-c <a and consider 
w^ere the leading element i s once again a positive integer le s s than 
a. F i n a l l y i f a gcd {b,c) but a ^ d , l e t c = c^a so that 
1 l\ / 1 0\ / a b\ ^ / a (l-c^)b+d 
^ V \r^i V V 7 \ * * 
and A J( { (1-c^) b*d } which reduces back to the case u*ien a^b. The 
inductive argument i s now complete* Now a'gcd(b'',d') • Letting 
b"* = a'b'"', c" = a'c^'and d* = a^ d " and considering 
O a" (d"-b"'c"" ) (12.16) 
the desired result i s obtained. 
With A =/ ^ '*'^ \ , (12.16) reduces to 
Ub ay 
0 a" (l+b"-- ) ^ 
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i-Further as d d and Nm = d d where Nm = TT p., the only allowed 
values for d^^ and d^ are 1 and Nm respectively- So the messages can 
be represented as x^ w^  where goes from 0 to Nm-1. In t h i s case, 
the elementary divisor d^, the encrypting exponent e and the matrix 
U (see 12.13) are made public. The decrypting exponent d i s kept 
secret. The security l i e s in the d i f f i c u l t y of factoring = Nm. 
The encryption procedure i s carried out as follows: 
Let M = x^w^ 
C = mod <ra> 
= (x w )^ mod <m> 
e 
= w^  mod <m> 
Using 
-1 
and 
= U 
i ^ + 1 = o 
where 
C' = y2^^2 obtained. Now reducing y^ (mod d^) the cipher C i s 
obtained 
C = y-w mod <m> 
A similar procedure can be carried out for decryption to recover the 
original message using the decrypting exponent d. An example using 
this method i s now given below. 
Let = 2+3i and Fl^ ~ ^^^^ where 11^  and 11^  are primes in Z [ i ] . The 
modulus m = 7i-4 and Nm = 65. ^ <m>= 48. Let e = d = 7 where 
ed = 1 (mod 48). 
• {::. 
Using the method given above to reduce A to diagonal matrix D, 
1 0 \ / -4 7 \ / 2 -7 \ f -1 O D = 
w 
where 
-18 -7 -4 1 -4 O 65 
-1 
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Hence 
(12.17) 
Let the message be M = 
The cipher i s given by 
C = mod <7i-4> 
= 4 w mod< 7i-4> 
Using (12.17), = l - 2 i 
and = 29-278i 
Using (12.17), 
29_278i = -220w^ + QOQw^  (12.18) 
Now reducing (12.18) (mod d^) and (mod <^2^* cipher i s given by 
C = 61 mod <7i-4> 
A similar process for decryption with decoding e?qponent d = 7 gives 
back the original message M. 
Case 2 
Now consider the case where the primes JIj which form the 
modulus m divide the rational primes p^ . of the form p^ = 3 (mod 4). 
Then the norm Nm i s a non-square free rational integer given by 
2 Nm = ! ' p. 
2 
In this case although 2[i]/<I^> i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of p_. elements, one 
cannot represent the residue classes modulo <n.> using the integers 
2 ^ Z/p^ Z as the l a t t e r does not form a f i e l d . On the other hand, one 
can represent the messages in the form x+iy where x, y e 2- As 
mentioned in 12.2.1, the Nm can be made to equal m^  by appropriately 
choosing m to be a rational integer. Therefore, one can represent 
the d i s t i n c t residue classes mod <m> as x+iy where 0^,y $ |^ /Nm[-1, 
thus giving r i s e to Nra residue classes. Using the elementary divisor 
theory described above, this corresponds to the case where d^ = 
p_. and d^ = TJ^ p,* Again these are the only allowed values for 
d^ and d^ as the following conditions must hold: 
( i ) ^1 1^2 
( i i ) d^.d^ = Nm 
( i i i ) Z/d^2 i s isomorphic to a direct sum of f i n i t e f i e l d s , for 
i = 1,2. 
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The divisors d^ and d^ and the exponent e are made public. 
The OTcryption and decryption procedures are very much simplified in 
this case. I f a message M i s raised to the power e then to perform 
mod <m> , i t i s only necessary to reduce the coef f i c i e n t s by the 
corresponding elementary divisors. Let M=x+iy be the message then, 
the cipher C i s obtained by 
mod <in> 
= (x+iy)^ mod <m> 
= g(mod d i ) + h (mod dg) i 
where d^ ^ = d^ =|^ /rS"| 
A similar procedure can be used for decryption. 
noin: 
12.3 Factori2ation Trapdoor System in Other Quadratic Fields 
12.3.1 ^ladratic Pields_R_(VDl 
Note that when D=-l, R(VD),vi*iere R i s the set of rational 
bei^^incUutes the ring of Gaussian integers considered i n the previous 
section. I n i t i a l l y some of the properties of the integers i n Rl^^D) 
which are required in the design of a trapdoor system are b r i e f l y 
examined. A detailed treatment of quadratic f i e l d s can be found in 
[61, 63, 65] . 
A quadratic f i e l d i s a f i e l d of degree 2 over the rationals. 
Such a f i e l d i s of the form R( 9) \«^ ere 6 i s a root of a quadratic 
polynomial which i s irreducible over the rationals. Let 6 sat i s f y an 
equation 
2 
x + 2ax b = O where a, b e 2 
Then 0 = -a ;^  Ja^-b. Removing from a^-b a l l sqiiare factors so that 
2 2 
a -b = s D where D has no factor higher than the f i r s t power, then 
R( 0) i s equivalent to R (>/D). That i s , every quadratic f i e l d i s of 
the form R(>/D) where D i s a rational integer free, of square factors. 
The ring of integers of R(^/D) for square free D depOTds on 
the arithmetic properties of D. I t i s shown in [61 ] that the integers 
in R(N/D) f a l l into two categories, namely, 
( i ) i f D ^ 1 (mod 4), then the integers are of the form x-*y^ 
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( i i ) 
where x, y e 2» ie , Z [>/D] 
i f D = 1 (n»d 4), then the integers are of the form x+y 
where x. y e Z. i e , Z [ ^ ^ " 
Note that the Gaussian integers considered in the l a s t section f a l l s 
into the f i r s t category. 
Using Lemma 1 (Section 12,2.:^, i t i s seen that an integer in 
R(N/D) i s a unit i f i t s norm i s + 1. When D ? 1 (mod 4), the norm of 
a i s Na = a ci = (a+b'/D) (a-b^D) = a^-Db^. 
When D = 1 (mod 4), the norm of Q i s given by 
Na = [a + I (l+>/D)] [a + I ( l - > / D ) ] = (a + ^ sb)^ - f b^. 
Note that the norms are positive in complex quadratic f i e l d s (ie^D i s 
negative) but not necessarily positive i n real quadratic f i e l d s (ie,D 
i s positive). Thus a i s a unit i f 
a^ - Db^ = + 1 1 
or > (12.19) 
( a . % b ) 2 - 5 b 2 = . l J 
When D<0, the equations (12.19) have only a f i n i t e number of solutions 
[63]. IVhen D = -1, as seen in Section 12.2.1 the ring of Gaussian 
integers Z [ i ] has four units namely + 1» + i« V>/hen D = -3, there are 
si x solutions to the equation (12.19) namely + 1, + w, + where w 
i s the cube root of unity, w = (-1 + ^ ^ ) / 2 . For a l l other complex 
fi e l d s , the only units are +1. In the case of real f i e l d s , there 
exists an i n f i n i t e number of solutions to the equation (12.19) and 
hence an i n f i n i t e number of units [63]. These units however may be 
expressed in the form of + where n takes a l l positive and negative 
rational values. The quantity £ i s called the fundamental unit. 
Using the definition of a prime element given i n Section 
12.2.1 i t i s seen that the Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 are also applicable in 
R('/D). Although every integer in R( VD) can be expressed as a product 
oj- Primes, i ^ does not necessarily imply that the factorization i s 
unique l i k e in 2 or Z[ i ] . Consider for instance the factorizations of 
the integer 6 in R(>/K)) expressed as 
6 = 2.3 = (4 + '/lO) (4 - ^/lO) 
or of the integer 21 in R O ^ ) 
21 = 3.7 = (1 + 2N/^) (1 - 2>/l5) = (4 +VI5) (4 - VI?) 
(12.20) 
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Considering ( 1 2 . 2 0 ) , we have the following situation: the integer 3, 
0-Prime,divides ( 1 + 2 ^ > ^ ) ( 1 - 2>n^) but f a i l s to divide either 
factor in R(>/^^. Such a situation does not a r i s e for instance in Z or 
2 [ i ] . Hence i t i s seen that in RisPs)^ P r i m e intejer5 which are not 
associated can have a common factor which i s not in R(s/^)» I t 
appears then that in such algebraic number f i e l d s tfe.' .Primes- — are 
not necessarily the atoms from which a l l the integers are constructed. 
I t i s in such cases the factorization of an ideal into a 
unique set of prime ideals (see Section 11.2*6)comes into use. The 
rings where the unique factorization of integers fails,correspond to 
non-principal ideal domains- The theory of non-principal ideal 
domains i s considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis and hence 
the design of factorization trapdoor systems has been confined to 
principal ideal domains. 
1 2 . 3 . 2 Des^i2n_of TrapdoorJ30din£ System£_ Conplex ^£lid£a^l Q^±^^l?-S. 
Fields_ 
The f i e l d s which possess the unique factorization of elements 
property obey Euclidean algorithm of one form or other. There are j u s t 
five complex Euclidean f i e l d s namely when D — 1 , - 2 , -3, -7 and - 1 1 . 
(There are 4 other complex f i e l d s which have the propserty of unique 
factorization of elements but obey a s l i g h t l y different form of 
Euclidean algorithm [ 3 8 ] ) . For these nine cases the ring R(^/D) i s a 
principal ideal domain. The prime ideals are therefore the ideals 
generated by the prime integers in R(>i^). From the point of view of 
designing a factorization trapdoor system, the primes i n R(>/D^ ) and the 
relationship between the primes in Z and the primes in R ( V ^ ) need to 
be considered. More exactly, i t i s necessary to know whether a 
' rational prime s p l i t s in R(>JD) and i f so how. does i t s p l i t . 
From Kuramer's theorem [ 6 8 ] , the decomposition of an ideal 
<p>, where p i s a prime in Z, into prime ideals in R(>/D) i s determined 
by the factorization of the polynomial f(x) = x -D in Z/pZ. Over 
Z/f>2, the factorizations of f ( x ) are 
i f P|D or 4D 
2 J 2 
X -D = ^ X -D i f D i s not a square (mod p) 
- 2 
(>o-a)(x+a)if D = a (mod p), a £ Z 
The three cases therefore correspond to: 
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1. I f a prime p in Z divides the discriminant [68] of the f i e l d 
R(>ID) ( i f D = 1 (mod 4),discriminant = D and if D ^ I (mod 4), 
discriminant = 4D), then the ideal < p> i s factorized into 
the square of a prime ideal in R{yfD)m That is,< p> = 
u^iere p denotes a prime ideal in R(NfD), and Np = p. (12.21) 
2. An odd prime p which does not divide the discriminant 
2 
generates a prime ideal of degree 2 in R(\/D) i f X -D = 0 
(mod p) does not have an integral solution. That i s , p i s 
2 
irreducible in R(^/D) and <p> = p and Np = p . (12.22) 
2 — 2 — 
3. On the other hand, i f x -D = O (mod p) (or y -4D = 0 (mod p)) 
has a solution t h ^ i <p> decomposes into two d i s t i n c t conjugate 
prime ideals, <p> = ^-^^2 ^^^^ ^Pl ~ ~ P (12.23) 
(Note that the prime p = 2 i s of no cryptographic significance) 
As an example, consider the non-principal ideal domain R(v/^) whose 
discriminant i s equal to 4D = -20. 2 and 5 are the only prime factors 
of the discriminant and consequently are factorable into squares of 2 2 prime ideals as <2> = <2, 1 + \/^> and <5> = <>/^ > 
The congruence x^ + 5 = O (mod p) has solution for p = 3, 7, 23,... 
but cannot be solved for p = 11, 13, 17, ... Therefore 
<3> = <3, 1 +Nri5> <3, I -v/35> 
<7> = <7, 3 +\r^> <7, 3 -v/35> ... 
while <11>, <13> ... are prime ideals. 
The designer chooses primes p^,..., p^ in 2 which give r i s e 
to prime ideals in R(>/D). I f the primes p^ are chosen so that x^-D 
= 0 (mod p^) have integral solutions then l e t t i n g 
<p^ > " P Pi2 where p^^, p^^ prime ideals in R ( ^ ) 
the composite ideal^<m> i s equal to, say. 
<m> Pi: 
1= , 
The number of incongruent residues with respect to the ideal <m> and 
relatively prime to <m>is given by 
1. 
/<m> = r [ ^ (p.^) 
TT N p., - 1 (12.24) 
i=l 
And hence using (12.23), 
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(12.25) 
2 _ -I f the primes p^, l ^ i ^ r , are chosen such that x -D = 0 (mod p^) do 
not have an integral solution for a l l i , then the ideals< p^> are 
irreducible in R(/D) and 
r 
^ <xa> = " [ (p^ -1 ) (12.26) 
i=l 
using (12.22) . 
2 — 
The designer can decide whether x -D = O (mod p) for a 
chosen prime p has solution or not using the law of quadratic reprocity. 
2 — 
In general i f x = a(mod,n), where gcd(a,n) = 1, has a solution then 'a' i s 
said to be a quadratic residue modulo n. Here n=p and a=D. To 
determine whether D i s a quadratic residue or not modulo p, the designer 
computes the Legendre Symbol (^). I f (^) = 1 .then D i s a quadratic 
residue and i f i t i s equal to -1 then D i s a quadratic non—residue. 
Calculating the Legendre symbol i s not much different from evaluating 
gcd of two numbers using Euclid's algorithm and can be done by repeated 
divisions in polynomial time. (Note that |D| i s of small value). 
The Fermat theorem in th i s case i s given by 
^ ^ = X (mod <m> ) 
urtiere a i s an arbitrary integer in R(>/D) r e l a t i v e l y prime ro <mf>. 
The encryption and decryption exponents e and d can be 
calculated using 
ed = 1 (mod J"<m > ) 
where _^<m> i s given by (12.25) or (12.26) 
The public encryption key i s (e,m) and the secret decryption key i s 
(d,m). Having generated the rational primes p^, calcula-ted ^ < ra>, e 
and d, the designer needs to obtain m to make i t public. That i s , 
given the primes p^,. p^ in Z, he needs to calculate m where m = 
n , . . . n and n ' s are primes in R(>/D), and IT . i s of the form 11. = a. + 
b^To i f D ^  1 (nod 4) and = a^ + b ^ ( — - — ) i f D = 1 (mod 4). To 
obtain m, he needs to find 1 1 ^ , . . . , 11 ^ , that i s , he needs to calculate 
a^ and b^ for a l l i , l ^ i ^ r by solving either 
= a^^ - b^^D = p^ or p^^, i f D ? t(mbd 4) (12.27) 
or 
Nn a. + a.b. 1 1 1 b^ = p^ or , i f D = I (mod 4) 
(12.28) 
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Note that (12.28) can be unritten as 
A^^ - Db^^ = 4p^ or 4p^^ (12.29) 
where A^ = (2a^ + b^) 
For solving (12.27) or (12.29), the method 4 of Section 12.2.2, which 
consists of a r b i t r a r i l y choosing a^ and to form integers 
then checking u^ether their norms are primes or squares o f primes, 
seems to be the most attractive one for the system designer. 
Again i t may be advisable for the designer to choose a l l the 
primes p. , l ^ i ^ r , to be of the same type, that i s , either they a l l 
decompose into d i s t i n c t conjugate prime ideals in R ( J D ) or they are 
irreducible in R ( V D ) . I f one of a^(A^) or b^ i s zero and the other i s 
p^(2p^), then factorization of m would be made easy as seen in Section 
12.2.2. 
12.3.3 SecurityjDf The Systerajm R(;{pjL 
The security of the system seems to be the same as that of 
the RSA system. The opponent needs to find the decrypting exponent d 
to break the system. One way of finding t h i s i s to obtain ^ <m>. To 
cal c u l a t e ^ m > , he needs to factorize Nm given the modulus nj. I f the 
2 — 
designer had chosen the rational primes such that congruence x -D = O 
(mod p^ )have a solution for a l l i , then the norm Nm i s given by 
Nm = TTPi 
2 -
On the other hand, i f the prunes have been chosen such that x -D = O 
(mod p^) have no solution for a l l i , then 
Nm = JX p;^ 
i=l ^ 
As in the case of Gaussian integers, note that the cryptanalyst does 
not require to find the primes in R(>/D') to break the system. Thus 
unlike the designer, he i s not faced with the problem of solving 
(12.27) or (12.29). 
12.3.4 ReE.resentat^ionj3f Mes^sa9es_anc3_Sjfstem O p e r a t i c 
2 — 
I f the primes p^ are chosen such that x -D = 0 (mod p^) have 
solution for a l l i , thm every integer of R(\/lD)/<m> i s congruent to an 
element i n the range O to N<m> -1 as in Section 12.2.4. Thus the 
messages can be represented using integers in 2 in the range O to 
N<m>-1. As in Section 12.2.4, the encryption and decryption procedures 
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can be performed modulo Nm or m, where Nm e Z and me R ( ^ ) . The messages 
can also be represented in the form x + y T D (D ^l(mod. 4-)) or x+y (lW5) 
2 
([3=1 (nod 4)),x,ye2> using the elementary divisor method given in 
Section 12.2.4. 
I f D ^ 1 (mod 4) then the integral basis of R(>/D) i s (I.VD") 
and the matrix A in Section 12.2.4 i s equal to 
A = 
I f D = 1 (mod 4), then the integral basis of R(v^) i s 
( 1 , ^ - ^ ^ and the matrix A i s equal to 
4 
Using the method given in Section 12.2.4, the matrix A can be reduced 
to diagonal form (dj^t^^) and the modified basis of the ideal < m> i s 
obtained as (d^ ^ w^ , d^ w^). The residue classes mod <m> are therefore 
given by x^ w^^ + x^ w^  where CHx^<d^ and 0^^2'^^2* equal 
to ^ ^ ^ ^ i in this case, the only allowed values for d^ and are given 
by d^=l and 6^= TT^^i . The operation modulo < m> required in 
encryption and decryption i s performed in the same way as that given 
in Section 12.2,4. 
2 
I f the primes are chosen such that x -D = 0 (mod ) 
have no solution for a l l i , then the norm i s a non-square free rational 
integer and as i n Section 12.2.4, one cannot represent the residue 
classes modulo < > using the integers 2/p^ 2 . This case corresponds 
to the situation when d^ = d^ = iJT p^ in the elementary divisor method. 
The messages are hence represented in the form + x ^ ^ / ^ f o r D ^ 1 1 + <>/Nm (mod 4) and \ ^2 ^~2—^ for D = 1 (mod 4) w^ere 0^:x^,X2 
= d^- The reduction mod <ra> i s performed by simply reducing each 
of the components x^^ and niod VNm. 
Again, the elementary divisors d^ and d^ are made public 
together with the encrypting exponent, e. 
12.3.5 Real_Ojadr a t ix_Fije]^^ 
There are 16 real quadratic f i e l d s which obey the Euclid's 
algorithm itfith respect to the f i e l d norm and hence possess the unique 
factorization of integers property [65]. • They occur \\dnen D i s equal to 
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2,3,5,6,7,11,13.17,19,21,29,33,37,41.57 and 73. One major difference 
between the complex quadratic f i e l d s and real quadratic f i e l d s i s that 
the l a t t e r has i n f i n i t e l y many units (Section 12.3.1). However th i s 
does not cause any serious problems provided we choose the message 
representation within the allowed standard set mod <m>. This i s done 
in any case, by either using the elementary divisor method or using 
the standard set of messages modulo Nm. Thus i t seems that in th i s 
case, there are not any major changes to the trapdoor system described 
above for the Euclidean complex quadratic f i e l d s . 
12.4 Discussion 
The design of factorization trapdoor systems in some 
quadratic fields u^ch are principal ideal domains has been considered. 
However majority of the quadratic f i e l d s are non-principal ideal 
domains and they do not possess the unique factorization of elements 
property. But the^ unique factorization of a non-zero ideal into prime 
ideals s t i l l applies in such f i e l d s . Factorization trapdoor system 
seems possible i f the chosen ring modulo the ideal i s isomorphic to 
a direct sum of f i n i t e fields* Choosing a square, free ideal A, not 
necessarily a principal ideal, in R ( J D ) and l e t 
A = ...p^ where P^  are prime ideals in R(\/D) 
R(NfD)/A = R(>/D)/p^ e ... © R(VD)/P^ 
where R ( ^ ^ ) / p ^ i s a f i n i t e f i e l d of Np^ elements 
The order of the group formed by residues r e l a t i v e l y prime to A i s 
given W ^ ^ 
/(A)=TT J(P.) = Tt (NP.-l) "Sing ( I I . 1 ) 
i=l ^ i =l ^ 
The coding exponents e and d can be found using ed = 1 (mod_^(A)). 
From Lemma 3, every prime ideal divides a rational prime p which i s 
unique [63 ]. I f the rational primes p^ are chosen such that x -D=0 
(mod p^) have .solution for a l l i , then the residue classes modp^ can be 
represented using rational integers mod p^. Hence the messages modulo 
A can be represented using integers O to N(A)-1. The elementary divisor 
method of Section 12.2.4 can. also be employed to represent the messages. 
I f the primes are chosen such that x^-D=0 (mod p^) have no solution 2 ^ -
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for a l l i , then both elementary divisors d^ ^ and d^ are equal to >/N(A). 
Let us conclude this chapter by considering a small example 
\**jich shoitfs some of the calculations involved in the design of a 
trapdoor system in R{\P5)f a non-principal ideal domain. 
Choosing rational primes Pj^=3 and P2='7f their decon^sition 
in R(\/C5) i s given by 
<3> = ( 3 , l+\iC5) ( 3 , l-vCs) = p^^ 
<?> = (7 , 3 + \ £ 5 ) ( 7 , 3 - \ / l 5 ) = p^^ 
Let 
Then 
A = p^ = ( 3 , l+vCT) ( 7 , 3 - \ / i r ) 
A = (21, 7+7\C5", 9 -3 \ f l5 , 8+2VC5') 
Any ideal can be represented using a two-element basis over the ring [ 65] 
Using standard rules for transfoiming the ideal basis [ 6 5 ] , 
A = (21, a+\fl5) 
N(A)= 21 
The integral basis of R(\/^) i s (l,\/ir5) as - 5 ? 1 (mod 4) 
Representing the ideal A as a Z-module 
[21, 219, 4 + 0 , - 5 + 4 0 ] where 0 
or 
-5+4 0 
O 21 
Let 
B = 
f 21 
0 21 
4 1 
Using the algorithm given in Section 1 2 . 2 . 4 , t h i s matrix i s reduced to 
a diagonal form (^]^f^2^ v^^ere *^j^|^2 
VBU 
/ I O 
0 21 
O 0 
V O O 
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where 
V = 
O O 
0 1 
1 O 
O 1 
-1 
0 
1 
-4 
and U = 
Now the messages can be represented as 
M x^ w^  + x^ Ux^<d^ i=l,2 (12.30) 
where 
IT-
In this case, as d^ ^ = 1,M = ^2^2* •''^ '^ 2^ *^ 2* However i f the rational 
primes are chosen such that they stay as primes in the higher f i e l d 
R {yfD)fthen = ^ 2 " ^ /N(A) and the messages can be represented 
using (12.30). ^(A) = (NP^-1) (NP^-l) = 12. One set of coding 
exponents e and d i s e = 5, d = 5. The messages can be encrypted 
using a similar procedure to that given in Section 12.2.4 for Gaussian 
2 
integers, except in this case, the recursive equation i s f ( 9 ) = 6 + 5 = 0 
0. The elementary divisors d^, d^* the encrypting instead of x +1 
exponent e and the matrix U are made public and the decrypting exponent 
d i s kept secret. 
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C H A P T E R 13 
CONVENTIONAL CRYPIOSYSTEM WITH PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION 
13.1 General 
This chapter focusses on the concept of public key 
distribution (R<D) mentioned in Section 9.6, whereby the 'public key 
idea' i s solely used to transfer a key between ZVXD users over an 
insecure channel. In this case, there i s no message as such which 
gets encrypted at the sending end and decrypted at the receiving end. 
In such a system, two users who wish to exchange a key communicate 
back and forth u n t i l they arrive at a key in common. The opponent 
eavesdropping on this exchange must therefore find i t conputationally 
infeasible to derive the key from the information overheard. This 
type of arrangement i s used in conjunction with the conventional 
cryptographic DES interface unit to form a DES/FKD hybrid system. An 
implementation of such a hybrid system i s discussed in Section 13.5. 
Dif f i e and Hellman [35] proposed such a key distribution 
system based on exponentiation over f i n i t e f i e l d . This technique 
briefly described in Section 9.5.3 makes use of the apparent d i f f i c u l t y 
of computing logarithms over a f i n i t e f i e l d GF(q) where q i s a very 
large prime number. Each user generates an independent random number 
x^ chosen uniformly from the set of integers {l,2,...q-l} , and computes 
y^ = a i(mod q) where'a' i s a primitive element of GF(q). The number 
y^ i s made public and the number x^ i s kept secret. When users i and 
j wish to communicate privately, they can use the comnon key ^^jf given 
t>y K^ .^= a'^i^j=(y^ )^j=(y^ )^i(mod q). 
For the system to be secure, the key K^ ^ must be d i f f i c u l t 
to compute for anyone who knows y^ and y . but does not know either x^ 
or X j . In order to ensure that this computation i s d i f f i c u l t , i t i s 
necessary that logarithms over GF(q) be d i f f i c u l t to compute. Other-
wise an opponent could compute x^ from y^ and impersonate user i . 
Some currently known algorithms for calculating the logarithms over 
f i n i t e f i e lds are now br i e f l y looked at. 
13.2 Logarithms Over Finite Fields 
Knuth's algorithm [45] to compute logarithm over GF(q) 
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requires 2 c^ g multiplications (mod q) in addition to other operations 
of comparable complexity. This algorithm requires 2 qig"| words of 
memory^  each ["log^q bits long. This algorithm can be generalized to 
allow a time-memory tradeoff in which time i s almost proportional to 
q^and memoy t o q ~ ^ for any O^r^. Knuth* s algorithm corresponds to the 
case where T=^, Allovxing arbitrary values of r enables the algorithm to 
be adjusted to particular time-memory requirements. The algorithm to 
— X 
compute X from y=a (mod q) works as follows: 
Let m = q^ 
Then there exist integers c and d such that 
X = cm+d with 0^< [q/"^ = ^'"^ 
and 0^ :d<m = q^ 
Substituting for x in a , gives cm+d , , , y = a (mod q) d - -cm , , . le, a = y a (mod q) 
In order to determine c and d, the values of a^(mod q) are precomputed 
for d=0,l,...m-l in O(q^) operations and the results stored in a table 
in 0(q^ log^ q^) operations. Then y,ya""*, ya" .. (mod q) are each 
d 
computed and compared with the sorted table of {a }until a match i s 
found. Each value of c tried requires 1 multiplication (mod q) and 
log^ q^ comparisons, thus giving a total of (l+log^ q^) operations. 
There are 0(q^"^) values of c to be tri e d . When r=l, this algorithm 
i s a look up table and when r=0, the algorithm reduces to an exhaustive 
search. Neglecting the logarithmic factors i t i s seen that the time-
memory product i s constant (since q^ .q^ "*^  = q) as the algorithm ranges 
between the extremes of a look up table and an esdiaustive search. 
Fbhlig and Hellman [69] proposed an improved algorithm to 
confute logarithms over GF(q) when the prime q i s chosen such that q-1 
has only small prime factors. On the other hand, i t has long been known 
that a disproportionately large portion of numbers are entirely 
composed of small prime factors and i t i s precisely this fact on u^iich 
Adleman based his very recent discrete logarithm algorithm [70]. 
Assuming a microsecond per operation machine, t h i s new algorithm could 
be expected to compromise a system based on a 200-bit prime q in 2.6 
days rather than the 3xlO^^ years using the best previously published 
method due to Shanks [45]. For a large enough prime q, however, 
Adleman's algorithm i s also infeasible. A sketch of this subexponential 
Adleman's solution to the logarithm problem i s now given following [ 6 ] . 
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— X Problem: Given a, y and q (a prime) f i n d x that s a t i s f i e s y=a" (mod q) 
(where *a'is a p r i m i t i v e element i n GF(q) i n the FKD system). 
The algorithm requires the following preliminary d e f i n i t i o n : a number 
a i s s a i d to be 'smooth^ with respect to abound BD, i f the f a c t o r i z a t i o n 
of a into primes, a = ] I p. ^  i s such that a l l p., l ^ i ^ r , s a t i s f y 
i = l ^ ^ 
p^< BD. 
Step 1 Find by random sampling (and checking) a p o s i t i v e integer R 
such that B = y (mod q),l^B4:q—1 and B i s smooth with respect to the 
bound BD(q) = e ( l " q l " l " q ) ^ and gcd ( R , q - l ) = l . 
Step 2 L e t ^ ^11 the primes-^ BD(q). Find by random 
sampling (and checking) p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r s R. for 1^ i$ m such that 
= a i(mDd q) where l ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^ l and i s smooth with respect to BD(q) 
and the vectors A^ = (e^^^,.. .e^^),u^ere A^ = j _ l ^ q ^ ^ i j , span the ro-
dimensional module over 2/(q-l)Z» the r i n g of i n t e g e r s modulo ( q - 1 ) . 
Step 3 By Gaussian elimination express B = ( f , , . . . , f ),where 
B = J_|qj j , a s a l i n e a r combination of the A^j namely B = ^\'*^2^2*"' * 
*"m^ m ( ^ ^ ) ) where 0^^$q-2 for l « i ^ . 
Now 
and m 
in. B = f . m 
as 
-m m 
l n - B = r ( H " i ^ i j + k ( q - l ) ) l n q j 3^ 
j = l ^1=1 
m 
B Z n e. . (mod (q-1)) 
^ i = l 
Exponentiating (13.1) g i v e s . 
n. 
m / m e. .\ 1 
B = M ( ] J * l j ' " j (nod q) 
That i s J m 
1 i (mod q) 
R 
Where A^ can be replaced by a i . 
Step 4 C a l c u l a t e R~^ (mod q-1). Then y = TIT a " i ^ i * ^ (mod q) 
That i s , y = a^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " i ^ i ' (mod q ) . That i s , x = R"^ ^ I ^ n^R^(mod q) 
Now b r i e f l y consider the execution time of t h i s algorithm. 
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Let i> (x,y)/x = Prob(2 i s smooth with respect to y / 2 ^ x ) . Using 
r . i I / V/ - ( l n x / l n y j ( l n l n x - l ) ^ Erdos's r e s u l t [ 6 ] , vj; {x,y )/x = e ^ ' -^'^  Thus the 
expected number of t r i e s needed to obtain a smooth number i s approx-
imately e^^"""/^^) ( l n l n x - 1 ) ^ ^^ .^^  ^^^^^^ ^ c a r r i e d out 6(y) 
times where 6{y) i s the number of primes l e s s than or equal to y and 
6(y ) = y/lny = e ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ . Thus the t o t a l computational e f f o r t i s 
approximately e ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ( I n l n ^ l j +lny-lnlny ^^.^^ approximately 
^c/d+d ^ ^ j ^ ^ _ i n x l n l n x and d = Iny* But e^'^*^*^ ( O O ) i s maximized 
k . , J . . , ^ _. 2 ( l n x l n l n x ) H when d = c , y i e l d i n g a computational e f f o r t of order e ^ . 
A sharper a n a l y s i s [ 6 ] r e s u l t s i n an upper bound for the logarithm 
problem of e^^"*^^" thus removing the f a c t o r 2 from the exponent-
System designer's avoidance of q such that q-1 has only small 
prime f a c t o r s cannot be accomplished by f i r s t choosing a prime q such 
that ^ ( l ^ q ^ ^ l " * ^ ) ^ i s p r o h i b i t i v e l y l a r g e from the c r y p t a n a l y s t point 
of view and then determining the prime power f a c t o r i z a t i o n of q-1. 
This i s because the most e f f i c i e n t known f a c t o r i z a t i o n algorithm due to 
Schroeppell (unpublished) a l s o makes use of the concept of smoothness. 
I t has an expected running time for f a c t o r i n g q-1 of e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^"^"^^^ ^  ^  
One way to overcome t h i s problem i s . t o generate a l a r g e random prime 
number u and l e t q to be the f i r s t prime i n the sequence iu+1 for 
i=2,4,6..« as mentioned i n Section 10.2. 
13.3 Public Key D i s t r i b u t i o n i n GF(2") 
While i t i s p o s s i b l e to implement the exponentiation p u b l i c 
key d i s t r i b u t i o n system as above, some implem^tation d i f f i c u l t i e s can 
be overcome by considering the exponentiation system i n the extension 
f i e l d s G F(2"). 
F i r s t consider the exponentiation over GF(q) from a system 
design point of view. I n i t i a l l y one needs a s u i t a b l e set of routines 
to generate and t e s t for l a r g e prime numbers. The t e s t s mentioned i n 
Section 10.2 can be used for t h i s purpose. Further i t i s required that 
the routine must generate a prime q such that q-1 has no small f a c t o r s . 
Blakely [71 ] r e f e r s to such primes of the form q=2p+l where p i s a 
prime as 'safe' primes. Then one must choose a p r i m i t i v e element 'a' 
in GF(q). The number of p r i m i t i v e elements (mod q) i s given by the 
Euler totiCTit function 0 ( q - l ) and hence the p r o b a b i l i t y that an 
a±>itrarily chosen element 'a' i s p r i m i t i v e i s given by 0 ( q - i y q - l . I f 
q i s of the form 4p+l where p i s a prime then 2"(mod q) i s a p r i m i t i v e 
element (mod q) f o r any n r e l a t i v e l y prime to q-1 and hence the problem 
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o f determining a p r i m i t i v e element i s s i m p l i f i e d . Otherwise f i n d i n g a 
p r i m i t i v e root of an a r b i t r a r y prime q may be more cumbersome re q u i r i n g 
the knowledge o f the f a c t o r s of q-1. I n addition, n a i l t i p l e p r e c i s i o n 
arithmetic i s required which i s cumbersome and slows down th e response 
time. 
To overcome some of these problems a s s o c i a t e d with the GF(q) 
implementation^ Berkovits [72] proposed to perform the exponentiation i n 
the extension f i e l d G F ( 2 " ) , i n s t e a d of GF(q). As t h i s i s an extension 
f i e l d of G F ( 2 ) a l l operations are based on modulo 2 a r i t h m e t i c which i s 
e a s i l y implementable using d i g i t a l l o g i c systems. Addition and sub-
t r a c t i o n are performed with e x c l u s i v e - o r operation alone, w h i l e oper-
ati o n s i n GF(q) require c a r r y and borrow propagation. Further advan-
tages a r i s e from the choice of n to be a prime so that 2^-1 i s a 
Mersenne prime. Since there are no subgroups within the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e 
group of such a f i e l d , the logarithmic attack reduces to an exhaustive 
search. Furthermore, s i n c e the order o f the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e group i s a 
prime, every elemwit except one i s p r i m i t i v e . Thus the s e l e c t i o n of 'a* 
becomes a r b i t r a r y . F i n a l l y i s i n c e a l l the r e s u l t i n g y's (y=a^ i n GF(2'^)) 
are a l s o p r i m i t i v e , the number of p o s s i b l e keys i s maximieed. 
As seen i n Section 10.5, the elements of GF(p") can be 
represented using polynomials o f degree l e s s than n whose c o e f f i c i e n t s 
are i n GF(p). In t h i s system p=2 and hence the c o e f f i c i e n t s are a l l 
e i t h e r 0 or 1. Using the e a r l i e r n otation, the f i e l d 2/2Z£x]/f ( x ) , 
where f ( x ) i s an i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial of degree n over Z/22, i s 
isomorphic to GF(2"). M u l t i p l i c a t i o n of two elements i n GF(2") are 
programmed as m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of two polynomials and the terms i n the 
product with exponent n or higher a r e reduced modulo the generating 
i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial f ( x ) . L e t f ( x ) be a monic polynomial and i s 
equal to n-1 
f ( x ) = x" + b i x^ where b^e {o,l 
Then n-1 i 
n = ^ X (nod f ( x ) ) 
i=0 
Then the reduction process of a polynomial P(x) modulo f ( x ) i s 
performed as follows: ( c f Section 10.5) 
L e t 
P(x) = Q(x) + R(x) x"" 
u^ere the degree of Q(x) i s l e s s than n. 
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Then n - l 
P(x) = Q(x) + R(x) 1^ b.x"-
Q(x) + H R(x) x^ (mod f ( x ) ) 
1 
T h i s r e s u l t may s t i l l have terms with exponents equal to n o r greater 
and the process i s repeated. The reduction process continues u n t i l the 
r e s u l t i s of degree l e s s than n. 
As 2^-1 i s prime, any number 'a' l e s s than 2*^ -1 (other than 
1) can be used as the base ( p r i m i t i v e element i n G F ( 2 " ) ) of the FKD 
system. The base 'a' can be represented as a vector whose value as a 
binary number i s equal to 'a*. That i s , l e t 
n - l ^ 
^ 1^ ^ i ^ uiiere a. e 2/2Z 
Uet the s e c r e t keys of users A and B be and which are i n t e g e r s 
l e s s than 2 " - l (except 1 ) . Then, 
/ n - l ^ 
where Vp^i^) i s ^ polynomial of degree l e s s than n with c o e f f i c i e n t s 
over GF(2). y ^ ( x ) can be represented as an integer in the range 
CkY <2"-l by c a l c u l a t i n g the value of the polynomial y - ( x ) i n binary. A Pi 
S i m i l a r l y the user B c a l c u l a t e s Y . Thus the public key and s e c r e t 
B 
key p a i r s of u s e r s A and B are given by (Y^.X^) and CYgfXg) re s p e c t i v e l y , 
The common key i s derived by u s e r s A and B using 
X X 
K ^ = ( y ^ ( x ) ) ^ = {y^{^)) ( m o d f ( x ) ) 
The choice of the extension f i e l d GF(2") depends on the 
required d i f f i c u l t y of computing logarithms over the f i e l d . The 
127 
p a r t i c u l a r choice of the Mersenne prime 2 -1, that i s , n=127 i s very 
a t t r a c t i v e from implementation point of view. In G F ( 2 ^ ^ ) , manip-
u l a t i o n of 127-bit blocks are conveniently performed i n most computers 
which have 8,16,32 or 64-bit a r c h i t e c t u r e s . A f u r t h e r a t t r a c t i o n i s 
that there e x i s t s a p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n p l e i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial, a 
t r i n o m i a l , over GF(2) namely f ( x ) = x"^^ + x + 1 [73] which can be used 
127 
to generate a l l the elements of GF(2 ). But with the advent of the 
subexponential algorithm for computing logarithm over f i n i t e f i e l d s by 
Adleman, i t i s necessary to work i n higher extension f i e l d s to o f f e r 
a s i m i l a r amount of work f a c t o r as the CES to break the system. The - 279 -
next Mersenne prime occurs when n=521 and 2 ^ ^ ^ - l i s a prime. Thus one 
can work i n GF(2 ) to overcome the attack using Adleman's subexpon-
e n t i a l logarithm algorithm. I n t h i s f i e l d , t h e corresponding i r r e d u c i b l e 
521 32 
trin o m i a l over GF(2) i s given b y f ( x ) = x + x + 1 [73]. Tore 
Herlestam [74 ] has proposed a h a i r L s t i c method for computing logarithms 
over GF(2^) where p i s a prime. When 2^-1 i s a Mersenne prime l e s s 
than or eqiaal to 2 - I , the method i s reported to work i n v e r y short 
running times on a general purpose computer [74 ] . Although the 
numerical r e s u l t s obtained so f a r and the complexity of the problem 
does not allow to a s s e s s the s e c u r i t y of the corresponding p u b l i c key 
d i s t r i b u t i o n systems with p=127, 521 and l a r g e r , t h i s may induce doubts 
that such systems could be considered secure. 
Even s o , t h i s system, r e f e r r e d t o as the Mitre system [ 7 5 ] , 
i s probably the most p r a c t i c a l of the pu b l i c key algorithms that have 
been proposed so f a r . However there is'another attack c a l l e d the 
short c y c l i n g attack which can be used with any p u b l i c key system 
discussed so f a r . This attack may enable 'backdoor' penetrations, for 
example, i n the Mitre system, a penetrator could use h i s knowledge of 
the system parameters namely the system base 'a' and the modulus 
polynomial f ( x ) to superencipher intercepted cipher u n t i l a c y c l e 
occurs. The e f f e c t i v e n e s s of such an attack on the Mitre system i s now 
considered. This attack i s of the same type as the one used by 
Simmons and Norris [76] against the RSA system. 
13.4 Short Cycling Attack 
Suppose g i s a function of a s e t S i n t o i t s e l f . Then given 
an X i n S, the sequence defined by X Q = X and x^=g(x^ ^ ) i s c a l l e d the 
path of the element x under the action of g. I f S i s a f i n i t e s e t , 
Xhen the path of each element must eventually repeat i t s e l f , l^ /hen g 
i s a one to one map, then r e p e t i t i o n begins with ^ - ^ ^ ^ some 
minimal k. Under these circumstances, the path o f x c y c l e s around the 
same k elements. This c i r c u l a r path i s c a l l e d the o r b i t o f x under g. 
The o r b i t of any element not i n the o r b i t of x i s completely d i s j o i n t 
from the o r b i t of x. Thus the s e t S i s p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o d i s j o i n t o r b i t s 
and hence the sum of the numbers of elements i n the d i s t i n c t o r b i t s i s 
the c a r d i n a l i t y of S which i s equal to the s i z e of the l a r g e s t o r b i t 
p o s s i b l e . 
Now consider the c y c l i n g i n the PKD system based on 
exponentiation i n GF(2"). Let 
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and 
P = {x:x an integer between 1 and 2^-1} 
C = {y:y a non-zero elemOTt of GF(2") } 
Le t P denote the set of p l a i n t e x t s ( s e c r e t keys) and C the s e t of 
ci p h e r t e x t s ( p u b l i c keys) under the encrypting function E. L e t us 
define another function DEC from C to P as follows: I f y i s an 
element of C, i t i s a polynomial of degree l e s s than n. Writing y as 
the n-tuple of i t s c o e f f i c i e n t s and evaluating that n-tuple as the 
binary expansion of an integer, the r e s u l t DEC(y) i s obtained. Since 
both E and DEC are one to one functions, t h e i r composition F i s a one 
to one map of the f i n i t e s e t P onto i t s e l f . The s e t P i s p a r t i t i o n e d 
i n t o d i s j o i n t o r b i t s under the F-map. These o r b i t s a r e the c y c l e s . 
A schematic diagram of the mappings i s shown i n Figure 13.1. 
DEC ( y) 
F i g 13.1 
The threat of short c y c l i n g a r i s e s as follows; 
Let 
y^ = a^ 'o (mod f ( x ) ) 
Then 
O 
= A \ (mod f ( x ) ) 
x^ = DEC(y^ ) 
y. = a ^ i (mod f ( x ) ) 
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Hence at some point r , as the set i s . f i n i t e 
y = a^r (mod f ( x ) ) 
= '^O 
and 
y^^^ = a O (mod f ( x ) ) 
When t h i s point i s reached, the opponent r e a l i z e s that the penultimate 
number of the sequence gives the o r i g i n a l s e c r e t key x^. 
This type of short c y c l i n g a n a l y s i s has been c a r r i e d out i n 
small extension f i e l d s using i r r e d u c i b l e polynomials of degrees 3 and 
7. The p r i m i t i v e polynomials used are f ( x ) = x^+x+1 i n GF(2*^) and 
f ( x ) = X +X+1 i n GF(2 ) r e s p e c t i v e l y . The system base * a' i s allowed 
to vary from 2 to 7 and 2 to 127 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Then the c y c l e lengths 
are determined for various values of the s e c r e t exponent x, using the 
program CYCLE.FTN g i v ^ i n Appendix 15. The c y c l e lengths obtained i n 
GF(2. ) for- s e v e r a l values of x are given i n Appendix 17 (Section A17.1), 
The complete s e t of r e s u l t s shows that i n the case of GF(2^) with f ( x ) 
7 5 2 =x +X+1, the base a=38 (evaluated using x=2 i n x +x +x, an element of 
GF(2^)) gives the maximum c y c l e length of 127. [ I n the case of GF(2^) 
urith f(x)=x +X+1, a=5 (x +1 i n GF(2 )) gave the maximum c y c l e length 
of 7 ]. For a l l the other values of the base, the c y c l e lengths are 
l e s s than 127. T h i s can be explained by the reasoning that the choice 
of the system base 'a' p a r t i t i o n s the set P i n t o d i s j o i n t o r b i t s ; i n 
the case of a=38 with the p r i m i t i v e polynomial x +x+l, t h i s has created 
a p a r t i t i o n c o n s i s t i n g only of the e n t i r e set P. Thus every element 
of P i s i n the same o r b i t and hence every value x giv e s the maximum 
c y c l e length with a=38. The other choices of 'a' p a r t i t i o n e d P into 
s e v e r a l d i s j o i n t o r b i t s with d i f f e r e n t c y c l e lengths. Tuo d i f f e r ^ t 
exponent values of x having the same c y c l e l«igth ( f o r instance a=9, 
Xj^=15, ^2~^^' c y c l e length =116) may be due to two or more o r b i t s 
having the same c a r d i n a l i t y or i t may be that x^ and x^ l i e i n the 
same o r b i t . 
These r e s u l t s may i n d i c a t e that c e r t a i n bases and c e r t a i n 
generating polynomials are superior to others thus g i v i n g r i s e to 
maximum c y c l e lengths i r r e s p e c t i v e of the exponent x. I f so, the 
system parameters should not be chosen at random, f o r instance, the 
system base 'a' should not be chosen randomly among a l l p r i m i t i v e 
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elements. To determine whether an optimum set of parameters i s 
po s s i b l e , f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s i s c a r r i e d out i n the extension f i e l d G F(2^). 
Considering the mappings shown i n Figure 13.1, i t i s seen 
that an opponent i s not r e s t r i c t e d to choosing the function DEC to get 
back from C to P. Any one to one map of C to P w i l l serve h i s purpose 
and the system designer cannot guard against a l l p o s s i b l e c h o i c e s of 
the opponent. Consider for instance, the function G(y) where 
G(y) = DEC (b- y) 
Let b take a l l non-zero values i n the s e t C. That i s , b can be any one 
of the 127 polynomials of degree l e s s than 7 i n G F ( 2 ^ ) . Consider the 
following algorithm. 
1. Choose a system base 'a'. 
2. Choose a p a r t i c u l a r value f o r 'b' i n G ( y ) = DEC(b.*y) 
3. Vary the exponent values x ( s e c r e t keys i n PKD) from 2 to 
127 and i n each case, c a l c u l a t e the corresponding c y c l e 
length. 
4. Do steps 2 and 3 for 127 values of 'b'. 
This algorithm has been implemented using the program RANDCYCLE. FTN 
given i n Appendix 16. Several values f or the system base 'a' have 
been t r i e d ; only the r e s u l t s for a=38 are given i n Appendix 17, 
Section A17.2. The r e s u l t s show the expected c y c l e lengths obtained 
as the secret exponent x v a r i e s from 1 to 127 for d i f f e r e n t values of 
the polynomial b (evaluated as a binary v e c t o r ) . From the r e s u l t s , i t 
i s seen that by varying b i n G(y) = DEC(b.y) the expected c y c l e length 
can be changed f or a fi x e d base 'a*. Hence the opponent can obtain a 
shorter c y c l e length than the maximum, by appr o p r i a t e l y choosing the 
value of b i n G(y) for any system base 'a'. Section A17.2 shows that 
with a=38, even though the expected c y c l e length i s equal t o the 
maximum 127, when b=?l, with b=2, the expected c y c l e length = 38.87, 
with b=13, expected c y c l e length = 27.18, with b=125, expected c y c l e 
length = 32.64 and so on. Hence even i f the system designer had 
chosCTi the 'best' system base, a=38, i n h i s PKD system i n G F ( 2 ^ ) , i f 
the opponent chooses b=13 i n h i s G(y) = DEC(b.y) then he only needs to 
superencipher on average 28 times before obtaining the s e c r e t exponent 
X. The system designer has no control over the opponent choice of 'b'. 
Thus i t seems that there i s no best choice for the system base 'a'. 
Section A17.3 of Appendix 17 g i v e s the average expected c y c l e 
lengths for s e v e r a l values of the system base 'a'. That i s , having 
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s e l e c t e d a system base 'a', the expected c y c l e lengths are c a l c u l a t e d 
for the 127 non-zero s p e c i a l i z e d values of the polynomial b. Then the 
average of these exp)ected c y c l e lengths i s determined. From the r e s u l t s 
i t seems that the average expected c y c l e length f o r a chosen system 
base i s around 63.5. R e c a l l i n g that i n the algorithm given above, one 
has considered only 127 functions o f a s p e c i a l i z e d form f o r the 
polynomial 'b*, i t appears that the average expected c y c l e length w i l l 
approach 63.5. i f one has averaged over a l l the 1271 p o s s i b l e functions 
from the set C to the set P. Dr R Odoni has i n f a c t explained using a 
h e u r i s t i c argument that the c y c l e length w i l l be n/2 when a l l the 
n l functions are t a k ^ i i n t o account. 
Thus once the opponent chooses the function from C to P, 
that i s , the value of b i n G ( y ) , then he has a c t u a l l y chosen the order 
i n which he w i l l t r y elements of P to search f o r the one t h a t encrypts 
into cipher y. That i s , he has e f f e c t i v e l y decided on the elements 
G{y^) = DEC (b.y^) 
G(y^) = DEC (b.-y2) 
G(y^) = DEC (b.y^) 
The opponent t r i e s each of the elements i n the above sequence i n turn 
i n the equation a ^ ^ ^ i ' = y^^^ to f i n d the one which matches with the 
given y^. For d i f f e r e n t values of b, the order of the sequence of 
elements changes and hence the number of elements to be searched to 
f i n d the match with y^ ^ changes. The average number of such elements 
to be t r i e d i s about 63.5. T h i s i m p l i e s that f o r a randomly chosen 
system base, the expected c y c l e length of an a r b i t r a r y c y c l e i s about 
h a l f the number of non-zero f i e l d elements. (That i s , ( 2 -0/2 and 
( 2 ^ ^ ^ - 1 ) 7 2 for GF(2^^^) and GF(2^^^ ) r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . Thus although the 
c y c l i n g attack w i l l eventually f i n d a s o l u t i o n , the work required 
appears to be equival«it to a "random" exhaustive key search and hence 
confirms C T ? ] . 
In the next s e c t i o n , the implementation of t h i s FKD system 
in conjunction with the conventional DES system, using Apple micro-
computers i s considered. 
13.5 DES/PKD Hybrid System 
A hybrid DES/FKD demonstration system has been developed 
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using the DES i n t e r f a c e u n i t (Chapter 4) and the exponentiation system 
127 
over GF(2 ). The system has been experimented using two Apple 
microcomputers forming a l i n k . Each Apple microcomputer i s assumed to 
be shared by n users (here n = 5 ). Each of these n users can compose 
and send a message to any other user at the other end i n a secure way. 
This system i s p r i m a r i l y inteTided as a testbed f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g the 
problems of developing an a p p l i c a t i o n system incorporating DES/FKD 
techniques on a microprocessor based system. 
The DES i n t e r f a c e card i s used to encrypt messages under one 
of the three modes namely the ECB, CFB or CBC (Chapter 5 ) . The FKD 
function performs the b a s i c G F ( 2 ^ ^ ) * exponentiation system using 
127 
f ( x ) = x + x + l a s the modulus i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial. This i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y used to t r a n s f e r the s e s s i o n keys s e c u r e l y between the 
two Apple microcomputers over a public telephone network. With 
6502 microprocessor running at 1 MHZ, an average time of 4 seconds 
with a worst case of 6 seconds i s required to perform the exponentiation 
127 
i n GF(2 ) . The FKD program s i z e i s approximately 400 bytes and the 
l i s t i n g of the program i s given i n Appendix 18 (see Section 13.6). 
CXiring system operation, the user can communicate with an 
user at the other end under DES or DES/FKD modes or generate a new 
s e c r e t / p u b l i c key p a i r for the FKD system. The system base 'a' and 
the modulus polynomial f ( x ) are input once to the program and they 
are assumed to be f i x e d . The public key g ^ e r a t e d i s stored in some 
preallocated memory location depending upon the user ID, n. That i s , 
i n t h i s simple system, each terminal s t o r e s i t s own l i s t o f p u b l i c 
keys. This i s sometimes r e f e r r e d to as the l o c a l F\iblic Key F i l e 
(PKF) mode. 
A secure connection i s e s t a b l i s h e d between u s e r s i and j 
through a simple connection protocol sequCTJce- T h i s sequence 
allows to e s t a b l i s h a DES session key and i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r 
*As mentioned in Section 13.2, t h i s can be changed to GF(2^^"^) with 
f ( x ) = x^^^ + x"^ ^ + 1 to overcome Adleman's algorithm. 
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required for secure communication between the u s e r s i and j . I t 
a l s o enables each user to authenticate the other's i d e n t i t y . A new 
ses s i o n key and a new i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c tor, d e r i v e d u s i n g t h e common 
key K. ..are e s t a b l i s h e d f o r each s e s s i o n between i and j . T h i s 
sequence i s used with the l o c a l PKF mode mentioned above. 
Vlhm user i udshes to e s t a b l i s h a secure connection with 
user j , i sends h i s user ID( I ) along with the ID of user j ( - J ) to 
the other end. That i s . 
^ j : I . J 
The user j i s informed at the r e c e i v i n g end that a communication 
has been requested by user i and the system asks the u s e r j to input 
h i s s e c r e t key v i a the keyboard of the te r m i n a l . As soon a s user j has 
entered h i s 16 character (127-bit) s e c r e t key, the system requests 
user i a t the sending end to input h i s s e c r e t key. At t h i s point, 
u s e r s i and j f e t c h the other user's l o c a l l y stored p u b l i c key value 
from t h e i r memories and connDute the common key K^^ using t h e i r own 
s e c r e t keys independently a t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e ends. Then t h e sending 
end gCTierates a pseudo-random number, R,and encrypts - t h i s number under 
the ECB mode of DES using the f i r s t 64 b i t s of K^^ as the CES key. 
i^ljl )• "niis cipher i s then transmitted t o the r e c e i v i n g end. That i s . 
The r e c e i v i n g end decrypts the cipher using ^j^^ "the DES key i n 
ECB mode to obtain the pseudo-random number R. Then he modifies the 
number R by adding 1 to i t and encrypts (R+1) under the ECB mode of 
DES with K^^2 transmits to user i . 
That i s . 
T h i s operation i s done by user j to prove h i s i d e n t i t y to user i which 
r e q u i r e s the knowledge o f the common key . = K The u s e r i at the 
sending end decrypts the information and t e s t s to see i f the message i s 
equal t o R+1. I f t h i s i s the case, then the user at the r e c e i v i n g end 
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must have computed the key K^ .^  = K^^ and hence i t must be u s e r j as he 
i s the only one who knows the user j ' s s e c r e t key. Hence u s e r i can 
s t a r t a conversation with user j at the other end. I f they do not 
match, then the user at the r e c e i v i n g end i s informed that the 
conversation cannot begin. T h i s may e i t h e r be due to some e r r o r 
during the communication or more s e r i o u s l y due to the f a l s e i d e n t i t y 
of user j at the r e c e i v i n g end. 
In t h i s simple procedure, the dynamically generated pseudo-
random number i s used as the session key to be used i n the DES 
algorithm for encrypting data. Note that the number R i s never a c t u a l l y 
t r a n s f e r r e d over the l i n k between u s e r s i and j i n i t s p l a i n form. 
I f the CF-S algorithm i s used i n i t s BCB mode for encrypting data 
messages no more i n i t i a l i z a t i o n procedure i s required. The use r s i 
and j can communicate with each other i n a secure manner u s i n g the DES 
system with R as the s e c r e t DES key. On the other hand, i f the DES i s 
used i n e i t h e r CFB or CBC modes, then the i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r needs 
to be t r a n s f e r r e d from the sCTider t o the r e c e i v e r . T h i s i s done using 
the normal procedure explained i n Section 5.3.2, by generating another, 
pseudo-random number, encrypting i t under the ECB mode us i n g t h e 
session key and transmitting i t to the r e c e i v e r . 
To authenticate the i d e n t i t y of user i and e s t a b l i s h an 
i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector for t r a n s f e r s from j to i , user j generates the 
pseudo-random number which he then sends to i i n encrypted from. 
Establishment of authentication of user i proceeds i n a s i m i l a r fashion 
as described above by the modification of the random number by user i . 
Note that user authentication i n such a p u b l i c key d i s t r i b u t i o n system 
i s based on the possession of the s e c r e t key v ^ i c h the user employs to 
compute the conanon key for any other u s e r . I t i s the c a l c u l a t i o n of 
the common key that r e s u l t s i n user aut h e n t i c a t i o n and DES pro t e c t i o n . 
A s e t of 10 p a i r s of p u b l i c / s e c r e t keys used i n t h i s demon-
s t r a t i o n system i s given i n Figure 13.2. The pu b l i c keys although they 
do not have to be kept s e c r e t , they s t i l l have to be a u t h e n t i c . Other-
wise an imposter could manufacture h i s own public key, c l a i m i t 
belonged t o another user and then employ i t to insjersonate him. Thus 
public keys have to be pu b l i c i n the broadest sense - not only non-
se c r e t , but guaranteed, • a c c e s s i b l e to or shared by a l l u s e r s of the 
network' [78 ]. Three p o s s i b l e methods by which the p u b l i c keys can be 
d i s t r i b u t e d i n t h i s hybrid DES/PKD system are considered [75"]. 
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System Base a o 1 2 3 4" 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
System Polynomial, f ( x ) : X ' + X + 1 
us e r 
No- Secret key (Bytes) 
P u b l i c key 
(Hexadeciinal code) 
_ 1 ASDPGEJZLMN3VCX2 ?EI)315A175(f»2A3'4E15C7l678a65^CI)41 
2 8765432187654321 9P6AC7C3I)D227686P5974^9CPA55D396 
5 QWERrrUI0PLEJ3G? C32C8P478137CCS5DSD399?7^72)ED4D0 
4 0?L,MKO9SIJ2raHU7 9{^52Z6C(325DCA2P326?32BB99PC9SA{39 
5 iaA2XSV25EDCTPR4 228p52l679E3CE31P29227A51943A2P2 
6 5TGB6YHN7nJM8ZAl 18SI)P7^P67CP4F21158ES573E2P80725 
7 913l4E65CP6D5251D258A83A06D3E5AgJ 
8 l:2"3#4f5$S6^7'8( 12872666521873150338581P653B830C 
9 AZ SXDCFVGBHKJMn, 619?508519P905A1C0AD20A7PP923BCA 
10 V2 8D?6 JiJ^MTG! HAM 4877538PPE03934P73eDS10924C0PS94 
Fig. 13.2 - PubUc & Secret Key Pairs i n GF(2^'^) 
13. 5.1 C e n t r a l R L i b l i c _ K e y _ F n e 
In t h i s approach, as i n Section 9.6, the e x i s t e n c e of a 
Publi c Key D i s t r i b u t i o n Centre (RCDC) i s envisaged which c o n t r o l s the 
formation of user connections. The connection protocol sequence may 
be described as follows. Each user r e g i s t e r s h i s p u b l i c key with the 
PKDC and each user knows the public key of the C m t r e . When a user i 
wishes to connnunicate with user j , he f i r s t enters h i s s e c r e t key on 
the t e r m i n a l . This key can then be combined with the FKDC's p u b l i c 
key, u ^ i c h i s assumed to be l o c a l l y stored on the term i n a l , to form a 
common key between the user and the PKDC. Then the user can connect 
with the FKDC, using the common key i n h i s D£S based system, to 
transmit an encrypted request to the R<DC f o r user j ' s p u b l i c key (or 
the e n t i r e l i s t of public k e y s ) . The PKDC decrypts the request and 
encrypts and transmits the desired p u b l i c k e y ( s ) to the u s e r i . Hence 
the connection to the PKDC i s authentic and p r i v a t e so t h a t an opponent 
cannot modify the public keys transmitted or in^^ersonate t h e FKDC 
without detection. This approach i n s u r e s that the H<DC c o n t r o l s the 
access of users to the system and c e n t r a l i z e s the dissemination of 
pu b l i c keys. Note that a connection to .the FKCX: i s re q u i r e d to obtain 
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a l i s t of public keys but once the user has stored the p u b l i c keys, 
the FKDC i s no longer needed unl e s s the user wishes to update h i s 
public key l i s t . 
13.5.2 Lpcal^ £i^^licJ<ey_FUe 
This method has been used i n the simple demonstration system 
described e a r l i e r and i s very a t t r a c t i v e when only a small number of 
users are involved. Each user possesses an authentic l i s t o f p u b l i c 
keys. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h i s l o c a l d i r e c t o r y can be accomplished 
manually through hardcopy or e l e c t r o n i c storage media such as 
programmable memory FTOM. Precautions must be taken to p r o t e c t the 
public keys from modification or s u b s t i t u t i o n but not from p r i v a c y . 
13.5.3 No_PiibUc Kej^ P i l e _ 
The t h i r d approach assumes a more benign environment i n which 
the opponent i s c o n t ^ i t to p a s s i v e l y eavesdrop. I f t h i s a p p l i e s , keys 
do not need to be stored. To e s t a b l i s h a connection, each user 
generates a new s e c r e t key, computes a new public key, exchanges i t and 
then c a l c u l a t e s the s e c r e t session key. An a c t i v e opponent however 
can interpose between the two u s e r s , can mirror each h a l f o f the 
scenario and e s t a b l i s h an imposter connection with each. T h i s method 
i s mCTitioned here for completeness sake and i t i s recommended that i t 
should be avoided i n p r a c t i c e . 
Thus t h i s arrangement shows that the implementation of the 
PKD algorithm and i t s use in a hybrid system using the DES i s e n t i r e l y 
f e a s i b l e . The value of combining the protection provided by the 
conventional cryptosystem with the user authentication a t t r i b u t e s of 
a public key system i s most advantageous. The i n t e g r a t i o n of these two 
methods gives the designer of secure systems f l e x i b i l i t y i n these areas: 
1. The d i s t r i b u t i o n and management of keys; while most con-
ventional cryptosystems r e q u i r e c e n t r a l i z e d key management 
and connection establishment, i n t e g r a t i o n of p u b l i c keys 
systems with conventional cryptosystems promises c e n t r a l i z e d 
c o n t r o l of key management functions with d i s t r i b u t e d connection 
establishment. 
2. Decentralized user authentication; s i n c e a u s e r ' s i d e n t i t y 
can be confirmed using p u b l i c parameters and a s i n g l e s e c r e t 
parameter known only to the u s e r . 
3. Document or f i l e p rotection; the conventional cryptosystem 
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can be used to protect against information r e l e a s e by 
encryption using document or f i l e key while access to the 
f i l e key i s r e s t r i c t e d by the p u b l i c key system. 
13.6 Exponentiation i n GF(2") 
In t h i s section two d i f f e r e n t methods o f performing 
exponentiation i n GF(2^) are considered. These i n d i c a t e t h a t f a s t 
exponentiation i n GF(2") i s p o s s i b l e using dedicated hardware and 
make the DES/PKD hybrid system described above a p r a c t i c a l way of 
providing both s e c u r i t y and a u t h e n t i c a t i o n . 
Both the methods, use the w e l l known 'square and multiply' 
technique to perform exponentiation i n GF(2"). T h i s technique has 
been used throughout Chapters 10, 11 and 12 and the flowchart i s given 
i n Figure 10.2. But i n t h i s case, the operations are performed modulo 
2 which makes the implementation easy and reduces the running time of 
the algorithm. The two methods d i f f e r i n the way they perform 
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n and squaring i n GF(2"). 
13.6.1 5i?thod_l_ 
13.6.1.1 5qu^I.H19_ 
Squaring operation i n G a l o i s f i e l d can be performed very 
e f f i c i e n t l y i f the i r r e d u c i b l e generator polynomial f ( x ) i s f i x e d as 
shown below. 
Let the i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial be a t r i n o m i a l , f ( x ) = x"+x+l. ( I n the 
demonstration hybrid DES/FKD system described i n Section X3.5, f ( x ) = 
X +X+1). Le t 'a' represent an element of the f i e l d GF(2") ( f o r 
example, the system base) and representing *a' as a binary polynomial 
a = a^ + a^ x^ + ... + ^ GF(2) 
As GF(2") i s a f i e l d with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 2, the property t h a t 
(a+b)^ = a^ + 
holds true for the operations i n the f i e l d . Thus the representation of 
a^ i s given by 
2 2 4 2 ( n - l ) a = + a^x + a^x +...+a^_^x 
Now reducing the powers greater than n using the r e c u r s i v e function 
x"*"^ = x^*^ + x^ for j ^ , gives 
where n/2 denotes rn/2l , the l e a s t integer greater than n/2. 
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As the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the f i e l d i s 2, one can represent a using 
exclusive-or operator ® 
2 n-2 
This expression can be r e w r i t t e n as 
^ 1 x+g' 
n - l 
a = a^ + .L {a. x 0 1=1 i+g (13.2) 
where g = n/2 — 1. 
Implementation of the equation (13.2) from the hardware point of view 
gives 
<1) 
c 2 i 
where 
( C Q , C J _ , . . . , c^_^) = ( V ^ ' - - ' ^ n - l ^ ' 
Thus squaring can be very e f f i c i e n t l y accomplished using e x c l u s i v e - o r 
gates alone. Such an implementation i n GF(2^) using 7 - b i t vector i s 
shown i n Figure 13.3. 
F i g 13.3-Squaring i n GF(2 ) 
13.6.1.2 ^^il.t ipl_icat^ion_ 
The m u l t i p l i c a t i o n i n GF(2") can be performed using the 
standard canonical b a s i s representation of elements. That i s , the 
elements of GF(2'^) are expressed i n terms of a canonical b a s i s f o r 
GF(2'^) over GF(2) and the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n r u l e i s derived as follows: 
Suppose that U and V i n GF(2") have the representation 
(u^,u, , ... u , ) and ( v _ , v , v , ) r e s p e c t i v e l y i n terms of the o 1 r ^ i u 1 2 n — i 
canonical b a s i s ( l , o t , . . . > a ~ ) where a i s a root of an i r r e d u c i b l e 
polynomial of degree n over GF(2). T h i s means that 
U = [UQ.U^.U^. "n-1^ 
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n - l 
and 
V = n-1 
n-l 
Hence Z = U.V 
1 . 
a 
n-l 
n-l 
»ct J 
n-l 
2n-2 n-l 
O 
n-l 
(13,3) 
Now expanding the nxn matrix in (13,3) as 
n - l 
n-l 2n-2 a 
= + a + M^ a^  + ... + M .cP"^ O 1 2 n—I 
wh-^re i s the GF(2) matrix whose entry in row i and column j i s the 
coefficient,of when a^*"'"^ i s expanded in the canonical basis 
(lfa»..*9 (P"^)* Hence i f ( z ^ , , . . , ^) i s the representation of Z 
we have 
n-l t„ t ^, x^, n-l 
O 1 n—1 ^ O - - 1 - — n—L ~ 
where 
" " "^o' ^l'*--» "n-1^ and V = ( V Q , V ^ . . . , V ^ ^ _ ^ ) . 
I t now follows from the uniqueness of the representation i n terms of 
a fixed basis that 
Zj^ = u^ y for k = O, 1,..-, n - l (13.4) 
The right hand side of (13.4) i s sometimes referred to as the bilinear 
form in the vectors u and v. 
Toa/oid the need to store the matrices ^^ in the calculation 
of the product of two elements, the algorithm given by Berlekamp in [56] 
has been used. 
Let the multiplicand be U and the multiplier be V and assume 
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that they are stored in two n-bit registers U and V respectively. Let 
the p a r t i a l product register be called To perform multiplication, 
the 2 register i s i n i t i a l l y set to zero. Depending on the lowest bit 
of the multiplicand v^, U i s either added or not added into 2 (modulo 
2 addition). I f = 1, then U i s added into Z; i f = O , Z i s l e f t 
unchanged. The V register i s then shifted right, the U register i s 
multiplied by a and the process i s repeated. Multiplication by a i s 
done according to the recursive equation a" = a+ 1. At the mth step, 
U contains a"* times the original multiplicand, VQ contains v , the mth 
b i t of the original multiplier and Z contains V^(Ua ) . After n 
such steps, the multiplication i s complete. Z contains the product of 
the original U and V registers. The V register has been cycled 
completely around to i t s original position but the U register now 
contains U a""^. A schematic diagram using feedback s h i f t registers 
i s shown in Figure 13.4 for the f i e l d GF(2^) with f ( x ) = as the 
generating irreducible polynomial. 
n^6 ^ 4 ^ 
A > F A>r 
u 
L ^ j L - j a L-y-J 
u. u 4^ u. u oh 
V. 
Fig 13.4 - Multiplication in GF(2') 
This method of multiplying and squaring elements in GF(2'^) 
has been used in the software implementation of the PKD algorithm in 
the hybrid system. With dedicate hardware, the exponentiation 
algorithm would take approximately 16256 ( = 127 x 128) clock cycles in 
the worst case. Hence using IMHZ clock, this gives a worst running 
time of less than 20 milliseconds compared to 6 seconds when carried 
out in software using 6502 machine code programming. 
13.6,2 Method_2_ 
Here exponentiation i s performed in GF(2") using a novel 
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technique based on normal basis representation of elements [79]. This 
section contains some of the notes communicated by Prof J Massey, ETH, 
Zurich, in private correspondence. The method has been used to design 
a hardware exponentiation system in GF(2^). 
13 • 6.2.1 ^ ^ l i i 2}-2^^2PU. 
The multiplication rule given in method 1 can be used with 
any basis not only with the canonical basis* 
Let a^»a2» •••tO^ tje any basis for GF(2") over GF(2) and 
l e t u = (u^,..., u^), V = (Vj^»v^».-.iv^) and Z = ( z ^ . z ^ , .. ., ) be the 
representations of U, V and Z in terms of this basis* I t follows that 
i f 2 = UV, then 
a, a I n 
a a, n 1 n J 
(13*5) 
The matrix in (13.5) can be expanded as 
.... 
a a. • • • 
n I 
M 'n 
where i s the GF(2) matrix whose entry in row i and column j i s the 
coefficiOTt of when a^Qj i s expanded in the basis ci^fOt2***f a^ *^ 
I t follows that 
t u - V for k = X,2,*.., 
In particular l e t us now consider a special basis ca l l e d the normal 
basis. 
Suppose that E i s an extension of the f i e l d F and E i s a 
vector space of dim^sion n over F. Then ^i*^2*'*'^^n said to be a 
normal basis for E over F i f Qj^,..*, a are a basis for E over F and n 
are also roots of the same irreducible polynomial in F [ X ] . For F = 
GF(2) and E = GF(2"), this i s equivalent to saying that for some 
m element OL of GF(2 ), a ^ n2 i-1 for i = l,2,..*,n.are l i n e a r l y 
independent over GF(2). Now letting [u ,u , .. .,u 3be the represent-
... n. , . _^ ,^ , w.-,-^  « nr2- ^hen ation of U e GF(2") in terms of the normal basis a,a , 
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SO that 
2 2 4 on-1 
O 1 n—2 n-l 
where the identity u = u for a l l u e GF(2) and the fact that cross-
term products vanish when raising to the power 2 in GF(2) have been 
used. Thus i t i s seen that squaring an element U in GF(2") merely 
consists of a right c y c l i c s h i f t of i t s representation in terms of a 
normal basis for GF(2") over GF(2). In a general extension f i e l d 
GF(q'^) where q i s a prime, raising to the qth power an element of 
GF(q") corresponds to a right c y c l i c a l s h i f t of i t s representation in 
terms of a normal basis for GF(q") over GF(q)« Thus the implementation 
of squaring in'multiply and squcire* technique exponentiation i s made 
very simple using normal basis* 
Now letting u = (u^, Y = (v^^,^,..., v ^ _ j ^ ) and 
z = (ZQ,2^,..., 2^ ^) be the norrnal basis representation of U, V and Z 
respectively and Z = U.V, then 
where M i s the GF(2| matrix whose entry in row i and column j i s the 
coefficient of when a^^""^ a^-^"^ = a^ *^"^ ""^ . i s expanded in the normal 
basis a,a^,*.-, a^^ ^. But and the elements and Z 
have the normal basis representations (u^ u^,.*., "n-2^* ^^n-l'^O* 
•••>v ^) and (z z^,.... z _) respectively. Thus i t follows that n—2 n—1 O n—2 
for the same matrix M as i n (13.6) 
\.2 = "O'-"' "n-2>^  " V2> 
and in general that, for t h i s same GF(2) matrix M 
\ = ( " k - K l V l ' " O " k ) " (^kH-l'---^n-l'V-"\' 
for Ofk^n-l. 
Thus w*ien a normal basis representation of GF(2") over GF(2) 
i s employed, each digit i n the product i s given by the same bilinear 
form with appropriate c y c l i c shifting of the representations of the 
factors. This property i s the key to construction of simple multipliers 
for f i n i t e f i e l d s . 
In the FKD system, i t i s necessary to implement the equation 
(13.6) to perform multiplication in GF(2'^). The expression (13.6) can 
be written as 
^ n - l = "n-2 V 2 * ("o" ' * ' A (^o'"l ' ^^ -^^  ^  
where the binary matrix A i s symmetric with an a l l zero main diagonal, 
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This can be seen as follows: 
Vi/riting m^ ^ for the entries in M, 
n - l 4— U . V .m. . J 1 J 
Suppose u^= V = 1 and u = v = 0 for s / k. Then z n-X, \k' But ok^ ^ ""ok+1 for this case U = V =cr which implies that Z = UV = or • Thus 
z^ ^ = 1 i f and only i f k = n-2. Hence = I i f and only i f k = n-2, 
so that the next to la s t OTtry on the main diagonal of M i s the only one 
which i s non-zero. 
Because of i t s symmetry and zero diagonal, the nxn matrix 
can be written as 
O 
. T 
* 
0 .... o 
^ t • 
where T i s the binary upper triangular ( n - l ) x ( n - l ) matrix. 
T = 
^01 '^02 
12 
•0,n-l 
'l^,n-l 
Thus, 
•n-2, n-l _ 
(13.8) 
Using (13.8) one particular implementation of the multiplication function 
i s shown in Figure 13.5. The boxes labelled T contain Exclusive^or 
gates only. Each component of the output i s that sum of input bits 
corresponding to the locations of the ' I ' s i n the corresponding row 
of the matrix T. The outputs of this box are then And-ed with the 
appropriate components of the other factor. The outputs of these n-l 
And gates are then summed by a tree of n-2 Exclusive-or gates. The 
outputs of the two Exclusive-or trees are summed and added to the term 
u ^v Alternatively, the two Exclusive-or trees and the Exclusive-n—2 n—2 
or gate that combines their outputs can be replaced by a single 
Exclusive-or tree with 2n-2 gates having 2n-l inputs. The c i r c u i t shown 
in Figure 13.5 computes z - I f U and V are shifted as shown in the 
n—1 
diagram, .the same c i r c u i t w i l l conpute 2^ ^ , z^ ^ , . . . , Z ^ , 2 Q during the 
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'Jl u "n-2 "n-1 
EX-OR 
TREE 
EX-OR 
TREE 
T 
0 1 
T 
n-2 n-1 
n-2 n-1 
0 - - AOT 
© - EX.OR 
r i g , 13.5 - M u l t i p l i e r ConfigTiration u s i n g T-matrix 
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next n-1 subsequent s h i f t s . 
A different implementation of the multiplication function i s 
based on the alternating property of 
Let B denote any nxn matrix in any f i e l d F and l e t u and v be 
any vectors in F'^. Then the bilinear form u^By defined by B i s said to 
be alternating i f i t vanishes whenever u = y, that i s , i f u^Bu = 0 for 
a l l u in F^. Two nxn matrices over F, B and D,are said to be congruent 
i f there i s an invertible matrix P such that 
B = D P 
Then 
Ijt B y = (Pu)^ D (Py) 
Thus the bilinear form u^ B y can be evaluated using the matrix D i f 
the basis i s changed by the transformation, P"" . When D has only a 
small number of non-2ero entries, the evaluation of (Pa)^ D (Py) 
requires only a small number of multiplications and additions beyond 
those needed to form Pu and Py. 
In [ 4 3 ] , a binary matrix B which i s symmetric and has an a l l 
zero main diagonal i s shown to be alternating. Thus the matrix A which 
defines the normal basis multiplier i s alternating. The rank of the 
matrix i s n when n i s even and i s n-l when n i s odd. The matrix A 
can be reduced to a diagonal matrix D using the elementary divisor 
method givCTi in Section 12.2.4. Thus for the nxn matrix TV, there 
exists elementary matrices E^ ,^ E^, ...,E^ (for some m) such that 
E ... -A-E,^ ... E ^  = D m i l -m 
where D i s a diagonal matrix with n non-2ero OTtries when n i s even 
or n-1 non-zero entries when n i s odd. Thus 
P*^  = E ... E, m 1 
The number of ' I ' s present in the P-matrix i s indicative of the number 
of Exclusive-or gates required to implement t h i s matrix. Hence using 
this P-box, one can implement the multiplier function as 
^n-l = "n-2 * ^ ^J^ ° 
This configuration i s shown in Figure 13.6. The connections in the 
P-box are determined by the P-matrix and the connections to the And 
gates are determined by the D-matrix. Subsequent s h i f t s of u and v 
vectors w i l l produce z^ 2'***' ^ O* 
As a f i n a l method of implementing the multiplier function 
2^ ^ = u^ M y, the 'brute-force' approach i s considered. This 
approach consists of f i r s t forming the vector My and then And-ing 
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"o "1 ^n-2 "n-1 
AND N EX-OR 
GATES y TREE 
Pig. 13.6 - M u l t i p l i e r Configuration using P o a t r i a 
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each of i t s components with the corresponding component of u, then 
f i n a l l y summing the outputs of the n And gates. This approach requires 
n And gates and n-1 E?cclusive-or gates in addition to the Exclusive-or 
gates needed to form Mv. Compared to the previous two methods, this 
one lacks the 'modularity' - several sub-circuits of the same kind. 
13.7 Hardware Design of An Expon^tiator in GF(2^) 
A hardware expon^tiation system in GF(2^) has been designed 
using the second method which involves the normal basis representation. 
To begin with, a program i s written to search for a generator of a 
normal basis in GF(2^). This consists of finding seven conjugates in 
GF(2^) which are linearly independent over GF(2). A conplete l i s t i n g 
of the program i s given in Appendix 19. • The steps involved in t h i s 
algorithm are given as follows: 
1. Choose an element Q£ e GF(2") 
2. Compute a . = a^^ for i = l , , . . , n in GF(2") using the 
irreducible polynomial f ( x ) = x" + x + 1. 
3. Form a nxn matrix using the n-bit vectors a , t a • 
1 n 
4. Calculate the determinant of the matrix over GF(2). 
5. I f determinant = 0 in GF(2), Go to step 1. 
6. I f determinant ^ O in GF(2), then a generates a normal basis. 
In this case n= 7. I n i t i a l l y , i t i s decided to look at the elements a 
of the formQ(= x^ + 1 for l^a^n-I. One such generator a i s found to be 
= x^ + 1. Then the powers a =a2^~^ for i = I ,2,J.., 7 modulo 7 ^ (x + x + X) are given by: 
0^  = x^ + 1, 0£ 2 = a ^ = x^ + x^ +1, a ^  = x^ + x^ + + x^ + 1, 
a = x^ + x^ + x^ + x^ + X + 1, a ^  = x^ + x^ + X + 1 and a _ = x^ + 2^ 6 7 
yT + X. 
The symmetric matrix of the bilinear form i s then given by 
6 2 fi 5 
X +X +1 X +X •X+l 
5 4 3 
X +X t-X 
6 
X +X 
4 3 2 
X •X +X +X+1 x^+x+1 
x^+x^+l x^ +x^ +x***! x^  +X^ +x^  +1 x^ +x^ +x^ +x^ +x x^ +x^ +x^  X^+X** +X+1 
• x^ +x^ +x^ +x^ +1 x^ +x^  +x^  +x+1 x^ +x^ +x^ +x+1 x^ +x^ +x x^xS^x^ 
* * e 4 3 2 X^+X +X *X +X+1 x^ +x^ +x+1 x^+x^+x^+l 
* * * x^ +x^ +x+1 x^ +x'^ +x^ +x^ +l x^+x^+ 1 
* * * * x^ +x^ +1 x^+x^ +x^+x+l 
* * • * • 
* - indicates syrmetry 
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Rewriting the above matrix in terms of the normal basis, gives 
2^ 04^ *06*0^ *02 a5*<i7*^ 4 
03 ^^*<^^6^ a,*o, 
a 
1 - 6 " ^ 0^ *03 
•^03*04*05*0, 02*06*0, 
05 <^ 1*<^ *<^ 4*^ *^  
02*03*05 
02*0, 
a,*o '4 "6 
0^ *03*0, 
01*03*04*05*0, 
a3^4*Og 
0^ *03 
05*0, 
0^ *02*03*05*06 a , * « 2 ^ 4 
1 
o. 
* - irrilcates syrmetry 
Expanding the above matrix in terms of ot^fOf^t*..* Q^ yt yields 
where 
r 
O 1 O O 1 o 1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
and 
i s obtained by rotating the rows of doumward by 1 position, and 
then rotating the columns right by 1 position. Similar operations on 
yie l d Mg. and so on. In the inplementation of the multiplier function 
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M = i s used. The T-matrix i s therefore given by 
0 1 0 0 O 1 
O 1 O O 1 O 
T = O O l l O O 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 o o o o 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
The T-box can therefore be realized as 
Note that one of the s i x outputs i s not used and i s id e n t i c a l l y equal 
to O. The And gate i s therefore unnecessary that i s fed by this O 
output. Thus the complete c i r c u i t requires 2 T-boxes with 5 Exclusive-
or gates each, 2 sets of 5 And gates operating on their outputs, 2 
Exclusive-or trees with 4 Exclusive-or gates each and 2 additional 
Exclusive-or gates and 1 And gate for producing the f i n a l output. The 
total gate count for the multiplier function i s equal to 20 Exclusive-
or gates and 11 And gates. 
Using the brute force method the multiplier function can be 
implemented as follows: 
• 4^ 
4* 
The number of gates required using t h i s approach i s equal to 18 
Exclusive-or gates and 7 And gates. I t appears to give the minimum 
number of gates of the three realizations; but the realization using 
the T-matrix or the P-matrix i s preferrable for large extension f i e l d s 
because then the c i r c u i t i s composed of two identical-subcircuits, that 
i s , a modular design i s achieved. 
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The c i r c u i t diagram of the designed complete exponentiation 
system in GF(2^) i s given in Appendix 20. Here the multiplier 
function has been implem^ited using the 'brute-force* approach. 
As the number of ' I ' s present in the M-matrix give an 
indication of the number of Exclusive-or gates required to inclement 
the multiplier function, to minimise the number of gates, one needs to 
reduce the number of ' I ' s in the M-matrix to a minimum. In an effort 
to obtain such an optimum M-matrix, various normal basis generators a 
with four different irreducible polynomials are t r i e d in GF(2 ) and tbe 
number of ' I ' s in their corresponding M-matrices are calculated. The 
results are given in Figure 13.7. From the results i t i s seen that 
a) the difference between the minimum and the maximum number of ' I ' s for 
the t r i e d cases i s not large, that i s , the variance does not appear 
to be high. 
b) The average number of ' I ' s i n the M-matrix i s approximately equal to 
2 49 • 
23 which i s roughly equal to n /2 = — = 24. 
This may imply that for a randomly chosOT normal basis generator and 
an irreducible polynomial, the number of ' I ' s i s approximately equal . 
to half the entries in the M-matrix. I t appears that the random choice 
of normal basis generators and different irreducible polynomials does 
not seem to yiel d any substantial reduction in the number of ' I ' s in 
the M-matrix. The above claim should be read with caution as th i s i s 
based on a small number of t r i a l s in a small extension f i e l d GF(2^). 
127 
13.8 Normal Basis Generators in GF(2 ) 
From cryptography point of view, one i s interested in large 
extension f i e l d s namely GF(2^^) or GF(2^^^). The next step i s there-
fore to determine the generators of normal basis in these extension 
fi e l d s which can then be used in the FKD exponentiation system. 
Albert [48] proved that i f F i s a subfield of E and E i s normal over 
F, then E has a normal basis over F. Thus, GF(2") has a normal basis 
over GF(2) for a l l n. Although the theorem by Albert establishes the 
existence of a normal basis for any f i e l d GF(2'^), i t does not give any 
help to determine the generators of normal basis i n practice. As no 
systematic method for finding these generators was apparently evident, 
i t i s decided to resort to the t r i a l and error procedure using the 
algorithm given in Section 13.7. However, l e t us f i r s t consider the 
probability of finding a normal basis using this random search procedure, 
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I r r e d u c i b l e polynomial of degree 7 Normal B a s i s No. of '1 's i 
over Gr(2) Generator the M-mat r i x 
x'^ +x+1 21 ( i f 
27 (2) 
x'^ +x+1 25 (3) 
x'^ +x+1 X^+X+1 27 (4) 
x'^ +x+1 X^+X+1 19 (5) 
x'^ +x+1 X^+X^+1 25 (6) 
x'^ +x^+x^+x^+x^+x+i x'^ +x+i 21 (7) 
x'^ +x+1 X ^ l 21 (1) 
x'^ +x+1 X^X^+1 21 (1) 
X^+X+1 X^+X^+l 21 (7) 
x'^ +x^ +x^ +x'^ +x^ +x+1 X^+X+1 19 (5) 
X^+X+1 27 (4) 
X 27 (2) 
x2 27 (2) 
27 (2) 
19 (5) 
x^ 19 (5) 
x'^ +x^+x^+x+1 x5 27 (4) 
X+1 27 (2) 
X ^ l 27 (2) 
xhi 25 (5) 
X^+1 27 (2) 
X ^ l 25 (3) 
X^+X+1 19 (5) 
X^+X+1 25 (3) 
X^+X+1 21 (7) 
X^+X+1 19 (5) 
t Same numbers in brackets indicate same M-matrix 
F i g . 13.7 - Table showing some normal b a s i s generators 
in GF(2^) and the number of '1' s i n 
the corresponding M-matrices 
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From [56, Theorem 11.39], the number of elements in GF(q™) 
which have m lin e a r l y independent conjugates over GF(q) i s given by 
m q I (1 - q ^  ) 
k 
are the degrees of the d i s t i n c t irreducible factors of where the 
x^'-l over GF(q). 
For the extension f i e l d GF(2^^^) 
127 , 
X -1 
d 127 
where Q^^'(x) denotes the cyclotomic polynomial 
That i s . 
(x) i s an irreducible polynomial of degree 1- The degrees of the 
irreducible factors of Q^^^^\x) are determined using the following 
result [56] : 
Since every element of order n has the same number of conjugates with 
respect to GF(2), ever^ irreducible factor of the cyclotomic polynomial 
Q^"^(x) has the same degree over GF(2). This degree i s the raulti-. 
p licative order of 2 modulo n. 
For the case n = 127, the multiplicative order of 2 modulo 127 i s 7 as 
2^ = 1 (nod 127). Thus every irreducible factor of Q^^^^(x) has 
degree 7 over GF(2)- Hence the probability of finding a normal basis in 
GF(2^2'^) = (1-3S)(1- i^)^® = 0-434. 
2 
The program FIND^J0RBAS.F77 in App>endix 19 i s used to determine 
127 
a normal basis generator in GF(2 ) using the random search algorithm. 
I n i t i a l l y i t i s again decided to consider the elements of the form 
a = x^+1 for l^a^l26. The operations are performed modulo the 
127 
irreducible polynomial x +x+l. The f i r s t such generator of normal 
basis found in GF(2^^) i s a = x^-^^-*-l. In GF(2^^^), with irreducible 
polynomial x^^^+x^^+1, the f i r s t generator of the form x^+1 i s found to 
be a = x+1. 
The M-matrix and the T-matrix required for the implementation 
of the multiplier function are also determined, using programs M-MATRIX. 
F77 and T-MATRIX.F77. The l i s t i n g of these tuo programs are given in 
Appendices 21 and 22. The number of Exclusive-or gates needed to 
implement the multiplier function using the T-matrix approach i s 
calculated using the program EXORND.F77 (Appendix 23). Without 
enroloying any optimization techniques, the T-matrix required 3794 
Exclusive-or gates. Thus a rough estimate of the toxal number of - 30
E x c l u s i v e ^ r and And gates required to implement the multiplier and 
hence the basic exponentiation function i n GF(2^^^) i s about 2x3794+2 
(125)+2 = 7840 Exclusive-or gates and 2(126)+1 = 253 And gates. This 
can; be conveniently manufactured using very large scale Integration 
(VLSI) techniques. 
13.9 Extension of Diffie-Hellman System to Matrix Rings 
This chapter on public key distribution system i s concluded 
by presenting an extension of the Diffie-Hellman system to matrix rings. 
As the ring of a l l nxn matrices over a f i n i t e f i e l d contains 
nilpotent elements when n>l (Section 10.4), again the group formed by 
only the non-singular matrices of order n, M^»is considered. In 
particular, the group of non—singular matrices over Z/pZ where p i s a 
prime i s considered. To form a public key distribution system, i t i s 
required to choose an element Ae M^(Z./p2) where p i s a very large prime 
such that 
A^ = X (mod p) 
where r i s the order of A, the base matrix. 
The base matrix A, the prime p and the order r are to be made public. 
Each user chooses a secret random number x^ less than r and generates a 
public matrix C^ where 
C^ = A'^i (mod p) 
Two users can arrive at the common key in the same way as in the D i f f i e -
Hellman system. For instance, i f user 1 wishes to i n i t i a t e an interchange 
of secret information with user 2, he extracts the public matrix C of 
X, X 
user 2 and computes J- (mod p). Similarly user 2 computes C^ 2 (mod p) 
and the process yields the common key K where 
K = Kj^2 ~ ^ 21 ^  ^' = ^^'^ = A'^'^2(nx3d p) 
With the Dif fie-Hellman system operated in Z, the maximum 
number of secret keys possible i s limited to p-1 whereas with t h i s 
extended system i t depends on the order of the base matrix, r. The 
larger the value of r, greater the number of users that the system can 
support. Again the security of this system i s dependent on the 
d i f f i c u l t y of computing logarithms modulo p. 
13.9.1 Oesi^_of BaseJ^latrix 
The system designer needs to construct a base matrix A in 
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(Z/pZ) and determine i t s order r . One method of construction of A with 
a given order i s outlined below. 
Consider an irreducible polynomial f ( x ) of degree m for which 
X i s a root where X ^ ^ m P • 
f ( x ) . + a - X m-1 
m-1 a. e 
1 P 
Regarding F_ as a m-dim«isional vector space over F_ with basis 
., X ), l e t T represent the following linear transformation 
on F . 
q 
T : X X X . 
Under T, then 1 — > X,X- m -a O* 
Hence the matrix representation of the linear transformation T relative 
to the basis (IfXtX) 
B = 
,X 
1 
0 
0 
m-1 ) i s given by the companion matrix 
O . ... O 
.1 .... O 
O ... 0 
-a/ - ^ n w l - ^ 2 " ^ 3 
Linear independence of I , T, T^..., T'""^ implies that I , B, B^ , .... 
B are linearly independent. Since f ( x ) = O, we have f(B) = O. But 
f(x) has degree m and so the linear independence implies that f ( x ) i s 
the minimum function of B. 
Hence the order of the matrix B i s equal to p"-l and 
m 
B^ = I (mod p) 
Thus the system designer can choose irreducible polynomials of degrees 
m^ , m^ , ...,m^  in Z/pZ (see Section 10.5.2.1) and form the composite 
matrix B as shown below: 
B. 
B 
s 
m. where the order of B^ i s equal to p i-1 for l ^ i ^ S • The order of the 
matrix B i s then given by the expression 
iicm { (p'^l.-l), (p"*2 -1 ) , ....,(p'"s -1) } 
The matrix A to be used in the public key distribution can then be 
obtained by conjugating B with an arbitrary non-singular matrix Y 
belonging to M^(Z/pZ). That i s . 
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A = Y B Y 
The order of A i s the same as that of B and they are of dimension n 
where n i s given by: 
s 
" = 52 • 
i = l 
T his above method has been iraplemcTited on the Prime computer system and 
the program used i s given i n Appendix 25. A small example of such a 
public key d i s t r i b u t i o n system i s considered below: 
13.9.2 Exan^le 
L e t p = 5 
Le t f ^ ( x ) = x^+x+1 u^iere f j ^ { x ) i s i r r e d u c i b l e over Z/52. 
The matrix B^ ^ i s therefore given by 
f o i " l - ( o l\ B = = (mod 5) 
[-1 - i j [ 4 4_ 
and 
O 1 
4 4 
3 „ 2 
5^-1 
I (nod 5) 
Le t ^2^^^^ " ^ ^^^^ which i s i r r e d u c i b l e over Z/SZ. 
Hence the matrix B^ i s given by 
B. 
and 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
-2 -1 -3 
(mod 5) 
5^-1 
= I (nod 5) 
Now i t i s necessary to choose Y and Y" such that 
B, 
B, 
-1 = A u4iere A e M (Z/5Z) 
L e t Y be an a r b i t r a r y 5x5 non-singular matrix given below: 
Y = 
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The determinant of Y i s c a l c u l a t e d using program DETMDD.F77 (Appendix 
12) and i s equal to 4 (mod 5 ) , hence Y i s non-singular. The i n v e r s e 
of Y i s c a l c u l a t e d using program INVM0D.F77 (Appendix 24) and i s given 
by 
O 
-1 
and hence 
A = 
0 
O 
3 
2 
3 
O 
1 
4 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
2 
O 
2 
1 
O 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
O 
3 
O 
2 
4 
3 
2 
4 
2 
4 
4 
1 
3 
4 
1 
O 
3 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
4 
1 
2 3 744 — The order o f A i s equal to Jlcm { ( 5 - l - ) ( 5 - 1 ) } = 744 and A = 1 (mod 5 ) , 
v e r i f i e d using program MATEXP.FTN (Appendix 13). Hence the key space i s 
2$x$743 where A^ = C (mod 5) compared to the key space 2^x$4 i n the 
Diffie-Hellman system with p = 5. 
13.9.3 Use of_U£per_Trian2u3^ar ^JatricesJpve£ 2/£Z_ 
On the other hand, the r i n g of upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices over 
Z/pZ (p prime) can a l s o be used. I f the base matrix A i s chosen from 
t h i s r i n g , then the maximum order o f such a matrix i s equal to p ( p - l ) 
u ^ i c h can be obtained by having non—zero elements along the main super-
diagonal. This can be shown as f o l l o w s . 
P a r t i t i o n i n g A i n t o a diagonal matrix D and an upper t r i a n g u l a r 
nilpotent matrix U, that i s , A = U+D, then i t i s seen that D.U, U.D and 
are a l s o upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t matrices. I n Section 10.4.4, i t 
i s shown that 
(D + U)^^^^ = ( I + V^) (mod p) where 0 i s the E u l e r t o t i e n t function 
t 
and ( I + U^)^ = i . for some t 
and U-i i s some upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t 
matrix. 
I f p i s assumed to be greater than n-1 (which i s v a l i d i n a PKD 
system as the prime p i s very large),' then t = 1. Thus the order of 
A i s p0(p) = p ( p - l ) . Hence i n t h i s case the key space for x i s 
2<:x5p(p-l)-
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C H A P T E R 14 
PERMUTATION POLYNOMIALS IN THE DESIGN OF PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS 
14.1 General 
The f a c t that perniutation polynomials can be used i n the 
construction of cryptographic systems of a general mathematical nature 
should not be s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e they determine the permutation of 
elements of the s e t , which i s the e s s e n t i a l b a s i s of a cipher system. 
The RSA permutation polynomials and some others which may be used i n 
the design o f public key systems a re i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
A polynomial f ( x ) with c o e f f i c i e n t s i n a f i n i t e f i e l d i s 
c a l l e d a permutation polynomial i f the numbers f { a ) where a £ F^ are a 
permutation of the a* s. An equivalent statement i s that the equation 
f ( x ) = a 
i s solvable i n F for every 'a' i n F and that the equation has a unique 
sol u t i o n i n F for each a e F [80^. 
q q 
14.2 Ftolynomial y = x" (mod m) 
F i r s t consider the 'famous' power polynomial y = x" which has 
been used i n the RSA public key cryptosystem and the Diffie-Hellman 
public key d i s t r i b u t i o n system. 
Lemma 1 
The polynomial 
y = x" i n Z/pZ where p i s a prime 
represents a permutation i f and only i f n i s prime to i>-l. 
Let d be the g r e a t e s t common d i v i s o r o f n and p-1.. Then l e t t i n g 
y = x" (mod p) and r a i s i n g y to the power ( p - l ) / d , g i v e s , 
y(F>-l)/d = 1 p j 
The above congruence has ( p - l ) / d roots i n Z/pZ and each root i s a nth 
power i n Z/pZ. I f d = 1, that i s , n i s r e l a t i v e l y prime t o p-1, then 
there e x i s t s only one nth root of each elen^nt i n Z/pZ and hence y = x" 
i s a permutation modulo p. 
Now the above argument can be extended to the c a s e where 
y = i s a permutation i n Z/mZ where m = |2| ^ i and the p^, l^^i^^r > 
are d i s t i n c t primes and n i s a p o s i t i v e integer such that gcd (n, ( p j ^ - l ) 
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(P2-1)...(P^-1))= 1. 
To prove that y = x" (mod m) i s a permutation one needs to 
show that x" = y" (mod m) implies that x = y (rood m). Folloxtdng [ 8 1 ] , 
the proof i s considered i n three steps-
( i ) X and y are r e l a t i v e l y prime to m. 
( i i ) X = ap^ and y = bp^ for l$:a,b$m/p^ 
( i i i ) X = ap^ and y = bp^ f o r i j ^ j , l<a^m/p^, l^b$m/pj 
( i ) The proof i s by induction on r . From Lemma 1, i f r = l , then 
y = x" i s a permutation as gcd ( n , p ^ - l ) = 1. Assume i t holds 
for r $ k - l . Let { • • •» ^ 0(ni)} ^ ^ con^^lete reduced residue 
system mod m, that i s , gcd (a^,m) = 1. I f a^" = a^" (mod m), 
then (a^/a^)'^ = x" = 1 (mod m) and hence = 1 (mod p ^ ) , 
l ^ i ^ r . The gcd ( n , p ^ - l ) = 1 and Lemma 1 imply t h a t x = 1 
(mod p ^ ) . But then x = 1 (mod m). Thus {^ ^^ "t •••» ^0(in)l 
are d i s t i n c t mod m. 
( i i ) Now suppose a"p^" = b"p^" (mod m) where 1$ a,l5<:m/p^. Then 
a^p^'^"^ = b" p^""^ (mod m/p^) and so a'^  = b" (mod m/p^) s i n c e 
p; i s i n v e r t i b l e mod m/p^. By induction hypothesis, a = b. 
Consequently, { a"p^" } , l^a$m/p^ are d i s t i n c t mod m. Moreover 
for any i , the s e t s { a"p^" } , l^a<ra/p^ and { • • •^"0^ni j} 
are d i s t i n c t s i n c e a^.^ ? 0 (mod p ^ ) , 1^  j< 0(m). 
( i i i ) I f a'^p^" = b"p^" (mod m) where l^a^m/p^, l^b^m/p^, i ^  j . 
then p^ b, p^ a. L e t a = p^ . a and b = p^ b, then 
—n - .n—1 — —n . *n»l. , , m . a (p p ) = b (p.p ) (mod — — ) 
and ^ '^ . 
p.p. i n v e r t i b l e mod — ^ imp l i e s that a" = b^(mod — ^ 
By the induction hypothesis and by 1^  a,b$m/p^p^., a = 5 and so ap^ = bp^. 
The only i n t e r s e c t i o n o f the s e t s { ap^^" } 34a^/p^, k = i , j have then, 
i s at the common multiples of p^p-* 
Suppose now that x = y (mod m) with x ? y (mod m). From 
the f i r s t case, n e i t h e r x nor y can be r e l a t i v e l y prime t o m. But: then 
X = ap^, y = bpj, for some i , j with 1^  i , j ^ r . Again by the above,this 
implies x = y (mod m). Thus { x" } l^x^m are d i s t i n c t (mod m). T h i s 
completes the induction. 
Conversely, i f the proposition i s not tr u e , then there i s at 
l e a s t one i such that gcd ( n , p ^ - l ) ^  1 and hence x" does not y i e l d a 
permutation (mod p. ) . I f x p y (mod p. ) and x" = y^ (mod p. ), then 
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for 2 = m/p. xz ? y 2 (mod m) and ( x z ) " - ( y z ) " (mod m).So .x" i s not a 
permutation (mod m). 
The above paragraphs thus show why i n the RSA system which 
e d 
uses the polynomials x and x (mod m), one needs to choose the coding 
exponents e and d r e l a t i v e l y prime to ( p ^ - l ) ( p 2 - l ) where, m = PxP2* 
14.3 Eblynomial y = ax + b (mod m) 
Consider the l i n e a r permutation polynomial f ( x ) given by 
f ( x ) = ax + b (mod m) (14.1) 
where a and b are elements i n Z/mZ and gcd (a,m) = 1 and m i s a square 
f r e e integer. Assume that the message i s x, l^x<m and the encryption 
procedure c o n s i s t s of evaluating f ( x ) . The decryption procedure i s 
given by the i n v e r s e polynomial, f ~ ^ ( x ) . Rewriting (14.1) as 
y = ax + b (mod m) 
i e I ax = y - b (mod m) (14.2) 
L e t t i n g y - b = y', gives 
ax = y" (mod ra) (14.3) 
The congruence (14.3) has as so l u t i o n 
X = y' a^^^"'-^ (mod m) 
where 0(ra) i s the Euler t o t i e n t f u nction. But the opponent does not 
a c t u a l l y need to c a l c u l a t e 0(m) to f i n d x given y. The congruence (14.3) 
can be e a s i l y solved using Euclid* s algorithm without the knowledge of 
0(ra) as follows. 
One can f i n d a"^ using E u c l i d ' s algorithm where 
a a~^ = 1 (mod m) 
Hence x = y'* a" (mod m) 
Thus as expected, the l i n e a r congruence (14.1), does not provide a 
secure public key system s i n c e the opponent can e a s i l y recover the 
message x without f a c t o r i n g the modulus m to i t s prime f a c t o r s . On the 
other hand, t h i s polynomial can be used to form a convOTtional crypto-
system where the parameters a, b and ra a r e kept s e c r e t . Further the 
parameters a and b can be v a r i e d i n some prearranged manner r e s u l t i n g i n 
a v a r i a b l e s u b s t i t u t i o n such as 
and 
^ = ^ l ( ^ i - l 
^ i " ^ 2 ^ * ^ i - l ' ^ l ' 
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14.4 L i n e a r F r a c t i o n a l S u b s t i t u t i o n 
Now consider the l i n e a r f r a c t i o n a l s u b s t i t u t i o n function 
f ( x ) = ^ (mod p) 
From Section 10.4.5, the above function permutes the elements i n 2/piZ 
i f ad - be ? O (mod p ) . In Section 10.4.5, the elements a,b,c and d 
were used to form the message. Here the element x i s considered to be 
the message. For designing a public key system which i s to be based on 
the d i f f i c u l t y of f a c t o r i n g a la r g e i n t e g e r , consider 
- ax+b 
y = ^ ("^^ 
where say m = Pj^P2 ^1*^2 d i s t i n c t primes-y i s the c i p h e r . A 
symbol °° i s adjoined to Z/mZ where = l/O, O = l/« and f o r x e Z/mZ, 
oD-*.x = ao, o o x = ' » for X ? O. The l e g i t i m a t e r e c e i v e r can decrypt the 
cipher by finding the inverse operations modulo p^ ^ and modulo p^ 
separately and then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to obtain the 
message x(mod P]^P2)* A c t u a l l y t h i s system has no s e c u r i t y a t a l l 
because the cryp t a n a l y s t can a l s o f i n d the message very e a s i l y with the 
knowledge of the parameters a,b,c,d and m. That i s , he does not need to 
f a c t o r i z e m in t o i t s prime f a c t o r s . T h i s i s because the i n v e r s e of the 
matrix W=(^ ^ ) (mod m) can be found even without the knowledge of the 
prime f a c t o r s of m. This can be done using a process s i m i l a r to the 
Gauss-Jordan e l i m i n a t i o n process over the r e a l numbers except i n t h i s 
case, the elementary operations are chosen to ensure that the 
determinant of the r e s u l t i n g matrix i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to m (assuming 
determinant o f ( ^ ^ ) i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to m). This type o f algorithm 
would require a s i m i l a r number of operations as i t s counterpart over 
3 
the r e a l s , t hat i s , something l i k e 0(n ) operations for a nxn matrix 
[45]. Thus the opponent can f i n d the A,B,C,D such that 
I f the greatest common d i v i s o r of cip h e r y (mod m) and m i s greater 
than 1, then t h i s gives one of the prime f a c t o r s of m. The p r o b a b i l i t y 
of t h i s occurring must be small for l a r g e m^as the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of a 
large m i s known to be hard. Therefore neglecting t h i s c a s e and 
considering gcd(y,m) = 1, the opponent can choose two elements w and z 
mod m such that 
zy = w (mod m) 
Once such a p a i r (w,z) i s found, he can e a s i l y s o l v e for the message 
X as 
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and 
X = Aw + B2 (mod m) (14.4) 
Thus the message x can be recovered without having to f a c t o r i z e m. An 
example i l l u s t r a t i n g the above method i s given below: 
Let m = p^p^ = 3.7 = 21. 
Let 
^ = I 2 ("«d21) det ( J I ) = 1 (mod 21) 
Let the message to be encrypted i s , x = 6. Then the c i p h e r y i s 
given by 
y = ^'6 I 2 = 
Using the modified Gauss—Jordan method, the opponOTt c a l c u l a t e s the 
i n v e r s e to be 
(mod 21) 
Choosing w = 2 (mod 21), g i v e s 
16z = 2 (mod 21) 
Using E u c l i d ' s algorithm, 2 = 8 (mod 2 1 ) . Now using equation (14.4), x 
i s c a l c u l a t e d to be 
X = 2.2 + 16.8 (mod 21) 
= 6 (mod 21) 
Again such a system can be used i n the design o f a conventional 
symmetric cryptosystem. One can vary the parameters a^,b^,c^,d^ such 
that ^^d^ - t)^c^ 5? 0 (mod m)^ by some prearranged manner. For instance, 
one can i n i t i a l l y s e l e c t two matrices and such that det (M^) ? O 
(mod m) and det(M ) ^ 0 (mod m) and M = M M., where M. = ( ^ i ^ i ) , 
2 i + i X X \ ^ i i / for subsequent i ' s . 
14.5 R ^ e i Rational Functions 
Now consider a general r a t i o n a l function f ( x ) = a 
quotient of polynomials over Z where g ( x ) and h(x) are r e l a t i v e l y prime 
i n Z [ x ] . Then f ( x ) i s a permutation function modulo m i f h(a) (mod m) 
i s a prime residue c l a s s (mod m) f o r any aC Z and the mapping 0: Z/mZ 
Z/iriZ, 8 ( a ) = h(a)"'^"g*(a) i s a permutation [soJ. I f m = Pj^P2f then 
f ( x ) i s a permutation function (mod m) i f and only i f i t i s a permutation 
function (mod ) and (mod p ^ ) . Again a symbol «> i s adjoined to Z/mZ 
- 314 -
where " = l/O and O = l/<» and f o r ae Z/mZ,oo + a = o o , a o o = O D for a 
f O. I f the q u a n t i t i e s f ( a ) are d i s t i n c t for a l l at Z/mZ U {«} ^ 
then f ( x ) i s a permutation function over 2/mZ U {00} . 
R^dei [82] considered c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r functions ^ ^ { ^ ) which could be 
used i n the design of public key cryptosystems as shown below: 
Let a be a residue modulo p (p, a prime 2) such that (^) = 
-1 ( i e , a i s a f i x e d non-square). R ^ e i then proved that the function 
f ^ ( x ) given by 
f ^ ( x ) + / a " 
n , f-^n f ^ ( x ) = y^a (x+^/S) + (x-Vg) 
(x+VJT)" - (x-VET)" 
i s a permutation (mod p) i f n i s odd and gcd (n,p+l) = 1 and p Jf 
Further he showed that 
f ^ ( x ) = f ^ ( f ^ ( x ) ) over Z/pZ 
as 
Thus f ^ i s the inverse permutation of f ^ i f d i s chosen such that 
ed = 1 (mod p+1) 
and 
^e<^d('^» = ^d^^et'^^) = 
The proof can be found i n [ 8 2 ] . 
One can use such a function f i n the design of p u b l i c key 
systems as follows. 
I f the ring Z/mZ i s considered where say m = P^P2 ^^1*^2 
primes 2) then the encrypting exponent e can be chosen such that 
gcd(e, = 1, gcd(e,p2+l) = 1 and ^  Jf P-^ and e ^  p^, then f ^ ( x ) i s 
a permutation function over Z/mZ. Th i s i s a consequence o f the Chinese 
Remainder Therorem. Now one can determine the . decoding exponent d such 
that 
ed = 1 (mod (p^+l)(p2+l) ) (14.5) 
The encryption procedure transforms the message x eZ/mZ using the 
function y = f ^ ( x ) and the decryption procedure recovers the message 
by evaluating ^ ^ ( y ) i n Z/mZ. The parameter a i n the function f i s chosen 
such that ( — ) = -! and (S- ) = The public key i s therefore equal 
^1 ^2 
to ( e , f ^ , m,a) and the s e c r e t key i s (d, f ^ , m,a ). 
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From (14.5), i t i s seen that to c a l c u l a t e the decrypting 
e^qDonent d, the opponent needs to f a c t o r i z e m i n t o i t s prime f a c t o r s . 
Thus t h i s function seems to be s u i t a b l e f o r a p u b l i c key cryptosystem 
whose s e c u r i t y again depends on the d i f f i c u l t y o f f a c t o r i z i n g a l a r g e 
integer m. 
14.6 Dickson Fblynomial Based Public Key System 
Le t us now consider a s p e c i a l c l a s s of polynomials c a l l e d the 
Dickson polynomials [53]. As p e r s o n a l l y suggested by Prof S D Cohen of 
Glasgow U n i v e r s i t y , such Dickson polynomials are used i n the design of 
public key cryptosystems. 
For a e F and any odd p o s i t i v e integer k, the E>ickson 
polynomial gj^(x, ct) i s given by 
( k - l ) / 2 , / r^—\^ I r p 
V*' k k - r \ , ,r k-2r /x+Vx -4n, + x-V>r-4oL 
gi,(x,a) = U / '^""^  \ ^ / I 2 
For a = O, gj^(x,0) i s equal to the f a m i l i a r power function x used by 
the RSA system. 
From [53], i t i s known that i f gcd(k,p -1) = 1, then gj^(x,a) i s a 
permutation polynomial i n F^. Further 
^ ^ (x,a) = g ^ ( g ^ ( x , a ) , e?-) = g^(g^(x,a),a®) 
Thus the inverse permutation of g^(x, a)f with gcd(e,p^-l> =1 can be 
found using 
ed = 1 (mod(p^-l) ) 
and 
g^"^(x,a) = g^(x,a^) over Z/pZ 
Now consider the polynomial g^(x,a) over Z/mZ where say 
npsp^p^, a product of d i s t i n c t primes. Then g^(x,a) represents a 
permutation i f and only i f 
g c d ( e . ( p ^ ^ - l ) ( P 2 ^ - l ) ) = 1 
Thus one can design a public key system using the Dickson polynomial 
gj^(x,a) as follows: 
1. Choose l a r g e random primes p^ and and l e t m = P^Pg* 
2. Choose the encryption exponent e such that gcd(e, (p^ -1 
(P^'^)Y 1. 
3. C a l c u l a t e the decrypting exponent d such that 
ed = 1 (mod ( p ^ ^ - l ) ( p 2 ^ - l ) ) (14.6) 
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4. Choose an a r b i t r a r y element a i n Z/mZ. 
The encryption procedure then c o n s i s t s of transforming the 
message x e Z/mZ using g^(x,a) and the decryption procedure recovers 
the message using g^(x, a ^ ) . The p u b l i c key i s t h e r e f o r e given by 
(e,ra,g^(x,a)fO£)and the s e c r e t key c o n s i s t s of (d,m, g ^ ( x , a ^ , a ) . The 
s e c u r i t y of t h i s system again l i e s i n the d i f f i c u l t y o f f a c t o r i n g the 
modulus m to i t s prime f a c t o r s to be able to c a l c u l a t e d using (14.6). 
Thus Dickson polynomials can be used to design secure public 
key systems l i k e the RSA system. I t has been simulated on the Prime 
Computer system using the program DRXY.F77 given i n Appendix 26. An 
example showing the various jjarameters i s given below. 
Example 
Let Pj^ = 5, p^ = 7 and ra = p^p^ = 35. L e t a = 1 
Choosing the coding exponents e and d such that 
ed = 1 (nod ( 5 ^ - 1 ) ( 7 ^ - 1 ) ) 
ed = 1 (nod 1152) 
Therefore e = 11 and d = 419 are s u i t a b l e . 
Thus the encryption Dickson polynomial function i s given by g ^ ^ ( x , l ) : 
polynomial degree = 11 
polynomial c o e f f i c i ^ t s = 
11 O 
X X 
(1 0 24 O 9 O 28 O 20 O 24 O ) 
The decryption Dickson polynomial function i s givOT by 9^j^g(^»l)* 
polynomial degree = 419 
polynomial c o e f f i c i e n t s = 
419 X 
( 1 0 1 0 2 0 5 0 14 0 
28 0 13 0 26 O 5 0 31 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 
21 0 21 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 O 0 20 o 15 0 15 0 
30 0 5 0 0 o 0 0 30 0 
20 o 20 0 5 0 30 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 14 0 
21 0 21 0 7 0 0 0 O o 
21 0 21 0 7 o O 0 14 0 
28 0 28 0 21 o O 0 21 0 
0 o 0 0 0 0 o o O o 
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0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 7 0 
28 0 28 0 21 o 0 0 0 0 
14 0 34 0 8 0 15 0 16 0 
12 . 0 7 0 14 0 30 0 34 0 
20 o 5 0 30 0 0 0 0 o 
O 0 0 0 0 0 o O O 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 15 0 
30 0 5 0 0 0 o 0 20 0 
5 0 5 0 10 0 25 0 0 0 
0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 
O 0 O o 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 
18 o 3 0 31 0 20 O 22 o 
14 o 14 0 13 0 25 0 18 0 
15 0 20 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 
O 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 7 o 
28 o 28 0 11 0 25 o 15 o 
20 o 0 0 0 0 10 0 20 o 
20 0 5 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 
25 o 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 
O o 0 0 0 0 0 o 21 o 
14 0 14 0 28 0 .0 o.- 25 0 
24 0 24 0 13 0 15 0 21 o 
7 o 27 0 4 0 25 0 29 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 o 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 28 0 
7 0 22 0 29 0 30 0 5 o 
21 o 21 0 27 0 5 0 19 o 
3 o 18 0 21 0 0 0 1 0) .0 x 
Message x = 10 (mod 35) 
Encryption : cipher y = gj^^(x , l ) = 25 (mod 35) 
IDecryption : g^-^giVf'^) B 10 (mod 35) = Message 
14.'7 Discussion 
Some pertnutation polynomials f o r which the i n v e r s e permutations 
are easy to construct have been considered. The l i n e a r polynomial 
ax+b and the l i n e a r f r a c t i o n a l s u b s t i t u t i o n function (ax+b)/(cx+d) are 
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found to be insecure when used as public key systems. The R M e i 
function and the Dickson polynomials seem to o f f e r a s i m i l a r l e v e l of 
s e c u r i t y as the prototype RSA system. In general, i t i s not easy to 
f i n d the inverse permutation for an a r b i t r a r y permutation polynomial. 
One way of fi n d i n g the inverse permutation of a polynomial g ( x ) i n Z/pZ 
c o n s i s t s of r a i s i n g the function g(x) s u c c e s s i v e l y to powers 2,3,4,... 
and combining an appropriate set of them to give the i n v e r s e function. 
Using t h i s method, both the system designer and the c r y p t a n a l y s t have 
the same work f a c t o r . On the other hand, i f a permutation polynomial 
g(x) can be found whose inve r s e s over Z/p^2 for i=l,-.«, r are easy to 
c a l c u l a t e but v^ose inverse over Z/mZ where m =1 [~p. i s d i f f i c u l t to 
' 1=1 
c a l c u l a t e without knowing the prime f a c t o r s p^, then one can design a 
public key system based on the f a c t o r i z a t i o n trapdoor as fo l l o w s : 
1. Choose l a r g e primes p^,..., p^ and l e t m = |_| p^ .^ 
2. The permutation polynomial g(x) i s made p u b l i c along with m. 
3. The OTcryption procedure c o n s i s t s of transforming a message 
XQ e Z/mZ g(xQ) e Z/mZ. 
4. The decrypt'iori procedure f i n d s g"^(xQ) i n Z/p^Z f o r i = l , . . . r 
and then uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to recover the 
message x^ i n Z/mZ. 
Note that the decryption procedure should req u i r e the knowledge o f prime 
f a c t o r s of m to be able to provide s e c u r i t y . 
Public key systems can a l s o be designed using permutation 
polynomials based on the law of composition. One can combine the 
jDermutation polynomials, for which i n v e r s e s can be found i f some 'extra* 
information i s known, under the law of composition to construct public 
key systems which can be more secure than the i n d i v i d u a l polynomial 
based systems. Consider for instance, the encryption procedure given 
by the coitposite permutation function g where 
and 
g = Vj^ O y^ O y^ O ... O y^ 
y^, l ^ i ^ , are permutation functions. 
(0 - denotes composition) 
The decryption procedure i s then obtained by the composition of the 
inverses of the composition f a c t o r s of g i n the opposite order given by 
HOTce g O h = h O g = I d e n t i t y , I . 
The system designer can e a s i l y obtain the i n v e r s e composite permutation 
function h as he knows the f a c t o r s of g. But the opponent only knows g 
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and i t s inverse i s very d i f f i c u l t to c a l c u l a t e s i n c e i t i s very 
d i f f i c u l t to f i n d the decomposition of g with respect to composition. 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s scheme, consider the following 
simple example given below: 
L e t y^ = x ^ l (nod m) where m = P-j^ P2 ^1*^1 ^ ^ (nod 0(m)) 
L e t y^ = ^ i ^ l " * " ^ ! ™) w^^r^ gcd(aj^,m) = 1 and b^ £ Z/mZ 
Le t y^ = y2^2 (mod m) where e^d^ ^ ^ 0(in)) 
L e t y^ = 2^^ 3'*'**2 where gcd(a2»ni) = 1 and e Z/mZ 
Then the composit© permutation g i s given by 
g(x) = a2(aj^x^l + b^ )^2 + b^ 
L e t t i n g = 3 e^ = 5, gi v e s 
15 
g(x) = c.x^ (mod m) where c. £ Z/mZ. 
i=0 ^ ^ 
The system designer would make the function g ( x ) and m p u b l i c and keep 
the prime f a c t o r s p^ and p^ and the f a c t o r s y'^*y2*y2 ^4 
conposition s e c r e t . I f someone only knows g ( x ) and m, th«i i t i s very 
d i f f i c u l t to f i n d the in v e r s e permutation. As seen e a r l i e r , one way 
2 
i s to t r y g, g , ... u n t i l the inverse permutation can be constructed 
by t r i a l and er r o r procedure. On the other hand, the l e g a l r e c e i v e r 
can f i n d the in v e r s e permutation very e a s i l y by c a l c u l a t i n g y ^ ~ \ 
followed by followed by y^\ followed by y^*"^ to recover the 
message. 
The complexity of the composite system can be d r a m a t i c a l l y 
increased using such an approach and there are numerous ways of 
constructing such composite systems. For i n s t a n c e , one could combine 
the RSA system and the knapsack system. The message can be encrypted 
using the RSA system or one of i t s extensions and the encrypted 
message can be interpreted as a s t r i n g of numbers i n say the binary 
system, which can be encrypted using knapsack system. T h i s gives r i s e 
to a number of p o s s i b i l i t i e s to increase the s e c u r i t y . 
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C H A P T E R 15 
CHAINING TECHNIQUES AND BROADCASTING WITH PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS 
15.1 General 
In the following s e c t i o n , some of the chaining techniques 
are applied to the generalized RSA matrix system discussed i n Section 
10.4. I t may be r e c a l l e d t h a t some of these techniques have heen used 
with the symmetric DES system (see Chapter 5 ) . Such techniques can 
a l s o be applied to the RSA polynomial system described i n Section 10.5. 
By these techniques, the undesirable e f f e c t s of redundancy and s t r u c t u r e 
present i n the p l a i n t e x t data are. eliminated. 
F i n a l l y , a precaution which should be taken when using the 
RSA system or any one of i t s extensions i n a broadcasting s i t u a t i o n i s 
mentioned, where a s i n g l e message i s encrypted under s e v e r a l p u b l i c keys 
to be sent to s e v e r a l u s e r s . 
15.2 P l a i n i n g Techniques 
Let E and D denote the encryption and decryption of a message 
M under the generalized RSA system. I n i t i a l l y , consider the i n t e r -
symbol dependence i n an i n d i v i d u a l block using the RSA matrix system. 
F i r s t consider the messages to be non-singular matrices over 
^T^^" a — e Z/mZ, where m = p^ i , under the normal encryption mode e = M 
(mod m). I f there i s a s i n g l e e r r o r i n cip h e r matrix C then the 
recovered p l a i n matrix w i l l be completely i n e r r o r . An example 
i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s i s shown i n Figure 15.1. T h i s i n d i c a t e s that there: 
i s a strong intersymbol dependence within an i n d i v i d u a l c i p h e r t e x t block. 
On the other hand, with upper t r i a n g u l a r matrix messages 
(including the diagonal elements), t h i s i s not the case. Consider a 
message M, a 3x3 matrix over Z/mZ, given by 
^ 2 ^ 
M = 1 0 I where gcd(a^^,m) = 1, l ^ i $ 3 
° -33 
and the corresponding cipher matrix C 
C = M (mod m) 
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L e t m = 5.3^ = 45 
Let e = d = 5 
m^  m„ \ / 8 13 
M = ' 
"3 % 
(mod 45) 
S ^4 
(mod 45) 
An er r o r i n c ^ a f f e c t s decryption o f a l l elements ™^»"^2*"'3 ™4' 
Denoting t h i s as 
(C-^c^«) > (m^*, m^ *, m^ *, m*) 
(29-» 30) ^ (39, 4a 3a 19 ) 
S i m i l a r l y , 
( c ^ — • c ^ * ) > (m^*, m^ *, m^ *, m^») 
(7 • 8 ) ^ (11. 5. 30, 1) 
(c^-^c^») > (m^*, m^ *, m^ *, m^») 
( 1 2 - ^ 13) > (11, 10, 25, 1) 
( ^ 4 ^ V —^ V' V' 
( 1 3 — * 1 4 ) ^ (29, 2, 42, 44) 
F i g 15.1 - In t e r symbol Dependence i n Non-singular 
Matrix Message:Space. 
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=11 =12 =13 ^ 
0 =22 =23 
0 0 =33 1 
I f there i s an e r r o r i n c^^, denoted by c*^^ , then a f t e r decryption i t 
i s found that 
c * 
^11 ^12 ^13 
0 ^22 ^23 
0 0 ^33 
^ 2 ^ 3 
0 ^22 ^23 
o 0 ^33 
^ > I ^ " " 3 I = t^» 
I t i s seen that only the elements a^^, a^^^ ^13 a f f e c t e d due to 
an e r r o r i n c^^^^. That i s , there i s not a strong intersymbol dependence 
between the elements as i n the case of the non-singular matrix messages, 
More gen e r a l l y , i t i s p o s s i b l e to work out which elements a r e being 
affec t e d by e r r o r s . Considering again 3x3 matrices, l e t the 
message be 
b 
M = I 0 d 
Then 
O 
b 
/^^ *^ = ( o d 
o 
a b n n r b c 0 d 
n "^ r d e 0 0 0 f 
Thus 
V i = 
^ n . l = <^5.2) 
and 
''n.l = a b n + b 
«^ n+l = d e n 
+ e 
=n+l = a c n 
+ b 
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HOTce 
, _ be_ (a" - d") 
d-f 
Now i f there i s an error in 'a', that i s , a*, this results i n error in 
a , b and c . [denoting this as, n n n 
a* > a •, b », c » 
' n ' n ' n 
a-d 
then > b^., c^. 
c» > c * 
n 
n ' n • n * n 
e* > e », c • 
n n 
f» ^ f e *, c * 
n ' n n 
Thus from the point of view of intersymbol dependence within a block, 
i t i s preferrable to use the set of non-singular matrices as messages. 
Now consider some chaining techniques using t h i s RSA matrix 
system. Suppose an user A wishes to communicate to ah user B a total of 
r messages M^ , M^ . Let the corresponding ciphers be Cj^, . . . y C^. 
One way of chaining would be to modify the f i r s t cipher C^ ^ 
using some function f^ before transmitting to user B. The fionction f^ ^ 
can be communicated to user B under some secure means- For the 
subsequent ciphers C^f . . . j C ^ f both users can derive the functions f^* 
f^ using some publicly, known function g, 
^ i • ^ ^ ^ i - 1 * •••• ^1» ' ' ' i - l * ' \ * ^i-l» ^l)» ^ 
One could also transmit the function f^ ^ to begin with using a public 
key distribution system such as the extended matrix version of the 
DiffiewHellman public key distribution system discussed i n Chapter 13. 
Now consider the case where the function f^ i s transmitted 
to the user B v i a the f i r s t message M^ . Tw such possible methods are 
looked at. 
15.2.1 ijethod_l_ 
The operation of th i s method follows the pattern given 
below: 
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User A User B 
^ ^ ^ 1 - 7 - * "2 
^ ^3^2 
-C2 
In this method, the previous cipher matrix i s simply added with the 
next message matrix before encryption. Here a simple modulo m addition 
has been suggested. More generally, one could use a publicly kno\«n 
function g to form g(M^, ^ i _ l ^ * With this method, an error in w i l l 
cause an error in the decryption of and ^^ .^^ ^ then the system w i l l 
synchronize. That i s ^ 
E M. + C. -1 1-1 
M. . + C. 1+1 1 
• 5 — * M.* + C * , 1 1-1 -Cv 1 
C i+1 'i+l i+l 
This system has the same error characteristic as the stream cipher 
feedback (CFB) or the cipher block chaining (CBC) modes of DES. Note tfeit-
\Sw> tnfitfeod. <loeo not fjrovtdfl. au-lftentvcabum 0/3 Ort^onc Gan Me^\j^h a meSQoje 
15.2.2 itethod_2_ 
The operation of this method follows the pattern given 
below: 
User A User B 
-> M. 
In t h i s method, the previous cipher matrix as well as the previous 
message matrix are added modulo m to the next message matrix prior to 
encryption. More generally, again a publicly known function g can be 
used'instead of modulo m addition where the argxunents of g are M^ , 
^-1 ^ i - 1 With this method, an error in C^, w i l l cause error in 
the decryption of a l l subsequent message matrices. 
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User A Us£r_B — — —C —M ^  
M. ,-K:. +M.—L^C. C,* —2^M.*+M * -K: * ^ M ** 
X-l X-1 1 1 1 1 1-1 1-1 1 
-C * —M-* * 
This system has the same error characteristic as the CBCP or the CFBV 
modes of DES discussed in Chapter 5. I t possesses the error 
propagation property. 
Note that in both these methods, the f i r s t message-cipher pair 
(M^,C^) i s essentially used to set up some form of ' i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector' (Section 2.3.2) and i t i s a direct block encryption. 
15.3 Broadcasting of Messages 
In many applications, i t i s necessary to transmit the -same 
set of messages to a group of users in the network. Simmons has 
shown that C83]in such broadcasting situations,special precautions 
should be taken to avoid the message being recovered by a cryptanalyst 
without" having to 'break* the underlying cryptosystem. His argument 
given below applies to the prototype RSA system (over Z) or any of i t s 
extensions proposed e a r l i e r . Thus the messages M and ciphers C in the 
argument can be rational integers, polynomials, matrices or algebraic 
integers. 
Let the modulus of the system be m (^j^P2) public 
encryption exponents be e^ and e^- Let a message M be encrypted with 
each of these exponents to form and C^. That i s , 
C = M^l (mod m) 
^ where M, C^, e 2/mZ 
= M^ 2 (mod m) 
Now i f i t i s assumed that gcd(e^,e2) = 1, then there ex i s t s a and b 
such that 
ae^ + be^ = 1 
The values of a and b can be found using the Euclid's algorithm. One 
of the coefficients i s positive and the other i s negative. I f a i s 
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negative, then using Euclid's algorithm, the multiplicative inverse of 
(mod m) i s given by 
C^ C^ "-*- = l(mod m) 
I f gcd(C^,m) = 1, then C^"^ ex i s t s and 
= M^^l'^2 (mod m) 
= M (mod m) 
Thus the message can be recovered even without factoring m into and 
p^. The only information needed are the integer values of m, e^ ,^ e^ • 
Cj^and a l l of which are assumed to be publicly, available. Thus 
precautions must be taken to avoid such situations. 
An example i l l u s t r a t i n g such a situation i s given below: 
Let m = 13.23 = 299 
Let = 5 d^ = 53 
Let e^ = 7 d^ = 151 
Let the message M = 4. Then, 
= ( 4 ) ^ = 127 (mod 299) 
= ( 4 ) ^ = 238 (mod 299) 
Now using Euclid's algorithm 
5a + 7b = 1 
=> a = 3, b = -2 
As b i s negative, we form 
C^C'^ = 1 (mod 299) 
(238 )C2"'^ = 1 (mod 299) 
Using Euclid's algorithm C^^ = 49 (mod 299) 
Hence 
(49)^ (127)-^ = 4918167583 
= 4 (mod 299) 
= M 
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C H A P T E R 16 
CX)NCLUSIONS 
Some cryptographic techniques for secure data communication 
over an insecure channel have been investigated in this t h e s i s . The 
f i r s t part has been primarily concerned with conventional crypto-
systems, in particular, the Data Encryption Standard (DBS) whereas 
the second part focussed on public key cryptosystems. . The main 
results and conclusions are summarized below [87-90]. 
Part 1 
A software implementation of the I^S algorithm has been 
carried out using an Apple microcomputer which allowed a study of some 
of the properties of the DBS such as the complementary property and 
the avalanche effect. I t has been found however that such a software 
implementation i s too slow for many re a l time applications and since 
i t i s necessary to store the secret key within the computer system, 
there i s a po s s i b i l i t y of i t s recovery by an unauthorized user. These 
problems can be overcome by a hardware LSI implementation of the DES 
and t h i s has been used in the design and construction of a micro-
processor based data encryption interface unit. 
The use of the interface in a point to point communication 
system allowed secure data transfer hetvj&en Apple microcompaters in 
either plain or encrypted format. The interface has been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
tested over the public switched telephone network with data rates up 
to 1200 bits per second. I f required, the security can be increased 
by performing multiple encryption with independent keys or using 
chaining techniques. Several chaining techniques have been investigated 
using the developed system namely Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Stream 
Cipher Feedback (CFB), Cipher Block Chaining with Plaintext Feedback 
(CBCP) and stream Cipher Feedback with Vector Feedback (CFB/). Each 
of these schemes gave r i s e to a cryptographic system with different 
error characteristics, speed of operation and level of security and 
hence is suitable for different applications. The error propagation 
property of CBCP and CFBV schemes made them - particularly suitable for 
message authentication purposes but unsuitable for use in 
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communication links prone to noise. The s e l f synchronizing property 
of CFB and CBC made them more useful for links prone to small amounts 
of noise. The four chaining modes are found to be less susceptible 
to attacks of replay, insertion,deletion and code book analysis in 
comparison to the standard Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode«-Oiaining 
also helped to eliminate the undesirable effects of data recJundancy 
and structure. A s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of the randomness of the output 
sequences produced under these different chaining modes confirmed the 
good pseudo-random generator property of the DES. 
The use of the developed encryption interface has been 
extended to provide off-line f i l e security using the Apple disk system. 
A s e l f synchronizing mode i s found to be more suitable for f i l e 
encryption as in this case, recovery from an error must be effected 
with ciphertext alon-e. I f a ciphering procedure with error prop-
agation property i s used for f i l e security, subsequent i n a b i l i t y to read 
a portion of the ciphertext because of damage to the physical medium 
or the recorded b i t s , may prevent a l l the following ciphertext being 
deciphered, l^/ith communication security, i t i s possible to recover 
from an error by retransmitting the original message. 
Further the developed system can be used on the Prestel 
public network allowing storage and r e t r i e v a l of completely and partly 
encrypted frames of information on the Prestel database. A 6-bit 
cipher feedback technique has been found to be suitable for such, an 
application. This technique prevented the occurrence of control 
characters in the ciphertext which are not acceptable to the Prestel 
control unit. 
The use of such a DES based encryption system i n a 
communication network requires the keys be distributed to the users 
over a separate secure channel. Several methods of key distribution 
using Key Centres and public key systems have been discussed-
Part 2 
A generalization of the RSA system in the ring of matrices 
over 2/mZ, where m i s a composite integer, i s proposed. I t i s shown 
that a factorization of the modulus m i s needed to compute the 
exponent of the group formed by either non-singular matrix messages or 
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upper triangular matrices with invertible diagonal elements over Z/mZ, 
thus offering a similar level of security as the prototype RSA system. 
This system allows the use of a non-square free modulus which i s not 
possible with the RSA system over the integers. This scheme i s as 
suitable for both privacy and authentication as i t s predecessor. The 
use of chaining techniques in t h i s generalized system to overcome the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of data redundancy has also been demonstrated. 
An extension of the RSA system to polynomial rings has been 
considered. I t i s found that the d i f f i c u l t y of factorization of a 
polynomial into i t s irreducible factors over a f i n i t e f i e l d does not 
in i t s e l f provide a secure public key cryptosystem. However, i f the 
d i f f i c u l t y of factorizing an integer i s compounded with the d i f f i c u l t y 
of factorizing a polynomial, then a secure RSA type system i n the ring 
of polynomials i s seen to be possible. For cryptographic application, 
both the modulus polynomial and the modulus integer need to be square 
free to enable proper decryption. 
The design of public key systems in some quadratic algebraic 
number f i e l d s using the factorization trapdoor concept has heen 
presented. The security of such systems i s found to be depend^it on 
the d i f f i c u l t y of factorizing the norm of the modulus. Thus a similar 
level of security as the prototype RSA system can be achieved i f the 
norm i s made to be su f f i c i e n t l y large. One method of message 
representation in such systems involves the use of the elementary 
divisor theory to choose a standard set of representatives. 
The investigation of such extensions indicate that rings 
other than the ring of rational integers^ can be used to construct public 
key systems with the factorization trapdoor property. From a practical 
point of view, i t seems that the complexity of such systems may 
favour the implementation of the factorization trapdoor i n the ring of 
rational integers. 
The Diffie-Hellman public key distribution has been 
implemented in the Galois extension f i e l d GF(2'^) with n = 127, where 
the computations required for exponentiation can be e a s i l y performed 
using d i g i t a l logic. To withstand the most recently published 
Adleman's subexponential algorithm to compute logarithms, i t i s 
521 
necessary to work in a higher ext«ision f i e l d of GF(2 ) to maintain 
a work factor equivalent to that of DES key exhaustion. 
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Short cycling attacks consisting of repeated encipherings 
have been carried out against the exponentiation system in GF(2") with 
n = 3 and 7. I t i s found that i f the primitive eleme^it i s chosen at 
random, then the expected cycle length of an arbitrary cycle i s very 
close to half the number of non-zero elements in the f i e l d . Thus this 
type of attack appears to be very much analogous to a random search 
procedure. 
The exponentiation system in GF(2^^^) has been used in 
conjunction with the DES CTicryption to form a hybrid system \»*iich 
combines the protection provided by the conventional cryptosystem with 
the user authentication attributes of a public key system. Such a 
hybrid arrangement i s found to be feasible in practice. 
A dedicated hardware exponentiation system in GF(2^) has 
been designed and constructed. The use of normal basis representation 
in the design allows a modular construction which i s very useful in 
large scale integrated c i r c u i t design. 
An extension of the Diffie-Hellman public key distribution 
system to matrix rings i s proposed. Using rings of non-singular 
matrices over 2/pZ (p prime) and upper triangular matrices with 
invertible elements along the diagonal over Z/p^t i t i s shown that the 
number of possible secret keys i s much greater for a given prime p 
compared to the original system. 
The role of permutation polynomials in the design of public 
key systems has been investigated and i t i s shown that the cl a s s of 
Dickson permutation polynomials and certain RWei rational functions 
can be used to construct public systems with a similar l e v e l of 
security as the prototype RSA system. Further, a method of designing 
public key systems using permutation polynomials under the law of 
composition has been presented. The complexity of such composite 
systems can be dramatically increased to provide high security. 
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A P P E N D I C E S 
Appendix 1 
5ata_Encryption Standard_ £ _-^_S2^5w§^£ S^ S-"-^  
A de s c r i p t i o n of the Data Encryption Standard program 
together with a p a r t i a l l i s t i n g i s given i n t h i s Appendix. 
The program i s written as a subroutine which can be 
c a l l e d at hexadecimal address 1E00. I n order to use the 
routine, three things must be supplied: mode, p l a i n t e x t and 
key. The user s e l e c t s the encryption or decryption mode by 
inputting E or D. I n the case of enciyption, the input 
p l a i n t e x t can be provided e i t h e r from the keyboard or from a 
f i l e stored i n memory whereas i n the case of decryption, the 
input ciphertext i s expected to be present i n the memory. 
The program i s almost the same for both encryption and 
decryption. I n the case of decryption, the l e f t s h i f t s are 
replaced by the ri g h t s h i f t s and the s h i f t schedule operation 
i s c a r r i e d out i n the reverse order to that of encryption. 
Hence only the encryption program i s considered here. 
A 1.1 _ Main_Program_ ^ ^Encryption 
RND CNT : I t e r a t i o n count 
IE00 : JSR (INIT - l ) 
JSR ( E l ) 
JSR (E2) 
LDA © 0 0 
CNT 
L5 : LDA WB CNT 
STA RND 
RND 
CMP @ 10 
BEQ L I 
CMP @ 08 
BEQ L2 
CMP @ OP 
BEQ L2 
CMP S 00 
BEQ L2 
CMP < § 01 
BEQ L2 
: Hexadecimal data 
A-1 
L2 
L I 
JSR (LEFT SHIFT) 
JSR (LEFT SHIFT) 
JSR (PC - 2) 
JSR • (E4) 
INC RND CNT 
JSR (INIT - 2) 
JMP L5 
JSR L5 
HALT 
Encryption ^ i ' i _Subroutines_ 
1. I N I T . l , INIT.2 : The subroutine INIT-1 i n i t i a l i z e s 
the key r e g i s t e r , the data r e g i s t e r and a l l the 
temporary r e g i s t e r s to Zero whereas the routine I1TIT.2 
only c l e a r s the temporary re g i s t e r s . -
2. E l : This subroutine tstkes 64 b i t s of key as input 
block and c a r r i e s out the permutation PC-1. The 
output i s stored i n memory lo c a t i o n s 9000 to 9007 
(Key R e g i s t e r ) . 
3. E2 : This subroutine takes 64 b i t s of data as input 
block and c a r r i e s out the I n i t i a l Permutation ( I P ) . 
The r e s u l t i s stored i n memory loca t i o n s 7000 to 7007. 
' (Data R e g i s t e r ) . 
4. LEFT SHIFT : The input to t h i s routine i s found i n 
locat i o n s 9000 to 9007. I t performs a si n g l e c i r c u l a r 
l e f t s h i f t on locations 9000 to 9003 and on 9004 to 
9007. The v a l i d output b i t s i n loca t i o n s 9000 to 9007 
are the seven most s i g n i f i c a n t b i t s , i . e . , 
V A L I 9000 to 9007 
PC-2 : This routine performs the permutation PC-2 on 
the memory locations 9000 to 9007• (Only the seven most 
s i g n i f i c a n t b i t s are used). The r e s u l t i s stored i n 4OOO 
to 4007 where the s i x middle b i t s are the v a l i d b i t s i . e . , 
4000 to 4007 : \/]y! A h 1 
« 6 > 
A-2 
E4 : This routine c a r r i e d out a number of ta s k s . F i r s t , 
the right h a l f of the o r i g i n a l data containing 52 b i t s 
into 48 b i t s using permutation E. Input to t h i s operation 
i s found i n locations 7004 to 700? and the output i s stored 
i n 3500 to 5507. I n each l o c a t i o n , the v a l i d b i t s are the 
s i x l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t ones, i . e . , 
3500 to 3507 : X/XA^ A L I DI 
4, 6 > 
The next part of the routine combines t h i s expanded 
version with the key b i t s a f t e r PC-2 ( i n 4OOO to 4OO7) 
using exclusive-or operation. The r e s u l t i s stored i n 
locati o n s 4500 to 4507- I n each l o c a t i o n , the v a l i d b i t s 
are the s i x l e a s t s i g n i f i c a n t ones, i . e . . 
4500 to 4507 : VXPC^ A L I D 
Then the routine used the 6-bit blocks i n 4500 to 4507 as 
input to the S-boxes and y i e l d s a 4-bit blocks as outputs 
The f i r s t and s i x t h b i t s i n each l o c a t i o n are combined to 
represent a nximber, i , i n the range 0 to 3 i n base 2, 
The middle four'bits are used to represent a number, j , 
i n the range 0 to 15 i n base 2. The output i s the entry 
( i , 0) i n the corresponding S-box, These S-box outputs 
are stored i n locations 46OO to 4607. Then, the 
Permutation P i s c a r r i e d out using the values i n 46OO to 
4607 as i t s input. The r e s u l t i s stored i n 5700 to 5703 
where a l l 8 b i t s i n each l o c a t i o n are v a l i d . They are 
exclusive-ored with the l e f t h a l f of the o r i g i n a l data 
i n 7000 to 7003 to form the r i g h t h a l f of the next 
i t e r a t i o n . F i n a l l y the r i g h t h a l f of the o r i g i n a l data 
i s transferred to the l e f t h a l f . 
E5 • This routine c a r r i e d out the Inverse I n i t i a l 
Permutation ( I P " ^ ) on 7000 to 7007- The output of t h i s 
routine i s stored i n 6IOO to 6107 which i s the f i n a l 
ciphertext output. 
A-3 
A 1.3 Use of the DES Program 
* 1E00 G 
* ENTER ENCRYPT (E) or DECRYPT (D) 
E 
* ENTER KEY PLEASE 
* ENTER DATA BLOCK PLEASE 
* ENCRYPTED DATA BLOCK I S POUND IN ( 6 X 0 0 - 6IO7) 
* 1E00 G 
* ENTER ENCRYPT ( E ) or DECRYPT (D) 
D 
* DECRYPTED DATA BLOCK I S POUND I N ( 3 8 0 0 - 3 8 0 ? ) 
A-4 
Appendix 2 
Point-to-point Communication^ _Block_Encryption Program ^ ECB} 
A 2.1 Basic Flowchart 
START 
I n i t i a l i z e temporary-
Registers e.g. CNTRL-G 
Counter, CNTRL-J 
CoTinter, e t c . 
Set Mode Register, 
Command Reg i s t e r of 
l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
Request the user for the 
desired Baud Rate and 
set accordingly-
Test DSR s i g n a l 
from Modem 
No 
Yes 
P l a i n or Encrypted or 
Mixture Format 
NO LINK 
ERROR-
P l a i n 
>-
Mix or Enc. 
Activate and I n i t i a l i z e 
Data S e c u r i t y Device 
Key Request ON? RESET Please 
Yes 
2 
A-5 
No 
Display 'Enter Key 
Please' 
No 
Fetch 1 Key Byte 
P a r i t y Check Routine 
Load Key Byte i n 
KEY Register 
64 Key B i t s ? 
\ 
Yes 
/ 
Display *Enter Data 
Please * 
Test foi " Mixture Format 
No 
Check DCD s i g n a l 
from Modem 
No 
Check Keyboard F l a g 
Yes 
Yes ^ 3 
Yes 
4 
A-6 
Tx Mode 
Data Input Routine 
10 
Only Return Character / Yes ^ 
No 
Hi 
End of Message? Yes 
Yes 
End of a Block? 
No 
Fetch a Data Byte 
Test for Control characters 
including CNTRL-G, CNTRL-J 
and increment respective 
counters i f present 
Store the output i n the 
Data Security Device 
Read Encrypted Data and 
Transmit i t to Modem 
F i l l block with pseudo-
random characters and 
provide Delay for 
repeated Return 
Provide Delay f or CNTRL-G, 
CNTRL-J and Line feed characters 
16 
A-7 
5 4 
Exactly 8 bytes = 1 Block? No 
Yes 
Encrypt and Send i t to 
Modem 
Pad with 7 bytes of 
pseudo-random characters 
ajid a Return character 
Enciypt and Send the Block 
Delay Routines 
/ 
Reset C ounters 
< Test f or Mixture format? No 
es 
P i l l the Block with a 
Return Character and 
pseudo-random characters 
Rx mode 
Fetch Data from Link 
A-8 
No 
No y 
No 
No 
Er r o r Check Routines 
^ 8 bytes of Data = 1 Block? 
Yes 
Decrypt Data Block 
^/ 
Display the p l a i n 
Data 
End of message? 
/ Yes 
Test for Mixture Format? 
Yes 
1 
1 
Check DCD s i g n a l from 
Modem 
Yes_ 
Check Keyboard F l a g 
.Yes 
23 
A-9 
'I 
Data Input Routine 
Only Return Character? ^J>Ye3^ Provide Delay 
for Repeated Return 
Increment Character 
Counter 
< 
End of Me 3sage ? 
Test for Mixture Format?^ 
Reset Counters 
NJ^ NO 
10 
1 
Fetch a data byte 
Test Routines for Control 
Characters including 
CNRTL-G and CNTRL-J 
> / 
Transmit Dats L to Modem 
Delay Routines 
Test for Mixture Format / Yes ^ 8 
No 
24 
A-9a 
24 
Fetch a data byte 
>^ No 
E r r o r Test Routines 
Display Received L a t a 
End of Message? 
A-9b 
A 2.2 Main Program 
30AE 
L I 
LDA" CO 51 
STA C0A8 
LDX @ 00 
LDY @ 00 
LDA ® 00 
STA IB 
STA 
STA 
LDA 
STA 
LDA 
STA 
F9 
06 
01 
08 
10 
07 
LDA C0A6 
AND 0 01 
BEa L I 
JMP NOLINK 
LDA @ 6E 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 12 
Comments 
Set Text Mode 
Reset l/O C o n t r o l l e r WD 2123 
Counter: No. of CNTRL-G within a block. 
Counter: No. of CNTRL-J within a block. 
I n i t i a l i z e memory l o c a t i o n (06) to be 
used i n determining end of a l i n e of 
displ a y on the VDU. 
Counter: No. of characters i n a l i n e . 
Counter used i n delay routine to avoid 
noise spikes created during r e l a y change-
over i n the modem. 
Check DSR = 1 ? 
Display No Link E r r o r Message. 
Set MODE Register of l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
WD 2123. 
Set COMMAND Reg i s t e r of l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
WD 2123. 
A-10 
L2 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 14 
STA C0A4 
JSR BAUD 
JSR PLAENC 
JSR FD6A 
LDA 
CMP 
BNE 
JSR 
JSR 
JSR 
JSR 
0200 
' DO 
L2 
DATA 
R7 
JMP PLAIN 
JSR DSD 
DATA 
R7 
Set SELCLK = 1 
Subroutine to set appropriate Baud Rate 
Subroutine d i s p l a y i n g the message P l a i n 
or Encrypt*. 
Subroutine to input data into the 6502 
Apple System from keyboard. 
Encryption format requested. 
Display Message - Enter Data Please. 
Jump to p l a i n data coimnunication routines. 
Subroutine which handles the se c r e t key. 
Fetches key from keyboard, checks Tor 
correct p a r i t y and stores i n KEY Reg i s t e r 
i n Security Device WD 2001. 
L4 
L3 
LDA 
AND 
NOP 
BNE 
JMP 
LDA 
BPL 
C0A6 
05 
L3 
RX 
COOO 
L4 
Check keyboard and the communication l i n k 
for the presence of v a l i d data in an 
al t e r n a t i n g manner. 
A-11 
LDA @ 55 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
Set COMMAND Register of l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
WD 2125 to Transmit Mode. 
Set Encryption Mode i n Security Device 
WD 2001. 
L5 
L6 
LIO 
L9 
L8 
JSR FD6A 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ L5 
JMP L6 
LDA ® F F 
JSR PCA8 
JSR END 
J S R SWITCH 
JMP L 4 
TXA 
LDY @ 00 
STA I D 
LDX @ 00 
LDA @ 00 
CMP 
Data Input Subroutine 
BEQ 
CPX 
BEQ 
JSR 
ID 
L7 
08 
L8 
DIR 
Subroutine to encrypt and send a block 
c o n s i s t i n g of a Return character and 
seven random characters. 
Switch the l/O device to Receive Mode. 
Check end of message• 
Check completion of a block of M b i t s 
Check Data Input Request. 
Test f o r CNTRL-G or CNTRL-J character. 
LDA 0200,y 
JSR TEST 
DEC ID 
INY 
INX 
JMP L9 
JSR READSEND Subroutine to send an encrypted block 
JSR DELAY LINE Subroutine to provide delay f or some 
s p e c i a l c h a racters. 
JMP LIO 
A-12 
L7 
L l l 
L I 2 
RX 
21 
L18 
L17 
CPX 
BEQ 
JMP 
JSR 
JSR 
LDX 
JSR 
JSR 
JSR 
JMP 
08 
L l l 
L12 
READSEND 
DELAYLINE 
00 
END 
DELAYLINE 
SWITCH 
L4 
LDA @ 02 
JSR FCA8 
DEC 07 
LDA 07 
CMP 0 00 
BEQ Z l 
JMP L4 
LDA @ 10 
STA 07 
LDA COAA 
LDA @ 16 
STA GOAD 
LDA @ OE 
STA COAl 
LDA @ 00 
STA FC 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 02 
BEQ L17 
JSR DIR 
INC FC 
Check DCD repeatedly to avoid 
noise spikes. 
Set Receive Mode i n the l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
Set S e c u r i t y Device to Decryption Mode 
Counter: To determine whether 8 bytes 
have been received. 
Test TxRDY of l/O C o n t r o l l e r . 
A-13 
L25 
LDA 
AND 
BNE 
LDA 
Am) 
BNE 
LDA 
AND 
BNE 
JMP 
JSR 
JMP 
OOAB 
@ 10 
L23 
COAB 
@ 08 
L23 
COAB 
20 
L23 
B l 
ERR 
L4 
Check f o r p a r i t y , 
f r a m i n g and overrun e r r o r s 
B l LDA 
STA 
COAA 
COAO 
LDA FC 
CMP ® 08 
BNE LI7 
JSR READPRINT 
L21 
CMP @ 8D 
BNE L18 
LDX • @ 00 
CPX @ 08 
BEQ L19 
LDA 9500, X 
CMP @ 87 
BEQ L20 
CMP @ 8A. 
BEQ L20 
INx 
JMP L21 
I n p u t the r e c e i v e d c i p h e r b l o c k 
t o t h e S e c u r i t y Device. 
Decrypt the c i p h e r and d i s p l a y the 
message on the VDU screen. 
I f end o f message, d i s c a r d any random 
bytes i n the l a s t b l o c k . 
A^4 
L19 JSR ENDl . 
JMP L4 
L20 LDA ® PF 
JSR PCA8 
JMP L19 
A 2.3 Subroutines 
Some o f the im p o r t a n t s u b r o u t i n e s c a l l e d by the main 
program are now b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d . 
A 2-3_.l _REA5SEN5 
This s u b r o u t i n e f i r s t checks the TxRDy and the CTS 
st a t u s b i t s t o see i f they are i n the c o r r e c t s t a t e . Then i t 
checks the DOR s t a t u s b i t and reads d a t a b y t e s from the S e c u r i t y 
Device one by one u n t i l a whole b l o c k i s formed. Then the b l o c k 
i s sent' down the l i n e . 
LDX @ 00 
L25 CPX @ 08 
BEQ' L22 
L23 LDA COAB 
BPL L23 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 01 
BEQ L23 
INX 
LDA C0A2 
STA COAC 
JMP L25 
L22 RTS 
A 2.5.2 _READPRINT 
This s u b r o u t i n e i n i t i a l l y checks the DOR s t a t u s 
b i t o f the S e c u r i t y Device and then reads the da t a b y t e s . 
The decrypted data b l o c k i s s t o r e d i n 9500 t o 950? f o r l a t e r 
use and i s d i s p l a y e d on the VDU screen. 
LDX @ 00 
L27 CPX @ 08 
BEQ L24 
A-15 
L26 LDA C0A5 
' BPL L26 
INX 
LDA C0A2 
STA 9500,X 
JSR FDFO 
JMP L27 
L24 RTS. 
A 2.5.3 _ EN5 
This s u b r o u t i n e i s concerned w i t h the l a s t b l o c k of 
the message i n the Transmission Mode. F i r s t i t checks whether 
the number o f ch a r a c t e r s present i n the l a s t b l o c k which i s 
not completely f u l l i s equal t o seven. I f so, i t adds t h e 
Return c h a r a c t e r a t the end and encrypts t h i s b l o c k and sends 
the c i p h e r over the l i n k u s i n g READSEN3). I f however t h e 
block contains l e s s than seven c h a r a c t e r s , i t f i l l s the b l o c k 
w i t h a Return and random c h a r a c t e r s , encrypts the b l o c k and 
t r a n s m i t s the c i p h e r over the l i n k . I n b o t h cases, t h e 
subro u t i n e STJBl i s used t o increment the a p p r o p r i a t e CNTRL-G, 
CNTRL-J c h a r a c t e r coTinters. The r o u t i n e SUBl i s p a r t o f 
the TEST su b r o u t i n e d e s c r i b e d i n Se c t i o n A 2.5-4. 
JSR DIR 
LDA @ 8D 
STA COAO 
JSR sum 
INX 
M12 CPX @ 08 
BEQ Ml4 
LDA 02P8,x 
STA COAO 
JSR s m 
INX 
JMP M12 
MI4 JSR READSEND 
RTS. 
A-16 
A 2.5.4 _ TEST 
This, s u b r o u t i n e checks whether t h e i n p u t c h a r a c t e r i s 
a CNTRL-G or a CNTRL-J or any othe r c o n t r o l c h a r a c t e r and 
increments the a p p r o p r i a t e counters a c c o r d i n g l y * 
STA COAO 
CMP @ 8A 
BEQ R l l 
CMP @ 87 
BEQ R12 
CMP @ AO 
BCS RI3 
RTS 
R l l INC F9 
RTS 
R12 INC IB 
RTS 
RI3 JSR SDBl 
RTS 
STOl INC •08 
LDA 08 
CMP ® 29 
BEQ RI4 
RTS 
RI4 LDA @ FP 
STA 06 
LDA @ 01 
STA 08 
RTS 
A 2.3.5 DELAYLINE 
This s u b r o u t i n e provides the necessary delay 
r e q u i r e d a f t e r sending a CNTRL-G, CNTRL-J o r a l i n e f e e d 
(end o f l i n e ) c h a r a c t e r . 
LDA 06 
CMP @ PP 
BEQ RI6 
JMP RI7 
A-.I7 
Rl6 LDA @ PO 
JSR FCA8 
LDA @ 00 
STA 06 
R17 LDA IB 
CMP ® 00 
BEQ R18 
LDA @ PP 
JSR FCA8 
DEC IB 
JMP R17 
R18 LDA P9 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ R19 
LDA @ 80 
JSR PCA8 
DEC P9 
JMP R18 
R19 RTS. 
A 2;5.6 _ BAUD 
This s u b r o u t i n e takes a number between 0 t o 8 from the 
keyboard as i t s i n p u t and sets the Baud Rate i n the l/O 
c o n t r o l l e r a c c o r d i n g l y i n the range 50 t o 1200 b i t s per 
second (bauds). 
R20 
LDA 0200 
AND @ OP 
STA COAE 
ASL 
CMP @ 06 
BCS R20 
CLC 
ADC @ 04 
STA 09 
SEC 
LDA @ 11 
SBC 09 
STA 09 
RTS. 
A-18 
A 2.5.7 _ ERR 
This s u b r o u t i n e p r i n t s an ERROR MESSAGE and helps 
the system t o resynchronize a f t e r an e r r o r has o c c i i r r e d . This 
i s done by r e s e t t i n g DIR and DOR s t a t u s f l a g s and i n i t i a l i z i n g 
the c h a r a c t e r counter (O8) and the memory l o c a t i o n (06) t o zero 
JSR PF2D 
R21 LDA C0A3 
AND @ 40 
BNE R23 
R22 LDA C0A3 
BPL R22 
LDA C0A2 
JMP R22 
R25 STA COAO 
JMP R21 
R24 LDA @ 01 
STA 08 
LDA @ 00 
STA 06 
LDX @ 08 
R25 CPX @ 00 
BEQ R26 
LDA C0A2 
DEX 
JMP R25 
R26 RTS. 
A 2.5.8 PLAIN 
This s u b r o u t i n e a l l o w s p l a i n d a t a communication 
over the l i n k . 
L29 LDA C0A6 
AND @ 05 
BNE L28 
JMP RXl 
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L28 
L 3 2 
L30 
L31 
L33 
L35 
L34 
RXl 
LDA COCO 
BPL L29 
LDA @ 33 
STA COAD 
JSR fd6a 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ L 3 0 
INX 
JMP L31 
LDA @ FP 
JSR FCA8 
JMP L32 
TXA 
STA ID 
LDY @ 00 ' 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ L34 
LDA COAB 
BPL L35 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AlUD ® 01 
BEQ L35 
LDA 0200,Y 
STA COAC 
JSR TEST 
JSR DELAYLINE 
INY 
DEX 
JMP L33 
JSR SWITCH 
JMP L29 
LDA @ 02 
JSR FCA8 
DEC 07 
LDA 07 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ Z3 
JMP L29 
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Z3 
L40 
L23 
L41 
LDA © 10 
STA 07 
LDA COAA 
LDA © 16 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 00 
STA 6500 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 02 
BEQ L40 
LDA COAB 
AND © 20 
BNE L23 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 10 
BNE L23 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 08 
BNE L23 
JSR PF2D 
JMP L29 
LDA COAA 
STA 6501 
JSR PDPO 
LDA 6501 
CMP @ 8D 
BEQ L41 
LDA 6501 
STA 6500 
JMP L40 
LDA © 12 
STA COAD 
LDA © PP 
JSR FCA8 
LDA 6500 
CMP © 87 
BEQ L42 
CMP © 8A 
BEQ L42 
JMP L29 
A- 21 
L42 LDA @ FO 
JSR FCA8 
JMP. L29 
A 2.3.9 _ DSD 
This subroutine i n i t i a l i z e s the Data S e c u r i t y Device, 
WD 2001, and enters the DES s e c r e t key i n t o the KEY R e g i s t e r 
of the device a f t e r c h e c k i n g / c o r r e c t i n g i t s p a r i t y . T h i s 
r o u t i n e a l s o generates a 6 4 - b i t pseudo-random number. 
S2 
SI 
S3 
S6 
LDA 0200 
CMP ® C5 
BEQ SI 
LDA 0200 
CMP @ C4 
BEQ S2 
JMP FP2D 
LDA @ 01 
STA FC 
LDA ® OE 
JMP S3 
LDA @ 00 
STA . FC 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
LDA C0A3 
AND @ 10 
BNE S4 
JMP RESET 
JSR ENTER 
LDA @ 00 
STA FA 
LDA @ F8 
STA ID 
LDA @ 02 
STA IE 
JSR FDOC 
JSR PDFO 
JSR PARI 
S4 KEY PLEASE D i s p l a y '.Enter Key Please* 
: P a r i t y check s u b r o u t i n e c a l l e d 
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S5 
LDA PB 
STA COAO 
LDA C0A5 
AND ® 20 
BEQ S5 
JMP PF2D 
LDY @ 00 
LDA 4E 
STA (1D),Y 
INC ID 
INC FA 
LDA FA 
CMP @ 08 
BNE S6 
LDY @ 08 
CPY @ 00 
BEQ S7 
S8 
LDA @ 88 
JSR FDPO 
DEY 
JMP S8 
S7 JSR FD8B 
RTS 
PARITYCHECK: STA FB 
LDX @ 00 
LDY ® 00 
510 ROL 
BCC 89 
INY 
S9 INX 
CPX @ 08 
BNE SIO 
TYA 
AND @ 01 
ROR 
BCS S l l 
LDA FB 
CLC 
ROL 
STA FB 
511 RTS 
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Appendix 3 
Extended C h a r a c t e r S e t 
0 O 
5 0 
7 8 
/lo 
FO 
o t ? 1 4- ^ a « 1 A R r n F P n l £ 3 4 a t y « 1 A f t C J > F F o l X . ^ 4 - o - £ ? 
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I I I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z [ \ ] - - * 4 b c d o f g h i j k l m n o 
p q r » t u v w x y z ) | ( ~ a 
Appendix 4 
Graphics D i s p l a y Program_ ^RESTRY. P77} 
C X X X X X X X X X X X X X x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
C This program p r i n t s the p l a i n t e x t and c i p h e r t e x t examples 
C us i n g Hershey c h a r a c t e r s e t . The f i l e WV c o n t a i n s t h e 96 
C p o s s i b l e ASCII c h a r a c t e r s (32 out o f 128 are c o n t r o l 
C cha r a c t e r s and hence not p r i n t e d ) . The program used GINO 
Q l i b r a r y s u b r o u t i n e s f o r drawing c h a r a c t e r s and i t a l s o 
^ invokes s p e c i a l Hershey s u b r o u t i n e s . 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
INTEGER TABLE (256), N, TOTALl (20) 
C Select the graphics p r i n t e r as the ou t p u t d e v i c e . 
CALL CC906 
C Select a new paper f o r a new set o f a x i s 
CALL PICCLE 
C Set the window s i z e , h o r i z o n t a l and v e r t i c a l axes s c a l e . 
CALL UNITS (2.94) 
CALL WINDOW ( 2 ) 
CALL CHASIZ ( l . O , l . O ) . 
C Read the c h a r a c t e r set from f i l e VW. 
OPEN (7, FILE = 'WV' ) 
READ (7,*) (TABLE ( l ) , 1=1,256) 
CLOSE ( 7 ) -
C I n p u t the example number and mode of e n c r y p t i o n nximber. 
K = 0 
READ (1,*) I P l , IP2 
IPP l = 1200 + I P l 
IPP2 = 1200 + IP2 
N = 0 
Y = 61.2 
C Draw the char a c t e r s u s i n g GINO and HERSHEY s u b r o u t i n e s . 
CALL M0VT02 ( l . O , Y) 
CALL HERCEN ( I P P l ) 
CALL M0VBY2 ( l . O , O.O) 
CALL HERCEN (IPP2) 
Y = Y-1.6 
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C A L L M0VT02 (l.O,Y) 
40 C A L L CHOSE ( T O T A L I , L , I K ) 
I F ( I K .EQ. 1) Go t o 50 
DO 101 JJ = 1, L 
TOTALI (JJ) = TOTALI(JJ) + 1 
101 CONTINUE 
I I = 1 
L I = L + 1 
30 IP ( l I . E Q . L l ) Go t o 10 
IP (N.EQ.40) Go t o 20 
NO = TOTALI ( I I ) 
NOO = TAB L E (NO) 
I F (NOO.EQ.O) NOO = l 6 l 
CALL HERCEN (NOO) 
CALL M0VBY2 (2.1,0.0) 
N = N + 1 
I I = I I + 1 
Go t o 30 
10 Go t o 40 
20 Y = Y - 1.6 
IF (Y. EQ.O) Go t o 50 
CALL M0VT02 ( l . O , Y ) 
N = 0 
Go t o 30 
50 CALL DEVEND 
STOP 
END 
C The su b r o u t i n e CHOSE transforms a c h a r a c t e r i n t o i t s 
C corresponding Hershey c h a r a c t e r . Hence t h i s a l l o w s a 
C p o s s i b l e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a l l 2 5 6 codes u s i n g the 
C extended c h a r a c t e r set (Appendix 3 ) . I t c a l l s another 
C s u b r o u t i n e C0NV2. 
SUBROUTINE CHOSE (TOTALI, L, I K ) 
CHARACTER ^ 1 A(38) 
INTEGER I , NUMl, NUM2, NUM, TOTAL, TOTALI ( 2 0 ) , 
* LENGT,.L 
READ (5,1), ( A ( I ) , 1 = 1, 38) 
1 FORMAT (38 A l ) 
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I K = 0 
1 = 1 
300 I P ( a ( I ) . EQ. * ' ) Go To 200 
1 = 1 + 1 
Go t o 300 
200 LENGT = I 
I F (LENGT.Lt.5) Go To 211 " 
J = 6 
L = 0 
201 L = L + 1 
CALL C0NV2 (A ( j ) , NTJMl) 
J = J + 1 
CALL C0NV2 ( a ( J ) , NTJM2) 
TOTAL = 16 * NUm + NUM2 
TOTALl (L) = TOTAL 
J = J + 1 
I F (J.NE. LENGT) Go t o 201 
RETURN 
211 IK = I 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE C0NV2 (CHAR, NUM) 
CHARACTER * 1 CHAR 
INTEGER NUM 
I F (CHAR. EQ. »0») NUM = 0 
I F (CHAR. EQ. 'A») NUM = 10. 
I F (CHAR. EQ. ' B O NUM = 11 
IP (CHAR. EQ. »C») NUM = 12 
I F (CHAR. EQ. »D») NUM = 13 
I F (CHAR. EQ. 'E') NUM = 14 
I P (CHAR. EQ. 'P') NUM = 15 
RETURN 
END 
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Appendix 5 
Po i n t t o P o i n t Communication_ £ .Cipher Block Chaining Program_(CBC) 
A 5-1 Basic Flowchart 
START 
I n i t i a l i z e Temporary 
Reg i s t e r s e.g. CNTRL-G 
Counter, CNTRL-J 
Counter, e t c . 
Set Mode R e g i s t e r , 
Command R e g i s t e r o f 
l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
Request the user f o r the 
d e s i r e d Baud Rate and 
set a c c o r d i n g l y 
Test DSR s i g n a l 
from Modem _No 
Yes 
P l a i n or Encrypted o r 
Mi x t u r e Format 
Key Request ON ? 
N^o LINK 
ERROR 
P l a i n 
Mix or Enc. 
A c t i v a t e and I n i t i a l i z e 
Data S e c u r i t y Device 
RESET 
Please 
Yes 
2 
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D i s p l a y * Enter Key 
Please* 
No 
Fetch 1 Key Byte 
P a r i t y Check Routine 
Load Key Byte i n 
KEY R e g i s t e r 
J . 
64 Key B 
No 
i t s ? ^ 
Yes 
Generate 64 b i t 
pseudo random niunber 
and s t o r e i n a s p e c i f i e d 
memory space - I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
V ector - and send i t t o the r e c e i v i n g end 
1 
D i s p l a y * Enter Data Please* 
est f o r M i x t u r e Format > Yes 
No 
Check DCD s i g n a l from 
Modem 
No 
Check keyboard f l a g 
Yes 
Yes 
4 
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10 
22 
Y T x mode 
Data Input routine 
/ Only return c h a r a c t e r ? F i l l block with pseudo-
No 
random characters and 
provide Delay f o r 
repeated Return 
) <^ End of Message ? 
Wo 
End of a Block? 
Yes 
Fetch a Data Byte 
Test for Control characters 
including CNTRL-G, CNTRL-J 
and increment respective 
counters i f present 
Exclusive-or data byte with 
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n V.ector byte 
Store the output i n the 
Data Security Device 
16 
Read Encrypted Data and Transmit 
i t to Modem. Store the encrypted 
data as Intermediate I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
21 
A-30 
22 
16 
Provide Delay for 
CNTRL-G, CNTRL-J and 
Line feed Characters 
5 
Exactly 8 bytes = 1 Block ? No 
Yes 
Exclusi v e - o r with the 
Intermediate I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector 
P i l l the Block with 
a Return character 
and pseudo random 
characters 
Encrypt and Send i t 
to Modem. Store encrypted data 
as intermediate I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
Pad with 7 bytes of pseudo-
random characters and a 
Return character 
Encrypt and Send and Store 
Encrypted data as intermediate 
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
Delay Routines 
Reset Co\inters 
^ Test for Mixture Format^^ ^ No 
Yes 
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Rx Mode 
Fetch I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector from Link 
and store i t i n a s p e c i f i e d memory 
Fetch Data from Link 
Error Check Routines 
No < 8 Bytes of Data = 1 Block' 
Yes 
Decrypt Data Block 
Exclusive-or with Intermediate 
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
Display the r e s u l t a n t p l a i n 
data 
< End of message? 
Yes 
Test for Mixture Format? 
Yes 
No 
1 
Check DCD s i g n a l from 
Modem 
No 
Check Keyboard F l a g 
25 
A-32 
< 
Data Input Routine 
Only Return Character? / Y e s 
< 
Provide Delay 
for Repeated Return 
Increment Character 
Counter 
End of Message ? 
est for Mixture Format?/Yes 
Reset Counters 
\U No 
• r 
10 
Fetch a data byte 
Test Routines for Control 
Characters including 
CNRTL-G and CNTRL-J 
Transmit Data to Modem 
Delay Routines 
Test for Mixture Format / Yes y ^ 
No 
24 
A - 3 5 
2i. 
Fetch a data byte 
\UNO 
E r r o r Test Routines 
Display Received Data 
End of Message? 
N1/NO 
A- 34 
A 5*2 Program L i s t i n g 
A 5 - 2 . 1 Main Program 
Most comments are s i m i l a r to the ones given i n the 
Block Encryption Program l i s t i n g i n Appendix 2. 
50AE 
L I 
LDA C051 
STA C0A8 
LDX @ 0 0 
LDY @ 00 
LDA @ 00 
STA I B 
STA P9 
STA 06 
LDA ® 01 
STA 08 
LDA @ 1 0 
STA 07 
LDA C0A6 
AND @ 01 
BEQ L I 
JMP NOLINK 
LDA @ 6E 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 12 
STA COAD 
LDA ® 14 
STA C0A4 
J S R BAUD 
LDA COAA 
J S R PLAENC 
J S R FD6A 
LDA 0 2 0 0 
CMP @ DO 
BNE L 2 
J S R DATA 
J S R R7 
JMP P L A I N 
A ^ 5 
L2 
P3 
P I 
P6 
P5 
P4 
L4 
P7 
JSR DSD 
LDA C0A6 
AND ® 03 
BNE P I 
JMP P2 
LDA COOO 
BPL P3 
LDA 0 33 
STA GOAD 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
JSR FD6A 
LDY @ 00 
CPY @ 08 
BEQ P4 
LDA COAB 
BPL P5 
LDA 02P8,Y 
STA 3000,Y 
STA COAC 
INY 
JMP P6 
JMP P7 
LDA C0A6 
AND 0 03 
BNE L3 
JMP RX 
LDA COOO 
BPL L4 
LDA @ 33 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
JSR PD6A 
CPX © 00 
BEQ L5 
JMP L6 
Pseudo random niimbers are 
stored i n 3000 to 3007 which 
act as the I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector ( I V ) . IV i s 
transmitted to the other end 
A- 36 
L5 LDA @ FF 
JSR FCA8 
JSR END 
JSR SWITCH 
JMP L4 
L6 TXA 
LDY @ 00 
STA ID 
LIO LDX @ 00 
L9 LDA @ 00 
CMP ID 
BEQ L7 
CPX ® 08 
BEQ LB 
JSR DIR 
LDA 0200,Y 
EOR 3000,X 
JSR TEST 
DEC ID 
INY 
INX 
JM> L9 
L8 JSR READSEND MOD 
JSR DELAYLINE 
JMP LIO 
L7 CPX @ 08 
BEQ L l l 
JMP L12 
L l l JSR READSEND MOD 
JSR DELAYLINE 
LDX @ 00 
L12 JSR ENDMOD 
JSR DELAYLINE 
JSR SWITCH 
JMP L4 
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RX 
Z l 
L18 
L17 
L25 
Bl 
LDA @ 02 
JSR FCA8 
DEC 07 
LDA 07 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ Z l 
JMP L4 
LDA @ 10 
STA 07 
LBA COAA 
LDA e 16 
STA CO AD 
LDA @ OE 
STA COAl 
LDY @ 00 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 02 
BEQ L17 
JSR DIR 
INY 
LDA COAB 
AND ® 10 
BNE L25 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 08 
BNE L23 
LDA COAB 
AND 20 
BNE L25 
JMP B l 
JSR ERR 
JMP L4 
LDA COAA 
STA COAO 
STA 5010,Y 
CPY @ 08 
BNE L17 
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L21 
L19 
L20 
JSR READPRINTMOD 
CMP ® 8D 
BNE LIS 
LDX @ 00 
CPX @ 08 
BEQ L19 
LDA 9500 ,X 
CMP @ 87 
BEQ L20 
CMP @ 8A 
BEQ L20 
INX 
JMP L21 
JSR END 1 
JMP L4 
LDA. @ FF 
JSR FCA8 
JMP L19 
A 5 - 2 . 2 Subroutines 
Most of the subroutines used i n the program are the 
same as the ones used i n the Block Encryption Program 
given i n Appendix 2 , The subroutine READSENDMOD i s a s l i g h t l y 
modified version of READSEND given i n Appendix 2 (A 2 . 3 . I ) . 
The modified section i n READSENDMOD i s given below. 
LDA C0A2 
STA COAC 
STA 3000, X 
JMP L25 
L22 RTS 
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The subroutine READPRINTMOD i s a s l i g h t l y modified 
version of READPRINT given i n Appendix 2 (A 2 .5 -2) . The 
modified section i n READPRINTMOD i s given below. 
LDA C0A2 
EOR 5000,X 
STA 9500,X 
JSR FDFO 
LDA 5010,X 
STA 5000,X 
JMP L27 
L24 RTS 
The subroutine ENDMOD i s the same as the subroutine 
END of Appendix 2 (A 2 . 5 .5 ) except that ENDMOD c a l l s the 
subroutine READSENDMOD instead of READSEND. 
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Appendix 6 
Point to_Point_Communication_:_ Stream Cipher Feedback Program (CPB) 
A 6 .1 Basic Flowchart 
START 
I n i t i a l i z e Temporary r e g i s t e r s 
e.g. CNTRL-G, CNTRL-J Counters etc 
Set Mode r e g i s t e r , Command 
r e g i s t e r of l/O C o n t r o l l e r 
Request the user f or the desired 
Baud Rate and set accordingly 
< ^ T e s t DSR Signal from Modem ^ ? / 
I Yes I— 
Only complete Encryption format 
program i s given 
Activate and I n i t i a l i z e the 
Data Security Device 
Key Request ON ? > No 
NO LINK, 
ERROR 
/RESET 
"H please 
l Y e s 
A- 41 
No 
Display * Enter key 
Please * 
Fetch 1 Key Byte 
P a r i t y Check Routine 
1 Load Key Byte i n KEY 
Register 
^ 64 Key B i t s ? ^ 
Generate 6 4-bit pseudo-
random niimber and store 
i n a s p e c i f i e d memory 
space - I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector -
and send i t to the r e c e i v i n g end 
Display * Enter Data Please* 
Check DCD s i g n a l from Modem 
No 
No-^ Check Keyboard F l a g 3 
Yes 
\U TX Mode 
Data Input Routine 
End of message ? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
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Load 8 bytes of I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector into Data Security Device 
1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Fetch a p l a i n data byte 
Check whether the input 
character i s a control character 
such as CNTRL-G or CNTRL-J 
Fetch the 8th encrypted byte 
and Exclusive-or i t with the 
pl a i n data byte 
Transmit cipher byte to 
Modem 
Provide Delay for some 
s p e c i a l Control characters 
S h i f t the input to the Data 
Security Device by 8 places to 
form new i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector 
RX Mode 
Fetch 8 bytes of i n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
vector from the l i n k and store 
i t i n a s p e c i f i e d memory space 
7 
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Load 8 bytes of I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector into the Data Security Device 
Fetch a da 
/ 
t a byte from the l i n k 
\ 
Fetch the 8th encrypted byte 
from the Data Security Device 
and E x c l u s i v e - or i t with the 
received cipher data byte 
Display the deciphered data 
byte on the VDU screen 
s / 
S h i f t the input to 
Security Device by 
new I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
the Data 
8 places 
Vector 
to form 
^ End of Message \ Yes 5 
No 
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A 6.2 Program L i s t i n g 
A 6.2.1 _ Main_Program 
Most comments are s i m i l a r to the ones given i n the 
Block Encryption Program l i s t i n g i n Appendix 2. 
30AE 
L I 
LDA C051 
STA C0A8 
LDX @ 0 0 
LDY @ 00 
LDA @ 0 0 
STA I B 
STA F9 
STA 06 
LDA @ 01 
STA 0 8 
LDA @ 10 
STA 07 
LDA C0A6 
AND ® 01 
BEQ L I 
JMP NOLINK 
LDA @ 6E 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 1 2 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 1 4 
STA C0A4 
J S R BAUD 
LDA COAA 
J S R PLAENC 
J S R FD6A 
LDA 0 2 0 0 
CMP @ DO 
BNE L 2 
J S R DATA 
J S R R7 
JMP P L A I N 
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L2 JSR DSD 
P3 LDA C0A6 
AND ® 03 
BNE PI 
JMP P2 
PI LDA COOO 
BPL P3 
LDA @ 33 
STA GOAD 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
JSR PD6A 
LDY @ 00 
P6 CPY ® 08 
BEQ P4 
P5 LDA COAB 
BPL P5 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @01 
BEQ P5 
LDA 02P8,Y 
STA 3000,Y 
STA COAC 
INY 
JMP P6 
P4 JMP P7 
L4 LDA C0A6 
AND @ 03 
BNE L3 
JMP RX 
LDA COOO 
BPL L4 
LDA @ 33 
STA COAD 
LDA @ 06 
STA COAl 
JSR FD6A 
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P7 CPX @ 00 
BEQ L5 
JMP L6 
LDA @ PF 
JSR PCA8 
INX 
TXA 
LDY @ 00 
STA I D 
L9 LDX @ 00 
LDA @ 00 
CMP I D 
BEQ L7 
JSR SUB5 
LDA 0200,y 
STA EC 
JSR TEST 
JSR SirB4 
L8 LDA COAB 
BPL L8 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 0 1 
BEQ L8 
LDA EC 
STA COAC 
JSR DELAYLINE 
JSR SHIFT 1 
DEC I D 
INY 
JMP L9 
L7 JSR SWITCH 
JMP L4 
P2 • LDA @ 02 
JSR PCA8 
DEC 07 
LDA 07 
CMP @ 00 
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P l l 
P14 
PI 3 
P12 
RX 
Zl 
PI 5 
BEQ P l l 
JMP P5 
LDA @ 10 
STA 07 
LBA COAA 
LDA @ 16 
STA CO AD 
LDA 06 
STA COAl 
LDY @ 00 
CFY 08 
BEQ P12 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ '02 
BEQ PI 5 
LDA COAA 
STA 3000, 
INY 
JMP P14 
JMP PI 5 
LDA 02 
JSR PCA8 
DEC 07 
LDA 07 
CMP 0 00 
BEQ Zl 
JMP L4 
LDA COAA 
LDA 16 
STA COAD 
LDA 0 06 
STA COAl 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 02 
BEQ PI 5 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 10 
BEQ L23 A-48 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 08 
BEQ L23 
LDA COAB 
AND @ 20 
BEQ L25 
JMP L24 
L25 JMP ERR 
L24 JSR STJB5 
LDA COAA 
STA EE 
STA EC 
JSR SUB4 
JSR PDPO 
JSR SHIPT2 
LDA EC 
CNP @ 8D 
BEQ L25 
JMP P15 
L25 JSR END 
JMP L4 
A 6.2.2 Subroutines 
Most of the subroutines are the same as the ones 
given i n the Block Encryption Program i n Appendix 2. 
Some ad d i t i o n a l subroutines c a l l e d by t h i s program are now 
b r i e f l y described. 
SUB3 : This subroutine inputs the data stored i n the memory 
locations 3000 to 3007 ( i n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector) i n t o the Data 
Security device a f t e r t e s t i n g the DIR status f l a g each time. 
K3 CPX @ 08 
BEQ Kl 
LDA C0A3 
AND @ 40 
BNE K2 
JMP PP2D 
K2 LDA 3000,X 
STA. COAO 
A- 49 
INX 
JMP E3 
Kl RTS 
SUB4 : This subroutine reads the encrypted I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector from the Data Security Device and exclusive-ores the 
8th encrypted data byte w i t h the p l a i n data byte (the cipher 
data byte) to produce the cipher data byte (the p l a i n data 
byte). 
K6 
K5 
LDX @ 00 
CPX @ 07 
BEQ K4 
LDA C0A3 
BPL K5 
LDA C0A2 
INX 
JMP K6 
LDA C0A2 
EOR EC 
STA EC 
RTS 
SHIFT 1, SHIFT 2 : These two subroutines are e s s e n t i a l l y 
the same. They s h i f t the memory locations 3000 to 3007 
( I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector) sequentially as f o l l o w s : 3007 ^ 3006, 
3006 > 3005, , 3001 ^ 3000 and (cipher data byte) 
•> 3007 
LDX @ 01 
LDA @ 00 
STA ED 
K7 LDA 3000,X 
DEX 
STA 3000,X 
INX 
INX 
INC ED 
• LDA @ 07 
CMP ED 
A- 50 
BNE K7 
LDA EC 
DEX 
STA 5000,X 
LDX @ 00 
RTS 
A- 51 
Appendix 7 
Results of some S t a t i a t i c a l tests on DES Output Sequences 
A 7»1 Input Samples and Keys^used i n _ S t a t i s t i c a l _ T e s t s 
A 7.1.1 Input Samples 
Input sample period i n d i g i t s Input sample 
(binary/hex) 
Abbreviation 
1 . 5 - d i g i t s OHIO (binary) 1.1 
1 0 0 1 0 1.2 
0 1 0 1 1 " 1.3 
0 0 0 1 1 '» 1.4 
1 0 1 1 1 1.5 
2, 8 - d i g i t s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (binary) 2.1 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 M 2.2 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I t 2.3 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 I I 2.4 
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 2.5 
3. 1 0 - d i g i t s 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (binary) 5.1 
0100010000 t i 3.2 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 I t 3.3 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 I t 3-4 
1100111000 I t 5.5 
4. 2 0 - d i g i t s PPPPC (hex) 4.1 
OOJPP " 4.2 
E3C5P " 4.3 
68D47 4.4 
BBBOP " 4.5 
5. 4 0 - d i g i t s FPPPPPPPFC (hex) 5.1 
CE5C5EOFCO I t 5.2 
OOOOOFFFFF I I 5.3 
999EEE1116 I t 5.4 
62B5A45197 I t 5.5 
6. 6 4 - d i g i t s FFFPPFPFFPPPFFFO (hex) 6.1 
OOOOOOOOFFFFFFPP t t 6.2 
C4C4C435CCC4C4C4 I I 6.3 
B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8 I t 6.4 
3141592654138547 I I 6.5 
A-52 
A 7-1.2 Keys 
I . IPIPIPIPOEOEOEOE 
I I . IPEOIPEOOEFIOEFI 
I I I . 039649C539317965 
IV. 85CDCB1C9BD0851A 
V. 3131313131313131 
*weak» 
* semiweak* 
'random * 
'random* 
* non-random• 
A 2.2 _Results of_Prequency2_ Serial_and_Runs tes t s on_ 
ciphertext sequences: using d i f f e r e n t modes under 
a f i x e d key 
5?5 S i g n i f i c a n t levels Frequency (P) t e s t 
S e r i a l (S) t e s t 
Runs (R) t e s t 
Key 3131313131313131 (hex) 
3.84 
5.99 
1.96 
Input Sample 
1.1 
Mode 
1.2 
1.5 
ECB 0.19 3.65 1.19 
CPB 0.77 2.90 -0.29 • 
CBC 0.66 2.61 -0.04 
CBCP 2.25 4.17 -0.06 
CPBV 0.39 7.56 -2.24 (**) 
ECP 4.00 7.69 -1.26 
CFB 0-25 3.71 -1.24 
CBC 0.39 4.16 1.33 
CBCP 2.06 4.98 0.94 
CFBV 0.77 3.22 -0.73 
ECB 20.81 ( ^ ) 23.09 1.37 
CPB 0.004 2.52 -0.75 
CBC 0.14 2.38 0.44 
CBCP 0.32 2.40 0.20 
CFBV 0.04 2.66 -0.81 
A-53 
Input Sample Mode P s R 
1.4 ECB 8.63 15.22 -1.87 
CPB 0,47 3.37 0.95 
CBC 0.25 2.89 0.76 
CBCP 0.06 2.33 -0.56 
CFBV •0.02 2.72 0.81 
1.5 ECB 4.25 6.18 ( ^ ) -0.12 
CPB 2.64 4.87 0.40 
CBC 7.22 9.69 ( ^ ) -0.34 
CBCP 0.04 4.79 1.63 (*) 
CFBV 2.44 4.35 0.01 
2.1 ECB 9.00 10.85 0.28 
CPB 2.25 4.35 0.07 
CBC 3.52 (*) 5.65 (*) 0.55 
CBCP 0.32 5.75 (*) -1.87 (^) 
CPBV 0.88 5.48 -1.60 (^) 
2.2 ECB 1.00 3.06 -0.03 
CFB 0.77 3.45 0.78 
CBC 1.56 4.00 0.74 
CBCP 1.41 4.68 -1.08 
CFBV 4.52 (^) 6.61 -0.36 
2.5 ECB 25.00 50.62 ( ^ ) -1.25 
CFB 0.47 5.61 (*) -1.80 (*) 
CBC 0.02 2.72 -0.88 
CBCP 0.10 2.09 -0.12 
CPBV 0.004 2.95 -1.00 
2.4 ECB 9.00 14.96 2.50 (^) 
CPB 4.79 7.27 {^) -0.67 
CBC 2.85 4.85 0.54 
CBCP 0.25 5.77 -1.24 
CFBV 0.14 2.55 -0.43 
2-5 ECB 0 18.27 4.00 
CPB 2.44 6.55 1.46 
CBC 1.72 8.05 2.12 
CBCP 0.39 2.45 -0.18 
CFBV 1.27 5.50 0.42 
A-54 
Input Sample Mode P S R 
3.1 ECB 0.19 5.18 1.70 (*) 
CFB . 3.06 7.50 -1.53 (*) 
CBC 1 3.10 0.41 
CBCP 1.27 3.28 0.29 
CFBV 2.25 4.16 0.07 
3.2 ECB 2.64 5.88 (*) -1.11 
CFB 0.47 2.65 0.45 
CBC 4.00 (**) 7.33 (^) 1.19 
CBCP 0.02 2.52 0.69 
CPBV 0.32 4.33 1.39 
3.3 ECB 1.72 4.58 0.99 
CFB 0.004 2.52 0.69 
CBC 1 3.22 0.53 
CBCP 0.004 3.99 1.38 
CFBV 0.035 2.48 -0.69 
3.4 ECB 2.07 19.25 (*^) -3.88 (**) 
CFB 0.02 2.17 -0.44 
CBC 3.29 5.34 -0.34 
CBCP 0.77 2.79 -0.29 
CFBV 1.89 3.82 -0.07 
3.5 ECB 4.52 M 6.82 (^*) •0.77 
CFB 0.66 2.93 0.46 
CBC 2.44 5.17 -0.86 
CBCP 0.88 6.95 (**) 2.03 (^*) 
CFBV 0.04 2.96 -1.00 
4.1 ECB 0.004 2.62 0.75 
CFB 1.89 7.45 (**) 1.94 (*) 
CBC 0.56 2.68 -0.42 
CBCP 1.13 3.71 0.724 
CFBV 0.66 2.88 -0.42 
4.2 ECB 0.04 10.14 ( ^ ) 2.81 (**) 
CPB 0.02 2.10 0.25 
CBC 0.04 2.27 0.44 
CBCP 0.53 7.92 (*^) -0.71 
CFBV 0.004 2.13 0.31 
A-55 
Input Sample Mode F S R 
4.3 ECB 0.00 2.01 0.06 
CFB 1.41 5.50 (*) 1.48 
CBC 1.56 5.65 (*) -1.45 
CBCP 0.32 2.80 -0.74 
CFBV 1.27 6.98 (**) -1.90 (*) 
4.4 ECB 2.64 5.06 0.77 
CFB 0.19 2.38 0.58 
CBC 2.44 5.57 0.95 
CBCP 0.14 2.28 0.58 
CFBV 0.004 2.94 -1.00 
4.5 ECB 5.50 (*) 5.45 0.24 
CFB 0.04 5.09 -1.06 
CBC 0.10 2.47 0.57 
CBCP 0.00 2.00 0.00 
CFBV 0.00 2.94 0.94 
5.1 ECB 0.02 2.05 0.06 
CFB 0.52 2.65 0.51 
CBC 1.00 4.26 -1.10 
CBCP 2.07 4.15 -0.57 
CFBV 0.14 5.92 1.52 
5.2 ECB 0.56 5-69 (*) -1.80 (*) 
CFB 0.02 2.00 -0.06 
CBC 0.88 4.80 - I . 4 I 
CBCP 0.02 5.65 1-25 
CFBV 0.47 2.65 0.328 
5.3 ECB 0.39 3.07 0.825 
CFB 0.19 2.24 0.151 
CBC 0.04 2.76 -0.87 
CBCP 0.25 5.28 -1.06 
CFBV 1.72 4.16 0.74 
5.4 ECB 2.64 25.5 (**) -4.49 (**) 
CFB 1.12 5.21 -0.10 
CBC 0.14 2.55 -0.45 
CBCP 0.85 5.40 -1.76 (*) 
CFBV 0.04 2.51 0.50 
A .56 
Input Sample Mode F s R 
5.5 ECB 0.04 4.57 -1.63 (^) 
CFB 0.06 3.53 -1-25 
CBC 0.04 2.05 1.10 
CBCP 0.56 2.80 0.52 
CFBV 0.00 2.00 0.06 
6.1 ECB 36.00 37.70 1.17 
CFB 0.25 2.80 0.70 
CBC 0.32 2.28 0.01 
CBCP 2.44 4.98 0.70 
CFBV 0.39 4.59 1.45 
6.2 ECB 1.00 3.07 0.03 
CPB 0.77 3.76 0.96 
CBC 0.06 2.16 0.25 
. CBCP 0.10 2.30 0.44 
CFBV 0.47 2.68 -0.42 
6.3 ECB 4.00 (*^) 105.60 (*^) 10.11 
CFB 0.56 2.74 0.46 
CBC 1.56 3.92 0.68 
CBCP 0.56 8.11 ( ^ ) -2.36 
CFBV 0.19 4.38 -1.50 (^) 
6.4 ECB 4.00 9.76 -1.88 (-) 
CFB 2.44 4.63 -0.49 
CBC 4.52 (^^) 8.00 (*^) -1.05 
CBCP 0.04 3.09 -1.00 
CFBV 0.02 3.36 -1.19 
6.5 ECB 36.00 (*^) 53.46 ( ^ ) -2.98 
CFB 1.56 3.85 -0.08 
CBC 2.25 5.17 -0.87 
CBCP 0.39 2.48 0.20 
CFBV 4.25 7.00 -0.68 
A-57 
A 7.2.1 _ _Number of_sequences_classified as non-random by each of 
~the~three~tests~ - - - - - - ^ - - - - - - - - - - - -
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Frequency t e s t be nF 
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Serial t e s t be nS 
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Runs te s t be nR 
Mode nF nS nR 
ECB 12 16 7 
CPB 1 4 0 
CBC 3 4 1 
CBCP 0 3 2 
CPBV 2 4 1 
A 7 .2.2 Number_of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random_by more 
than one t e s t ~ " 
No. Mode Input Sample Tests which i n d i c a t e 
non-randomness 
1 ECB 1.2 F, S 
2 1 .3 P, S 
5 1 .4 F, S 
4 1 .5 F, S 
5 2.1 F, S 
6 2 .3 F, S 
7 2 .4 F, s, R 
8 2 .5 s, R 
9 3.4 s, R 
10 3.5 F, S 
11 4.2 s, R 
12 5.4 s, R 
13 6.1 F, S 
14 6.3 F, s, R 
15 . 6.4 F, S 
16 6.5 F, s, R 
17 CBC 1 .5 F, S 
18 2 .5 S, R 
A-58 
No 
19 
20 
21 
22 
25 
24 
25 
Mode 
CBCP 
CFBV 
Input Sample 
5.2 
6.4 
5.5 
6.5 
1.1 
2.2 
6.5 
Tests which i n d i c a t e 
non-randomness 
S, R 
S, R 
S, R 
F, S 
F, S 
^ Z'5 5^2^1*2 of_Frequency^ §^ E^ S-^ _^ *^ _-^ ii^ 2 t e s t s on 
Ciphertext sequences; using d i f f e r e n t keys 
5^ S i g n i f i c a n t levels Frequency (F) t e s t 
S e r i a l ( s ) t e s t 
Runs (R) t e s t 
5.84 
5.99 
1.96 
Sample No. 
( i ) (1.5) 
( i i ) (2.1) 
( i i i ) (3.3) 
( i v ) (4.1) 
(v) (5.2) 
( v i ) (6.5) 
Input Sample 
10111 
00000001 
0000011111 
FFFFC (hex) 
CE5C5E0FC0 (hex) 
3141592654138547 (hex) 
Input Mode Key F S R 
Sample No. 
( i ) ECB I 0.004 5.07 1.00 
I I 1.56 4.26 -0.71 
I I I 7.22 (**) 12.05 (**) 1.95 
IV 0.25 8.52 (**) 2.45 
V 4.25 6.18 (*^) -0.12 
( i ) CFB I 1.15 5.28 0.29 
I I 4.00 (**) 6.95 m -0.82 
I I I 0.004 2.25 0.44 
IV 4.25 (^*) 6.56 (*^) -0.56 
V 2.64 4.87 0.40 
A- 59 
Input Mode Key F s R 
Sample No. 
( i ) CBC I 2.25 5.10 1.01 
I I 0.06 3.53 -1.25 
I I I 1.89 4.10 -0.32 
• IV 2.25 4.35 0.07 
Y 7-22 9.69 (**)-0.34 
( i ) CBCP I 0.06 2.90 -0.94 
I I 1.13 3-68 0.79 
I I I 0.56 2.78 0.59 
IV 1.27 3.50 0.42 
V 0.04 4.79 1.65 
( i ) CFBV I 0.77 2.93 0.46 
I I 0.88 8.73 ( ^ ) - 2 . 4 l 
I I I 1.72 4.00 0.62 
IV 0.47 3.50 -1.05 
V 2.44 4.35 0.01 
( i i ) ECB I 25.00 4.30 -5.57 ( ^ ) 
I I 1.00 39.35 i"^) 6.04 (**) 
I I I 4.00 22.15 (^)-3.96 ( ^ ) 
IV 2.07 9.19 (**)-2.25 
V 9.00 10.83 0.28 
( i i ) CFB I 1.27 4.54 -1.15 
I I 1.27 3.91 -0.84 
I I I 0.66 4.05 -1.17 
0.10 2.24 0.32 
V 2.25 4.35 0.07 
( i i ) CBC I 1.27 3.28 -0.27 
I I 1.00 5.41 1.55 (^) 
I I I 0.56 5.36 -1.67 (*) 
IV 0.47 4.41 -1.42 
V 3-52 5.63 .(*) 0.55 
( i i ) CBCP I 4.00 15.35 (^) 5.14 
I I 1.15 3.50 -0.65 
I I I 1.41 5.29 1.56 
IV 0.19 5.81 1.26 
V 0.32 5.75 (*) -1.87 
A. 60 
Input Mode Key F S R 
Sample No. 
( i i ) CFBV I 0.004 2.6l 0.75 
I I 0.39 2.57 0.45 
I I I 0.10 3.46 -1.19 
IV 3.06 4.98 0.22 
V 0.88 5.48 -1.60 (*) 
( i i i ) ECB I 1.27 3.20 -0.02 
I I 3.29 10.35 -2.16 i*^) 
I I I 6.25 24.57 4.22 
IV 2.25 4.35 0.07 
V 1.72 4.58 0.99 
( i i i ) CFB I 0.004 2.03 0.13 
I I 1.27 3.21 -0.09 
I I I 0.04 3.85 1.51 
IV 1.41 8.00 -2.15 ( ^ ) 
V 0.004 2.52 0.69 
( i i i ) CBC I 1.27 5.01 -1.34 
I I 1.72 3.89 0.50 
I I I 0.004 2.44 -0.69 
IV 1.41 5.92 -0.65 
V 1.00 5.22 0.55 
( i i i ) CBCP I 1.27 5.52 -0.54 
I I 0.52 2.51 0.14 
I I I 0.59 2.40 -0.24 
IV 0.06 5.69 -1.51 
V 0.004 5.99 1.58 
( i i i ) CFBV I 2.44 4-47 0.39 
I I 1.27 4.85 -1.21 
I I I 0.14 2.14 -0.18 
IV 2.25 4.65 -0.49 
V 0.04 2.48 -0.69 
( i v ) ECB . I 0.004 2.05 0.19 
I I 5.94 M 11.06 (**) -1.57 (*) 
I I I 0.04 7.52"(**) 2.52 (**) 
IV 0.56 5.68 1.02 
V 0.004 2.62 0.75 
A-61 
Input 
Sample No 
( i v ) 
Mode 
CFB 
( i v ) CBC 
( i v ) CBCP 
( i v ) CPBV 
(v) ECB 
(v) CFB 
Key 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
I 
I I 
I I I 
IV 
V 
1.41 
1.89 
1.13 
0.56 
1.89 
1.41 
0.04 
0.32 
2.07 
0.56 
0.47 
0.19 
0.06 
0.77 
1.13 
4-00 (^^) 
0.56 
0.10 
0.56 
0.66 
1.56 
2.07 
4.52 (**) 
2.07 
0.56 
5.35 (^) 
0.06 
0.39 
0.10 
0.02 
4.10 
6.94 ( ^ ) 
5.14 
2.61 
7.45 ( ^ ) 
4.83 
4.59 
3.07 
4.26 
2.68 
2.44 
2.22 
2.90 
4.02 
3.71 
5.89 (*) 
2.68 
2.14 
3.95 
2.88 
4.43 
4.87 
6.91 (**) 
9.19 (**) 
5.69 (*) 
9.02 (**) 
2.90 
5.57 
5.57 
2.00 
0.80 
1.75 (*) 
0.29 
•0.05 
1.94 (^) 
•1.21 
-1.63 (*) 
•0.87 
•0.50 
•0.42 
0.08 
0.006 
•0.94 
1.09 
0.72 
0.19 
0.59 
-0.18 
1.14 
•0.42 
1.00 
0.88 
-0.61 
-2.25 (*^) 
-1.80 (*) 
1.49 
0.88 
0.95 
-1.25 
-0.06 
A^2 
input Mode Key p s R 
Sajnple No. 
(v) CBC I 1.13 . 5.25 -0.22 
I I 2.64 6.75 (**) 1.46 
I I I 0.77 5.07 0.59 
IV 1.00 5.14 0.28 
V 0.88 4-80 -1.41 
(v) CBCP I 4.25 (**) 6.74 0.70 
I I 4.52 (**) 6.66 0.14 
I I I 0.66 2.66 -0.25 
IV 1.89 5.18 1.12 
V 0.02 5.65 1.25 
(v) CFBV I 2.64 4.76 0.52 
I I 0.04 2.07 0.19 
I I I 0.88 6.58 (**) -1.91 (^) 
IV 0.14 2.45 0.51 
V 0.47 2.65 0.528 
( v i ) ECB I 9.00 (^) 14.96 (**) 2,50 (•SHt-) 
I I 1.00 7-07 2.05 (**) 
I I I 16.00 { ^ ) 55.94 (**) -5-59 (**) 
IV 64.00 65.65 ( ^ ) 2.07 (**) 
V 56.00 (^) 55.46 -2.98 
( v i ) CFB I 0.14 2.55 -0.45 
I I 0.06 2.56 -0.56 
I I I 0.10 2.14 0.15 
IV 0.47 2.71 -0.55 
V 1.56 5.85 -0.08 
( v i ) CBC I 5.94 (**) 11.28 1.95 (*) 
I I 1.89 4.26 O..56 
I I I 1.89 5.47 -0.58 
IV 1.00 2.96 -0.16 
V 2.25 5.17 -0.87 
( v i ) CBCP I 50.25 81.45 -6.51 (**) 
I I 0.77 6.70 (**) -1.98 
I I I 5.16 2.56 -0.50 
IV 0.04 5.59 -1.19 
V 0.59 2.48 0.20 
A-63 
Input Mode Key F S R 
Sample No. 
( v i ) CFBV I 0.77 2.74 0.15 
I I 0.04 2.05 0.06 
I I I 0.14 2.28 0.52 
IV 0.04 5.85 -1.58 
V 4.25 7.00 -0.68 
Nnmher of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by each 
of the three_tests 
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Frequency t e s t be nF 
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Seri a l t e s t be nS 
Let the number of sequences c l a s s i f i e d as non-random by 
Runs te s t be nR 
Key nF .nS nR 
I 8 6 4 
I I 5 10 5 
I I I 5 7 4 
IV 2 6 5 
V 4 6 1 
A 7.5.2 Niimber of sequences cl a s s i f i e d ^ a s non-random_b2 more 
than one t e s t 
Key Input Sample 
I ( i i ) 
( i i ) 
(v) 
(v) 
( v i ) 
( v i ) 
( v i ) 
Mode 
ECB 
CBCP 
CPB 
CBCP 
ECB 
CBC 
CBCP 
Tests which i n d i c a t e non-
randomness 
F.R 
P, S, R 
F, S 
P, S 
P, S, R 
P, S 
P, S, R 
A-64 
Key Input Sample Mode Tests which i n d i c a t e non-
I I 
I I I 
IV 
randomness 
( i ) CFB F, S 
( i i ) ECB S, R 
( i i i ) ECB S, R 
( i v ) ECB F, S 
(v) CBCP F, S 
( v i ) . ECB S, R 
( v i ) CBCP S, R 
( i ) ECB F, S 
( i i ) ECB F, S, R 
( i i i ) ECB F, S, R 
( i v ) ECB S, R 
(v) ECB F, S 
( v i ) ECB F, S, R 
( i ) ECB S, R 
( i ) CFB F, S 
( i i ) ECB S, R 
( i i i ) CFB S, R 
(v) ECB S, R 
( v i ) ECB F, S, R 
( i ) CBC F, S 
( i i ) ECB F, S 
( v i ) ECB F, S, R 
( v i ) CFBV F, S 
A 1 Autocorrelation graphs (See pages A-65a to A-65f) 
A 7'A-l Autocorrelation t e s t _ : _a measure of randomness 
Let M "be equal to the number of points which l i e beyond the 
5% s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l c alculated using normal approximation 
(section 6.2.4) Total number of points = 400. 
Key Input Sample Mode M/4OO 
I ( i ) ECB 76/400 
CFB 14/400 
CBC 21/400 
CBCP 18/400 
CFBV 15/400 
(Continued on page A-66) 
A-65 
Atr) 
I 
• " I 
I 
i ^ ! 
i i 
u 
i I 
do 40 A) 
I 
so 70 100 
-r-
IIO Ii0 oo 
A 7.4 (a) Autocorrelation function of input sample ( i ) 
A-65a 
AW 
14 
«f 
(H 
0- L 
t o 
- 1 — 
3n Itt 3^ 0 
- 1 — 
3A> 3^ 0 4*0 
A 7.4 (b) A u t o c o r r o l Q t l o n o f ECB output eoquenco o f I n p u t Qonplo ( l ) 
A-65b 
M 
el 
HI 
»« 
01 
0 
A(r) 
! i ! 
I ) I I 
I I 
' I ! 
. I. 
lb in 
S". . • , • , • i 
14» Ira 310 3«« 3 j i 40 
A "^ '4 ( o ) A u t o c o r r o l a t i o n f u n c t i o n o f CPB output Boquenoo o f I n p u t Bomplo ( l ) 
A-65C 
M 
^^ ^ 
c-3 
Of 
i ! 
Us 3o 3X4 i4ll 3*6 4<w 
A 7.4 ( d l A u t o c o r r o l t t t i o n f u n c t i o n o f CBC o u t p u t eequenco o f I n p u t sample ( l ) 
A-6$d 
AW 
M 
0-t 
tf 
ei 
0.4! 
I 
I i 
! 1 
it* rti iM ' iz« 
I. • -1 
i l l in in 4*0 
A 7 ,4 (0) A u t o c o r r e l o t i o n f u n o t l o n o f CBCP out p u t aequonce o f i n p u t oample ( l ) 
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1-01 
oi 
c-} 
oi 
o-i 
t-l 
0 
• • . . 
its »40 
. • • . - . . ' • J - . v 
210 Art J 3 i 340 9ro 
A 7.4 (t) A u t o c o r r o l o t i o n f u n c t i o n o f CPBV out p u t ooquonce o f I n p u t oaopXo ( l ) 
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Key Input Sample Mode M/400 
I ( i i i ) ECB 65/400 
CPB 17/400 
CBC 13/400 
CBCP 10/400 
CPBV 21/400 
V ( i ) ECB 76/400 
CPB 10/400 
CBC 18/400 
CBCP 37/400 
CPBV 29/400 
( i i i ) ECB 77/400 
CPB 17/400 
CBC 20/400 
CBCP 22/400 
CPBV 21/400 
A 7.5 Results of Prequency^^ Se r i a l and Riins t e s t s 
intermediate DES output sequences 
5^ S i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l s : Frequency (P) t e s t 
S e r i a l (S) t e s t 
Runs ( R) t e s t 
(a) PIaint ext : PFPPFPPPPPPPPPPP (hex) 
Key : IPIPIPIPOEOEOEOE (hex) -
Round No. P S R 
1 14.06 30.80 -2.91 
2 0.06 2.40 0.51 
3 3.06 6.01 0.94 
4 2.25 4.72 0.29 
5 0.25 2.40 0.03 
6 0.06 2.40 0.51 
7 0.25 2.15 -0.22 
8 0.06 3.41 -1.25 
9 0.00 2.78 -1.01 
10 1.56 4.08 -0.31 
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5.99 
1.96 
Round No. P S R 
11 1 . 0 0 5 - 5 1 0 . 1 5 
12 0 . 2 5 5 - 1 6 0 . 7 9 
15 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 
14 5 -06 5 - 9 9 - 0 . 5 9 
15 2 . 2 5 4 - 7 1 - 0 . 7 5 
16 0 . 0 6 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 
Ciphertext 0 . 0 6 2 . 1 5 0 . 0 1 
(b) Pl a i n t e x t : PFPFPPPPPPPPPPFP (hex) 
Key : 85CDCB1C9BD0461A (hex) 
RoTind No. F S R 
1 18 .06 4 6 . 2 6 - 4 . 2 5 
2 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 2 - 0 . 2 5 
3 1 . 5 6 7 . 8 8 2 . 2 7 
4 2 . 2 5 4 . 7 2 1.08 
5 1 . 0 0 5 . 5 1 0 . 1 5 
6 0 . 2 5 2 . 2 7 - 0 . 4 7 
7 0 . 5 6 2 . 9 2 - 0 . 4 4 
8 0 . 5 6 2 . 7 8 -0.18 
9 0 . 2 5 2 . 4 0 0 . 0 5 
10 0 . 0 6 2 . 4 0 0 . 5 1 
11 0 . 2 5 5 . 1 6 0 . 7 9 
12 0 . 0 6 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 
13 0 . 0 6 2 . 1 5 0 . 0 1 
14 0 . 2 5 5 . 4 2 1 . 0 4 
15 0 . 2 5 5 . 4 2 1 . 0 4 
16 0 . 0 0 2 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 
Ciphertext 0 . 2 5 6 . 7 2 2 . 0 6 
(c) P l a i n t e x t : FPPPPFPPPPFFPFFE (hex) 
Key : 5151515151515151 (hex) 
Round No. P S R 
1 1 0 . 5 6 2 7 . 5 1 - 5 - 2 5 
2 0 . 2 5 2 . 2 7 - 0 . 4 7 
5 0 . 5 6 5 . 6 7 1 . 0 9 
4 1 . 5 6 4 . 7 0 0 . 9 8 
5 1 . 5 6 1 0 . 9 5 - 2 . 6 4 
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Round No. F S R 
6 0.06 - 4.69 -1.76 
7 0.56 5.17 0.85 
8 4.00 5.65 0.54 
9 5.06 7.95 -0.68 
10 5.06 4.74 0.14 
11 1.56 4.07 0.46 
12 2.25 5.98 -1.01 
15 1.56 5.21 -1.55 
14 0.00 6.59 -2.27 
15 1.56 6.61 -1.61 
16 2.25 4.72 0.29 
Ciphertext 2.25 4.54 -0.49 
(d) P l a i n t e x t 
Key 
016519E1C5C04780 (hex) 
5151515151515151 (hex) 
Round No. P s R 
1 1.56 4.52 -0.58 
2 0.25 2.27 -0.47 
5 0.25 2.55 0.54 
4 2.25 5.09 -0.49 
5 1.00 2.79 0.15 
6 1.00 4.06 1.15 
7 0.56 5.55 0.85 
8 0.06 2.02 7.88 
9 0.56 2.78 -0.18 
10 2.25 4.54 -0.49 
11 0.25 2.78 -0.75 
12 5.06 4.72 0.41 
15 0.25 5.42 -1.25 
14 0.25 2.27 -0.47 
15 0.00 5.29 1.01 
16 1.56 5.45 -0.51 
Ciphertext 1.56 4.07 0.46 
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Appendix 8 
P i l e Security : Cipher Block Chaining_Program_ (CBC) 
A 8.1 Basic Flowchart 
START 
Enter name of f i l e to be 
Encrypted or Decrypted 
Fetch f i l e from d i s k e t t e 
Select Encryption (E ) or Decryption (D) 
E 
Enter secret 
Correct i t s ] 
key and check/' 
pa r i t y 
Determine whether F i l e i s . 
Applesoft or Integer Basic 
Load corresponding End of 
F i l e pointer positions 
Generate 8 pseudo random 
characters to form the 
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector 
Yes 
End of F i l e ? 
No 
A-69 
C a l l SUB 5 
C a l l SUB6 
Automatic Transfer 
of Encrypted F i l e onto 
d i s k e t t e under the f i l e 
name provided by the 
user 
STOP 
2 
Determine whether the f i l e 
i s Applesoft or Integer Basic 
and load appropriate 
End of F i l e pointer positions 
Fetch I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector from 
end of f i l e 
End of F i l e ? Yes. 3 
No 
Call STJB7 
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector = Cipher Block 
A-70 
3 
Modify the pointer locations 
to allow f o r LIST command 
Return to appropriate Basic 
prompt signal 
SUB 5 
COTJNTl = 0 
COUHTl 
Yes y 
No 
/ 
Exclusive-or I n i t i a l i z a t i o n 
Vector byte w i t h f i l e data 
byte 
Check DIR Status f l a g 
Yes 
Input th 
r e s u l t i 
Security 
e Exclusive-ored 
nto the Data 
Device 
Increment COTOTl taking 
i n t o account of page 
boTindary crossing 
Display 
•^ERROR Message 
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EeeA pointers to allow storage 
of encrypted f i l e on top of the 
o r i g i n a l p l a i n f i l e 
C0imT2 
C0roT2 = 8? ^ Retxxm 
No Check DOR Status 
Yes 
Read the output from the 
Data Security Device and 
store the output back i n 
the same place i n memory 
Increment C0UNT2 taking into 
account of page boundary 
cr o s s i n g 
SUB6 
Generate 8 bytes of 
pseudorandom characters 
P i l l the l a s t block by 
padding i t with pseudorandom 
characters 
6 
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6 
± 
Encrypt the padded block 
and store i t back i n the 
memory 
Record the positions of 
pointers 
Re turn 
10 
SUB? 
C0TJNT5 = 0 
\ / 
COUNT 5 = 8 ? Yes 
NWjJo 
Check DIR Status 
No 
Input a data byte 
from Cipher F i l e to 
Data Security Device 
Increment C0UNT5 taking 
into account of page 
bo\indary crossing 
C0UNT4 = 0 
^ C0UNT4 = 8 y 
11 
No 
Display 
ERROR MESSAGE 
Return 
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No 
11 
I 
Check DOR Status 
10 
\Lr Yes 
Read the data bytes from 
the Data Security Device 
and Exclusi v e - o r i t with 
the I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector to 
produce the o r i g i n a l p l a i n 
data 
Store the decrypted data 
"bytes back i n the same 
memory locations as the 
Cipher data 
Increment C0TTNT4 taking 
into account of page boxindary 
cro s s i n g 
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A 8.2 _Prograiii_Listing 
A 8-2.1 Main Program 
5000 
L I 
L5 
L4 
L2 
J S R F I L E S E C R 
LDA @ 00 
STA 06 
LDA @ 60 
STA 07 
J S R F I L E N A M E 
J S R LOAD 
J S R ENCDEC 
J S R DSD 
LDA F C 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ L I 
JMP L2 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ L3 
LDA 69 
STA I B 
LDA 6A 
STA I C 
JMP L4 
LDA CA 
STA I B 
LDA CB 
STA 10 
J S R SUB 5 
J S R STJB6 
J S R P I L E 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ L5 
LDA 07FE 
STA I B 
Comments 
Displays * P i l e S e c urity System*, 
Locations 6000 to 600? contain • 
the I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Vector. 
Displays 'Enter Filename Please*. 
Loads f i l e into system memory 
Displays * Encrypt ( E ) or Decrypt (D) 
I n i t i a l i z e s the Data S e c u r i t y 
Device and requests and stores the 
sec r e t key i n the KEY Register 
of the device. 
Same subroutine as the one given 
i n Appendix 2. 
L I 
L2 
Encryption • 
Decryption 
A.75 
L5 
L7 
STA 69 
LDA 07PF 
STA I C 
STA 6A 
JMP L6 
LDA 9600 
CMP PP 
BNE L7 
LDA 00 
STA I B 
LDA 9601 
TAX 
I N X 
STX I C 
JMP L6 
TAX 
I N X 
STX I B 
LDA 9601 
STA I C 
L6 JSR SUB? JSR PROMPT 
A 8.2.2 _ _Subroutines 
Some of the subroutines used by t h i s program are the 
same as the ones used by the Block Encryption Program i n 
Appendix 2. ( f o r instance, subroutine DSD). Three 
additional subroutines namely a merged version of subroutines 
SUB5 and SUB?, STJB6 and PILETRANSPER are given i n t h i s s e ction 
Merged STJB5 and SUB? 
S22 
S6 
LDY @ 00 
LDX @ 00 
LDA I B 
STA PC 
LDA 19 
CMP PC 
BNE S I 
LDA I C 
A-76 
SI 
S2 
S3 
S4 
S5 
S19 
SIO 
STA PC 
LDA lA 
CMP PC 
BNE SI 
RTS 
CPX < 3 08 
BEQ S19 
LDA C0A3 
Am S 40 
BNE S2 
JMP PP2D 
LDA 08 
CMP ® 00 
BEQ S3 
JMP S4 
LDA (19),Y 
EOR 6000,X 
JMP S5 
LDA (19),Y 
STA 6010,X 
STA COAO 
INX 
JSR SIO 
JMP S6 
JSR S18 
JMP S22 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ S7 
LDA 19 
CMP @ PP 
BEQ S8 
INC 19 
RTS 
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S8 
S7 
S9 
S18 
S14 
S13 
S16 
S15 
LDA @ 00 
STA 19 
INC lA 
RTS 
LDA 19 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ S9 
DEC 19 
RTS 
LDA @ FF 
STA 19 
DEC lA 
RTS 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ S12 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ SI 5 
LDA 19 
CMP ® 00 
BEQ S14 
DEC 19 
JMP SI 5 
LDA @ FF 
STA 19 
DEC lA 
JMP S15 
LDA 19 
CMP @ FF 
BEQ S16 
INC 19 
JMP S15 
LDA @ 00 
STA 19 
INC lA 
DEX 
JMP S18 
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S12 
S21 
S25 
S24 
S20 
SUB6 
S26 
S25 
LDX © OO 
CPX @ 08 
BNE S23 
RTS 
LDA C0A3 
BPL S23 
LDA 08 
CMP @ 00 
BEQ S24 
LDA C0A2 
EOR 6000,X 
STA (19),Y 
LDA 6010,X 
STA 6000,X 
JMP S20 
LDA C0A2 
STA (19),Y 
STA 6000,X 
INX 
JSR SIO 
JMP S21 
LDA @ 00 
STA FC 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ S23 
CPX @ 08 
BEQ S24 
LDA (ID),Y 
EOR 6000,X 
STA COAO 
LDA AAB6 
BNE S25 
INC PC 
JSR SIO 
INX 
DEC ID 
JMP S26 
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S24 
S23 
S27 
S29 
S30 
S28 
PILETRANSPER 
JSR S18 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ S27 
LDA 19 
STA 07PE 
LDA lA 
STA 07PP 
JMP S28 
LDA @ 00 
CMP 19 
BNE S29 
LDA @ 
STA 19 
DEC lA 
JMP S30 
DEC 19 
LDA PC 
STA (19),Y 
LDA 19 
STA 9600 
LDA lA 
STA 9601 
RTS 
JSR PE93 
JSR PE89 
OLD 
LDA @ 30 
STA AA5P 
LDA 03 
STA AA64 
LDA @ 09 
STA AA65 
LDA AAB6 
BEQ S51 
LDA @ PE 
STA AA72 
LDA @ 07 
A -80 
S 3 2 
STA AA73 
SEC 
LDA 19 
SBC P E 
STA PC 
LDA lA 
SBC @ 07 
STA AA6D 
LDA PC 
STA AA6C 
J S R PD8E 
LDA C6 
J S R PDPO 
LDA @ C9 
J S R PDPO 
LDA @ CC 
J S R PDPO 
LDA @ C5 
J S R PDPO 
LDA @ .PP 
J S R PDPO 
J S R PD8E 
J S R PD6A 
J S R S 5 3 
J S R A331 
J S R FD8E 
J S R 03D0 
S 3 1 LDA lA 
STA AA75 
LDA 19 
STA AA72 
SEC 
LDA ® 0 2 
SBC 19 
STA PC 
LDA % 96 
SBC lA 
JMP S 3 2 
A-&1 
533 LDY ® 00 
TXA 
STA 06 
LDX @ 00 
534 LDA @ 00 
CMP 06 
BEQ L35 
LDA 0200,Y 
STA AA75,X 
INX 
INY 
DEC 06 
JMP S34 
535 CPY @ 15 
BEQ S36 
LDA @ AO 
STA AA75,Y 
INY 
JMP S35 
536 RTS 
A-82 
Appendix 9 
PRESTEL E d i t l n g _ Keyboard 
INIIItlUCK oc oc 
. . . . . . ' • 
f — s (- ^ 
CLfAR^ iiFARI CNU 
L J, ' ' 
n r $ i rv. 1 r & 3J L4J LBJ Le - I (Otl 3/J L@ 
0 0. [01 [0 101 0 I®1 101 Ifill 
3 Q ® 0 iTl Q |T| g 
SHIFT 
S P A C E RCPEATl 
• 
ni 
[0 1© 101 u 
n 0 ® 0; QNCO^  
[MCI.J f coNr l GRAF —^—- SfP [GHAI 
[ n c r j 
fllOLD) GRAF — f n F i . l ICRmI 
fcONcl IUIACKI 
lO'GRO 
f w r w l 
1Q[CHC| 
\ I FLASH 
I I I % F | 
ItAD) 
Appendix 10 
Chinese Remainder_Theorem 
The Chinese Remainder Theorem can be stated as follows 
Let m-j^^ m^-^»"m^ denote r p o s i t i v e integers that are 
r e l a t i v e l y prime i n pairs and l e t a^^ a,^y - ^  a.-^ denote any r 
integers. Then the congruences x = (mod m^) i = 1, 2,»»-ir, 
have common solutions. Any two solutio n s are congruent modulo 
nxj^  . m^  • • • m;^. 
Let us now consider an algorithm to implement the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem to compute a (mod m) where m = m^ ^ — 'irij. 
Algorithm 
1. For i = 1 to r compute M^  = m/m^  
2. For i = 1 to r compute M.~^  (mod mi-) 
^ -1 
3* Compute a = ^ a^ M^  M^  
Mj^. (mod m^^^ )^ 1 < i ^  r , can be c a l c u l a t e d by r 
applications of the E u c l i d ' s algorithm (Appendix 11). Thus 
step 2 requires at most 0 ( r log n) operations where m n. 
Computation of 'a i n step 3 requires at most 0 ( r ) operations 
As M. <n, the amount of storage required f or M and M 
i i 
l.< i < r , i s at most 0 ( r log n ) • 
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Appendix H 
Euc l i d ' s Algorithm 
E u c l i d ' s algorithm i s a rapid method of t e s t i n g r e l a t i v e 
primeness and i t can be used to compute inverses modulo m. 
In t h i s t h e s i s , the E u c l i d ' s algorithm has been frequently 
assumed to have been used i n determining inverses modulo m. 
Here the ba s i c algorithm i s given. Por more d e t a i l e d 
treatment r e f e r to _45_ 
Given p o s i t i v e integers a and b c a l c u l a t e the 
greatest common d i v i s o r , gcd (a,b) = d and x and y such 
that ax + by = d. 
This i s c a r r i e d out using the D i v i s i o n Theorem which 
can be stated as 
and there e x i s t unique Given integers b;:=»- o 
integers q^5. o and r , o < r ^ b such that a = b q + r 
Now applying the D i v i s i o n Theorem s u c c e s s i v e l y , i t i s seen that 
a 
b 
r 
r q o o 
r. 
r o 
+ r i 
+ r . 
(d i v i d i n g b i n t o a) 
(d i v i d i n g i n t o b) 
(d i v i d i n g r ^ i n t o r ^ ) 
(e t c . ) 
where 
n-2 
n-1 
n 
^n-1 
n-1 
n 
n-1 + 
+ 0 
n 
•n-2 < < b 
and n i s the greatest common d i v i s o r of a and b That 
I S = r n gcd (a,b) 
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The numbers x and y can be c a l c u l a t e d as follows. To 
begin with, l e t x = o, u = 1 and v = o. Then at 
each d i v i s i o n step, form 
- l i - i ^' 
- i i - i y 
t ^ y 
X -i:^ u 
y < V 
u ^ s 
V <: t 
When the repeated d i v i s i o n algorithm ends, d = r ^ and 
r ^ = ax + by. 
Let us now sketch a more formal proof. 
Theorem : I f r i s the l a s t non-zero remainder i n 
n 
E u c l i d ' s algorithm for a and b, then r ^ i s the god (a,b) 
- and r ^ = ax + by for some x and y. 
Proof : I f r i s the l a s t non-zero ramainder i n E u c l i d ' s n 
algorithm for a and b, then the naiinber of steps i n the 
algorithm i s n+1. I f n = o, then b divides a and the 
theorem i s t r i v i a l . I f n = 1 , then the E u c l i d ' s algorithm 
for a and b has the form 
a = bq^ + r^ 
\> = + 0 
r ^ i s the gcd (a,b) and = a . l + b • (-q-j^) 
Using induction, assume that the theorem i s true for N = n-1. 
That i s , the theorem i s true for any two numbers whose E u c l i d ' s 
algorithm takes n steps. Suppose the E u c l i d ' s algorithm 
takes n + 1 steps for a and b. I f a = bq^ + r-j^ then 
the r e s t of the algorithm for a and b i s the E u c l i d ' s 
algorithm for r ^ and b. So the E u c l i d ' s algorithm takes n 
steps for r^' and b. I f r ^ i s the l a s t non-zero remainder 
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of E u c l i d ' s algorithm applied to a and b, i t i s the l a s t 
non-zero remainder for E u c l i d ' s algorithm applied to 
and b. By induction r ^ i s the gcd (b, r ^ ) and = 
bu + r^v • Now a = bq^ + r ^ and hence r ^ , the gcd (b,r^) 
i s also the gcd (a, b ) . S u b s t i t u t i n g for i n 
the expression r = b u + r v gives r = bu + v (a-bq^ ) 
n 1 n 
i€ J '^xi ~ ^ (^ ~ ^^^) + a V, Thus the theorem i s true 
by induction. 
To compute inverse of an integer a (mod m) where gcd (a,m) = 1, 
l e t b = m. The repeated d i v i s i o n algorithm can 
then be used to f i n d x and y such that ax + my = d. 
Hence ax E d (mod m). As d = 1 , x i s the inverse of 
a (mod m). Knuth 4 5 ] shows that inverses (mod m) can be 
computed i n 0 (log m) operations. Purthermore, note that the 
f a c t o r i z a t i o n of m into primes i s not required to determine 
the r e l a t i v e primeness and c a l c u l a t e the inverse. 
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Appendix 12 
Determinant of a Matrix over_GP(2)_Program_(DETMOD^F772 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
C This program c a l c u l a t e s the determinant of a given NxN matrix 
C over G. F (2) by reducing the matrix to upper t r i a n g u l a r form using 
C elementary operations. 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
INTEGER B(127, 12?), TEMP(l27), XMl, XM, 
+ X, XM2, XM3, XM4, XM5, SIGN 
N = 127 
READ ( 1 , * ) ( ( B ( I , J ) , J,= 1,N), I = 1, N) 
L = 1 
SIGN = 1 
K = 2 
XMl = 1 
70 L I = L 
XM = B ( L , L ) 
XM = ABS (XM) 
XM = MOD (XM,2) 
I F (XM. EQ. 0) GO TO 215 
214 DO 95 J = L, N 
XM2 = B ( L , J ) 
XM2 = ABS (XM2) 
XM2 = MOD (XM2, 2 ) 
XM2 = XM2/XM 
95 CONTINUE 
DO 141 I = K, N 
X = B ( I , L) 
X = ABS (X) 
X = MOD (X, 2) 
I F (X. EQ. 0) GO TO I 4 I 
DO 140 J = L , N 
XM3 = B ( I , J ) 
XM4 = B ( L , j ) 
XM3 = ABS (XM3) 
XM4 = ABS (XM4) 
XM5 = MOD (XM3, 2) 
XM4 = MOD (XM4, 2) 
A- 8 8 
B ( I , J ) = XM5 - XM4 * X 
I P ( B ( I , J ) . EQ. -1) B ( I , J ) = 1 
140 CONTINUE 
141 CONTINUE 
L = L + 1 
K = K + 1 
Xm = XMl * XM 
I F ( L - N) 70, 190, 190 
190 XM5 = B (N,N) 
XM5 = ABS (XM5) 
XM5 = MOD (XM5, 2) 
Xm = XMl * XM5 
xm = x^a * S I G N 
211 WRITE (1, 210) XKL 
21 0 FORMAT ( I X , 'DETERMINANT = ' , 1 1 0 ) 
STOP 
215 L I = LI + 1 
I F ( L I . EQ. 1 2 8 ) GO TO *212 
XM = B ( L I , L ) 
XM = ABS (XM) 
XM = MOD (XM, 2) 
I F (XM.EQ.O) GO TO 215 
DO 96 J = L , N 
TEMP ( J ) = B ( L , J ) 
B ( L , J ) = B ( L i , J ) 
B ( L I , J ) = TEMP ( J ) 
96 CONTINUE 
S I G N = (-1) * S I G N 
GO TO 214 
212 XMl = 0 
WRITE ( 1 , 8 1 3 ) 
813 FORMAT ( I X , 'MATRIX I S SINGULAR') 
GO TO 211 
END 
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Appendix 13 
Matrix Exponentiation Program (MATEXP.^FTN} 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
C This program i s used to encrypt and decrypt matrix messages 
C using the extended RSA matrix system- Exponentiation of the 
C matrix message i s performed using the square and multiply 
C technique. 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
I N T E G E R M(3,5), C(3,5), z ( 3 , 3 ) , n(5,3), V ( 3 , 3 ) , X(IOO), EXP 
REAL Q 
N = 3 
WRITE (1,1) 
1 FORMAT (1 H, 'INPUT T H E MESSAGE/CIPHER MATRIX P L E A S E ' ) 
READ (1,*) ( ( M ( I , J ) , J = 1, N), I = 1, N) 
WRITE ( 1 , 2 ) 
2 FORMAT (1 H, 'ENTER THE ENCRYPTING/DECRYPTING 
EXPONENT P L E A S E ' ) 
READ (1,*) EXP 
C I n i t i a l i z e the C matrix to i d e n t i t y matrix 
DO 5 I = 1, N 
DO 3 J = 1, N 
C ( I , J ) = 0 
3 C (1,1) = 1 
e Convert EXP to a k-bi t binary vector ( K ^ ^ l O O ) 
DO 4 L I = 1, 100 
Q = EXP/2 
IR = EXP - INT (Q) * 2 
L 2 = 101 - L I 
X ( L 2 ) = IR 
EXP = INT (Q) 
4 CONTINUE 
C Raise the matrix M to the power EXP 
I I = 100 
9 I F ( X ( I I ) .EQ.O) Go to 5 
CALL MULT (M, C, Z ) 
DO 6 I = 1, N 
DO 6 J = 1, N 
A- 90 
7 
10 
11 
c ( i , J ) = z ( I , J ) 
I F ( l I . E Q . l ) GO TO 7 
C A L L MULT (M, M, Z ) 
DO 8 I = 1, N 
DO 8 J = 1, N 
M ( I , J ) = Z ( I , J ) 
I I = I I - 1 
GO TO 9 
WRITE (1, 10) 
FORMAT (IH, 'THE CIPHER/MESSAGE MATRIX I S ' ) 
WRITE (1, 11) ( ( M ( I , J ) , J = 1, N ) , I = 1, N ) 
FORMAT (IH, 3 (16, 2X)) 
STOP 
END 
C The subroutine MULT m u l t i p l i e s the matrix U by matrix V 
C Over Z/mZ where m i s the modulus of the public key 
C system. I n t h i s case m = 299. 
SUBROUTINE MULT (U, V, Z) 
INTEGER U (3,3), v ( 3 , 3 ) , z(3,3) 
DO 12 I I = 1, N 
DO 12 J l = 1, N 
Z ( I I , J l ) = 0 
DO 12 Kl = 1, N 
TP = Z ( I I , J l ) + U ( I I , K l ) * V ( K l , J l ) 
Z ( I I , J l ) = MOD ( I P , 299) 
12 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END. 
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Appendix 14 
Polynomial_Exponentiation Program _(POLYEXT._F_77) 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
C This program i s used to encrypt and decrypt polynomial 
C messages using the extended RSA polynomial system. 
C Exponentiation of the polynomial message i s performed using 
C the square and multiply technique. 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
INTEGER M ( 4 ) , V ( 4 ) , Z ( 4 ) , EXP, X(lOO) 
REAL Q 
N = 4 
WRITE ( 1 , 1 ) 
1 FORMAT (IH, 'INPUT THE MESSAGE/CIPHER 
POLYNOMIAL PLEASE') 
READ ( 1 , * ) (M(J), J = 1, N) 
WRITE ( 1 , 2 ) 
2 FORMAT ( 1 H, 'ENTER THE ENCRYPTING/ 
DECRYPTING EXPONENT PLEASE') 
READ ( 1 , * ) EXP 
c I n i t i a l i z e the V polynomial to i d e n t i t y vector. 
DO 3 I I = 1, N 
3 Y ( I I ) = 0 
V ( 1 ) = 1 
c Convert EXP to a K-bit b i n a i y vector (K^^^lOO) 
DO 4 L I = 1, 1 0 0 
Q = EXP/2 
IR = EXP - INT(Q) * 2 
L 2 = 101 - L I 
X ( L 2 ) = IR 
EXP = I N T ( Q ) 
4 CONTINUE 
C" Raise the polynomial M to the power EXP 
I I = 1 0 0 
9 I F (X ( I I ) . EQ.O) GO TO 5 
CALL MULT (M, V, Z) 
DO 6 I = 1, N 
A- 9 2 
6 V ( I ) = Z ( I ) 
5 I F ( l I . E Q . l ) GO TO 7 
CALL MULT (M, M, Z) 
DO 8 I = 1, N 
8 M ( I ) = Z ( I ) 
I I = I I - 1 
GO TO 9 
7 WRITE ( 1 , 1 0 ) 
10 FORMAT ( 1 H, »THE CIPHER/MESSAGE POLYNOMIAL I S ' ) 
WRITE ( 1 , 1 1 ) (M ( J ) , J = 1, N) 
11 FORMAT (IH, 4 ( 1 6 , 2 X ) ) 
STOP 
END 
C The subroutine m u l t i p l i e s the polynomial U by polynomial V 
C over Z/mZ where m i s the modulus of the public key 
C system. The product polynomial i s reduced modulo an 
e i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial. I n t h i s subroutine, the i r r e d u c i b l e 
C polynomial i s f (x) = x * * 4 + x * * 2 + 1 and 
C m i s equal to 35 
SUBROUTINE MULT (U, V, Z) . 
INTEGER U ( 4 ) , V ( 4 ) , Z ( 4 ) 
Z ( l ) = U ( l ) V ( l ) - U ( 4 ) ^- V ( 2 ) - U(3) * V ( 3 ) - U ( 2 ) * V ( 4 ) + U ( 4 ) * V ( 4 ) 
Z ( 2 ) = U ( 2 ) * V ( 1 ) + U ( 0 ) * V ( 2 ) - U ( 4 ) * V ( 3 ) - U ( 3 ) ^ V ( 4 ) 
2(3) = U( 3 ) ^ V ( 1 ) + U ( 2 ) * V ( 2 ) + U ( 1 ) * V ( 3 ) - U ( 4 ) * V ( 2 ) - U ( 3 ) * V ( 3 ) - U ( 2 ) ^ V ( 4 ) 
Z ( 4 ) = U(4)* V ( l ) + U ( 3 ) * V ( 2 > f U ( 2 ) * V ( 3 ) + U ( l ) * V ( 4 ) - U ( 4 ) * V ( 3 ) -U(3)*V(4) 
DO 12 I = 1, N 
IP = Z ( I ) 
Z ( I ) = MOD ( I P , 35) 
12 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END 
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Appendix 15, 
Cycle Length_Calculation_Program_in GF_(2 * * Z ) ! ^ ^ ^ ^ * ^ ! ' ^ ) 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
C This program i s used to c a l c u l a t e the cy c l e lengths i n 
C GF (2*-*^7) for a given secre t exponent key when the system 
C base polynomial, evaluated as a binary vector, i s varied 
C from 2 to 127 . The generatox i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial used i n 
C the system i s x * * 7 + x + l . 
C x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
INTEGER M(7,7), s ( 7 , 7 ) , u ( 7 ) , v ( 7 ) , Z l ( 7 ) , X ( 7 ) , 
TEMP(7) 
REAL Q, Ql 
e Read the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n matrix (M) and square matrix (S) 
e from the data f i l e MITDATA 
READ (5, ( ( S ( I , J ) , J = 1,7), I = 1,7) 
READ (5, ( ( M ( I , J ) , J = 1,7), I = 1,7) 
WRITE (1,1) 
1 FORMAT (IH, 'INPUT THE BASE AND SECRET KEY PLEASE') 
READ (1,*) BASE, KEY 
501 BASE 1 = BASE 
e Convert BASE and KEY to 7-bit binary vectors. 
DO 2 L I = 1, 7 
Q = BASE/2 
Ql = KEY/2 
IR = BASE - INT (Q) * 2 
I R l = KEY - INT (Ql) * 2 
L2 = 8 - L I 
U (L2) = IR 
X (L2) = I R l 
BASE = INT (Q) 
KEY = INT (Ql) 
2 CONTINUE 
e Store the BASE i n temporary vector TEMP 
DO 3 I = 1, 7 
TEMP ( l ) = U ( I ) 
5 CONTINUE 
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e I n i t i a l i z e the V - vector to 1. 
DO 4 I = 1, 6 
V ( I ) = 0 
4 V (7) = 1 
e Compute the cycle length for a given base. 
ICL = 1 
1 = 7 
9 I F (X (I).EQ.O) GO TO 5 
CALL MULT (U, V, M) 
DO 6 I I = 1, 7 
U ( I I ) = TEMP ( I I ) 
6 CONTINUE 
5 I F ( I . E Q . I ) GO TO 7 
CALL SQUARE (U, S) 
DO 8 I I = 1, 7 
TEMP ( I I ) = U ( I I ) 
8 CONTINUE 
1 = 1-1 
GO TO 9 
DO 51 J J = 1, 7 
CHECK ( I C , J J ) = V ( J J ) 
51 CONTINUE 
ICL = ICL -1 
I F (ICL .EQ. 0) GO TO 56 
DO 521 I I = 1, IC 
DO 52 I J = 1, 7 
I F (V(JJ) .EQ. CHECK ( l l , J J ) ) F L A G = 1 
I F ( V ( J J ) .NE. CHECK ( l l , J j ) ) FLAG = 0 
52 CONTINUE 
I F (FLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 53 
521 CONTINUE 
56 DO 54 L = 1, 7 
X (L) = V(L) 
U (L) = TEMPI ( L) 
54 CONTINUE 
ICL = ICL + 2 
I F (ICL.EQ. 350) GO TO 55 
GO TO 50 
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53 ICCL = ICL + 1 
WRITE (6,400) ICCL 
400 FORMAT (IH, 'THE BASE I S =', 2 x, 7 ( l 4 , I X ) ) 
GO TO 502 
55 ICL = ICL -1 
WRITE (6,402) IC, (U(L), L = 1,7) 
402 FORMAT (IH, 'MAXIMUM CYCLE', 14, 2X, 7 (I4,1X)) 
502 BASE = BASEl + 1 
BASEl = BASE 
I F (BASE •EQ.128) GO TO 503 
WRITE (6,504) 
504 FORMAT ( » * * * * * * * * * * - * * • * * * ') 
GO TO 501 
503 STOP 
END 
C The subroutine MULT m u l t i p l i e s the polynomial U by the 
C polynomial V over GP (2 * * 7) using the i r r e d u c i b l e 
C trinomial x * * 7 + x + l 
SUBROUTINE MULT (U, V, M) 
INTEGER P(7) , P l ( 7 ) , U(7), P2(7), V ( 7 ) , M(7,7) 
DO 12 I = 1,7 
12 P ( I ) = 0 
I J = 7 
20 IP (V(IJ).EQ.O) GO TO 13 
DO 14 I = 1,7 
P ( I ) = U ( I ) + P ( I ) 
N = P ( I ) 
Nl = MOD (N,2) 
P ( I ) = Nl 
14 CONTINUE 
13 DO 15 K = 1,7 
DO 16 I = 1,7 
PI ( I ) = U ( I ) * M (I , K ) 
16 CONTINUE 
P2 (K) = 0 
DO 17 I = 1,7 
P2 (K) = P2(K) + PI ( I ) 
N = P2(K) 
Nl = MOD (N,2) 
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P2(K) = Nl 
17 CONTINUE 
15 CONTINUE 
DO 18 L = 1,7 
18 U(L) = P2(L) 
I F ( I J . E Q . I ) GO TO 19 
I J = I J -1 
GO TO 20 
19 * DO 21 L = 1,7 
21 V (L) = P (L) 
RETURN 
END 
e The subroutine SQUARE squares the polynomial U over 
C GF (2 * * 7) using the i r r e d u c i b l e t r i n o m i a l X * * 7 + X + l 
SUBROUTINE SQUARE (U, S) 
INTEGER Z ( 7 ) , Z l ( 7 ) , U(7), S(7,7) 
DO 22 J = 1,7 
DO 23 I = 1,7 
Z ( I ) = U ( I ) * S ( I , J ) 
23 CONTINUE 
Z1(J) = 0 
DO 24 I = 1,7 
Z l ( J ) = Z1(J) + Z ( I ) 
NUM = Z l ( J ) 
NUMl = MOD (NUM, 2) 
Z l ( J ) == NUMl 
24 CONTINUE 
22 CONTINUE 
DO 25 I = 1,7 
25 U ( I ) = Z 1 ( I ) 
RETURN 
END 
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Appendix 16 
Short Cycling Attack_in PKD System_over GF_(2^^71(RANDCYCLE.F77) 
C This program c a r r i e s out short c y c l i n g attack on the public 
C key d i s t r i b u t i o n over G F (2''^*7) with i r r e d u c i b l e trinomial 
C x * * 7 + x + l . The attack c o n s i s t s of repeated encipherings 
C to detennine the cycle length and the s e c r e t key. For a 
C fixed base polynomial, i t c a l c u l a t e s the average c y c l e length 
C when the se c r e t keys vary over the range 1 to 127. 
C This procedure i s repeated f or the 127 possible DEC functions 
C of the form DEC (b ^  y) where b i s any one of the 127 
C polynomials over GP (2 * * 7 ) - Then, the expected c y c l e length 
C for the 127 DEC functions i s determined. 
C This program can be run with d i f f e r e n t system base 
C polynomials. 
C 
C The prograjD u t i l i z e s the subroutines MULT and SQUARE 
C given i n CYCLE.F77- (Appendix 1 5 ) . 
INTEGER M(7,7), s ( 7 , 7 ) , u ( 7 ) , V ( 7 ) , Z l ( 7 ) , X ( 7 ) , IC 
+ TEMP1(7), CHECK(350,7),TEMP(7), FLAG, BASE, 
+ TEMP2(7), KEY, U l ( 7 ) , V l ( 7 ) , B ( 7 ) , DEC, KEYl 
+ DECl, BASEl 
REAL Q, Ql, QK, SUM, AVR, EXPAVR, EXP 
SUM = 0.0 
EXP = 0.0 
WRITE (1,1) 
FORMAT (IH, 'INPUT THE BASE, SECRET KEY 
+ AND DEC POLYNOMIAL B PLEASE') 
READ (1,*) BASE, KEY, DEC 
Convert BASE, KEY and DEC to 7-bit binary vectors. 
DO 2 L l = 1,7 
Q = BASE/2 
IR = BASE - INT (Q) * 2 
L2 = 8 - L l 
U (L2) = IR 
BASE = INT (Q) 
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2 CONTINUE 
101 DECl = DEC 
501 KEYl = KEY 
DO 3 L I = 1, 
QK = KEY/2 
Ql = DEC/2 
IRK = KEY - INT 
I R l = DEC - INT 
L2 = 8 - L I 
X(L2) = IRK 
B (L2) = I R l 
KEY = INT (QK) 
DEC = INT (Ql) 
5 CONTINUE 
C Compute the cycle length ICC for a given KEY and DEC 
IC = 1 
DO 38 I = 1,7 
TEMPI ( I ) = U ( I ) 
38 CONTINUE 
DO 10 I = 1,6 
V ( I ) = 0 
V (7) = 1 
1 = 7 
DO 40 I = 1,7 
TEMP ( I ) = U ( I ) 
40 CONTINUE 
31 I F (X(I).EQ.O) GO TO 52 
CALL MULT (U, V, M) 
DO 41 I I = 1,7 
U ( I I ) = TEMP ( I I ) 
41 CONTINUE 
32 IP (I . E Q . I ) GO TO 35 
CALL SQUARE (U,S) 
DO 42 I I = 1,7 
TEMP ( I I ) = U ( I I ) 
42 CONTINUE 
1 = 1-1 
GO TO 31 
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33 CALL MULT (B, V, M) 
DO 82 I = 1 ,7 
B ( I ) = TEMP2(I) 
82 CONTINUE 
DO 51 J J = 1 ,7 
CHECK ( I C , J J ) = V ( J J ) 
51 CONTINUE 
IC = IC -1 
I F (IC.EQ.O) GO TO 56 
DO 521 I I = 1, IC 
DO 52 J J = 1 ,7 
I F (V(JJ).EQ.CHECK ( l I , J j ) ) FLAG = 1 
I F (V(JJ).NE.CHECK ( l I , J J ) ) FLAG = 0 
I F (FLAG.EQ.O) GO TO 56 
52 CONTINUE 
I F (FLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 53 
521 CONTINUE 
56 DO 54 L = 1 ,7 
X (L) = V(L) 
U(L) = TEMPl(L) 
54 CONTINUE 
IC = IC + 2 
I F (IC •EQ.350) GO TO 55 
GO to 50 
53 ICC = IC + 1 
DO 499 I I I = 1, 7 
U ( I I I ) = T E M P I ( I I I ) 
499 CONTINUE 
SUM = SUM + ICC -1 
GO TO 502 
SUM = SUM + IC -1 
c Increment the KEY by 1 and repeat the process 
502 KEY = KEYl + 1 
KEYl = KEY 
I F (KEY.EQ.128) GO TO 503 
GO TO 501 
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C When a l l the 127 possible values f or the KEY have been 
fl t r i e d , compute the average c y c l e length f or a given DEC 
C and a given base polynomial. 
505 AVR = SUM/127 
WRITE (1,477) SUM, AVR 
477 FORMAT (IX, 'SUM =', F12.5, 3X, 'AVR = ', F10.5) 
WRITE (1,504) 
504 FORMAT (' * * ^ * ^ t * * * * ^ ^ * * * * » ) 
C Increment the DEC value by 1 and repeat the process of 
C finding d i f f e r e n t cycle lengths when the KEY takes a l l the 
e 127 possible values 
DEC = DECl + 1 
DECl = DEC 
KEY = 1 
KEYl = KEY 
SUM = 0.0 
EXP = EXP + AVR 
IP (DEC•EQ.128) GO TO 102 
GO TO 101 
e When the 127 DEC values of the s p e c i a l form are t r i e d , 
C compute the expected c y c l e length f or the given base 
C polynomial. 
102 EXPAVR = EXP/127 
WRITE (1,103) EXPAVR 
103 FORMAT (IX, 'THE EXPECTED CYCLE LENGTH I S ' P10.5) 
STOP 
END 
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A 17.1 Cycle lengths in GF (2 * * 7) for several values of Secret Key, X 
Dase a X = 2 X = 4 X = 15 X = 52 X = 64 X = 67 X = 68 X = 73 X = 105 X = 115 
2 74 74 74 74 11 74 74 74 42 . 42 
5 118 118 118 118 2 118 118 118 118 118 
4 27 53 53 27 53 53 53 27 27 27 
5 59 63 59 59 59 63 59 59 63 59 
6 75 75 38 75 75 75 75 75 11 38 
7 63 13 9 63 9 63 20 63 13 9 
8 11 45 65 45 • 65 6 65 11 65 65 
9 1 116 116 116 116 116 116 1 116 116 
10 43 5 75 75 43 75 43 43 43 3 
11 12 92 10 92 10 12 2 12 12 92 
12 53 12 34 4 34 24 4 53 12 12 
13 101 8 101 101 13 101 101 101 1 101 
14 113 113 113 113 113 113 113 115 113 12 
15 47 54 54 47 14 47 54 47 47 54 
16 68 9 68 14 9 33 33 68 68 33 
Base a 1 = 2 X a 4 X = 15 X = 32 X = 64 X =67 X = 68 X = 73 X = 105 X = ] 
17 28 89 28 89 28 28 09 28 89 89 
18 40 1 40 40 14 16. 11 40 40 . 14 
19 106 106 106 106 106 106 8 107 106 106 
20 22 30 15 30, 30 17 17 22 5 22 
21 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 7 
22 52 62 11 62 62 61 62 52 52 62 
23 91 91 91 91 91 .7 . 91 91 91 91 
24 25 45 45 25 25 45 . 50 25 25 50. 
25 18 48 51 18 51 51 51 18 18 48 
26 10 50 36 50 26 26 50 10 50 . 50 
27 58 
V 
39 58 39 58 58 58 58 58 3 
28 80 80 80 43 43 43 80 80 80 80 
29 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
30 49 49 16 16 49 46 51 49 7 51 
51 27 27 58 27 17 5 58 27 27 9 
Base a X = 2 X = 4 X = 15 X = 32 X a 64 X = 67 X = 68 X = 73 X = 105 X = 
32 72 19 72 72 .72 72 72 72 72 72 
33 66 24 5 66 66 21 , 21 66 5 66 
34 116 116 116 116 116 116 5 116 116 116 
35 33 2 56 56 56 34 56. 33 56 54 
36 92 92 92 92 92 7 21 92 92 • 92 
37 18 18 69 69 33 35 69 18 69 55 
38 127 127 127 127 127 
• 
127 127 127 127 127 
f 
1-1 
39 50 50 50 50 37 50 50 50 50 14 
o 
40 109 109 109 • 10 109 109 109 109 109 109 
41 40 . 69 69 69 40 69 69 40 69 69 
42 57 57 11 50 57 50 57 57 50 50 
43 30 79 30 80 5 30 79 30 30 79 
44 20 44 20 44 26 44 29 20 .44 44 
45 42 42 . 63 63 63 63 63 42 65 63 
46 . 87 87 36 . 87 36 87 87 87 87 36 
47 61 12 5 24 24 61 61 61 12 61 
115 
Base a X = 2 X = 4 X = 15 X = 32 X = 64 X = 67 X = 68 X = 73 X = 105 X = 
48 91 51 91 91 26 
• 
91 91 91 26 26 
49 78 43. 78 78 78 78 .70 78 78 78 
50 104 18 • 
• r 
18 4 104 18 104 104 104 104 
51 72, 72 18 48. 72 72 48 72 48. 72 
52 2 
> 
72 21 15, 13 
I 
21 13 2 72 72 
53 82 15 82 18' 82 18 82. 82 15 82 
54 31 2 52 52 52 52 2 51 52 52 
55 37 9 21 8 32 21 8 37 57 . 52 
56 21 21 21 72 72 72 72 21 72 . 21 
57 40 40 49 49 4 49 49 40 4 49 
58 14 49 63 14 49 6.3 49 14 I''. 49 
59 38 27 27 31 38 38 9 38 15 - 51 
60 17 17 13 26. 5 31 . 31 17 17 5 
61 12 47 22 57. 47 87 22 12 37 12 
62 45 . 45 4 45 66 66 66 45 45 4 
63 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
115 
Baae a X = 2 X = 4 X = 15 X = 32 X ° 64 X = 67 X = 68 X = 73 X = 105 X = 
64 7 33 46 46 33 46 7 7 10 12 
65 60 54 58 58 58 58 60 60 60 60 
66 75 16 - 75 16 75 16 75 75 16 5 
67 16 87 87 87 16 87 6 16 87 9 
68 ,97 97 97 97. 15 97 97 97 97 97 
69 12 108 10.8 108 104 108 108 12 108 108 
70 ' 5 79 10 1 79 79 79 5 8 79 
71 118 114 118 118 9 118 118 118 118 118 
72 88 88 88 88. 24 88 88 88 88 88 
73 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 
74 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
75 103 103 22 103 103 105 105 103 105 105 
76 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
77 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 57 
78 28 28 77 77 16 77 28 28 77 77 
79 8 28 28 91 91 91 91 8 91 28 
115 
Base a X = 2 X - 4 X = 15 X - 52 X = 64 X =• 67 X =. 68 X = 75 X - 105 X = ] 
80 92 8 92 18 92 9 92 92 7 92 
81 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
82 26 66 29 66 . 66 26 , 4 26 66 29 
85 79 40 79 40 40 79 79 79 79 40 
84 21 55 21 64 55 55 64 21 21 64 
85 79 79 79 51 79 11 11 79 79 79 
86 26 46 46 46 51 46 51 26 4 46 
f M O -J 
87 81 81 81 81 54 4 54 81 81 81 
88 95 95 95. 95 19 95 95 95 95 95 
89 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 
90 92 92 92 15 92 92 92 92 92 92 
91 80 80 15 80 80 51 51 80 80 51 
92 50 79 5 79 79 50 50 50 8 79 
95 118 118 -• 11 118 8 118 118 118 118 118 
94 6 47 47 47 43 47 14 6 14 45 
95 45 14 47 47 45 45 14 45 47 10 
Base a X = 2 X = 4 X = 15 X = 52 X = 64 X = 67 X 68 X = 75 X = 105 X = 115 
96 17 71 71 21 1 21 ^ 17 21 71 
97 25 23 27 25 66 25 66 25 66 66 
98 97 26 97 97 26 97 26 97 4 97 
99 15 111 111 111 111 111 111 15 111 111 
100 18 90. 90 90 90 15 15 18 18 90 
101 84 84 55 6 • 84 84 84 84 84 55 
102 34 40 25 25 . 40 25 25 34 .3 40 
105 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
104 24 24 24 24 95 95 95 24 95 24 
105 48 27 46 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
106 54 49 49 49 49, 25 54 54 49 25 
107 24 40 65 65 65 65 40 24 40 63 
108 60 44 44 60 44 60 44 60 6 1 
109 96 18 96 96 96 18 96 96 96 96 
110 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 8 8 
111 57 57 61 57 61 8 61 57 57 61 
Base a X » 2 X •= 4 X = 15 X = 32 X = 64 X = 67 X = 68 X = 75 X = 105 X = 
112 42 41 41 22 41 42 41 42 42 16 
113 5, 90 90 5 90 90 28 .5 90 28 
114 125 123 125 125 125 125 123 125 123 124 
115- 96 • 96 8 . 96 25 96 96 96 96 8 
116 27 • 25 18 27 2 1 27 27 35 25 
117 104 104 104 2 9 104 104 104 104 104 
118 66 . 66 66 15 66 66 66 66 15 88 
119 13 97. 15 15 97 97 97 . 15 97 97 
120 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
121 35 5 . 35 19 • 22 22 19 35 55 22 
122 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
123 52 6 26 52 15 5? 23 52 52 15 
124 82 82 82 82 82 82 1 82 9 8 
125 2 66 66 66 13 13 66 2 66 66 
126 75 75 75 75 5 75 75 75 75 75 
127 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
A. 17.2 Expected cycle lengths f or the System Base a = 38, 
using DEC (b * y) 
Polynomial b Expected 
(evaluated as Cycle length 
a binary vector) 
(Refer to Section A 17.1, 
a = 38 c y c l e length = 12?) 
1. 127.00 
2 58.87 
5 54.48 
4 66.59 
5 94.67 
6 45.80 
7 55.87 
8 22.75 
9 47.87 
10 121.11 
11 44.50 
12 87.55 
13 27.17 
14 29.77 
15 115.61 
16 59.87 
17 45.56 
18 64.50 
19 105.19 
20 49.77 
21 109.85 
22 66.54 
23 55.09 
24 127.00 
25 109 .95 
26 68.85 
27 76.54 
28 55.76 
29 52.15 
50 51.95 
51 47.80 
52 99.28 
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53 
54 
35 
36 
37 
38 
59 
40 
41 
42 
45 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
55 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
75.16 
55.17 
29.39 
46.40 
121.11 
45.44 
53.02 
71.49 
52.94 
64.42 
70.09 
60.95 
127.00 
57.27 
45.50 
44.00 
123.05 
43.02 
75.60 
27.30 
54.87 
29.71 
35.60 
38.28 
64.00 
35.71 
67.99 
48.39 
46.89 
54.40 
77.71 
77.71 
69.69 
61.60 
82 .09 
49.79 
60.18 
78.09 
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71 62.91 
72 59.52 
73 108 .20 
74 115.38 
75 36.04 
76 85.96 
77 63.08 
78 65.25 
79 119.19 
80 54.83 
81 44.69 
82 111.77 
83 53.17 
84 81 .11 
85 37.35 
86 45.56 
87 52.97 
88 52.26 
89 42.45 
90 51.00 
91 65.90 
92 67.20 
93 55.47 
94 54.69 
95 77.88 
96 98.20 
97 54.20 
98 58.67 
99 56.65 
100 26.26 
101 43.66 
102 60.75 
103 68.02 
104 37.00 
105 60.56 
106 48.98 
107 49.60 
108 106.53 
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109 87.68 
110 55.51 
111 54.55 
112 78.11 
115 55.91 
114 48.41 
115 52.91 
116 45.87 
117 42.75 
118 59.53 
119 40.97 
120 75.69 
121 61.03 
122 60.71 
125 41.87 
124 70.98 
125 32.64 
126 52.24 
127 69.25 
A.17.3 Average Expected Cy 
of System Base 
System Base Average Expected Cycle Length 
8 67.65 
15 65.44 
28 63.28 
58 61.16 
42 65.59 
55 64.16 
64 66.41 
79 61.91 
85. 66.61 
90 63.12 
98 64.11 
104 64.17 
117 65.81 
124 61.51 
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Appendix 18 
Public_Key_Distribution Program L i s t i n g 
A 18.1 Main Program 
PKD 
L I 
L4 
L3 
L2 
Kl 
LDA C051 
STA C0A8 
LDA @ 66 
STA PA 
LDA C0A6 
AND @ 01 
BEQ L I 
JMP NOLINK 
LDA @ 6E 
STA GOAD 
LDA @ 14 
STA C0A4 
JSR BAUD 
LDA COAA 
JSR TRANS 
LDA C0A6 
AND ® 05 
BNE L5 
JTdP RX 
LDA COOO 
BPL L4 
JSR PD6A 
LDA @ 53 
STA GOAD 
INX 
LDY @ 00 
CPX @ 00 
BEQ L5 
LDA COAB 
BPL Kl 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND ® 01 
Comments 
Displays NOLINK E r r o r 
Sets Baud Rate 
Displays * I f wishing to Transmit 
enter your user ID and the 
re c e i v e r ' s user ID*. 
Ar 114 
K2 
K5 
BEQ Kl 
LBA 0200,^ 
STA CO AC 
INY 
DEX 
J14P L2 
LDA 0202 
AND @ OP 
ASL 
ASL 
ASL 
ASL 
STA P9 
LDA @ 16 
STA CO AD 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 02 
BEQ K2 
LDA COAA 
CMP 0202 
BEQ K3 
JMP U 
LDA @ 35 
STA GOAD 
JSR SUBS 
JSR INPUT] 
JSR SUB9 
JSR EXP 
JSR SUBIO 
JSR SUBll 
Stores the public key of B, y^, 
i n 6100 to 610P 
Displays 'Input Secret Key' 
Stores the se c r e t key, x^, i n 
6200 to 620P. 
Porms K^B = ( ^ 3 ) i n GP(2**127) 
and c l e a r s 6200 to 620P. . 
stored i n 6OOO to 6OOP. 
Stores the common key i n the 
KEY Re g i s t e r of the Data Security 
Device, 
Stores the s e s s i o n key, Kg, 67OO 
to 6707 i n the DATA Register of 
the Data Security Device. 
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L 2 2 
L 2 5 
L 2 4 
JSR SUB12 Forms E g ^ (Kg) and transmits i t 
to the r e c e i v e r B. 
INC 6 7 0 0 
JSR STJBll Forms E ^ ^ (K^ + 1 ) for 
• authentication purposes and stores 
JSR STJBI3 i t i n 6 7 1 0 to 6 7 I P 
LDY @ 0 0 
LDA @ 16 
STA COAD 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 0 2 
BEQ L 2 2 
LDA COAA 
STA 6720,Y 
INY 
CPY @ 08 
BEQ L 2 3 
JMP L 2 2 
CPY @ 00 
BEQ L 2 4 
LDA 6720,Y V e r i f y received E K ^ ^ (Kg +l) 
CMP 6710,Y 
BNE L 2 5 
DEY 
JMP L 2 3 
JSR S U B I 4 Load Kg into KEY Re g i s t e r of 
JSR SUBIO Data Secixrity Device 
JSR S U B I 5 Clear a l l temporary memory loca t i o n s 
Jump to Block Encryption or 
Stream cipher Feedback or 
Cipher Block Chaining Program 
for DES encrypted data conmiunication 
RX 
Rl 
LDA @ 16 
STA COAD 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 0 2 
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T3 
T2 
T l 
R2 
BEQ Rl 
LDA COAA 
AND @ OF 
ASL 
ASL 
ASL 
ASL 
STA F 9 
LDX @ 0 2 
CPX @ 0 0 
BEQ T l 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 0 2 
BEQ T2 
LDA COAA 
STA PD 
DEX 
JKP T3 
LDA 53 
STA GOAD 
JSR INPUT] 
JSR SUB9 
LDA COAB 
BPL R2 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND @ 01 
BEQ R2 
LDA PD 
STA COAC 
JSR STJB8 
JSR EXP 
LDA @ 16 
STA CO AD 
LDA COAA 
Stores the se c r e t key of B, i n 
6 2 0 0 to 6 2 0 F . 
Stores the public key of A, y^, i n 
6 1 0 0 to 6 1 0 F . 
Forms * ^ 1 2 7 ) 
and stores i t i n 6 0 0 0 to 600P. 
A- 117 
R6 
R4 
R5 
R9 
R8 
LDY ® 00 
CPY @ 08 
BEQ R5 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND ® 02 
BEQ R4 
LDA COAA 
STA 6700,Y 
INY 
JMP R6 
LDA @ OE 
STA COAl 
JSR STJBIO 
JSR STJBll 
JSR SUB15 
Stores the common key K ^ i n the 
KEY R e g i s t e r of the Data Security Device 
Stores the received encrypted se s s i o n 
key ^ i n the DATA Reg i s t e r of the 
Data S e c u r i t y Device. 
Decrypted i s stored i n 67IO 
to 6 7 I P . 
LDY @ 00 
GPY ® 08 
BEQ R8 
LDA 6710,Y 
EOR 6008,Y 
STA 6700,Y 
INY 
JMP R9 
LDA ® 35 
STA COAD 
INC 6700 
LDA ® 06 
STA COAl 
JSR SUBll Encrypts Kg.+1 using K ^ and 
JSR STJB12 transmits the cipher to the sender 
JSR SUBI4 Load the session key ^  into the 
LDA @ 00 KEY R e g i s t e r of the Data Security 
STA COAl Device. 
JSR STJBIO 
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JSR STTBI5 C l e a r a l l temporary memory 
lo c a t i o n s 
J\imp to Block Encryption 
or Cipher Feedback program 
for encrypted data communication 
A 18.2 Subroutines 
L i s t i n g s of some important subroutines used by the 
main program are given below. 
SUB8 
SUB9 
• • LDY @ 00 
S2 CPY @ 10 
BEQ SI 
LDA (F9),Y 
STA 6100,Y 
STA 6500,Y 
INY 
JMP S2 
SI RTS 
• • LDY @ 00 
S4 CPY ® 10 
BEQ S3 
JSR FDOC 
STA 6200,Y 
JSR FDFO 
LDA 4E 
STA 6700,Y 
LDA @ 00 
STA 6000,Y 
STA 6400,Y 
INY 
JMP S4 
S3 LDA @ 01 
STA 6OOF 
S6 CPY @ 00 
BEQ S5 
LDA @ 8 8 
Comments 
Stores the public key i n memory 
lo c a t i o n s 6IOO to 6IOP eind i n 
6500 to 65OF 
Stores the secret key i n memory 
lo c a t i o n s 6200 to 620F 
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SUBIO 
SUBll 
JSR FDPO 
DEY 
JMP S6 
S5 JSR FD8B 
RTS 
LDA @ 06 Stores the common key i n 
STA COAl the KEY R e g i s t e r o f the Data 
LDA C0A3 S e c u r i t y Device. 
AND @ 10 
BNE S7 
JMP PF2D 
S7 LDY @ 00 
S9 CFY @ 08 
BEQ S8 
LDA 6000,Y 
JSR PARITY CHECK 
LDA PB 
STA COAO 
LDA C0A5 
AND @ 20 
BEQ SIO 
JMP FP2D 
SIO INY 
JMP S9 
S8 RTS -
• • LDY @ 00 Encrypts K +1 under the s 
CPY @ 08 key K ^ u s i n g the DES 
BEQ S l l B l ock E n c r y p t i o n mode 
LDA C0A5 
AlTD @ 40 
BNE S12 
JMP PP2D 
S12 LDA 6700,Y 
EOR 6008,Y 
STA COAO 
JMP S13 
S l l RTS 
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STO13 
S17 
Sl6 
LDY @ 00 
CFY @ 08 
BEQ SI5 
SI 5 
LDA 
BPL 
LDA 
STA 
INY 
JMP 
RTS 
C0A5 
Sl6 
C0A2 
6710,Y 
SI7 
Stores the encrypted ^ +1 under 
the key i n memory l o c a t i o n s 
6710 t o 67IF. 
SUBI4 
S22 
SUBI5 
S25 
S24 
STJB12 
S25 
SIB 
SI9 
DEC 6700 Stores t h e session key i n the 
LDY @ 00 memory l o c a t i o n s 6OOO t o 6OOP 
CPY @ 08 which i s then t r a n s f e r r e d t o the 
BEQ S23 KEY R e g i s t e r of the Data S e c u r i t y 
Device. 
LDA 6700,Y 
STA 6000,Y 
INY 
JMP S22 
RTS 
LDY @ 00 Clears a l l temporary memory 
CPY @ 10 l o c a t i o n s used i n t h i s PKD program 
BEQ S25 
LDA @ 00 
STA 6200,Y 
STA 6700,Y 
STA 6710,Y 
STA 6720,Y 
STA 6000,Y 
INY 
JMP S24 
RTS 
LDY @ 00 Used t o encrypt e i t h e r under 
CPY @ 08 ^AB ^s"^^ "^^^"^ ^AB "^ ^^ "^ ^ 
BEQ S21 i s t h en t r a n s m i t t e d t o the o t h e r 
LDA COAB end. 
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BPL SI9 
LDA COAB 
JSR DELAY 
AND ® 01 
BEQ S19 
520 LDA C0A5 
BPL S20 
LDA C0A2 
STA COAC 
INC 
JMP S18 
521 RTS 
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Appendix 19 
D e t e r m i n a t i o n o f A Normal Basis Generator in_GF(2 ^ ^  12?) 
(FIN5NORBAS._F77l 
C 
C This program s e l e c t s elements o f the form v = x * * IL L + 1 
c over GF (2 * * 127) where ILL v a r i e s from 1 t o 126 and 
C computes the conjugates v * * 2 , v * * 4 , . . . , v * * ( 2 * * 
C (127-1))over GF(2). A l l o p e r a t i o n s are done modulo 
C the i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial x * * 127 + x + 1. Then i t 
C determines whether these 127 conjugates are l i n e a r l y 
C independent "by c a l l i n g the program DETMOD. F77 (Appendix 12). 
C DETMOD- F77 f i n d s the determinant o f the 127 x 127 m a t r i x 
C formed "by the 127 conjxigates. I f the determinant i s not 
C equal t o zero, then the conjugates form a normal b a s i s 
C over GF (2 ^  * 127). 
INTEGER TmP{l27), B(127, 127), V ( l 2 7 ) , C(l27) 
ILL = 1 
C Choose an element over GF (2 * * 127) o f the form 
C X ^  * ILL + 1 
42 DO 1 I = 1, 127 
1 V ( I ) = 0 
V ( I L L ) = 1 
V (1) = 1 
C Compute the 127 conjugates and form the m a t r i x B 
I J 1 
DO 6 I L = 1, 127 
B ( I J , I L ) = V ( I L ) 
6 CONTIITOE 
I J = I J +1 
100 1 = 1 
C ( 1 ) = V ( l ) 
DO 2 1 = 1,65 
J = 64 + I 
K = i + 1 
JJ = 2 * I 
KK = 2 * I + 1 
C (JJ) = V(J) 
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L = V(K) + V(J) 
C (KK) = MOD (L,2) 
2 CONTINUE 
DO 3 IK = 1, 127 
V ( I K ) = C ( I K ) 
B ( I J , IK) = C(IK) 
3 CONTINUE 
I J = I J + 1 
I F (IJ.EQ.128) GO TO 110 
GO TO 100 
e Find the determinant o f the m a t r i x B u s i n g DETMOD. P77 
CALL DETMOD ( B , I D E T ) 
WRITE (1,210) I L L , I D E T 
210 FORMAT ( i X , 'DET = », 110, 2X, 'ILL = ', 15) 
C I f the m a t r i x B i s s i n g u l a r over G F ( 2 ) , increment I L L 
C by one and repeat the procedure u n t i l ILL = 128. I f the 
C m a t r i x B i s n o n - s i n g u l a r s t o p . 
I F (IDET. EQ. 0) GO TO 810 
STOP 
810 I L L = I L L + 1 
I F (ILL.EQ*128) GO TO 221 
GO TO 42 
221 STOP 
END 
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M u l t i p l i e r _ M a t r i x Program _(M-MATRIX^F772 
C This program c a l c u l a t e s the M-matrix r e q u i r e d f o r implementing 
C m u l t i p l i c a t i o n over GF (2 * * N) u s i n g the normal b a s i s 
C generated by the program FINDNORBAS. F77- Here N = 127. 
INTEGER B(127, 127), TT(127), V(127), Z ( 1 2 7 ) , X(127, 127), 
+ S(8128, 127), INV(127, 127), X l ( l 2 7 , 127), 
+ FLAG, TEMP(127), T l , T2, T3, T. 
COMMON/Bl/B 
C0MM0N/B3/S 
C0MM0N/B6/1NV 
C0MM0N/B7/U/V/Z/TEMP 
C0MM0N/B13/X 
C0MM0N/B14/X1 
N = 127 
Nl = N + 1 
N3 = N - 1 
N2 = 8128 
e Read the m a t r i x B which c o n t a i n s the 127 conjugates which 
e form the normal basis m a t r i x 
READ (5, *) ( ( B ( I , J ) , J = 1,N), I = 1,N) 
C Read the i n v e r s e o f m a t r i x B, INV. 
READ (5, *) ( ( 1 N V ( I , J ) , J = 1,N), I = 1,N) 
C Form the composite m a t r i x by m u l t i p l y i n g the 127 conjugates 
C arranged i n a column v e c t o r w i t h those arranged i n a row 
C v e c t o r . Then reduce every element o f t h i s composite m a t r i x 
C modulo X ^ * 127 + X + 1. 
I I = 1 
IP = 1 
514 I = IP 
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DO 400 J = 1, N 
U ( J ) = B ( I , J ) 
TEMP(J) = B ( I , J ) 
400 CONTINUE 
I = 1 + 1 
DO 401 J = 1,N 
- S ( I I , J ) = B ( I , J ) 
401 CONTINUE 
512 DO 402 J = 1, N 
V(J) = B ( I , J ) 
402 CONTINUE 
DO 202 lA = 1,N 
Z ( I A ) = 0 
202 CONTINUE 
DO 220 lA = 1,N 
IP ( V ( I A ) . E Q . O ) GO TO 210 
DO 204 IB = 1, N 
IZ = Z ( I B ) + U(IB) 
Z ( I B ) = MOD ( I Z , 2 ) 
204 CONTINUE 
210 T l = U(127) 
T2 = U ( l ) 
T3 = T l + T2 
T = MOD (T3,2) 
DO 250 IC = 1, 125 
ID = 128 - IC 
IE = ID - 1 
U ( I D ) = U(IE) 
230 CONTINUE 
U(2) = T 
U ( l ) = T l 
220 CONTINUE 
DO 221 JJ = 1,N 
U(JJ) = TEMP(JJ) 
221 CONTINUE 
I I = I I + 1 
DO 403 J = 1,N 
S ( I I , J ) = Z ( J ) 
403 CONTINUE 
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I = 1 + 1 
IP (I.EQ.NI) GO TO 511 
GO TO 512 
511 . IP = IP + 1 
IP (IP.EQ.N) GO TO 515 
I I = I I + 1 
GO TO 514 
513 I I = I I + 1 
DO 404 J = 1, N 
S ( I I , J ) = B(1,J) 
404 CONTINUE 
C Convert every element o f the composite m a t r i x S from 
C c a n o n i c a l b a s i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o normal' b a s i s 
e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n u s i n g . INV m a t r i x . 
DO 405 I = 1, N2 
DO 406 J = 1,N 
U(J) = S ( I , J ) 
406 CONTINUE 
DO 407 I I = 1,N 
IT = 0 
DO 408 J = 1,N 
IT = IT + U(J) * 1N V ( J , I I ) 
IT = MOD ( I T , 2 ) 
408 CONTINUE 
V ( l l ) = IT 
407 CONTINUE 
DO 409 J = 1,N 
S ( I , J ) = V(J) 
409 CONTINUE 
405 . CONTINUE 
e Porm the M-Matrix from the composite m a t r i x by choosing 
C the c o e f f i c i e n t o f the conjugate v. 
I = 1 
J = 1 
I I = 1 
612 X ( I , J ) = S ( I I , 1 ) 
X 1 ( I , J ) = S ( I I , 2 ) 
1 = 1 + 1 
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I I = I I + 1 
I F (I.EQ.NI) GO TO 611 
GO TO 612 
611 J = J + 1 
I = J 
I F (J.EQ.NI) GO TO 613 
GO TO 612 
613 DO 410 I = 1,N 
DO 410 J = 1,N 
X ( I , J ) = X ( J , I ) 
X I ( I , J ) = XI ( J , I ) 
410 CONTINUE 
WRITE (6,316) 
316 FORMAT ( I X , * THE M-MATRIX IS* ) 
DO 6 IKK = 1, N 
WRITE (6,315) ( X ( I K K , J J J ) , JJJ = 1,N 
315 FORMAT ( I X , 11 (14, 2X)) 
6 CONTINUE 
C Check whether the M-matrix i s c o r r e c t by r o t a t i n g the 
e rows one p o s i t i o n downward and then s h i f t i n g the rows 
C one p o s i t i o n r i g h t and then comparing t h i s M-matrix w i t h 
C the M-matrix formed by choosing the c o e f f i c i e n t o f 
C conjugate v * * 2. 
DO 411 J = 1, N 
TEMP ( J ) = X(N,J) 
411 CONTINUE 
DO 412 I = 1, N3 
I I = Nl - 1 
I I I = 1 1 - 1 
DO 412 J = 1, N 
X( I 1 , J ) = X ( I I 1 , J ) 
412 CONTINUE 
DO 413 J = 1,N 
X(1,J) = TEMP(J) 
413 CONTINUE 
DO 414 I = 1,N 
TEMP ( I ) = X(I,N) 
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414 CONTINUE 
DO 415 J = 1, N3 
J l = 128 - J 
J J l = J l - 1 
DO 415 I = 1, N 
X ( I , J 1 ) = X ( I , J J 1 ) 
415 CONTINUE 
DO 416 I = 1, N 
X (1,1) = TEMP ( I ) 
416 CONTINUE 
DO 417 I = 1, N 
DO 417 J = 1, N 
IP ( X ( I , J ) . E Q . X 1 ( I , J ) ) GO TO 614 
GO TO 615 
614 FLAG = 1 
417 CONTINUE 
WRITE (6,310) FLAG 
510 FORMAT ( I X , 'MATCHING OK; M-MATRIX CORRECT*, 15) 
STOP 
615 WRITE (6,311) I , J 
311 FORMAT ( I X , 'NON MATCHING; M-MATRIX WRONG*, 
I5,2X,I5) 
STOP 
END 
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M u l t i p l i e r _ I m p l e m e n t a t i o n u s i n g T7Matrix_App.r6ac^ (T3MATEIX. .F77) 
c This program c a l c u l a t e s the number o f EX-OR gates r e q u i r e d t o 
C implement the T-matrix. I t reads the M m a t r i x as i n p u t and 
e forms the T-matrix. Then i t determines the number o f * l ' s i n 
C each row o f the T-matrix, the number o f EX-OR gates r e q u i r e d 
C f o r each row and the t o t a l nximber o f EX-OR gates r e q u i r e d f o r 
C the whole T-matrix. 
INTEGER B(127,127), COUNT, COTJITTI, T0TAL(127), STm(l27), 
+ NUM, RCOUNT, Z, REM , U C 1Z7 ,127 ) 
REAL ANS 
N = 127 
C Read the M m a t r i x 
READ (5,*) ( ( B ( I , J ) , J = 1, N). I = 1, N) 
C Form the U-matrix from the M-matrix 
DO 10 I I = 1, N 
DO 10 JJ = 1, N 
10 U ( I I , J J ) = 0 
DO 2 I = 1, N 
IF (I.EQ.N) GO TO 5 
D0 4 J = I + 1 , N 
U ( I , J ) = B ( I , J ) 
4 CONTINUE 
3 IP = 1 
2 CONTINUE 
C Count the number o f * l ' s i n each row and s t o r e i t i n 
C TOTAL a r r a y . 
DO 500 I = 1, N 
TOTAL ( I ) = 0 
DO 401 J = 1, N 
I F ( U ( l , J ) . E Q . l ) GO TO 402 
GO TO 405 
402 TOTAL ( I ) = TOTAL ( l ) + 1 
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403 IP = 1 
401 CONTINUE 
500 CONTINUE 
e CoTint the number o f EX-OR gates r e q u i r e d , NUM, f o r each row 
C and s t o r e i t i n SUM a r r a y . 
DO 400 I = 1, N 
NUM = 0 
RCOUNT = 0 
COUNTl = TOTAL ( l ) 
IP (COUNTl.EQ.l) GO TO 600 
IP (COUNTl.EQ.O) GO TO 610 
GO TO 201 
600 NUM = 1 
GO TO 601 
610 NUM = 0 
GO TO 601 
201 ANS = COUNTl/2.0 
COUNT = ABS (ANS) 
REM = COUNTl-COUNT *2.0 
RCOUNT = RCOUNT + REM . 
NUM = NUM + COUNT 
IP (COUNT.EQ.l) GO TO 200 
COUNTl = COUNT 
GO TO 201 
200 IP (RCOUNT.EQ.l) GO TO 202 
IP (RCOUNT.EQ.O) GO TO 202 
IP (RCOUNT. GT. 1) GO TO 203 
STOP 
203 COUNTl = RCOUNT + 1 
RCOUNT = 0 
GO TO 201 
202 NUM = NUM + RCOUNT 
601 SUM(I) = NUM 
400 CONTINUE 
C W r i t e the number o f EX-OR gates r e q u i r e d f o r each row 
WRITE (6,460) (SUM(JJ), JJ = 1, N) 
460 FORMAT ( I X , 9(16, 2X) 
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C Calculate the t o t a l number of EX-OR gates for the whole 
C M matrix and pri n t the r e s u l t . 
Z = 0 
DO 450 I I = 1, N 
Z = Z + SUM ( I I ) 
450 CONTINUE 
WRITE ( 6 , 4 6 l)Z 
461 FORMAT (IX, IIO) 
STOP 
END 
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Appendix 23 
Exclusive-or Gate Coxnit Program ( E X O R N O ^ F ? ? } 
C This program coimts the n\imber of EX-OR gates required to 
C implement the M matrix without any optimisation. I t reads 
C the M matrix as input and outputs the t o t a l nuinher of * l * s 
C i n each row of the M matrix, the number of EX-OR gates 
C required for each row and the t o t a l number of EX-OR gates 
C for the whole M matrix. 
INTEGER B ( 1 2 7 , 1 2 7 ) , COUNT, C O t m T l , T O T A L ( l 2 7 ) , 
+ STJM(127), NUM, RCOUKT, Z , REM 
REAL ANS 
127 
e Read the M matrix 
READ ( 5 , *) ( ( B ( I , J ) , J = 1, N), I = 1, N) 
fi Cotint the number of * l ' s i n each row and store i t i n TOTAL 
C array. 
DO 500 I = 1, N 
TOTAL ( I ) = 0 
DO 401 J = 1 , N 
IP ( B ( I , J ) . E Q . 1 ) GO TO 402 
GO TO 405 
402 TOTAL ( I ) = TOTAL ( l ) + 1 
403 IP = 1 
401 CONTINTTE ' 
500 CONTINUE 
C Count the number of EX-OR gates required, NUM, f o r each 
C row.and store i t i n SUM array. 
DO 400 I = 1, N 
NUM = 0 
RCOUNT = 0 
COUNTl = TOTAL ( l ) 
I F (COUNTl.EQ.l) GO TO 600 
GO TO 201 
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600 NTJM = 1 
GO TO 601 
201 ANS = COTOTl /2 ,0 
COUNT = ABS (ANS) 
REM = COMTl-COmiT ^ 2 . 0 
RCOITNT = RCOTTNT + REM 
NTJM = NTIM + COUNT 
I F (COUNT.EQ.l) GO TO 200 
COUNTl = COUNT 
GO TO 201 
200 I P (RCOUNT.EQ.l) GO TO 202 
I F (RCOUNT.EQ.O) GO TO 202 
I F (RCOUNT.GT.l) GO TO 203 
STOP 
205 COUNTl = RCOUNT + 1 
RCOUNT = 0 
GO TO 201 
202 NUM = NUM + RCOUNT 
601 SUM ( I ) = NUM 
400 CONTINUE 
C Write the number of EX-OR gates required for each row 
WRITE ( 6 , 4 6 0 ) (SUM(JJ), J J = 1 , N) 
460 FORMAT (IX, 9 ( 1 6 , 2X)) 
C Calculate the t o t a l number of EX-OR gates for the whole 
C M matrix and p r i n t the r e s u l t . 
Z = 0 
DO 450 I I = 1, N 
Z = Z + SUM ( I I ) 
450 CONTINUE 
WRITE ( 6 , 4 6 1 ) Z 
461 FORMAT (IX, 110) 
STOP 
END 
A-138 
Appendix 24 
Inverse Matrix over GF_(2)_Program_ _(INVM0D. F 7 7 ) 
C This program c a l c u l a t e s the inverse of a given NxN matrix 
C over GF (2 ) 
INTEGER B ( 1 2 7 , 2 5 4 ) , TEMP ( 2 5 4 ) , XM, X, XM2, XM5, 
XM4, XM5, Y, XM6, XM7, XM8, NX, NY, LZ 
N = 127 
READ ( 1 , ^) ( ( B ( I , J ) , J = 1, N). I = 1, N) 
1 = 1 
NX = N + 1 
NY = 2 N 
C Form the i d e n t i t y matrix i n columns NX to NY and rows • 
C 1 to N 
DO 81 IK = 1, N 
DO 81 I J = NX, NY 
B (IK, I J ) = 0 
81 CONTINUE 
DO 80 J = NX, NY 
B ( I , J ) = 1 
1 = 1 + 1 
80 CONTINUE 
C Compute the inverse matrix by performing elementary row 
C operations and store the inverse i n colTimns NX to NY and 
C rows 1 to N 
L = 1 
K = 2 
70 L I = L 
XM = B ( L , L ) 
XM = ABS (XM) 
XM = MOD (XM,2) 
I F (XM.EQ.O) GO TO 215 
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214 DO 95 J = L , NY 
XM2 = B ( L , J ) 
XM2 = ABS (XM2) 
XM2 = MOD (XM2,2) 
XM2 = XM2/XM 
95 CONTINUE 
DO 141 I = K,N 
X = B ( I , L ) 
X = ABS ( X ) 
X = MOD ( X , 2 ) 
I F (X.EQ.O) GO TO 141 
DO 140 J = L , NY 
XM3 = B ( I , J ) 
XM4 = B ( L , J ) 
XM3 = ABS (XM5) 
XM4 = ABS (XM4) 
XM3 = MOD (XM5,2) 
XM4 = MOD ( X M 4 , 2 ) 
• B ( I , J ) = XM3 - XM4 * X 
I F ( B ( I , J ) . E Q . - 1 ) B ( I , J ) =1 
140 CONTINUE 
141 CONTINUE 
L = L + 1 
K = K + 1 
I F ( L - N ) 70 , 190 , 190 
XM = B ( L , L ) 
XM = ABS (XM) 
XM = MOD (XM , 2 ) 
DO 195 J = L , NY 
XM6 = B ( L , J ) 
XM6 = ABS ( X M 6 ) 
XM6 = MOD ( X M 6 , 2 ) 
XM6 = XM6/XM 
195 CONTINUE 
L = N 
235 LZ = L -1 
DO 291 K = 1, LZ 
I = L - K 
Y = B ( I , L ) 
Y = ABS ( Y ) 
A - 1 4 0 
Y = MOD (Y,2) 
I F (Y.EQ.O) GO TO 291 
DO 290 J = L, NY 
XM7 = B ( I , J ) 
XM7 = ABS (XM7) 
XM7 = MOD (XM7,2) 
XM8 = B(L,J) 
XM8 = ABS (XM8,2) 
B ( I , J ) = XM7 - XM8 * Y 
I F (B(I,J).EQ.- 1) B ( I , J ) = 1 
290 CONTINUE 
291 CONTINUE 
L = L - 1 
I F ( L - l ) 320, 320 , 235 
320 WRITE ( 1 , 3 3 0 ) 
330 FORMAT (IX, 'TEE INVERSE MATRIX I S ' ) 
WRITE ( 1 , 3 3 1 ) ( B ( I I , J ) , J = NX, NY) 
331 FORMAT (IX, 11 ( 1 5 , 2X)) 
CONTINUE 
STOP 
215 L I = L I + 1 
Nl = N + 1 
I F (ra-EQ.Nl) GO TO 212 
XM = B(L1,L) 
XM = ABS (XM) 
XM = MOD (XM,2) 
I F (XM.EQ.O) GO TO 215 
DO 96 J = L, NY 
TEMP ( J ) = B(L , J ) 
B(L,J) = B(L1,J) 
B ( L I , J ) = TEMP ( j ) 
96 CONTINUE 
GO TO 214 
212 WRITE (1,815) 
8 I 5 FORMAT (IX,/THE MATRIX I S SINGULAR') 
STOP 
END 
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Matrix based Public Key D i s t r i b u t i o n Program (PKDEXT. P ? ? ) 
Q This program i s used to design a matrix based P u b l i c 
C key d i s t r i b u t i o n system based on exponentiation over GF(p) 
C where p i s a prime. 
C This program e s s e n t i a l l y c o n s i s t s of a number of c a l l s to 
C d i f f e r e n t subroutines (programs) given i n the previous 
C appendices and hence only the main steps are given here. 
INTEGER B l ( 2 , 2 ) , B 2 ( 3 , 3 ) , X ( 5 , 5 ) , XINV ( 5 , 5 ) , 
+ M ( 5 , 5 ) , A ( 5 , 5 ) 
p = 5 
C Input the companion matrix B l and check the order of B l 
C using MATEXP. F ? ? . 
READ (1,*) ( ( B 1 ( I , J ) , J = 1 , 2 ) , I = 1 , 2 ) 
CALL MATEXP. F77 
C Input the companion matrix B2 and check the order of B2 
C using MATEXP. F77 
READ (1,^) ( ( B 2 ( I , J ) , J = 1 , 3 ) , I = 1 , 3 ) 
CALL MATEXP. F77 
C Select an a r b i t a r y X matrix and fi n d the determinant 
C of X to see i f i t i s non-singular modulo p using DETMOD.F77 
READ (1, *) ( ( X ( I , J ) , J = 1 , 5 ) , I = 1 , 5 ) 
CALL DETMOD. P77 
C Find the inverse of X using INVMOD.F77 
CALL INVMOD. P77 
C Multiply the X matrix with the composite B l B2 matrix 
C and the XINV matrix using MULPKD. P77 which i s given as 
C a subroutine i n MATEXP. F77. 
CALL MULPKD (X, B l , B2, XINV, A) 
C The A matrix i s therefore the base matrix i n the public 
C key d i s t r i b u t i o n system. The system i s then implemented 
C using MATEXP. F77. 
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Dickson Polynomials hased PK System Program ^DPOLY. P77) 
C This program evaluates the c o e f f i c i e n t s of Dickson 
C polynomials f or GN(x) for given N over Z/m2. The value of N 
C s p e c i f i e d i n t h i s program i s equal to the degree of 
C polynomial plus 1 and the modulus in i s equal to the product 
C of two primes p and q. The program then evaluates the 
C function GN(X) for a l l x, 1 to m-1. 
INTEGER ^ 4 GO(462), G l ( 4 6 2 ) , G 2 ( 4 6 2 ) , H ( 4 6 2 ) 
N = 6 
C Use the recu r s i v e function to evaluate GN(x). 
N3 = N + 1 
Nl = N - 1 
N2 = Nl -1 
IFLAG = 0 
G 0 ( 1 ) = 2 
G 0 ( 2 ) = 0 
G l ( l ) = 0 
Gl ( 2 ) = 1 
DO 1 I I = 3, 
GO ( I I ) = 0 
Gl ( I I ) = 0 
G2 ( I I ) = 0 
CONTINUE 
DO 2 1 = 1 , N2 
DO 3 J = 1, N 
H(J) = Gl ( J ) 
DO 4 J = I f Nl 
K = N5 - J 
L = K - 1 
Gl (K) = Gl (L) 
CONTINUE 
G l ( l ) = 0 
DO 5 J = 1, N 
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12 
13 
G2(J) = G1(J) - G0(J) 
IM = G2(J) 
IP (IM.LT.O) IPLAG = 1 
IN = ABS (IM) 
IT = MOD (IN, 35) 
IP (IPLAG.EQ.l) GO TO 12 
G2 (J) = IT 
GO TO 13 
G2(J) = 35 - IT 
IPLAG = 0 
G1(J) = G2(J) 
G0(J) = H(J) 
CONTINUE 
CONTINUE 
C Evaluate the function f o r IX equal to 1 to 34 
121 
17 
112 
111 
16 
IX = 1 
IZ = 0 
DO 16 I J = 1, N 
J J = G2 (15) 
I F (JJ*EQ.O) GO TO 111 
I J l = I J -1 
lY = 1 
IP (IJI.EQ.O) GO TO 112 
DO 17 I I = 1, I J l 
lY = IX * lY 
lY = MOD ( l Y , 35) 
CONTINUE 
lY = lY * J J 
lY = MOD ( l Y , 35) 
IZ = IZ + lY 
IZ = MOD ( I Z , 35) 
IKE = 1 
CONTINUE 
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18 
120 
WRITE (1, 18) IX, IZ 
FORMAT (IX, 'IX 116, 2X, 'IZ = ', I l 6 ) 
IX = IX + 1 
I F (IX.EQ .35) GO TO 120 
GO TO 121 
STOP 
END 
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P a p e r s P u b l i s h e d / S u b m i t t e d 
Secure comoiurilcatloris 
between microcomputer 
systems 
P W Sanders and V Varadharajan d e s c r i b e a secu r i t y i n t e r f a c e u n i t t ha t uses t h e 
DES t o e n c r y p t sens i t i ve da ta 
A data security communications interface unit has been 
developed to allow data transfer between Apple ter-
minals in either plain or encrypted format under user 
control, fhe unit employs the Data Encryption Stan-
dard algorithm and has a degree of sophistication suffi-
cient to meet most user needs. The unit uses the 6502 
microprocessor to control encryption, decryption and 
communications. In addition to the transfer of encryp-
ted data, the interface also provides a facility for storing 
encrypted program and data files locally in the Apple 
disc sys tem. Further, the encr/ption system has b e e n 
designed to allow storage and retrieval of completely 
encrypted or partly encrypted frames of information on 
the Prestel database. The interface has been tested 
extensively using several DBS modes of operation. 
Keywords: data communications, security, encryption. 
Data Encryption Standard. Preste/ 
Data securi ty has never b e e n more significant than it is 
today, owing to the e x p a n d i n g role of distr ibuted c o m -
putation, distr ibuted databases and t e l e c o m m u n i c a -
tions appl icat ions s u c h as e lectronic mail and 
e lectronic funds transfer. Converg ing c o m p u t e r and 
communica t ions technologies have resul ted in a 
dramatic increase in the v o l u m e and s p e e d of informa-
tion col lect ion a n d distr ibution. Greater information 
transfer in turn impl ies a greater risk of exposure of sen-
sitive or conf ident ia l information to unauthor ized 
users, owing to the ready availability of inexpens ive 
miniature intercept ing dev ices . T h e s e have resul ted in 
Plymouth P o t y t e c h n i c . D r a k e C i r c u s . P l y m o u l h . D e v o n PL4 S A A . U K 
an i n c r e a s e d interest in c o m p u t e r data secur i ty , not 
only in the military and pol i t ical area but a lso in the 
f ield of c o m m e r c e . Th is has mot iva ted r e s e a r c h , par-
ticularly in the art of cryptography, w h i c h forms the 
central t e c h n i q u e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s security. 
This article d e s c r i b e s the des ign of an encrypt ion 
interface unit e m p l o y i n g the Data Encrypt ion St;*.n-
dard^ a d o p t e d by the U S Nat iona l Bureau of S tan-
dards. It has b e e n d e s i g n e d primarily for the A p p l e 
m i c r o c o m p u t e r , w h i c h is c o m m o n l y u s e d as a n 
intelligent terminal in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s networks . T h e 
p u r p o s e of this inter face is threefo ld . 
• It a l lows secure data c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in a point- to-
point configuration. 
• It prov ides a local storage facility in the A p p l e d isc 
system for the e n c r y p t e d program and datafi les. 
• It a l lows storage a n d retr ieval of e n c r y p t e d or 
partly e n c r y p t e d informat ion on the Prestel v iew-
data sys tem. 
SYSTEM DESIGN 
T h e encrypt ion sys tem conf igurat ion for point- to-point 
data c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is s h o w n in Figure ^. T h e c o m -
municat ions link is half dup lex , a l lowing t ransmission 
in either d i rect ion, but n o t s imul taneously , with 
datarates ranging from 50—1 200 bit /s, sui table for 
t ransmiss ion over s t a n d a r d t e l e p h o n e l ines. T h e 
encrypt ion unit is i n c o r p o r a t e d as an in-built feature of 
the terminal , this be ing s u p e r i o r to a s tand-a lone 
arrangement for r e a s o n s of a c c e s s control , s i n c e the 
former t e c h n i q u e greatly r e d u c e s the c h a n c e s of 
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figure 7. Point'to-point system configuration 
detection b e t w e e n the terminal and encrypt ion unit, 
wvhere the text is in plain form. As s h o w n in Figure 1, the 
plain text from the keyboard is encrypted by the inter-
face and the c ipher is transmitted over the standard 
te lephone line via the m o d e m . 
A schemat ic diagram of the encrypt ion interface 
showing different funct ional b locks is s h o w n in Figure 
2. The unit is des igned around the 6 5 0 2 micro-
processor with assoc ia ted random a c c e s s memory 
(RAM) and read only m e m o r y ( R O M ) of the A p p l e sys-
tem. Encrypt ion and decrypt ion of data is carr ied out 
by a large-scale integration d e v i c e using the D E S 
algorithm. Data c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is hand led by a dual 
e n h a n c e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s controller e lement 
( D E U C E ) . This control ler conta ins two i n d e p e n d e n t 
asynchronous receiver / t ransmit ter channe ls and two 
n d e p e n d e n t generators providing possib le transmis-
sion rates up to 19 200 bi t /s . T h e encrypt ion unit c o n -
tains the necessary EIA R S 2 3 2 - c o m p a t i b l e circuits for 
interfacing it to the m o d e m , a n d a P R O M is p rov ided to 
hold the necessary programs for the operat ion of 
the sys tem. 
T h e interface can opera te in th ree different formats; 
plain, encryp ted or a mixture of bo th . T h e users at both 
e n d s of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s link initially c h o o s e a 
datarate from the range of 50-1 2 0 0 bi t /s and then 
se lec t o n e of the three m o d e s . In t h e c a s e of the plain 
m o d e , the data transfer b e t w e e n t h e users wil l b e in 
plain form. If ei ther of the o ther t w o m o d e s is c h o s e n , 
then the- secre t D E S key has to be entered . It is 
a s s u m e d that the part ies c o n c e r n e d have pre-
k n o w l e d g e of the key, a n e c e s s i t y for proper c o m -
munica t ion of the e n c r y p t e d data. Any eight 
a lphanumer icaf characters of t h e k e y b o a r d can b e 
u s e d to form the 64 bit key requ i red for the O E S 
algorithm. It is essent ia l that the k e y shou ld be c h o s e n 
randomly (for e x a m p l e , by s o m e form of random n u m -
ber generator) , so that it may not b e easi ly g u e s s e d by 
any cryptana lysL T h e key is d i s p l a y e d on the V D U to 
verify the cor rec tness of entry but t h e d isplay is e r a s e d 
immedia te ly after the last c h a r a c t e r is input, to avo id 
de tec t ion by others dur ing t h e c o u r s e of c o m m u n i c a -
t ion. M a n y users w o u l d p r o b a b l y use s o m e easy- to -
r e m e m b e r phrase or n u m b e r combina t ion for 
d e v e l o p i n g the key, a n d in s u c h c a s e s the p h r a s e c a n 
be conver ted to a form sui tab le for O E S using a good 
6 5 0 2 
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interface 
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ctrcuil 
Figure 2. Functional block diagram 
246 connputer c o m m u n i c a t i o n s 
'hashing' function. Further minor software changes can 
be made to provide for mult iple D E S key encrypt ion, to 
achieve higher levels of securi ty or to modify facilities. 
W h e n the terminals are set ready to a c c e p t data , the 
user w h o presses a key first gains control of the line, 
and thus will be able to transmit data. A max imum of 
256 bytes of message can be input to the system from 
the keyboard at one t ime. The message is encrypted 
using one of the several D E S m o d e s ment ioned below, 
and then transmitted over the line. If the key is to be 
altered for the next m e s s a g e , the system must be reset. 
Further, data stored in m e m o r y can be encryp ted and 
transmitted in a similar fashion. 
In the case of a mixture of plain and encrypted infor-
mation, the input from the terminal will a lways b e in a 
plain form until a change to the encrypted m o d e is 
initiated by typing a spec ia l character ( C N T R L - A ) . The 
unit is automatical ly returned to the plain format after 
8 characters (64 bit). Alternatively, another specia l 
character ( C N T R L - B ) can be used to return to the plain 
format, but then one must ensure that the C N T R L - B 
charac te rdoes not occur within the e n c i p h e r e d data to 
ensure unambiguous decrypt ion at the receiving end. 
This can be a c h i e v e d by using multiple G N T R L - B 
characters to indicate the end of encrypted text. The 
larger the n u m b e r of s u c h characters, the smal ler the 
probability that they o c c u r in the enc iphered data, and 
the smaller the ambiguity in decrypt ion, but this unfor-
tunately increases the n u m b e r of redundant characters 
in the transmitted data. 
O n e of the requi rements of this mixture format is 
that in a mult iuser network, the plain information must 
only be d e c i p h e r e d correct ly by the user with the right 
key. There may be cases where the encryption algorithm 
transforms a noncontrol character to a control charac-
ter and vice versa. As a control character is not dis-
played by the Apple , this results in a l ine of text with 
parts of it encrypted at the transmitting end not pro-
ducing a line of text at the receiving end w h e n using 
the wrong key. As a certain amount of delay is required 
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Figure 3. Electronic code-book mode 
for specia l control characters s u c h as C N T R L - C (Bell) or 
C N T R L - J ( l ine feed) , this can c a u s e an over-run error at 
the rece iv ing e n d . even in the r e c e p t i o n of plain text 
w h e n using the wrong key. Sof tware has b e e n writ ten 
to o v e r c o m e s u c h si tuat ions. 
Several m o d e s of the Data Encrypt ion Standard 
have b e e n investigated^ using t h e d e v e l o p e d e n c r y p -
tion s y s t e m , namely the e l e c t r o n i c c o d e book ( E C B ) . 
c ipher block changing ( C B C ) a n d stream c ipher f e e d -
back ( C F B ) . 
T h e E C B a l lowed a t ransformat ion of a 64 bit plain 
text word into a c ipher text w o r d of the s a m e length, as 
s h o w n in Figure 3. In this m o d e , the information is 
e n c r y p t e d in integral mul t ip les of 64 bits. T h e last 
b lock is p a d d e d wi th r a n d o m bi ts prior to e n c r y p t i o n to 
build it up to 64 bits. Dur ing d e c r y p t i o n , the padd ing is 
taken into account so that the r a n d o m bits are d iscar -
d e d after decrypt ion . A crit ical w e a k n e s s of this m o d e 
(Figure 4 ) ' is that a given plain text a lways p r o d u c e s the 
s a m e c ipher text under the s a m e key. Thus , the c o m -
promise of the plain text under ly ing any c ipher text 
b lock results in the c o m p r o m i s e of all repet i t ions of 
this s a m e text for the r e m a i n d e r of the cryptographic 
per iod. This p rob lem is of ten referred to as the c o d e -
book analysis prob lem. 
In the C B C m o d e , a plain text block is e x c l u s i v e -
ored with the previous c i p h e r text block, prior to 
encrypt ion , as s h o w n in Figure 5. In the first encrypt ion 
c y c l e , the plain text b l o c k is exc lus ive -ored wi th a 
block of p s e u d o r a n d o m bits ca l led the init ial ization 
vector ( IV) . Mathemat ica l ly , the s c h e m e can b e 
e x p r e s s e d as follows: 
if the /'^ plain text and c i p h e r text b locks are x(/) a n d 
y(0 
a n d the init ial ization a n d f e e d b a c k vec tors are U ( T ) . 
U (2 ) . . . U(n - 1) 
w h e r e U(1) = 2 = init ial izat ion vector 
U(/) = y ( / - 1) 
then the e n c i p h e r m e n t and d e c i p h e r m e n t b e c o m e 
y(/) = f j x ( / ) + y(/ - 1)1 i" > 7 
x(/) = K"iyii) y(' - D ) ' > i 
w h e r e x ( 0 ) = y ( 0 ) - 7 , f d e f i n e s the cryptographic 
funct ion and the subscr ipt des ignates the part icular 
key. 
The security of this m o d e d e p e n d s , amongst other 
factors, upon the m a n a g e m e n t of the init ial ization v e c -
tor. C B C reproduces the s a m e c ipher text w h e r e v e r the 
s a m e plain text is e n c r y p t e d under a fixed key and 
initialization vector. In the E C B m o d e , the c ipher text 
repeti t ion is found to o c c u r a t b lock level , w h e r e a s in 
the C B C m o d e the c ipher text repetit ion is at m e s s a g e 
level . The C B C m o d e not o n l y r e d u c e s the c o d e - b o o k 
analysis prob lem but also p rov ides a l imited error 
ex tens ion character ist ic w h i c h is va luable in protect ing 
•The ASCII character set has been extended using Hershey* charac-
ters to indicate all 25b po»sibie codes produced by encipherment. 
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Figure 4. Examples of encrypted text 
| a Plaintext: b e / e c t r o n / c c o d e b o o k ; c c i p h e r 6/ocik chaining; d cipher block chaining with plaintext feedback; e s t r e a m cipher feedback: 
f stream cipher feedback with pfaintext feedback 
against fradulent data alterat ion. O n e or more errors in 
a single c ipher text b lock affects the decrypt ion of two 
blocks, namely the b lock in w h i c h the error o c c u r s and 
the s u c c e e d i n g bjock, but they synchron ize thereafter 
(see Figure 6 ) . This se l f -synchroniz ing s c h e m e is par-
ticularly suitable w h e n no ise is present on the c o m -
municat ions l ines. 
To provide for error propagation throughout the 
message, a slight variation of the C B C t e c h n i q u e is 
i m p l e m e n t e d . Here the input plain text is modi f ied by 
making it a funct ion of both the previous plain text and 
the c ipher text b locks prior to encrypt ion , as s h o w n in 
Figure 7. That is 
y ( / ) 
xO) 
where 
UO) 
= ffc(x(/) + U(i)J » > 1 
fr'[y(') + u(/)] /> 1 
^ X (/ - 1 ) + y ( / - 1) ( > 1 
This s c h e m e represents a genera l b lock c ipher , and if 
any port ion of the c ipher b e c o m e s garbled, the d e c r y p -
tion of alt s u b s e q u e n t b locks unti l the e n d of the 
message is garbled (Figure 6) . T h i s t e c h n i q u e is u s e d 
for the p u r p o s e of m e s s a g e authent ica t ion . 
W h i l e the C B C t e c h n i q u e o v e r c o m e s the c o d e -
book analysis p r o b l e m , the p r o b l e m of padd ing of the 
last b lock still remains. A s t r e a m c ipher m o d e is 
therefore i m p l e m e n t e d to c o p e with this p rob lem. 
Wi th this t echn ique , the D E S is u s e d as a random n u m -
ber generator. T h e output of t h e D E S is exc lus ive -o red 
with plain text to form the c i p h e r t e x t The decryp t ion 
process opera tes the s a m e way as encrypt ion , wTfh the 
exact p s e u d o r a n d o m st ream of encrypt ing bits be ing 
generated. A n 8 bit C F B i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is s h o w n in 
Figure 8, al though any n u m b e r of the 64 bits can b e 
used . Wi th this stream c i p h e r t e c h n i q u e , the plain text 
is encryp ted character by c h a r a c t e r and not in b locks. 
A n error in the c ipher text c h a r a c t e r affects not on ly the 
decrypt ion of the garbled c i p h e r text but a lso the eight 
s u c c e e d i n g characters until the bit error, is shi f ted out 
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Rom teit (I) 
I Cipher leit (I) I-
i 
DES decrypt 
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I 
f i 
DES encrypt OES encrypt 
1 
t i 
Cipner test (1) C'ltfm teit (2) 
Cipher text (2) I 
i 
I Output text (2) 
Plain text 121 
Figure 5. Cipher block chaining mode 
of the C F B input b lock (Figure 6) . Again this is a self-
synchron iz ing s c h e m e . 
To provide for error propagat ion, a slight variation of 
this t e c h n i q u e has a lso b e e n i m p l e m e n t e d by provid-
ing a feedback from the init ial izat ion vector, in addi -
tion to the f e e d b a c k from the c i p h e r text as s h o w n in 
Figure 9. This s c h e m e represen ts a general stream 
c ipher and corrupt ion of a single bit of c ipher text will 
c a u s e e a c h s u b s e q u e n t bit of r e c o v e r e d plain text to 
be in error (Figure 6 ) . 
T h e encrypt ion s y s t e m c a n a l s o be u s e d to provide 
storage of e n c r y p t e d informat ion locally in the A p p l e 
d isc sys tem. In this c a s e , i n s t e a d of transmitt ing the 
encryp ted information to a n o t h e r user over a c o m -
municat ions l ine, it is s tored in m e m o r y . 
Theoret ica l ly , a n y of the D E S m o d e s d i s c u s s e d 
a b o v e cou ld b e u s e d , but w h e n a file is e n c r y p t e d , 
recovery from an error must b e a f fected with c ipher 
text a lone. If a c ipher ing p r o c e d u r e with error propaga-
tion is u s e d for file secur i ty , s u b s e q u e n t inability to 
read a fraction of the c i p h e r text b e c a u s e of damage 
either to the phys ica l m e d i u m or to the r e c o r d e d bits 
may prevent all the fol lowing c i p h e r text from being 
d e c i p h e r e d . There fore a se l f - synchron iz ing a p p r o a c h 
is des i rab le for file e n c r y p t i o n . This therefore leaves 
the two chain ing m o d e s C B C a n d C F B , e i ther of w h i c h 
could be e m p l o y e d . If c i p h e r f e e d b a c k on 8 bit charac -
ters is used , then the m a x i m u m s p e e d will be o n e 
eighth of the b lock m o d e s p e e d , and h e n c e , the 
D E 
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Figure 6. Error characterist /cs 
a f / e a r o n ; c c o d e b o o k ; b cipher block chaining; c cipher block chaining with plaintext feedback: d stream cipher feedback: e stream 
cipher feedback with plaintext feedback 
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Figure 8, Opher feedback mode 
throughput is correspondingly lower. On the other 
hand, with CBC, the problem of padding exists, since it 
is a block cipher. 
The program performs encryption and decryption of 
either an Applesoft BASIC file or Integer BASIC file, or 
an input datafile from the keyboard. The encrypted file 
is automatically stored on the disc under the file name 
provided by the user. The encrypted file can be loaded 
back from the disc at a later time and decrypted to give 
the original file, provided the same key has been 
used. 
S E C U R I T Y IN P R E S T E L V I E W D A T A S Y S T E M 
The encryption system has been incorporated into the 
I 56 bit Te 
4) 
56 bit ; 8 I 
55 bit ' 8 
Cipher 
DES 
f 
I 56 bit i el 
Discord 
Ploin data Plain dtra 
Figure 9. Stream cipher with cipher text and plain 
text feedback 
Prestel network, allowing transfer of encrypted as well 
as plain information between an Apple microcomputer 
and a Prestel viewdata computer. This allows secure 
storage and retrieval of sensitive information, such as 
bank statements or legal documents. 
The basic unit of information on Prestel is a frame 
which consists of up to a maximum of 960 characters. 
One or more frames are linked together to form a page, 
and these pages of information form the Prestel 
database. A natural choice for encryption would 
therefore be a complete frame, but there may be, 
instances where the encipherment of a seaion of a 
frame, or even a few characters is required. The header 
information at the start of the frame can be used to 
indicate that encipherment has been used on that 
frame. 
As in the case of file security, the two possible 
modes of DES suitable for this application are cipher 
block chaining (CBC) and stream cipher feedback 
(CFB). Since it is required to encrypt parts of a frame 
down to individual characters, only the cipher feed-
back mode, which allows character-by-character 
encryption, can be used. Further, if the CBC mode is 
used, when parts of a frame are encrypted, it is likely to 
require padding for each encrypted part. This in turn 
wilt result in cryptogram extension, and will pose a pro-
blem when storing the enciphered frame on the Prestel 
database, since each frame is limited to a maximum of 
960 characters. 
The encrypted information passes through the Pres-
tel control unit, which rejects any of the control charac-
ters present in the cipher text. There is therefore a 
need to prevent the occurrence of these control 
characters in the encrypted information. That is. the 
data formal is restricted to satisfy the Prestel computer 
protocols. This can be achieved by using 6 bit cipher 
feedback without altering the existing Prestei software. 
The 64 character codes chosen for encipherment are 
0-9, A-Z, a-z, space and period. All other codes are 
transparent and hence bypass encryption. This is. of 
course, a weakness, but work is currently being carried 
out to expand this to a full character and graphics set. 
The output codes are reformed into the same range as 
the input, thus preserving the one-to-one relationship 
between transmission and reception. As we were 
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mainly interested in enciphering alphanumerical 
characters present in the frame, the above set of input 
codes was found to be adequate for the purpose. 
The system is connected to the public switched 
telephone network via a modem in the usual manner. 
The Prestel number is dialled, and when the Prestel 
computer responds by sending a continuous data tone 
of high frequency, the data switch is pressed for the 
modem to take control of the line. The terminal 
becomes ready for data transfer. 
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Figure 70. Prestei page in plain form 
After entering the secret DES key in the normal 
fashion, the user has the choice as to when to set the 
interface into the decryption mode. This enables him 
to decipher only those pages which have some 
enciphered data and to read the other Prestel pages 
in plain form. Only the user with the right key and cor-
rect initialization vector will be able to obtain the 
original plain text. This software implementation 
allows changes in the initialization vector during com-
munication, whereas to change the key, the system 
needs to be reset and restarted. This allows every user 
to have a single secret key, although he may use any 
number of different initialization vectors. 
In the editing mode, the user is able to enter, 
amend, copy and delete encrypted as well as plain 
frames in Prestel. From the user point of view, it is 
essential that the encryption operations must be as 
simple as possible. Start (?) and stop (/) markers are 
used to indicate the beginning and end of enciphered 
data. The CNTRL-A key is used to set the interface unit 
to the encryption state. All subsequent characters 
input are encrypted under the CFB mode. The CNTRL-
B key autornatically returns the interface to the plain 
mode, and so allows encryption of even a single byte of 
data. Examples of completely encrypted and partly 
encrypted frames are shown in Figures 10, 11 and 
12. 
A stand-alone unit working on the same principles 
has also been developed for any computer connected 
between the RS232 interface output and the corres-
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figure 7 7. Encrypted Preste/page figure 72. Partly encrypted Prestel page 
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Figure 73. Communications card providing secure 
storage and transmission between Apple microcom-
puters and any other computer 
ponding input of the modem. Figure 13 shows the 
communications board designed for the Apple 
microcomputer. 
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initiate an interchange of secret information with user 2. he 
firsi extracts the public matrix C , of user 2. Then he computes 
C^' (mod p) 
User 2 obtains the public key C , of user 1 and computes 
(modp) 
It can be seen thai this process yields the common key K , 2 , 
where 
/C,2 = K j , = Cr(mod p) = CV(mod p) 
= /l"'-(mod p) 
This can be used in the connection protocol of a D E S based 
system to establish the session key. With the DifTie-Hellman 
system the maximum number of secret keys possible Is limited 
to /? — 1, whereas with this extended system it depends on the 
order of the base matrix: the larger the value of r. the greater 
the number of users that the system can support. Again the 
security of this system is dependent on the difficulty of com-
puting logarithms over GF(p). 
P U B L I C K E Y D I S T R I B U T I O N IN M A T R I X 
R I N G S 
Indexing terms: Codes. Public key systems 
An-extension of the Diffle-Hellman public key distribution 
system to matrix rings is described. Using rings of non-
singular matrices over Z/pZ and upper triangular matrices 
with invertibic elements along the diagonal over Z/pZ. it is 
shown that the number of possible secret keys is much 
greater for a given prime p compared to the original system. 
An outline of a method to construct the base matrix used in 
the system is given. 
Introduction: Diffie and Heilman* first proposed the idea of 
public key distribution in which two parties exchanging only 
public information over an insecure channel could establish a 
secret key for use in a convenuonal cryptosystem such as the 
data encryption standard.- They proposed a system based on 
the exponential function / : . x — o v e r CF{p), where p is a 
very large prime and a is a primitive element in GF(p). The 
security of this system depends on the difficulty of computing 
logarithms over GF(p). Pohlig and Hellman^ investigated an 
algorithm for computing logarithms over GF(p) and proved it 
to be efficient when p — 1 consists of small prime factors only, 
but computationally infeasible when p - 1 contains at least 
one large prime factor. 
Here we investigate an extension of the exponentiation 
system to matrix rings. 
Extended exponentiation system: The group formed by only 
the nonsingular matrices of order n, M„, is considered as the 
ring of all n X n matrices over a finite field containing nilpo-
teni elements when n > I. 
To form a public key distribution system, it is required to 
choose an element A e M„iZ/pZ), where p is a very large 
prime such that 
A' = I (mod p) 
where r is the order o( A. the base matrix. 
The base matrix A, the prime p and the order r are to be 
made public. Each user chooses a random number Xf less than 
r and generates a public matrix C^. where 
C, = A'- (mod p) 
Two users can arrive at the same key in the same way as in 
the Diffie-Hellman system. For instance, if user I wishes to 
Design of base matrix A: The system designer needs to con-
struct a matrix A in M„{F^) and determine the order r. One 
method of construction of A with a given order is outlined 
below. 
Consider an irreducible polynomial f { x ) of degree m for 
which is a root (/. e F J : 
Qi e F. 
Regarding as an m-dimensional vector space over F with 
basis { I , K ... A " ' ' ! - 'et T represent the following linear 
transformation on F , : 
T : .X — » A .r 
Under 7, 
A - ' - . - a ^ . A ' - ' . . . - a o 
Hence the matrix representation of the linear transformation 
T relative to the basis { I . /. A"*"'} is given by the com-
panion matrix: 
0 0 
1 0 
0 I - - o 
'0/ 
Linear independence of /, T, 7* . . . T " " ' implies that /. B. 
. . . B""'' are linearly independent. Since /(.x) = 0. we have 
/ ( B ) = 0. But /(.x) and degree m and so the linear indepen-
dence implies that/(.x) is the minimum function of B. 
Hence the order of the matrix B is equal top" - I . and 
/ (mod p) 
Thus the system designer can choose irreducible polynomials 
of degrees mj, . . . m, over GF(p) and form the composite 
matrix B as shown below: 
B , 
\ • 
where the order of B , is equal to p"" — 1 for 1 < / < m .^ The 
order of the matrix B is then given by the expression 
'cJ(p"" - I). iP""- 1) CP"' - 1)} 
The matrix A to be used in the public key distribution system 
can then be obtained by conjugating B with an arbitrary 
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mairix Y belonging to M„{F ): 
YBY 
The order of /i is ihc same as that of B and ihey are of 
dimension n, where n is given by 
The outlined method has been implemenied on the prime 
computer system and an example is given. 
On the other hand, if we choose ihe base matrix A from the 
ring of upper triangular matrices over Z/pZ, where p is a 
prime, then the maximum order of such a matrix is equal to 
(p — \)p, which can be obtained by having nonzero elements 
along the main super diagonal. This can be shown as follows. 
Partitioning A into a diagonal matrix D and an upper tri-
angular nilpoient matrix U, i.e. A — U D, then we see that 
D . U, U . D and are also upper triangular nilpoteni. Then, 
inductively, if 
we have 
A"' = M + (/)(/)'+ i/,) 
nilpotent upper 
triangular 
= Z)'*' + 
Hence A^"^ - A'''' = / + U^, where 4> is the Euler function, 
and (/ -i- U^Y s / for some /. 
If p is assumed to be greater than n - I, we have t = 1. 
Thus the order of is (p — \)p. 
Example: Let p = 5. L e i = + .x + l . / , (x) is irreducible 
over Z/5Z. The matrix is therefore given by 
and 
/ (mod 5) 
Let /iCx) = .x^  + + .X + 2. /jf.x) is irreducible over Z / 5 Z . 
Hence the mairix 5 , is given by 
5 , = 
1 0 / O 1 0 \ 
0 1 = 0 0 1 
1 - 3 / \ 3 4 2 
(mod 5) 
and 
/ O I 0 \ 
0 0 1 
\ 3 4 2 
= I (mod 5) 
Now we need to choose }'and Y~ ' such that 
~B, O" 
0 B. 
Let X be an arbiiary nonsingular matri.x given below; 
2 3 1 0 1 
1 2 2 3 1 
1 0 3 2 4 
1 2 1 4 3 
2 4 0 1 1 
(The determinant of K is 4 (mod 5) and hence x is non-
singular.) The inverse of Y is given by 
0 2 1 3 0 
0 1 2 2 0 
3 3 1 4 3 
2 2 4 2 4 
3 0 1 4 2 
and hence 
A = 
0 2 0 4 
1 1 3 I 
4 0 0 3 
3 3 2 4 
1 2 4 1 
The order of A is equal to 
/ . „ ; ( 5 ^ - l ) ( 5 ' - i n = 744 
and 
A''^* = / (mod 5) 
Hence the key space is 2 ^ .x ^ 743. where A' = C (mod 5). 
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Extension of RSA Cryptosystem to Matrix Rings 
Abstract 
A g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of the RSA cryptosystem i n the r i n g of matrices 
over Z/mZ i s presented. I t i s shown that f a c t o r i z a t i o n of the modulus 
m i s needed to compute the exponent of the group formed by e i t h e r non-
singular matrix messages or upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices including 
diagonal elements thus o f f e r i n g the same l e v e l of s e c u r i t y as the RSA 
system. The l a t t e r method employing the t r i a n g u l a r matrices as messages 
seems to be more p r a c t i c a l than the use of a r b i t r a r y non-singular matrix 
messages. The scheme i s as s u i t a b l e for p r i v a c y and authentication as 
i t s predececessor. 
1. Introduction 
Assume R i s a f i n i t e r i n g with unity which i s a s s o c i a t i v e but not 
n e c e s s a r i l y commutative. Suppose that members of the r i n g R are used 
as messages and that reR i s enciphered as r ^ where e i s the published 
encrypting exponent. The trapdoor property can be stated as follows:-
There e x i s t s some integer n>0 such that r ^ ^ ^ = r for a l l reR. 
These rings are to be r e f e r r e d to as trapdoor r i n g s . For instance, i n 
Z/pZ, r ^ = r for a l l reR. More generally, i f we l e t R = = GF(q), the 
f i e l d of q elements where q i s a prime power (p^) , then r*l = r for a l l 
reR. Further i f R and S are any two such trapdoor r i n g s , then the 
d i r e c t sum (or product) R © S c o n s i s t i n g of v e c t o r s ( r , s ) with reR and 
seS i s another trapdoor rin g say T, The number of elements i n the r i n g 
T i s equal to the product of the number of elements i n R and S. This 
above procedure can be applied repeatedly taking vectors of a r b i t r a r i l y 
many components each taken from some f i n i t e f i e l d . Considering f i n i t e 
f i e l d s Fq. for l ^ i ^ j , where q^'s can be the same or d i f f e r e n t , the trap-
door rin g R i s formed by a l l vectors x = (x,, x . ) , where x.eF 
for l ^ : i ^ j . The ring R c o n s i s t s of q-j^ q2 <lj elements and the 
equality r^+i = r i s obeyed for a l l reR, where n i s equal to ( q ^ - i ) 
(q2-l) ... or any multiple of i t . 
There are many f i n i t e rings which are not trapdoor r i n g s . Consider 
2 2 3 for instance, R = Z/p Z where p i s a prime. Then p s p s .,. = 0 i n the 
ring R but p / 0 i n the ring R. So the property that p'^'*'^  s p i s not 
s a t i s f i e d for any n>0. More generally, f o r a r i n g R to be a trapdoor r i n g . 
i t i s necessary that R have no ni l p o t e n t elements except zero. However, 
i f we take an integer m to be a square free p o s i t i v e integer say 
m = ... Pj where a l l p^'s are d i s t i n c t primes, then the r i n g 
R = Z/mZ i s a trapdoor r i n g . This r i n g can i n f a c t be regarded as a 
d i r e c t sum of Fp^ © Fp.^ © . .. © Fp. as described above. I f j = 2, 
then t h i s becomes the standard trapdoor rin g used by the RSA 
cryptosystem[l]. This i s a consequence of theorems of Wedderburn [2] on 
f i n i t e semisimple rings and skew f i e l d s . 
The o r i g i n a l RSA scheme derived i t s message space from the ring 
of integers modulo m, Z/mZ, where m i s the product of two l a r g e d i s t i n c t 
primes p and q. Here we i n v e s t i g a t e other f i n i t e systems that might 
serve as a b a s i s for an extended RSA cryptosystem. E s s e n t i a l background 
material i n group and rin g theory can be found inj^S] . 
2. Matrices over Z/mZ 
I f the ri n g of a l l n x n matrices over the r i n g Z/mZ i s considered, 
i t i s seen that the ring contains nilpotent elements when n>l. To 
overcome t h i s problem, i n i t i a l l y only the group Mn formed by the non-
singular matrices of order n, i s s e l e c t e d to form the message space of 
this extended system. But the use of such a r b i t r a r y non-singular 
matrices as messages poses further problems as the sender has no c o n t r o l 
over the matrix elements but must accept what the p l a i n t e x t d i c t a t e s . 
That i s , the sender cannot always ensure that h i s messages w i l l form 
non-singular matrices over Z/mZ. However^, to begin.with, the use of non-
singular matrices as a possible message space i s i n v e s t i g a t e d i n our 
matrix based RSA system-. 
Let us f i r s t consider the f i n i t e group formed by matrices of order 
n whose determinants are r e l a t i v e l y prime to p and whose elements are 
i n Z/pZ (p prime). The order of the group formed by these elements 
can e a s i l y be shown [ A ] to be equal to Np where 
Np = ( p " - l ) (p"-p) . . . (p°-p"-b (1) 
I f such non-singular matrices with elements over Z/pZ are used as 
messages then one can form a conventional cryptographic system where the 
secret key contains the modulus p i t s e l f . The encrypting (e) and 
decrypting (d) exponents can then be determined using 
ed = 1 (mod Np) (2) 
The encrypting key i s therefore (e, p, n) and the decrypting key i s 
(d,p,n). None of these keys can be made public and the encryption and 
decryption procedures are as i n the RSA system. 
C = Me (mod p) 
and 
M = (mod p) 
(3) 
The above system can be modified to include the public key property 
as follows: Suppose the modulus used i n the system i s a composite 
number m whose f a c t o r i z a t i o n i s given by 
s 
m = [~ p / j (4) 
j = 1 
Then, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the order ^5-8^ of 
the m u l t i p l i c a t i v e group formed by non-singular matrices of order n 
over Z/mZ i s given by 
s 
\ = 1 I Pj (5) 
where 
( r j - l ) n ^ 
Pj ( p % l ) ( P j - p j ) n ( P j - P - " ^ ) (6) 
Now as i n the RSA cryptosystem i f we take m to be the product of two 
d i s t i n c t primes p and q, then the expressions (5) and (6) s i m p l i f y to 
\ = Np-Nq (7) 
( p " - l ) ( p % ) (p%"-b(q"-l) ... (q"V) (8) 
Therefore for a message matrix ME^^ (Z/mZ) 
I (mod m) (9) 
and hence the coding exponents can be c a l c u l a t e d using 
ed = 1 (mod Njn) (10) 
The expression for the order N^^^  depends on the s t r u c t u r e of m, that i s , 
on i t s prime f a c t o r s . This can therefore be used to form a p u b l i c key 
cryptosystem whose s e c u r i t y i s the same as that of the RSA system. 
Although the order 1^ can be used i n finding e and d u s u a l l y the 
order i s a very large number. For instance, even for small primes such 
as p = 13 and q = 23, the order i s approximately 1.6 x 10^^ for 3 x 3 
non-singular matrices. Therefore, i t i s d e s i r a b l e to f i n d the exponent 
EXP of the group, i . e . , the l e a s t integer greater than zero such that 
M^ ^^  = I (mod m) (11) 
EXP i s a d i v i s o r of the order of the group. 
Let us f i r s t consider the exponent of the group formed by the non-
singular matrices over Z/pZ, M^(Z/pZ). 
Let the exponent be i such that 
= I for a l l A zl\^(Z/pZ) (12) 
Z Si Assume that p > n. A = 1 (mod p) implies that x -1 i s d i v i s i b l e by 
the minimum polynomial of A. As A ranges over the non-singular matrices 
of order n over Z/pZ, x -1 must be d i v i s i b l e by every monic i r r e d u c i b l e 
polynomial p(x) (^x) of degree 5 n i n Z/pZ, Every i r r e d u c i b l e polynomial 
p(x)(?ix) of degree u divides x^^ ^ T 1 . Thus x^-1 must be d i v i s i b l e by x ^ " ~ ^ - l 
But 
x^-1 = 0 (mod x^-1) (13) 
implies a b. 
Hence, 
1 = 0 (mod p " - l ) for Ku^n (14) 
Therefore, 
Jl = 0 (mod £cm{p-l, p " - l } ) c e r t a i n l y (1.5) 
Furthermore, the matrix A given by 
A = I + 
o 1 o • • - o 
• •• ;• o • 
o . . - o 
(16) 
s a t i s f i e s A^ = I ?t A (p>n) (17) 
That i s , A has order p and hence 
Hence the exponent of GL(n,p),p>n, i s given by 
p ^^ m { p-1, p^-1, p " - l } (18) 
Now for any AeMn(Z/pZ), using Jordan's Canonical form, there e x i s t s a 
non-singular matrix E such that 
E'^ A^E = 
«1 
• 
(19) 
Each block i s of the form 
1 
o i 
(20) 
i . e . X^I^ + for some upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t matrix 
where A^'s are non-zero i n ^'pr^ for some r^^n. 
I f the order of D i s k, -that i s , = I (mod p ) , then as D = E ^AE, 
t h i s gives 
(E-^AE)*' = (E-^AE) (E-^AE) ...^ ^^ "^ ^^  
= E-IA'^E 
Thus A = 1 (mod p) (21) 
Order of A = order of D = k = Jicm of orders of B^ 
I f N^ = 0, then order of B^ i s a d i v i s o r of p^^-1. 
Hence the order of A divides Jlcm {p-1, p " - l } 
Otherwise, B? = A?I^ w i l l have si 
A divides p ilcm {p-1, p " - l } 
. such an order and hence the order of 
A multiple of p i n the expression for the exponent ^ i s expected as 
the order given by (1) contains multiples of p. 
-Similarly, 
A^ = I (moA q) for a l l A i n M^(Z/qZ) 
where s = q Zcm {q-1, q^-1, q " - l } (22) 
Therefore exponent EXP of the group GL(n,m) where m = p.q i s given by 
EXP = Jlcm (p Jlcm {p-1, p^-1 }, q 5,cm {q-1, q " - l } ) (23) 
Now l e t us extend t h i s argument to non-square free modulus m. F i r s t 
consider a matrix A i n M^  (Z/^Z). Let 6 be the n a t u r a l homomorphism 2 from Z/p Z onto Z/pZ (p prime). From the above argument 
e(A)^'''^^ = I i n Mn(Z/pZ) (24) 
e ( i ) 
Therefore 
e(A^-I) 3 0 (mod p) where t = EXP 
This means that every entry i n A^-I i s some multiple of prime p and 
hence 
A*'-I = p B for some matrix B 
That i s , 
A^ = I + pB (25) . 
A^P = (I+pB) P 
Using the binomial theorem, 
A'" = I + (P)pB + (5) p V + .. 
= I (mod p) 
Therefore considering in general a matrix i n (Z/p Z) 
Mn- (Z/p^Z) — > (Z/pZ) 
e: ^ e(A) 
I f e(A) has order t, then A has order t or pt or p t or p^-^t 
I f 
m 
1=1 
(26) 
then 
EXP = 
where v 
and w^  
icm { v ^ , v^, . . V g } 
r i - 1 p. (w.) 
2 
p^ icm(p.-l, p. -1. p ^ M ) 
(27) 
(assuming p^ i s greater than n for a l l i . ) 
Again from (27), i t i s c l e a r l y seen that the exponent EXP depends 
upon the prime factor composition of m. 
From cryptography point of view, the use of such non-singular 
matrices may be considered i m p r a c t i c a l as the sender has no control over 
the elements i n the message matrix. The sender i s faced with the problem 
of determining whether a p l a i n t e x t message matrix i s non-singular or not 
i f i t i s si n g u l a r , he cannot encrypt that p a r t i c u l a r message. This i s 
not acceptable for cryptographic a p p l i c a t i o n . However, the proportion 
of non-singular matrices over Z/mZ, where for instance m = pq and p and 
q are large d i s t r i c t primes, i s very much close to 1. 
One common approach to o b t a i n an a r b i t r a r y n o n - s i n g u l a r m a t r i x over 
the r e a l s i s to have the d i a g o n a l e n t r i e s of the m a t r i x message much 
b i g g e r than the c o r r e s p o n d i n g e n t r i e s i n the row and the column. But 
t h i s d i a g o n a l dominance does not a l w a y s e n s u r e t h a t the m a t r i x w i l l be 
n o n - s i n g u l a r when working over f i n i t e r i n g s . F o r i n s t a n c e , c o n s i d e r the 
m a t r i x A g i v e n below which i s ' d i a g o n a l l y dominant*. 
p-1 A 
1 p - J («^ o<^  P) ( 2 8 ) 
2 
Det A = p - 2p = 0 (mod p ) . Hence d i a g o n a l dominance i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e 
o v e r f i n i t e r i n g s . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , l e t us now c o n s i d e r the s e t of upper t r i a n g u l a r 
m a t r i c e s as a p o s s i b l e c h o i c e of our message s p a c e . I f the d i a g o n a l 
e n t r i e s a r e made u n i t y , t h i s e n s u r e s t h a t t he m a t r i x i s i n v e r t i b l e a s 
the d e t e r m i n a n t i s r e l a t i v e l y prime to the modulus m. 
L e t M r e p r e s e n t such an upper t r i a n g u l a r message m a t r i x . We can 
p a r t i t i o n the m a t r i x M i n t o I+N where N i s a n i l p o t e n t m a t r i x and I i s 
the i d e n t i t y m a t r i x . I f M i s i n U^(Z/pZ) then ( I + N ) ^ = I a s = 0 
assuming p ^n-1. The o r d e r of- the group formed by t h e s e upper t r i a n g u l a r 
^ . n ( n - l ) / 2 ^ , n ( n - l ) / 2 , . m a t r i c e s i f p . The o r d e r becomes m when c o n s i d e r i n g 
m a t r i c e s over Z/tnZ. Here we s e e t h a t the o r d e r of the group depends 
o n l y on m and not on the f a c t o r i z a t i o n of-m. Hence t h i s i s not s u i t a b l e 
f o r a p u b l i c key system. 
On the o t h e r hand, i f we a l t e r the message space to c o n t a i n upper 
t r i a n g u l a r m a t r i c e s w i t h d i a g o n a l e n t r i e s prime to m, then such messages 
are i n v e r t i b l e modulo m. T h i s i s not a s e r i o u s problem as i n p r a c t i c e m 
i s a product of l a r g e primes and the d i a g o n a l elements c a n be chosen to 
be r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l e r i n t e g e r s . Now the o r d e r of the group formed by such 
m a t r i c e s i s determined as f o l l o w s : 
C o n s i d e r i n g a nxn m a t r i x , i t i s r e q u i r e d t h a t a l l t h e n d i a g o n a l 
e n t r i e s must be coprime to m. The number of i n t e g e r s l e s s than m and 
coprime to m i s g i v e n by the Euler t o t i e n t f u n c t i o n 0(m) . 
The remaining J n ( n - l ) s u p e r d i a g o n a l e n t r i e s of the m a t r i x may take 
any v a l u e modulo m. T h e r e f o r e the o r d e r i s e q u a l to m"^^ ^^^^0(m)^ 
The v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and the one c a l c u l a t e d above i s t h a t 
now the order of the group i s dependent on the prime f a c t o r s of m. 
Hence the modulus m needs to be f a c t o r i z e d b e f o r e the d e c r y p t i o n 
exponent d can be c a l c u l a t e d using ed = 1 mod (o r d e r ) . As for the set 
of non-singular matrices, one can determine the exponent of the group formed 
by these upper tria n g u l a r matrices with diagonal e n t r i e s prime to m. The 
exponent can be used instead of the order i n finding e and d. 
F i r s t consider a square f r e e modulus m. Let 
_ s 
m = 1 I (29) 
Let us f i r s t consider a message M i n Z/pZ whose diagonal elements are 
r e l a t i v e l y prime to p. 
M = I O'-C P C,^) "^ere (d..,p ) = 1 (30) 
for a l l i , l ^ i ^ n 
P a r t i t i o n i n g M into a diagonal matrix D and an upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t 
2 
matrix U, that i s , M = D+U, then i t i s seen that D-U, U-D and U are a l s o 
upper t r i a n g u l a r n i l p o t e n t . Then i n d u c t i v e l y , 
i f = + Ur (31) 
we have M'^ ' * '^ = (D+U) ( D ' ^ + U ) 
= D ^ " ^ ^ + U.D^ + D.Ur + U.U^ ( \ 
V 
nilpotent upper t r i a n g u l a r 
M ' ^ ' " ^ = D'^''^ + Ur+1 (32) 
Hence 
M<^ (P> = I + (mod p) (33) 
and 
P = T ^ IlP ( I + U^)^ 3 I + (mod p) 
r ' = ^ ^ "S' ( I + U.)P = I + uP" (mod p) 
etc 
Thus 
M*- = 1 (mod p) for some t 
I f p 5 n-1, then t = 1 
(34) 
Therefore, the exponent of the group formed by upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices 
Cwith i n v e r t i b l e elements along the diagonal) over Z/pZ i s equal to 
0Cp). P 
Now i f s 
m = I T Pi (35) 
then the exponent divides 
Icm {0(pi)p^, 0(P2)P2. . 0<Pj)Pj} (36) 
(Note that i f the diagonal e n t r i e s are unity then the exponent i s equal 
to m or 2m, i f m i s even or odd r e s p e c t i v e l y . ) 
Let us now consider a non-square free modulus m given by 
_s 
m 
j = l J 
(37) 
F i r s t consider an nxn upper t r i a n g u l a r non-singular matrix M over 
Z/p^ Z, (p > n ) . Again l e t M - D + U where D i s a diagonal matrix and U 
i s an upper tria n g u l a r nilpotent matrix over Z/p^Z, Following the 
argument given above, i t i s seen that 
j0(p'^) = I + (mod p'^ ) (38) M' 
where i s some upper t r i a n g u l a r nilpotent matrix. 
Hence 
( I + = I + p U^^ (mod p'^ ) 
P^0i^^ = I + U^ j,^  (mod p'') 
(.1 + p - CI + U^j)P =1 + p"" = 1 (mod p'') 
Therefore M^ ^^  = I (mod p^) (39) 
Hence the exponent of the group formed by upper t r i a n g u l a r non-singular 
matrices over Z/mZ, where m i s given by (37), divides 
Zcm { 0 ( p ^ ^ l ) p ^ ^ l . 0CP2''2)P2''2, 0 ( p / ^ ) p / ^ } (40) 
3. System Design and Operation 
The designer randomly chooses large primes p^ to p^ f o r some s ^2 
following the guidelines suggested i n l") and forms t h e i r product m. 
The primes need not be n e c e s s a r i l y d i s t i n c t . As i n the case of the RSA 
system, these primes are kept s e c r e t . As the upper t r i a n g u l a r non-
s i n g u l a r matrix messages can be s e l e c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y a p u b l i c key 
cryptosystem using such a message space has been implemented. The coding 
exponents e and d are determined using 
ed = 1 (mod EXP) (41) 
where EXP can be equal to (40). 
The public encryption key i s given by (e,m,n) and the s e c r e t 
decryption key i s (d,m,n) where n denotes the dimension of matrix messages 
The message i s divided into blocks of integers l e s s than the modulus 
m and a sequence of nxn upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices i s constructed by 
arranging the integers i n order as they occur, l e f t to r i g h t and top to 
bottom. The encryption procedure c o n s i s t s of r a i s i n g each of these 
upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices to the power e. This has been implemented 
using the w e l l known square and multiply technique p]. The ciphertext 
produced c o n s i s t s of a sequence of nxn upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices over 
Z/mZ. Each of these matrices i s transmitted to the r e c e i v e r by sending 
the n(n+l)/2 ciphertext matrix elements (excluding the lower t r i a n g u l a r 
zeroes) i n order as they occur i n the matrix, l e f t to r i g h t , top to 
bottom, with a space separating the elements. The r e c e i v e r recovers the 
o r i g i n a l message by f i r s t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the sequence of nxn upper 
tr i a n g u l a r cipher matrices and then r a i s i n g them to the power d modulo m. 
Such an extended RSA matrix system using upper t r i a n g u l a r message 
matrices has been simulated on the Prime computer. An example showing 
the various parameters i s given i n Figure 1. 
4. Discussion 
One can see that the RSA system can be extended to matrix messages 
provided the message space i s r e s t r i c t e d to avoid nilpotent elements. In 
t h i s paper, the group of non-singular matrices over Z/mZ and the group of 
upper t r i a n g u l a r matrices with diagonal elements coprime to m over Z/mZ 
have been i n v e s t i g a t e d . I n both these cases, f a c t o r i z a t i o n of the modulus 
m into primes i s required to compute the exponent thus providing the same 
l e v e l of s e c u r i t y as the RSA system. But the f i r s t case, employing 
arbitrary non-singular matrices as the message space does not seem to be 
s u i t a b l e for a p r a c t i c a l cryptosystem as i t i s not p o s s i b l e to r e s t r i c t 
arbitrary p l a i n t e x t matrices to be non-singular. On the other hand, i n the 
second case employing upper t r i a n g u l a r non-singular m a t r i c e s , i t appears 
that the messages can be s e l e c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y i n p r a c t i c e . The exponent of 
the group formed by such upper t r i a n g u l a r nxn matrices over Z/mZ divides 
ficm (0(p^'^^)p^^^, .... 0(Pg'^s)p^rs) „here m = P j ^ j w i t h p ^  > n for 
a l l U j $ s . 
Further two points are worth mentioning regarding t h i s extended 
matrix system. F i r s t l y , i t i s seen that non-square f r e e modulus can be 
used which i s not possible with the RSA system. Secondly, the use of a 
matrix as a message may allow large amounts of data to be processed 
within one encryption/decruption c y c l e . Whether t h i s i s an advantage 
depends upon the ease with which matrix manipulations can be c a r r i e d 
out. Computational savings can be achieved i f transform techniques are 
used to reduce the number of s c a l a r m u l t i p l i c a t i o n s involved i n a matrix 
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n . 
Example 
Let the modulus m = p.q = 41.29 = 1189 
Exponent of the group formed by 3x3 upper t r i a n g u l a r non-singular 
matrices over Z/1189Z, divides 
Hem {40.41, 28.29} = 332920 
Choosing the encrypting exponent, e = 1317, the decrypting exponent d 
can be c a l c u l a t e d using E u c l i d ' s algorithm and i s equal to 117293, That 
i s , 
1317 . 117293 = 1 (mod 332920) 
Let us assume that the p l a i n t e x t message to be encrypted i s 232677205141 
In t h i s example, the message i s divided into 2-digit blocks of integers 
l e s s than m. S t a r t i n g from r i g h t to l e f t as 
(23 26 77 20 51 41) 
The upper t r i a n g u l a r p l a i n t e x t message matrices become 
90 23 26 
0 50 77 
0 0 48 
and P. 
31 20 51 
0 215 41 
0 0 289 
where the diagonal elements are a r b i t r a r i l y chosen to be r e l a t i v e l y prime 
to 1189. 
The ciphertext message matrices are then given by 
1317 
90 23 
• 
26 
0 50 77 
0 0 48 _ 
^31 20 51 ' 
^2 = 0 215 41 
0 0 289 
1317 
1105 458 1070 
0 50 251 
0 0 831 
(mod 1189) 
843 774 660 
0 592 41 (mod 1189) 
0 0 405 
These ciphertext matrices are transmitted to the r e c e i v e r as 
(1105 458 1070 50 251 831 843 774 660 592 41 405) 
The r e c e i v e r reconstructs the matrices and C2 and computes 
(modm) and (modm) to obtain and ?2 hence the p l a i n t e x t 
message. That i s . 
117293 
1105 458 1070 
0 50 251 
0 0 831 
90 23 26 
0 50 77 
0 0 48 
(mod 1189) 
843 774 660 
0 592 41 
117293 
L 0 0 405 
31 20 51 
0 215 41 (mod 1189) 
0 0 289 
Figure 1 
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^CRYPTION 
ITH the advent of e lectronic mai l , 
c t r o n i c f u n d s t r a n s f e r a n d the 
ir ibuted office, an increas ing amount of 
if idential data is being stored on d i s c 
j t ransmitted b e t w e e n termina ls a n d 
•nputers. 
The information may be f inancia l , 
lere a high degree of securi ty is required, 
it may cons is t of sensi t ive c o m m e r c i a l 
al ings, personnel records, legal d o c u -
jnts , e tc . . wh ich could c a u s e diff iculties 
prob lems if they fell into the w r o n g 
nds. 
It i s not too difficult to take a copy of a 
;c , or l isten in on te lephone l ines wi th 
3 ' c h e a p . yet sophist icated c o m m u n i c a -
in equipment presently avai lable and 
3n examine the information at o n e ' s 
sure . 
T h e relatively s imple precaut ions , if 
ly, employed in many data s y s t e m s 
ove a minor obstac le to the de te rmined 
t tack". The following d e s c r i b e s the 
leration of a unit w h e r e b y the A p p l e ter-
inal user c a n reduce this poss ib le 
curi ty problem to a m i n i m u m . 
Data encrypt ion moved out of the 
ilitary a n d polit ical s p h e r e s in 1 9 7 5 
hen an I B M encryption algori thm w a s 
r c e p t e d by the A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l 
j r e a u of S tandards as the encrypt ion 
e c h a n i s m for all federal non-mi l i tary 
3 p l i c a t i o n s . It is known as the Data 
ic rypt ion S t a n d a r d ( D E S ) a n d is likely to 
3 adopted as s u c h in this country. T h e 
ird s h o w n in the photograph oppos i te 
l i l ises this s tandard . 
T h e algori thm c h a n g e s the plain data 
ito an unintell igible cipher form under the 
Dntrol of a key; the change being to s u c h 
n extent that the transformation is 
® 
entirely different for e a c h key va lue . 
The a lgori thm, w h i c h h a s been m a d e 
public for a lmost 1 0 years now and h a s 
not yet been c r a c k e d , u s e s multiple 
modulo 2 addit ion, permutat ions and s u b -
Plain 
text 
Encryption 
Storage 
Cipher 
text 
1 
Key Transmit 
Storage 
\ 
Cipher 
text 
Receive 
Decryption Plain text 
T 
Key 
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Plain 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Key 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 <-
C i p h e r O 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Modu lo 2 
addit ion 
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 C ipher 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 K e y 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 Plain 
•igure i 
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st i tut ions to e n s u r e that the key or plain 
text c a n n o t b e d iscovered from the cipher 
text. 
T h e very s i m p l e modulo 2 example in 
F igure I s h o w s the difficulty of retrieving 
the original informat ion w h e n the " c a r r y s ' 
are lost u n l e s s the correct key i s avai lable . 
T h e s t a n d a r d u s e s a 5 6 bit key with 64. 
bit b l o c k s of plain text to p r o o u c e , after 16 
" r o u n d s " . 6 4 bit c ipher b l o c k s of data 
giving a " k e y s p a c e " of 2^^ - or 1 0 ' * 
different k e y combinat ions . T h i s is an 
ext remely large number , a n d e n s u r e s that 
if e a c h key combina t ion w a s tried in turn 
by a fast c o m p u t e r it w o u l d take m a n y 
years before all w e r e covered . 
T h e key c a n frequently be c h a n g e d o r 
mult iple encrypt ion m a d e w i th different 
k e y s to m a x i m i s e secur i ty . T h i s alogri thm 
h a s recent ly b e c o m e avai lab le in large 
s c a l e in tegrated circuit form. 
T h e encrypt ion card c a n opera te in one 
of three m o d e s . 
O Point to point c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n 
Apple termina ls not conta in ing a host 
computer . 
O L o c a l s torage of encrypteo programs 
64 bits 
A 
Plain (8) 
t 
Key 
•0 
64 bits 
ENC 
Figure II 
(8) 
Una <8) J 
ENC 
8 bits = 1 character 
(8) T 
Key 
Plain (8) 
d data files on the Apple d isc s y s t e m . 
Communica t ion be tween an Apple ter-
inal and a host computer for s torage and 
trieval of encrypted information in its 
emory bank. T h e operation of these 
o d e s is control led by programs stored in 
O M on the c a r d , the a p p r o p r i a t e 
ogram being se lec ted by a C A L L c o m -
and after the card h a s been act ivated 
ilh a P O K E instruction. 
In the secure storage mode Applesof t 
• Integer Bas ic data is p a s s e d through 
le encrypt ion ch ip after it has been in-
iai ised with the c h o s e n key. cons is t ing of 
l y eight charac te r combinat ion , inc lud-
ig control charac ters , from the keyboard . 
The encrypted form is then s tored on a 
s c and can be ca ta logued in the normal 
lanner. 
If this c ipher text is later d o w n t o a d e d 
o m the d i s c and listed comple te rubbish 
rill result. Often the listing cont inues to 
i n b e c a u s e the end of l ine/fi le pointers 
re never r e a c h e d , or it is m a y b e m u c h 
horter in length than the original b e c a u s e 
l e control charac ters in the encryp ted 
}rm are not d isplayed. 
W h e n operat ing in the c o m m u n i c a t i o n 
l o d e s . a suitable m o d e m m u s t b e u s e d to 
onvert the digital c o d e s from the card 
Tto e q u i v a l e n t s p e e c h s i g n a l s for 
• a n s m i s s i o n . T h e card incorpora tes a 
ommunica t ion controller that a l lows full 
luplex. asynchronous t ransmiss ion at the 
X i T T s tandard rates to 9 .6 k b i t / s e c : the 
squired rate being se lected from the key-
loard. 
Different rates for t ransmiss ion and 
ecept ion allow a s y m m e t r i c duplex o p e r a -
ion, s u c h as is u s e d . o n the Prestel data 
lases and other v iewdata s y s t e m s . 
T h e D E S algorithm can be used in a 
lumber of w a y s to obtain the required 
ecuri ty but the method c h o s e n by the 
ard is a s t ream cipher feedback ar range-
nent as s h o w n in Figure II. 
In this c a s e the D E S is u s e d a s a 
)seudo random number generator , its 
By P.W. SANDERS 
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output being cont inuously exc lus ive O R -
ed (modulo 2 addition) wi th the plain text. 
T h e decrypt ion p r o c e s s opera tes in the 
s a m e manner - an identical p s e u d o 
random s t ream of bits being genera ted in 
s y n c h r o n i s m to retrieve the plain text after 
another exclusive OR operat ion. Th is 
method h a s a number of a d v a n t a g e s 
w h e n u s e d in the a b o v e app l ica t ions : 
• There is a cha in ing of the encrypt ion -
the output cipher text charac te r b e c o m e s 
d e p e n d e n t u p o n the p r e v i o u s e i g h t 
charac ters of c ipher and plain text, a s we l l 
a s the key, w h i c h r e m o v e s the prob lem of 
straight forward substi tut ion of c h a r a c t e r s 
to alter the m e s s a g e wi thout k n o w l e d g e 
of the key. 
• T h e s y s t e m h a s a se l f -synchron is ing 
property w h e n confronted wi th t r a n s m i s -
sion errors. A error within a c ipher text 
charac te r a f fec ts that charac te r and the 
fo l lowing e ight c h a r a c t e r s only o n d e c r y p -
tion, after w h i c h the s y s t e m automat ica l ly 
b e c o m e s r e s y n c h r o n i s e d . 
O T h e a r r a n g e m e n t is very f lexible, a l low-
ing a mixture of plain and encrypted 
c h a r a c t e r s under keyboard control . Wi th 
block c ipher , eight character b locks must 
a l w a y s be u s e d , necess i ta t ing " p a d d i n g " if 
l ess than eight encrypted c h a r a c t e r s are 
n e e d e d . W i t h this "byte" feedback a 
s i n g l e c h a r a c t e r c a n be e f f i c i e n t l y 
encrypted . 
A s t a n d - a l o n e unit h a s been deve loped 
for any c o m p u t e r that h a s the s a m e 
facil i t ies as the card , but being c o n n e c t e d 
b e t w e e n the R S 2 3 2 interface output of 
the c o m p u t e r and the cor respond ing input 
of the m o d e m , t t 
The encryption card 
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